World War II: Causes of the War – Part 3

1. World War II: Causes of the War – Part 3

2. Policy of Appeasement – Neville Chamberlain • Believed he could trust Hitler and liked that he was trying to make Germany a better place • He didn’t like war (and the public was against it). His main focus was on the ills that had beset Britain’s industrial life, in particular unemployment • He had faith in the triumph of reason and believing himself to be fighting the good fight for peace, he was prepared to be patient, stubborn, and optimistic

3. British Foreign Policy • There were so many dictatorships in Europe that one could scarcely take issue with them all • Austria was regarded as fascist • Czechoslovakia was a random collection of nationalities under Czech domination • Poland was a military dictatorship, frequently anti-Semitic, and oppressive in its treatment of national minorities

4. British Foreign Policy • The discussion of whether fascism or communism was more dangerous to Britain was like determining the relative disagreeableness of mumps and measles • If Nazis and fascists were opposed to communism, then there was something to be said for them (until it became an obvious danger to British security) • At the last moment, the Labour Party awoke to the realization that the greatest danger lay not in armaments but in Britain’s lack of them

5. French Foreign Policy • Policy of armaments was hard to pursue in a country devoted to peace • Search for allies was hampered at almost every turn by ideological sympathies and antipathies of the French • Their foreign policy between the wars was in principle based on a network of alliance with east European states – Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania • The hope was that these allies would help to protect France against Germany, but in practice it was more likely that France would have to protect them

6. Policy of Appeasement – Austrian Anschluss • In July 1934, Austrian Nazis broke into the Chancellery in Vienna, shot the Chancellor, Dollfuss, and proclaimed over the radio that he had resigned • Other members of the government rallied, and the assassins had to surrender • The Austrian army and police defeated risings in five of the nine provinces • The defeat of the rising showed that determined opposition, even in a small country, could check Nazi aggression

7. Policy of Appeasement – Austrian Anschluss • In 1936 and 1937, Mussolini diminished his support for Austria and stopped supplying arms to the Austrian army • In Apr. 1937, Mussolini told Schuschnigg that he could no longer undertake to defend Austria by force • The Austrian Chancellor announced a plebiscite whether the public wanted “a free and German, an independent and social, a Christian and united Austria” – everything pointed to a massive “yes” vote. The vote was to be taken on Mar. 13, 1938

8. Policy of Appeasement – Austrian Anschluss • Hitler had secret news of the plebiscite before it was announced in Austria • On Mar. 11, Hitler called for the plebiscite be postponed. Goering telephoned Vienna with the demand that Schuschnigg must resign and be replaced as Chancellor by Seyss-Inquart • This was resisted for a time, until Schuschnigg announced the resignation of his whole Cabinet except Seyss-Inquart • German forces entered Austria early on Mar. 12, in a seemingly friendly manner • Behind the army with its bands and flags there came the Gestapo. 10-20,000 arrests, ranging from Schuschnigg himself to Socialist Party members and Jews

9. Policy of Appeasement – Austrian Anschluss • France and Britain’s Reaction • Had long expected the Anschluss, which was thought to be inevitable and in principle right • In Britain in particular, there was a widespread belief that the enforced separation of Germany and Austria had been among the errors of Versailles • Austrians were in no real position to sacrifice themselves to awaken the rest of Europe

10. Policy of Appeasement – Sudeten Crisis/Czechoslovakia • The bulk of the German population lived in a horseshoe-shaped area along the frontiers with Germany and Austria • The main problem was that the Germans, who in 1919 had abruptly lost a position of predominance and became a subordinate minority, were discriminated against in education, jobs, and the distribution of public funds • German industrial areas tended to blame the government in Prague for their misfortunes, and by the growth of ideological conflict • A quasi-Nazi party in Czechoslovakia, called Heimatsfront, polled nearly 1.25 million votes in May 1935, more than any other party (the Nazi Party provided a large amount of funds)

12. Policy of Appeasement – Sudeten Crisis/Czechoslovakia • The government held that a democratic state could not entrust its administration to representatives of a totalitarian party • Konrad Henlein, the leader of the Nazi party in Czechoslovakia, demanded the removal of all discrimination against the German population • Early in 1937, Henlein began to demand autonomy for the German areas, which the government refused because any concessions made to the Germans would be demanded by the Slovaks, Magyars, and Poles, and would end in the disintegration of the state • The Anschluss in Austria sharpened the conflict

13. Policy of Appeasement – Sudeten Crisis/Czechoslovakia • On May 19-21, there were widespread rumors of German troop movements in areas to the north of the Czech border • Two Sudeten Germans were shot by a Czech officer, so on May 21 Ribbentrop told the British Ambassador in Berlin that there had been 100 German casualties in the Sudetenland, and that if such provocation continued the German people would intervene as one man • Germany had no intention of launching an attack, but the danger of war appeared to be real • Britain and France increased their pressure on the Czechs to make concessions

14. Policy of Appeasement – Sudeten Crisis/Czechoslovakia • Hitler proclaimed that he would “protect” the Sudeten Germans, who were unable to protect themselves • The Czechs made far-reaching attempts to satisfy the German minority, but as Hitler instructed, Ribbentrop was to always ask for more than the Czechs would accede to • After much criticism of German officials against Hitler’s policy with Czechoslovakia, they appealed to Britain for support if they tried to overthrow Hitler • Chamberlain was not prepared to risk the issue of war on the success of a few conspirators in Germany who were trying to remove their powerful and popular dictator

15. Policy of Appeasement – Czechoslovakia/Munich Conference • A conference was called at Munich and Hitler, Mussolini, Daladier (PM of France), and Chamberlain assembled on September 29th • German occupation of the Sudeten area was agreed to. Chamberlain even got Hitler to sign the a paper promising to settle all future Anglo-German differences by diplomacy • The Czechs were not allowed to participate nor the Russians, who were still enemies of Nazi Germany

16. Policy of Appeasement - Czechoslovakia • In March 1939, Hitler got the Czech President to sign away what was left of the independent country • Goering threatened that he would obliterate Prague with bombs. The Czech will to resist was broken • On March 15, 1939, the Wehrmacht moved. However, Hitler’s breach of the Munich settlement caused the West to want to do something to stop Hitler • People in Britain started to move towards a determination to resist a German attempt to dominate Europe by force

17. Policy of Appeasement - Czechoslovakia • Britain doubled the strength of the army • Chamberlain accused Hitler of breaking his word and taking the law into his own hands • Hitler signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact on August 23, 1939, but nothing was done about it

18. Policy of Appeasement – Memel & Albania • Soon afterward, Germany annexed Memel, a German city seized by Lithuania in 1923 • Albania had long been under Italian political and economic influence, and in some circumstances the action might have been seen as little more than consolidation • However, three weeks after annexing Czechoslovakia and a fortnight after the German occupation of Memel, with the air full of rumors of war, the event assumed a very different aspect • It indicated a degree of coordination between Germany and Italian plans far greater than was actually the case • The states created in the post-war settlement were crumbling away

19. Danzig Dispute • Was overwhelmingly German in population (96%) and after 1933 its internal administration was run by the Nazi Party • Danzig represented a fundamental issue: • For Germany, it was a matter of historic right and a German population • For Poland, it was a guarantee of access to the sea and a symbol of security

20. Danzig Dispute • Germany proposed to Poland that Danzig should be incorporated in Germany, and a German-controlled road and rail link with East Prussia be established. Finally, Poland should join the Anti-Comintern Pact, signed between Germany, Japan, and Italy • In return, Germany would guarantee her frontier with Poland, and extend the 1934 Non-Aggression Pact for 25 year…the Poles refused

21. Invasion of Poland • Britain and France guaranteed their support to Poland, hoping that the guarantee would act as a deterrent so that it wouldn’t have to be carried out • Nazi S.S. troops wearing Polish uniforms staged a phony invasion of Germany, damaging several minor installations on the German side of the border • They also left behind a handful of dead German prisoners in Polish uniforms to serve as further evidence of the alleged Polish attack • War resulted on September 1st, 1939

22. Failure of the League of Nations • The U.S. didn’t accept the Versailles Treaty/League of Nations. These factors played a part: • Isolationism (the U.S. didn’t want to be drawn into another war) • Disillusionment (shock, disappointment, and dismay at the war, causing the U.S. to not want to get into another one) • Partisanship (political parties voting according to party lines)

23. Summary of the Causes of WWII • The clash of ideologies • Economic pressures and opportunities • Room to cultivate food and move undesirables • Changes in military technology and strategic thought • Long-standing territorial disputes, conflicts of interest, psychological tensions between peoples • Propaganda and coercion • Prestige and material interests • Appeasement and confidence