Remote physical device fingerprinting
Download
1 / 28

Remote Physical Device Fingerprinting - PowerPoint PPT Presentation


  • 123 Views
  • Updated On :

Remote Physical Device Fingerprinting. Authors Tadayoshi Kohno, Andre Broido, KC Claffy Appears in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2005 Presented by Peter Matthews. Introduction. There are a number of reliable techniques for remote operating system fingerprinting nmap XProbe

loader
I am the owner, or an agent authorized to act on behalf of the owner, of the copyrighted work described.
capcha
Download Presentation

PowerPoint Slideshow about 'Remote Physical Device Fingerprinting' - kelda


An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation

Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author.While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server.


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Presentation Transcript
Remote physical device fingerprinting l.jpg

Remote Physical Device Fingerprinting

Authors

Tadayoshi Kohno, Andre Broido, KC Claffy

Appears in

IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2005

Presented by

Peter Matthews


Introduction l.jpg
Introduction

  • There are a number of reliable techniques for remote operating system fingerprinting

    • nmap

    • XProbe

  • Paper proposes the next step:

    • Remotely fingerprint a physical devicewithout that device's knowledge or cooperation


Clock drift l.jpg
Clock Drift

  • A standard clock circuit in a computer system uses a quartz crystal oscillator as its time base, similar to any modern wristwatch

    • Some amount of imprecision in the oscillatory frequency

  • Clocks using these thus exhibit drift over time when compared to the actual time


Clock skew l.jpg
Clock Skew

  • A clock will usually have some offset

    • Offset(t) = time_reported(t) – true_time(t)

  • The clock skew S is the change in this offset over time

    • S = d Offset(t) / dt

  • Measured in ppm (μs/s)


Slide5 l.jpg

  • How much skew?

    • +/- 4 seconds a day common

    • (25 minutes a year)

  • Importantly, paper argues skew of a device is (generally) consistent and distinctive to that device

    • Thus can use as a fingerprint for this device

24 hours later


Network time protocol ntp l.jpg
Network Time Protocol (NTP)

  • Hierarchical server system

    • Top-level servers synchronized via atomic clocks, GPS

  • Used to synchronizes system clock periodically



Tcp timestamps option tsopt l.jpg
TCP Timestamps Option (TSopt)

  • 32-bit timestamp contained in each packet, taken from a virtual clock that is “at least approximately proportional to real time”

  • Frequency (Hz) between 1 and 1000

    • Windows 2000, XP – 10 Hz (100 ms resolution)

    • Redhat 9.0 – 100 Hz (10 ms resolution)

  • Usually reset to zero upon reboot

  • Usually not affected by changes to the device's system clock (NTP synchronization does not affect)


Exploiting the tcp timestamps option passive approach l.jpg
Exploiting the TCP Timestamps Option (Passive Approach)

  • The measurer – any entity capable of observing TCP packets from the fingerprintee

  • Create a trace of TCP packets from fingerprintee

  • For each packet plot a point

    • X value: Amount of actual time passed between reception of first packet in trace and the current packet

    • Y value: The offset observed for this packet, based on timestamp


Slide10 l.jpg


Slide11 l.jpg
TSopt clock skew estimates for two sources from a OC-48 link of a US Tier 1 ISP over a two hour period.


Exploiting the tcp timestamps option semi passive approach l.jpg
Exploiting the TCP Timestamps Option (Semi-Passive Approach) of a US Tier 1 ISP over a two hour period.

  • Windows 2000 and XP machines do not set timestamp flag in their initial SYN packets

  • RFC 1323 mandates that noneof the following TCP packets in the connection can include timestamp

  • Thus, previous approach will not work if a Windows machine is behind NAT, firewall


Slide13 l.jpg

SYN, TSopt=0

SYN, TSopt=1

SYN-ACK, TSopt=1

Subsequently…

data, timestamp

data, timestamp


Icmp timestamps l.jpg
ICMP Timestamps responding SYN/ACK packet

  • Reports value of system clock (milliseconds past midnight)

  • RFC 792 requires frequency is 1000 Hz (1 ms resolution)

  • If system clock is updated via NTP regularly, will be relatively accurate

    • However, most hosts do so infrequently


Exloiting icmp timestamp requests active approach l.jpg
Exloiting ICMP Timestamp Requests (Active Approach) responding SYN/ACK packet

  • The measurer: entity capable of sending ICMP Timestamp Request and storing the fingerprintee's subsequent ICMP Timestamp Reply messages

  • Limitation: Fingerprintee must not be behind a NAT or firewall that filters ICMP

  • Estimation of clock skew is similar to that in TSopt methods.


Questions concerning clock skew l.jpg
Questions Concerning Clock Skew responding SYN/ACK packet

  • What is the distribution of clock skews among devices?

  • How stable are these clock skews over time?

  • Can these clock skews be measured accurately, independent of network topology and access technology?


Distribution of clock skews l.jpg
Distribution of Clock Skews responding SYN/ACK packet

Figure 1: Histogram of TSopt clock skew estimates for sources in a 2 hour network trace from a OC-48 link of a US Tier 1 ISP. (Considered only sources that sent packet over a period of at least 50 minutes per hour, and sent at least 2000 packets per hour.)


Slide18 l.jpg


Slide19 l.jpg


Stability of clock skews l.jpg
Stability of Clock Skews 96 hours.

  • The network traces from this experiment were then divided into 12 and 24 hour periods

    • All periods of the same length for each machine were then compared

  • Range of maximum difference for a single device:

    • 12-hour period: 1.29 – 7.33 ppm, 2.28 ppm mean

    • 24-hour period: 0.01 – 5.32 ppm, 0.71 ppm mean

  • Supports authors’ claim that modern processors have relatively stable clock skews


Independence of access technology l.jpg
Independence of Access Technology 96 hours.

  • Fingerprinting of a laptop connected via various access technologies and locations

  • Skew estimates all within a 1 ppm range


Independence of network topology l.jpg
Independence of Network Topology 96 hours.

  • PlanetLab machines located globally used as measurer, same laptop as previous experiment

  • Excepting measurement from IIT, skew estimates within .5 ppm range

  • Generally speaking, estimates are largely independent of topology and distance between fingerprinter and fingerprintee


Other os factors l.jpg
Other OS Factors 96 hours.

  • For tested operating systems, system clock and TSopt clock effectively have the same clock skew


Applications l.jpg
Applications 96 hours.

  • Detecting virtual honeynets and virtual hosts

  • Counting number of devices behind a NAT

  • Tracking individual devices

    • With some probability

  • Arguing that a given device was not involved in a recorded event

  • Could use un-anonymized traces on a link to assign hosts in an anonymized trace


Strengths l.jpg
Strengths 96 hours.

  • Shows that it is possible to extract relevant security information from data considered noise

  • Approach could be used with any other protocols that leak information about a device’s clock


Weaknesses l.jpg
Weaknesses 96 hours.

  • Further experimentation required

    • Laptop running Windows XP SP2 has a noticeably different TSopt clock skew after switching to battery power

    • Newer processors throttle their speeds based on temperature and load, affects voltage from power supply

  • Easy to circumvent particular methods

    • echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_timestamps

    • Randomize TSopt timestamp

    • Filter ICMP timestamp


Possible extensions of paper s approach l.jpg
Possible Extensions of Paper’s Approach 96 hours.

  • Utilization of approach with other protocols that leak information about a device’s clock

  • Use of profiling in combination with skew data

    • Skew is within a certain range and machine visits certain websites frequently

    • OS profiling techniques


Questions l.jpg
Questions? 96 hours.


ad