Peace by Cooperation ?. The Stability Pact for S.E. Europe - Premisses, Problems, Consequences. Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Reinhard Meyers Institut für Politikwissenschaft - Westfälische Wilhelms- Universität Münster. This file can be downloaded next week from our Website.
The Stability Pact for S.E. Europe
Premisses, Problems, Consequences
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Reinhard Meyers
Institut für Politikwissenschaft - Westfälische Wilhelms- Universität Münster
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Support of socioeconomic
contribution to/ precondition of stability for the whole of Europe
implementation of the rules of peaceful coexistence and of a regime of conflict prevention/ conflict resolution between the nations of Europe
conservation of social peace as precondition of a successful transformation to a market economy and a liberal democracy
domestic/ international security
The vicious circle of Balkan politics
conservation of social peace
successful modernisation/ transformation
Develop a strategy of regime change using non-military instruments transforming SE Europe into a region of
* sustainable stability
* growing prosperity
* firmly established peace
Regional cooperation as the main instrument of problem solving
# Matchmaking: bringing together donors, implementing agencies, and recipient countries for joint priority setting
# Peer review & peer pressure as methods to advance the reform process
# Honest brokerage & good offices as instruments to bring together institutions that do not normally cooperate
Object: to stabilize the S.E.European region after the conflicts of the 1990s enhancing regional cooperation and supporting ever closer integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures
Problem: During the Kosovo crisis, decision-makers realised that there had never been a coherent, longterm policy of conflict prevention in S.E.Europe.
Rather, the international approach to the Balkans had been piecemeal and country-oriented, following the geographical direction Milosevic’s policies chose to take.
The transnational character of many regional
problems was hardly admitted; a predominantly
reactive, „fire-brigade“ policy concentrated on
managing crisis after crisis, from Slovenia to the
„The previous policy of the international community vis-a-vis former Yugoslavia had two severe deficits: It concentrated on the consequences instead of on the sources of conflict, and it tackled the problems of the region individually and separately from the ones in other parts of Europe.“
Joschka Fischer, Cologne, June 1o, 1999
a) EU Regional Approach adopted on February 27, 1996, as part of the Royaumont process following the Dayton Agreement
b) EU Common Strategy for the Western Balkans, commissioned by the Vienna European Council in December 1998
The Union’s Regional Aproach of 1996 encouraged closer political and economic ties among the Balkan countries, but appeared late, with vague goals, and little incentives for the countries to actually carry out the proposed objectives. Differential bilateral EU approaches to individual countries undermined much of the Regional Approach in the second half of the 90s.
On 10 June 1999, at the EU's initiative, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was adopted in Cologne. Its main aim is to strengthen the countries of South Eastern Europe "in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole region". The Stability Pact is a political declaration of commitment and a framework agreement on international co-operation to develop a shared strategy among all partners for stability and growth in South Eastern Europe. It is not a new international organisation nor does it have any independent financial resources or implementing structures. It is a co-ordinating mechanism which matches requests from the region with offers from participating nations and organisations and co-ordinates political and economic reforms and reconstruction in the region. It seeks to provide a forum to stimulate change in the region.
SP an example for a general trend in international politics: regionalization replacing bipolarity
SP based on lessons from international crisis management and conflict prevention, stressing the need for
* a secure environment
* promotion of sustainable democratic systems
* economic and social well-being
* reconstruction of intra- and intersocietal relations based on agreed rules, legitimacy and public authority
as preconditions for successful conflict prevention and sustainable peace.
SP also incorporates the CSCE process experiences – trust in the power of confidence-building measures, coherence of approach to problems in a number of baskets, insistence on peaceful change, compromise, and package deals as means of inter-national (re)conciliation, emphasis on local ownership of policies
Premiss: CSCE concept of conflict transformation through an open-ended process of increasing cooperation that will unfold over time
S.E.Europe Regional Table meets on Foreign
Steering Body acting as Clearing Minister level
House for all matters of
Chair: Special Coordinator appointed by
Coordinates all activities of and among the European
the working tables, meets regularly with Union
the chairs of the working tables, and re-
ports periodically to the OSCE
Working Table Working Table Working Table
on democratisation on economic reconstruction, on security issues
and human rights development, and cooperation
Working Tables establish work plans in conformity with the objectives of the Stability Pact. Within the range of their competence, they can establish side tables or call meetings and conferences on matters of a specific or sub-regional nature.
Sub-Table Sub-Table Sub-Table Sub-Table
Meetings Conferences Meetings Conferences
Regional TableChair: Erhard Busek
Working Table I: DEMOCRACYChair: Goran Svilanovic
Working Table II: ECONOMYChair: Fabrizio Saccomanni
Working Table III: SECURITYChair: Janez Premoze
Sub TableSecurity & Defence
Sub TableJustice & Home Affairs
The European perspective has proved to be the most powerful incentive for reconciliation, co-operation and internal reforms in the region. Countries in the region view the Pact as the primary instrument of political and institutional support for the EU integration of SEE countries. More important: The Stability Pact has succeeded in giving life to regional co-operation. For the first time in history, SEE countries perceive such co-operation as a building block, not a stumbling block for European integration.
First, the Pact has made it clear that regional co-operation is an indispensable component and a precondition for Euro-Atlantic integration. It is the fast track to full EU membership. The EU, on its part, has recognised that it should not reward a race towards membership. “If countries want to join the European Union, they have to demonstrate that they can develop regional co-operation and can solve their problems in co-operation with their neighbours,” Commissioner Verheugen once stated. People in the region should have by now understood that such co-operation is one of the founding principles of the European Union itself.
Secondly, the Stability Pact has given evidence that co-operation serves the mutual interests of all participating countries. Against this background, the Pact has been engaged in facilitating the resolution of transnational issues, using the tool of regional co-operation as a catalyst for reconciliation, good-neighbourliness and improved political relations.
Albania, Bosnia & Hercegovina, Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
4,5 bn Euro 1991 – 1999 on part of EU
17 bn Euro including humanitarian assistance + contributions of member states
bring peace, stability, and economic development to the region and open the long-term perspective of EU membership
151. We heard from many of our witnesses that the Stability Pact, in particular the Quick Start Package, was announced with a great deal of fanfare which led to high expectations of it. Stephen Wordsworth from the FCO told us that these expectations were overblown (Q 34). Clare Short went one step further and indicated that the grandiose promises made at its inception were a cause for concern because they were seen by many as too ambitious (Q 252). Chris Patten believed that:
"the expectations were less than coherently explained or analysed and that it is unfair to blame those who run the Pact for the gap between the initial rhetoric and what the Pact has usefully been able to do." (Q 65)
152. Gary Titley MEP made a similar point when he explained that the Pact had been established as a reaction to the problem of a perceived lack of co-ordination of aid efforts in the Balkan region. He thought that the Pact itself needed to be more streamlined and focused and given specific yearly tasks to achieve (Q 177).