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This project is funded by the European Union Projekat finansira Evropska Unija. EVALUATING THE SITE SAFETY REPORT Part 1 Ike van der Putte [email protected] Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Projekat realizuje Human Dynamics Konzorcijum. Overview.

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Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte@rps nl

This project is funded by the European Union

Projekat finansira Evropska Unija

EVALUATING THE SITE SAFETY REPORT Part 1Ike van der [email protected]

Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

Projekatrealizuje Human Dynamics Konzorcijum


Overview

Overview

  • Completeness, correctness and credibility check SR

  • Purpose and definitions in SR

  • Essential Elements of a SR


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

Complete, Correct andCredible.

• Under “complete” questions for evaluation will verify the presence of the required, essential information that a safety report should contain; and

• Under “correct” and “credible” will go questions that would be used to verify the ones in complete (to cross-check them).


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

• For every “no” checked, the Safety Report would not be acceptable,

and should be immediately returned to operator for additional work;

• For every “limited” checked, the Safety Report would still be acceptable,

but will need further clarification

It should be noted that some of the “complete” and “correct” questions might

need to be verified during on-site inspection.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

In Evaluating and assessment of Safety Reports

by the authorities keep the purpose of a SR in mind !


Purpose of a safety report

Purpose of a Safety Report

  • WHY? Safety reports are intended to demonstrate that:

  • a major accident prevention policy (MAPP) and a safety management

  • system (SMS) have been put into effect;

  • major-accident hazards are identified and necessary measures have been

  • taken to prevent such accidents and to limit their consequences for man

  • and the environment;

  • adequate safety & reliability have been incorporated into the design,

  • construction, operation and maintenance of any installation;

  • internal emergency plans have been drawn up, supplying information to

  • enable the external emergency plan to be drawn up;

  • information for land-use planning decisions has been given.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

HOW?:The safety report must include the following minimum data and

Information that are specified in more detail in Annex II of the

SevesoII Directive:

• Information on the MAPP and on the SMS

• Presentation of the environment of the establishment

• Description of the installation(s)

• Hazard identification, risk analysis and prevention methods

• Measures of protection and intervention to limit the consequences of an

accident


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

WHO?: The safety report must be submitted to the competent authority by

the operator.

It is up to the operator and within its responsibility to decide on the sufficiency

of competence of the people and organisations involved in the preparation

of the safety report.

Relevant organisations entrusted with such tasks must be named in

the safety report.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

  • WHEN? The safety report must be submitted:

  • - in case of a new establishment a reasonable period of time prior to the start of

  • construction or operation; and

  • without delay after a periodic or necessary review.

  • The safety report must be reviewed and, if necessary, updated:

  • - in a regular period, which is laid down in the respective regulations (min. 5 year) or

  • - at the initiative of the Operator or at the request of the Competent Authority, where

  • justified by new facts, new technical knowledge about safety or about hazard

  • assessment, or

  • - in case of a modification of a site, this means modification of the establishment, the

  • installation, the storage facility, the (chemical) process, the nature of dangerous

  • substance(s) or the quantity of dangerous substance(s). The decision whether these

  • modifications would have an impact on safety and, therefore, would require a review

  • of the safety report should be taken by using a systematic analysis such as for

  • instance a screening method or a rapid ranking tool


Sr definitions

SR Definitions

  • The safety report should demonstrate that necessary measures to prevent, controland limit the consequences of a possible major accident have been put in place and are fit for purpose.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

The safety report should demonstrate that necessary

measures to prevent, control and limit the

consequences of a possible major accident have

been put in place and are fit for purpose.

A. “Demonstrate”

For this specific purpose, “demonstrate” is intended in its meaning of: “justify”

or “argue the case” but not “provide an absolute proof”

The Competent Authoritieswilltake the information and conclusions in the

report largely as presented, using professional judgement more generally to

assess the credibility and logic of the conclusions reached in the report.

An extensive in-depth scrutiny or exhaustive examination is not

envisaged in most cases.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

The safety report should demonstrate that necessary

measures to prevent, control and limit the

consequences of a possible major accident have

been put in place and are fit for purpose.

• The operator shall expect professional judgment from the assessor of a

safety report and should base its demonstration on this assumption.

• The demonstration must be “convincing”. This means that the rationale

for deciding the completeness of hazard identification and the adequacy

of the measures employed should be supported and accompanied by all

assumptions made and conclusions drawn.

• The demonstration should provide evidence that the process was

systematic which means that it followed a fixed and pre-established scope.

• The extent to which the demonstration is performed should be

proportional to the associated risk.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

The safety report should demonstratethat necessary

measures to prevent, control and limit the

consequences of a possible major accident have

been put in place and are fit for purpose.

B. “NecessaryMeasures”

“Necessary measures” shall be taken in order to prevent, control and limit the

consequences of a possible major-accident.

• The efficiency and effectiveness of the measures should be

proportionate to the risk reduction target (i.e. higher risks require

higher risk reduction and, in turn, more stringent measures).

• The current state of technical knowledge should be followed. Validated

innovative technology might also be used. Relevant national safety

requirements must berespected.

• There should be a clear link between the adopted measures and the

accident scenarios for which they are designed).

• Inherent safety should be considered first, when feasible (i.e. hazards

should always be removed or reduced at source).


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

The safety report should demonstratethat necessary

measures to prevent, control and limit the

consequences of a possible major accident have

been put in place and are fit for purpose.

C. “Prevent, Control and Limit”

• Prevent: to reduce the likelihood of occurrence of the reference scenario

(example: automated system to prevent overfilling; sometimes “avoid

measures” are regarded to be a separate category as they refer to the total

avoidance of a scenario, e.g. in case of the burying of a vessel)

• Control: to reduce the extent of the dangerous phenomenon (example: gas

detection that reduces intervention time and may prevent major release);

• Limit: to reduce the extent of the consequences of a major accident (e.g.

through emergency response arrangements, bunding or firewalls).


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

The safety report should demonstratethat necessary

measures to prevent, control and limit the

consequences of a possible major accident have

been put in place and are fit for purpose.

D. “Major Accidents”

To qualify an accident as “major accident”, three criteria must be fulfilled:

• the accident must be initiated by an “uncontrolled development”;

• “one or more dangerous substances” listed in Annex I of the Directive must

beinvolved;

• the accident must lead to “serious danger” to human health, the environment,

or the property.

“seriousdanger”:

• potential life-threatening consequences to one human (on-site or off-site);

• potential health-threatening consequences and social disturbance involving

a number of humans;

• potential harmful consequences to the environment at a certain (larger) extent;

• potential severe damage to property (on-site or off-site).


Essential elements of a safety report

Essential Elements of a Safety Report


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A SAFETY REPORT

Note: Structure is according

to ANNEX II SEVESO II;

In practice structure of Safety reports

is not followed exactly


I mapp and sms

I. MAPP and SMS

Major Accident Prevention Policy (MAPP), is a “self-commitment” by the operator

of a Seveso type establishment to meet the requirements of Article 5.

(operator obligations)

A safety management system (SMS) is instead a set of activities that ensures

that hazards are effectively identified, understood and minimised to a

tolerable level. In this sense, it may be regarded as the transposition of the

general goals identified in the MAPP into specific objectives and procedures.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

MAPP and SMS should address the following issues:

1. organisationandpersonnel

2. identification and evaluation of major-accident hazards

3. operational control

4. management of change

5. planning foremergencies

6. monitoring performance

7. audit and review


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

In practice a SMS consists of a compilation of written principles, plans, formal

organisationcharts, responsibilitydescriptions, proceduralrecommendations,

instructions, data sets, etc. This does not mean that all of these documents do

not have to be available in case of inspections but with respect to the safety

report, most of them have the character of “underlying documents”.

For the purpose of a safety report, the description of the SMS is of a

summarising character and should address all the above seven subsets.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

The MAPP is embedded in the overall management system of the company and

sets the general goals for the SMS, the latter serving as

basis for the risk/hazard analysis (as far as it concerns major accident hazards).


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A SAFETY REPORT

Note: Structure is according

to ANNEX II SEVESO II;

In practice structure of Safety reports

is not followed exactly


Ii presentation of the environment of the establishment

II. Presentation of the Environment of theEstablishment

A. description of the site and its environment including the geographical

location, meteorological, geological, hydrographical conditions and, if

necessary, itshistory;

B. identification of installations and other activities of the establishment

which could present a major accident hazard;

C. description of areas where a major accident may occur.


Iia description of the site and its environment 1

IIA.Description of the site and its environment (1)

The safety report should contain an adequate description of the establishment

to enable the authorities to have a clear picture of its purpose, location,

activities, hazards, services and technical equipment

An introductory section should contain general information on the

establishment, i.e.:

• purpose of the establishment;

• mainactivitiesandproduction;

• history and development of the activities, including the status of

authorisations for operations already agreed and/or granted, when applicable;

• the number of persons working at the establishments (i.e. internal and

contractors’ personnel, specifying working times, possibility of visitors, etc.);

• general statements characterising the establishment with respect to its main

hazards as regards relevant substancesandprocesses.


Iia description of the site and its environment 2

IIA. Description of the site and its environment (2)

Location

The description of the location of the establishment should contain data on

topography and accessibility to the site at a sufficient degree of detail

( in line with the extent of the hazards and the vulnerability of the surroundings).

The description of the natural environment and the surroundings

should demonstrate that the natural environment and surrounding activities

have been sufficiently analyzed by the operator to identify both the hazards

that they pose to safe operation and the vulnerability of the area to the impact

of major accidents.


Iia description of the site and its environment 3

IIA.Description of the site and its environment (3)

Location/topography

The topographic maps submitted should be of an adequate scale and should

include the establishment as well as all development in the surrounding area

within the impact range of the accidents identified.

On such maps the land-use pattern (i.e. industry, agriculture, urban

settlements, environmentally sensitive locations, etc.), the location of the

most important buildings, infrastructure elements (i.e. hospitals, schools, other

industrial sites, motorway and railway networks, stations and marshalling

yards, airports, harbours, etc.) and access routes to and from the establishment

must beindicated.

The land-use pattern of the area surrounding the establishment may be

presented according to the specification of the official land-use plan of the

greater area.


Iia description of the site and its environment 4

IIA. Description of the site and its environment (4)

Location/natural environment

As the natural environment of an establishment may present potential hazard

sources and may influence the development and consequences of an accident,

data will be needed for the description of these relevant environmental

factors. In general, this type of data includes:

meteorological data (wind, thunderstorms, precipitation, stability classes,

temperature)

geological, hydrological and hydrographical site data (flooding likelyhood, seismic

data etc.

other site specific natural factors (water quality, sensitive ecosystems, protected

natural areas


Iia description of the site and its environment 5

IIA. Description of the site and its environment (5)

Location/layout of the establishment

The lay-out should adequately identify installations and other activities of the

establishment including:

• main storage facilities;

• processinstallations;

• location of relevant substances and their quantities;

• relevant equipment (including vessels and pipes);

• spacing of the installations and their main sections;

• utilities, services and internal infrastructure equipment

• location of key abatement systems;

• location of occupied buildings (with an indication of the numbers of persons

likelytobe present);

• other units if relevant for the safety report conclusions


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

IIB.Identification of installations and other activities of the establishment which could present a major accident hazard

The installations of an establishment to be submitted to risk analysis have to

be possibly selected through a screening method. The selection may follow the

use of index methods or threshold criteria for hazardous substances or other

suitablemethods.

The result of this screening process should be indicated in a separate form in

the safety report, e.g. a list of the installations and activities of concern or a

specific indication in the respective maps.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

Additional element SEVESO III,

Annex II Safety Report

(c) on the basis of available information, identification of neighbouring

establishments, as well as sites that fall outside the scope of this Directive,

areas and developments that could be the source of, or increase the risk or

consequences of a major accident and of domino effects;

IIC. Description of areas where a major

accident may occur

Issue is linked with II/A and IV/B and may be demonstrated together


Summary contents of safety report description of establishment and its environment

Summary: Contents of Safety Report - Description of establishment and its environment

  • Presentation of the Environment of Establishment (location, meteo data, hydrographical, vulnerable receptors etc : EIA)

  • Identification of Units of the establishment which could present a major accident hazard (Safety Critical Units)

  • Description of the Units (layout, activities, products, safety critical processes, source terms of major-accidents, LOC)

  • Outline of safety procedures in all stages, safety relevant systems and components, fire fighting

  • Dangerous substances ( Inventory of equipment, substance characteristics: SDS / CLP )

    References to : EIA, Emergency Plans, regional LUPlans

    Maps with Land Uses in the environment (the greater area that can be affected by the major accident consequences )

__________________________________________________________________________________

Ref. G. PAPADAKIS - SEVESO SERBIA 24th June 2013


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A SAFETY REPORT

Note: Structure is according

to ANNEX II SEVESO II;

In practice structure of Safety reports

is not followed exactly


Iii description of the installations screened out

III. Description of the InstallationS“screened out”

A. description of the main activities and products of the parts of the

establishment which are important from the point of view of safety and

sources of major-accident risks and conditions under which such a major

accident could happen, together with a description of proposed preventive

measures;

B. description of processes, in particular the operating methods;

C. description of dangeroussubstances


Iiia b hazardous installations and activities and processes

IIIA/B. Hazardous installations and activities and processes

Sufficient information should be provided in the safety report to permit the

competent authority to assess the adequacy of the controls in place or foreseen

in the hazardous installations identified through the screening process.

Reference can be made to other, more detailed documents available to the

authority on request and/or on-site (the “underlying documents” already

mentioned in the section about the SMS).


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

IIIA/B. Hazardous installations and activities

and processes(2)

Description:

The description of hazardous activities (processes/storage) and equipment

parts shall indicate the purpose and the basic features of the related operations

within the establishment which are important to safety and may be sources of

major risks. This should cover:

a) basic operations;

b) chemical reactions, physical and biological conversions and transformations;

c) on-site interim storage;

d) other storage related activities i.e. loading-unloading, transport including

pipe work, etc.;

e) discharge, retention, re-use and recycling or disposal of residues and wastes

including discharge and treatment of waste gases;

f) other process stages, especially treatment and processing operations.


Iiic dangerous substances

IIIC. Dangerous Substances

The safety report should give information on types and quantities of

dangerous substances to which the Directive applies at the establishment. The

substances can fall into any of the following categories:

• rawmaterials;

• intermediateproducts;

• finishedproducts;

• by-products, wastes and auxiliary products;

• products formed as a result of loss of control of chemical processes.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

IIIC. Dangerous Substances (2)

  • For the eligible dangerous substances, data to be provided should include:

  • type and origin of the substance (i.e. CAS Number, IUPAC Name

  • b) physical and chemical properties (i.e. characteristic temperatures and

  • pressures,

  • c) toxicological, flammability and explosive characteristics (i.e. toxicity,

  • persistence, irritant effects,

  • d) substance characteristics under loss of control of process or storage

  • conditions(e.g. information on possibletransformationinto new substanceswith other properties of toxicity, degradability, etc.)

  • e) others (e.g. corrosion characteristics in particular relating to the

  • containmentmaterial, etc.);

  • the latter two only when relevant for the safety report conclusions or

  • specificallyaddressedthere.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A SAFETY REPORT

Note: Structure is according

to ANNEX II SEVESO II;

In practice structure of Safety reports

is not followed exactly


Iv identification and accidental risks analysis and prevention methods

IV. Identification and Accidental Risks Analysisand Prevention Methods

A. detailed description of the possible major-accident scenarios and their

probability or the conditions under which they occur, including a summary

of the events that may play a role in triggering each of these scenarios, the

causes being internal or external to the installation;

B. assessment of the extent and severity of the consequences of identified

major accidents, including maps, images or, as appropriate, equivalent

descriptions, showing areas that are liable to be affected by those

accidents, subject to the provisions of Articles 13(4) and 20;

C. description of technical parameters and equipment used for the safety of

installations.


Risk assessment

Risk assessment

Risk analysis is teamwork

Ideally risk analysis should be done by bringing together experts with different backgrounds:

  • chemicals

  • human error

  • process equipment

    Risk assessment is a continuous process!


Risk assessment1

System definition

Hazard identification

Analysis of accident scenarios

Estimation of accident frequencies

Consequence analysis and modelling

Risk estimation

Risk Assessment

  • Scheme for qualitative and quantitative assessments

  • At all steps, risk reducing measures need to be considered


Risk analysis main steps

Risk Analysis

Hazard Identification

  • ”What if”

  • Checklists

  • HAZOP

  • Task analysis

  • Index (Dow, Mond)

Hazard & Scenario Analysis

Likelihood

Consequences

Risk

Risk Analysis – Main Steps


Hazard analysis hazard level and source term

HAZARD ANALYSIS: Hazard Level and Source Term

  • Selection of safety critical equipment / Units and identification of Source term : the possible amount of release estimated under realistic conditions (e.g. operat. pressure, release rates, release duration, area where the fuel can be accumulated , etc)

  • The F& E Index (DOW Index),

  • The (Sub)Selection Method of Major Accident Scenarios for QRA (Purple Book/TNO) based on the distance of critical equipment from vulnerable receptors,

  • Rapid ranking methods based on hazard indices and frequencies of past accident

  • The IAEA classification method for chemical hazards

  • HAZID method i.e. checklists, What-if, systematic methods as HAZOP, etc.

__________________________________________________________________________________

G. PAPADAKIS - SEVESO SERBIA 24th June 2013


Risk analysis main steps1

Risk Analysis

Hazard Identification

Hazard & Scenario Analysis

  • Fault tree analysis

  • Event tree analysis

  • Bowties

  • Barrier diagrams

  • Reliability data

  • Human reliability

  • Consequence models

Likelihood

Consequences

Risk

Risk Analysis – Main Steps


Bow tie

Initiating events

Major Events

Critical Event

IE

ME

IE

And

AE

IE

ME

IE

AE

OR

IE

IE

AE

OR

IE

CE

OR

IE

ME

IE

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And

ME

IE

IE

AE

OR

IE

ME

IE

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Event

Tree

Preventive

Barriers

Mitigative

Barriers

FaultTree

Bow-tie

SCENARIO


Risk analysis main steps2

Risk Analysis

Hazard Identification

Identify

Safety

Barriers

Hazard & Scenario Analysis

Likelihood

Consequences

Risk

Risk Analysis – Main Steps


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

Based on historical data and Guidelines for Process Equipment Reliability Data,

Centre for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) of the AIChE, 1989.

Ref. RPS/BKH/PM report REAP 2002


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

The main elements in any risk analysis process are as follows:

• hazard identification;

• accident scenario selection;

• scenarios’ likelihood assessment;

• scenarios’ consequence assessment;

• risk ranking;

• reliability and availability of safety systems

With regard to the hazard identification, a range of tools exists for systematic

assessments, which are selected depending on the complexity of the individual

case.

The identification of hazards is followed by designation of

reference accident scenarios which form the basis for determining whether

the safety measures in place or foreseen are appropriate.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

For the scenarios’ likelihood and consequence assessment,

which are essential steps in the risk analysis process,

quite different approaches can be followed.

These assessments make use of methodologies that are

generally subdivided into different categories, in particular:

• qualitative - (semi)quantitativeand

• deterministic - probabilistic.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

Qualitative/ (semi)Quantitative:

The likelihood of occurrence and the consequences of a major accident

scenario could be assessed either:

• in qualitative terms using ranges , for example highly likely to extremely

unlikely for likelihood, and very severe to negligible for consequences or

• in (semi) quantitative terms by providing numerical figures (e.g. occurrence

per year, number of fatalities per year).

In general, the choice of either a qualitative or quantitative approach is

strongly influenced by the specific safety culture philosophy within each

individual Member State.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

Deterministic/Probabilistic:

The distinction in this respect is more difficult to define. Although the

definitions are widely used in several engineering fields, these definitions

depend a lot on the specific application and there is not always coherent

understanding of them.

The deterministic approach is normally associated with consequence-based

decision criteria and it is also mostly related to the use of qualitative terms,

whereas the probabilistic approach relates more to quantitative elements and is

seen as a “risk-based” methodology.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

Deterministic/Probabilistic:

Note: Hybrid approach in some countries – Italy/France


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

A. Description of major-accident scenarios, initiating causes and the conditions under which they occur

A structured approach to scenario selection is a crucial step in the overall

analysis. The safety report should, therefore, outline the principles and

procedures followed (SMS) to determine the scenarios. In doing so, events

which are documented in accident databases, near-miss recording, safety alerts

and similar literature must be reviewed when drawing up the list of scenarios

and appropriate lessons learnt incorporated.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

A major-accident scenario for the purposes of the safety report

usually describes the form of the loss of containment specified

by its technical type e.g.:

• vesselrupture

• pipe rupture

• vesselleak, etc.

and the triggered event, namely:

• fire

• explosion

• release of hazardoussubstance(s)


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

The “bow-tie” diagram is can be used as one of the methods

to describe major-accident scenarios to include

underlyingcauses:

The centre of the diagram is the loss of containment event i.e. the “top event”.

The bow-tie left depicts the overall possible causes, which could lead to the

occurrence of the top event. The vertical bars refer to the measures that are put

in place to prevent the release of dangerous substances by including also

measures to control escalation factors.

The bow-tie right side describes the development of possible outcomes resulting

from the top event. The vertical bars in the bow-tie right side refer to the measures

to prevent that the top event could cause harm too the men, the environment and

the installations.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

MATTE

If potential release scenarios of a substance which could give rise to a

major-accident to the environment (MATTE) are identified during the hazard

identification process, further assessment of the risk to the environment must be

carried out

  • Examples of receptors which may be classified as having high damage potential include:

  • Rivers or aquifers used for public supply;

  • Ecologically sensitive areas;

  • Residential areas;

  • Land used for agricultural purposes;

  • High quality waters used for fishing;

  • Waters with aquatic ecosystems of particular value;

  • Waters used extensively for recreational purposes;

  • Rivers where water is abstracted for agricultural or horticultural purposes.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

The following non-exhaustive list provides the most relevant event types that

describe the consequences of the top event development (outcome):

• pool fire

• flash fire

• tank fire

• jet fire

• VCE (vapourcloudexplosion)

• toxiccloud

• BLEVE (boiling liquid expandingvapourexplosion)

• soil/air/water pollution

A point to note is that these events may occur in

• process units

• storage units

• pipe work

• loading/unloadingfacilities

• on-site transport of hazardous substances.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

The safety report must demonstrate

that, of these possible scenario elements, the relevant scenarios were chosen.

The selection may follow strategies such as:

• event likelihood

• consequences

• how comprehensive or representative the scenario is.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

It is necessary to consider the causes of the potential

accident; the most relevant of these are:

Operationalcauses(malfunctions, technicalfailures, ignition, kock-on effectsetc)

Internal causes may be related to fires, explosions or releases of dangerous

substances at installations within the establishment affecting other installations

leading to a disruption of normal operation (e.g. the fracture of a water pipe

leading to a disruption in the cooling capacity on site).

External causes (fire, explosions toxic release of neighboring plants –Domino

Effects; Natural hazards-NATECH; transportation and transport off site etc.

Plant security (intentional acts)

Other accident causes (related to design, construction and safety

Management)


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

  • NOTE SEVESO III ANNEX II – Safety Report

  • Identification and accidental risks analysis and prevention methods:

  • detailed description of the possible major-accident scenarios and

  • their probability or the conditions under which they occur including

  • a summary of the events which may play a role in triggering each

  • of these scenarios, the causes being internal or external to the installation;

  • including in particular:

  • (i) operationalcauses;

  • (ii) external causes, such as those related to domino effects, sites that fall outside

  • the scope of this Directive, areas and developments that could be the source of,

  • or increase the risk or consequences of a major accident;

  • (iii) natural causes, for example earthquakes or floods;


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

The “top event” and the related causes constitute what is often called the

“fault tree” or left-hand side of the “bow-tie”. In the picture below this is

shown in a schematic form:


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

Active/passive /mixed measures, including behaviour and hardware

The following picture shows the schematic role of measures in the fault tree


Preventive and mitigative barriers

Preventive and Mitigative barriers

Temperature control prevents the formation of toxic fumes

Containment reduces the exposure of workers to the toxic fumes


Bow tie1

Initiating events

Major Events

Critical Event

IE

ME

IE

And

AE

IE

ME

IE

AE

OR

IE

IE

AE

OR

IE

CE

OR

IE

ME

IE

AE

And

ME

IE

IE

AE

OR

IE

ME

IE

AE

OR

IE

ME

Event

Tree

Preventive

Barriers

Mitigative

Barriers

FaultTree

Bow-tie

SCENARIO


What are barriers

What are barriers?

  • Barriers can be passive

    • material barriers: container, dike, fence,

    • behavioural barriers: Keep away from, do not interfere with

  • Barriers can be active

    • Active barriers follow a sequence: ”Detect – Diagnose – Act”

    • Active barriers can consist of any combination of

      • Hardware

      • Software

      • Lifeware (human action, behaviour)


Examples of passive barriers

Examples of passive barriers

Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD): A value that indicates the probability of

a system failing to respond to a demand. The average probability of a system failing

to respond to a demand in a specified time interval is referred as PFDavg.


Examples of active barriers

Examples of active barriers

1IEC - International Electrotechnical Commission, develops electric, electronic and

electrotechnical international standards


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

PFD of each component of Safety Instrumented System (SIS)

need to include in Safety Integrity Level (SIL) calculation


Human response as a barrier

Human response as a barrier

  • Responses can be skill-, rule-, and/or knowledge based

    • Skill based: routine, highly practiced tasks and responses

      • I.e. steering a car

    • Rule based: responses covered by procedures and training

      • I.e. obeying traffic rules

    • Knowledge based: responses to novel situations

      • I.e. finding the way to a new destination

  • Skill- and rule based responses can be relatively fast and reliable, knowledge based responses are slow and not so reliable


The following are not barriers but functions of safety management

The following are NOT barriers, but functions of Safety Management :

  • Training and education.

    • provides the competence to respond properly

  • Procedures

    • paperwork is not a barrier, only the response itself

  • Maintenance and inspection

    • necessary to ensure functioning of primary barriers over time

  • Communications and instructions

they influence barrier reliability a lot!


Worst case scenarios wcs in the safety report

Worst Case Scenarios (WCS) in the Safety Report

The WCS s should be limited to a reasonable amount

The criteria for choosing the WCS in a SR are expected to be determined by the Competent Authority (assessing the SR)

Criteria for WCS can include and address

  • The most safety critical equipment

  • The most critical releases from equipment rupture (probabilistic or deterministic approach i.e. releases with a probability higher than a set value or releases with the maximum inventory and worst phenomenon involved

  • Catastrophic ruptures of equipment and FBR (full bore rupture) of pipes (smaller releases should be determined)

__________________________________________________________________________________

Ref. G. Papadakis SEVESO SERVIA June 2013


Example worst case scenarios selection via hazard identification 1

Example Worst Case Scenarios selectionvia Hazard Identification (1)

  • MAJOR-ACCIDENT HAZID:

    • Site breakdown into areas/processes

    • Major Hazards associated

      • fire/explosion

      • toxic release

      • large spill

    • Frequency and consequence allocation

    • Team based approach


Example worst case scenarios selection via hazard identification 2

Example Worst Case Scenarios selection via Hazard Identification (2)

Definitions of Frequency Categories

CategoryDefinition

High (H)Event has occurred or is expected to

occur several times during lifetime of site (20-30 years)

Intermediate (I)Event may occur once during lifetime of site

Low (L)Event is not expected to occur during lifetime of the site but may

occur once during operations of all existing similar sites

Remote (R)Event is unlikely to occur throughout all similar sites within

a 100 year period of operation at the current level


Example worst case scenarios selection via hazard identification 3

Example Worst Case Scenarios selection via Hazard Identification (3)

Definitions of Consequence Categories

CategoryDefinition

Catastrophic (C)Death, irreversible environmental damage or system loss

Severe (S)Severe injury, severe occupational illness,

long-term environmental damage or major system damage

Minor (M)Minor injury, minor occupational illness, short-term

environmental damage or minor system damage

Negligible (N)Negligible/no injuries, negligible/no occupational illness,

negligible/no environmental damage or

negligible/no system damage


Worst case scenarios selection via hazard identification 4

Worst Case Scenarios selection via Hazard Identification (4)

  • Aggregation - basis for risk assessment


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

Example Worst Case Scenarios

selection for

further evaluation (5)

Following the initial selection process, all category 1 (major-accident) hazards

Should be grouped by hazard type, e.g. toxic release or flammable release.

A representative worst case is selected from each hazard group for further evaluation.

The representative worst case is the category 1 hazard with the worst

consequence can be referred to as the worst credible case.

(normally used for consequence assessments and LUP)

Category 2 hazard with catastrophic consequences: This selected scenario

can be referred to as the worst possible case.

The high frequency/less significant consequence hazards represent

the worst probable casefor a site.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

B. Assessment of the extent and severity of the consequences of

identified major accidents

Within a safety report, the consequence assessment for people and environment

will be used for two different types of decision processes:

1. Consequence assessment to prevent major-accident hazards and

to mitigate accident consequences, or to evaluate the efficiency and

adequacy of the protective measures taken.

2. Consequence assessment forexternalemergency planning and land use

planning around establishments

For 1 mostly qualitative;

For 2 mostly modelling


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

Modelling the consequences of major accidents is based on several

inputs such as for instance:

• the physical and hazardous properties of the substances in question

(flammability, toxicology, etc.)

• emission potential (thermal radiation, overpressure)

• release characteristics (amount, phases, conditions, etc.) and

• weatherconditions.

The foundation of modelling of this type is again a specific set of reference

scenarios. In this case it is the right side of the “bow-tie” that serves as the

starting point. This part of the bow-tie is usually called the “event

tree”:


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

Hazard Endpointvalue

Toxic load ERPG - 2 or AEGL-2

Heat radiation 1.6 8 or 39 kW/m2

Explosion pressure 0.1 or 0.05 bar

For the purpose of safety report scenarios the

End points indicated may be used.

The Emergency Response Planning Guideline (ERPG) values are

intended to provide estimates of concentration ranges where one

reasonably might anticipate observing adverse effects as

described in the definitions for ERPG-1, ERPG-2, and ERPG-3 (= life threatening)

as a consequence of exposure up to 1 hr to the specific substance.

AEGL = Acute exposure guideline levels (1 – 3)


Consequence event tree for a flammable pressure liquefied gas instantaneous rupture

Consequence event tree for a flammable pressure-liquefied gas – instantaneous rupture


Example bleve

Example BLEVE


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

Results of this modelling exercise are expressed in terms of severity of

(potential) impact. For safety reports, potential impact is commonly defined in

terms of human health, although relative property or environmental damage

mayalsobepresented.

Two main approaches are used to measure severity of impact:

• the damageprobit curve (impact relatedto a probability that certain

damage (physiological or material) will occur)

• fixeddamagethresholds. (links specific impacts,

such as the onset of death or serious injury, to specific level and time of

exposure). Threshold levels for accidental airborne releases of toxic substances,

static or dynamic thermal radiation, and overpressure have been calculated by various

expert groups


Harmonised model netherlands safeti

Harmonised model Netherlands SAFETI

Dutch study revealed that different QRA software

packages often give very different results. Safeti has been selected

as the QRA model for the Netherlands

The risk tool SAFETI calculates the individual risk

(risk at specific location) and societal risk (risk to overall

population) of accidental releases of toxic or flammable

chemicals to the atmosphere. This calculation includes con-

sequence modelling (discharge and atmospheric dispersion,

toxic effects, flammable effects) and subsequent risk model-

ling.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

Individual risk contours around a hazardous establishment and the area affected by an individual accident scenario.

(ref Jongejan et al 2010)


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

The Dutch societal risk criterion for hazardous

establishments and a fictitious FN-curve.

The Dutch societal risk criterion of 10−3/n2 per

installation per year was initially developed for LPG-

fuelling stations. It was later applied to all Seveso

establishments.


Harmonised model netherlands safeti1

Harmonised model Netherlands SAFETI

STEL 35 ppm

IDLH 500 ppm

STEL = Short term exposure limit

IDLH = Immediate Dangerous to Life and Health


Harmonised model netherlands safeti2

Harmonised model Netherlands SAFETI

Source:QRA’s FOR DUTCH INSTALLATIONS

IChemE SYMPOSIUM SERIES NO. 153 2007


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

Ref. Robert Plarina Netherlands Ministry of Environment


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

__________________________________________________________________________________

Ref. G. Papadakis SEVESO SERVIA June 2013


Example of consequence zones criteria lpg

Example of Consequence Zones Criteria(LPG)

__________________________________________________________________________________

Ref G. Papadakis SEVESO SERVIA June 2013


Example of consequence zones criteria toxic cloud

Example of Consequence Zones Criteria(Toxic Cloud)

__________________________________________________________________________________

Ref. G. Papadakis SEVESO SERVIA June 2013


Risk management in europe

Risk management in Europe

  • “Generic distances” based on environmental impact in general (noise, smell, dust, etc.).

  • Consequence based (”deterministic” or ”Qualitative”)Safety distances are based on the extent of consequences (effects) of distinct accident scenarios (“worst case” or ”reference” scenarios).

  • Risk based (”probabilistic” or ”Quantitative”)Quantitative risk analysis (QRA) includes an analysis of all relevant accident scenarios with respect to consequences and likelihood (expected frequency), and results in calculated values of individualrisk and societal risk, which can be compared with acceptance criteria.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

NOTE SEVESO III ANNEX II – Safety Report

Identification and accidental risks analysis and prevention methods:

(c) review of past accidents and incidents with the same substances and processes

used, consideration of lessons learned from these, and explicit reference to specific

measures taken to prevent such accidents;


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

C. Description of technical parameters and equipment used for

the safety of installations

The safety report should discuss general criteria assumed (i.e. best available

technology, good engineering practice, quantitative risk criteria) and include reliability

of components, functional calculations, compliance declarations etc

Prevention, control and mitigation measures of a hazardous installation may

include:

• process control system including back ups;

• fire and explosion protection systems

vapour screens, emergency catch pots or collection vessels, and emergency

shut-of valves;

• alarm systems including gas detection;

• automatic shut down systems etc.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A SAFETY REPORT

Note: Structure is according

to ANNEX II SEVESO II;

In practice structure of Safety reports

is not followed exactly


V measures of protection and intervention to limit the consequences of an accident

V. Measures of Protection and Intervention to Limit the Consequences of an Accident

A. description of the equipment installed in the plant to limit the consequences

of major accidents;

B. organization of alert and intervention;

C. description of resources that can be mobilised, internal or external;

D. summary of elements described in a, B, and C above necessary for drawing

up the internal emergency plan prepared in compliance with Article 11.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

The safety report should also clearly include information which identifies any

key mitigation measures resulting from the analysis that are necessary to limit

the consequences of major accidents, as referred to in Annex II, part V of the

Directive, namely:

• description of the equipment installed in the plant to limit the consequences

of major accidents;

• organisation of alert and intervention;

• description of resources that can be mobilised, internal or external;

• summary of elements described above necessary for drawing up the internal

emergency plan.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

A. Description of equipment

A description of equipment installed in the plant to limit the consequences of

major accidents should be provided. This list should include an adequate

description of the circumstances under which the equipment is intended for use.

  • NOTE SEVESO III ANNEX II – Safety Report

  • description of the equipment installed in the plant to limit

  • the consequences of major accidents for human health

  • and environment, including for example

  • detection/protection systems, technical devices

  • for limiting the size of accidental releases, including water

  • spray; vapour screens; emergency

  • catch pots or collection vessels; shut-off- valves;

  • inerting systems; fire water retention;


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

B. Organisation of alert and intervention

The organisation for alert and intervention should be adequately described.

Thisdescriptionshouldinclude:

• organisation, responsibilities, and procedures for emergency response;

• training and information for personnel and emergency response crews;

• activation of warnings and alarms for site personnel, external authorities,

neighbouring installations, and where necessary for the public;

• identification of installations which need protection or rescue interventions;

• identification of rescue & escape routes, emergency refuges, sheltered

buildings, and control centres;

• provision for shut-off of processes, utilities and plants with the potential to

aggravate the consequences.


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

C. Description of resources that can be mobilised

The report should contain an adequate description of all relevant resources

which will need to be mobilised in the event of a major accident. This report

shouldinclude:

• activation of external emergency response and co-ordination with internal

response;

• mutual aid agreements with neighbouring operators and mobilisation of

external resources;

• resources available on-site or by agreement (i.e. technical, organizational,

informational, first aid, specialized medical services, etc.).

NOTE SEVESO III ANNEX II – Safety Report

(d) description of any technical and non-technical measures relevant

for the reduction of the impact of a major accident


Evaluating the site safety report part 1 ike van der putte ike van der putte rps nl

  • References

  • Guidelines on a Major Accident Prevention Policy

  • and Safety Management System,as required by Council Directive

  • 96/82/EC (SEVESO II). Neil Mitchison & Sam Porter (Eds.)

  • ISBN92-828-4664-4

  • Guidance on the preparation of a Safety Report to meet the requirements of

  • Directive 96/82/EC as amended by Directive 2003/105/EC (SEVESO II).

  • Luciano Fabbri, Michael Struckl and Maureen Wood (Eds.), 2005.

  • ISBN 92-79-01301-7

  • Planning for Emergencies Involving Dangerous Substances for Slovenia. Final Report.

  • Contract no: SL-0081.0011.01. 28 February 2012.

  • I.van der Putte: Regional Environment Accession Project (REAP). Nethconsult/BKH Consulting Engineers/RPS.

  • Subcontractors: AEA Technology, URS/Dames & Moore, EPCE, Project Management Group, REC Hungary


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