EPR: OECDEPR

1. ???????(EPR):OECD???????????EPR?????????? (?)??????????(IGES) ???????????????? (SCP) ? ?? ?????

2. (?)?????????? (IGES)?? 1998????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????? 103???????64?????????????? (???26?????????2010?6???) 2

3. ????? EPR??????? OECD??????????? ?????????EPR????? (E-waste????) ?? 3

4. ?. EPR??????? 4

5. ???????(PPP)?? ???????(EPR)? ???????(PPP) “???”??????????????????????????????? (??:????????????) ????????????????? ???????(EPR) ?????????? ??(???)?????????? ? “???”???????? ???=???????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? 5 EPR extends PPP. The concept of polluter pay principle essentially requires polluters to pay for the pollution they generate. Polluter pays principle has been applied mainly for the pollution related to production process. When considering the environmental impacts of the waste phase of products’ life, it becomes unclear who are the generators of pollution (wastes): is it producer, distributors, or consumers? PPP: target only for supply-chain EPR: target for both supply- and recycle-chain How EPR is understood? -primarily helps to improve the situation surrounding waste management (VROM1998; Shiota 1999 in Scheer and Rubik 2006) -guides environmental improvement of products and systems surrounding the products throughout their life-cycle (Lifset 1993; Davis 1998; Lindsqvis 2000 in Scheer and Rubik 2006) -responsibility of the producers is extended to the post-consumer stage of a product’s life (Shiota 1999; OECD 2001 in Scheer and Rubik 2006) -the extension is not limited to end-of-life management of products (Davis 1998; Lindhqvist in Scheer and Rubik 2006) Who is the polluter? ? should be answered under traditional liability principles by assigning liability to the entity in the product chain that is the cheapest cost avoider. EPR extends PPP. The concept of polluter pay principle essentially requires polluters to pay for the pollution they generate. Polluter pays principle has been applied mainly for the pollution related to production process. When considering the environmental impacts of the waste phase of products’ life, it becomes unclear who are the generators of pollution (wastes): is it producer, distributors, or consumers? PPP: target only for supply-chain EPR: target for both supply- and recycle-chain How EPR is understood? -primarily helps to improve the situation surrounding waste management (VROM1998; Shiota 1999 in Scheer and Rubik 2006) -guides environmental improvement of products and systems surrounding the products throughout their life-cycle (Lifset 1993; Davis 1998; Lindsqvis 2000 in Scheer and Rubik 2006) -responsibility of the producers is extended to the post-consumer stage of a product’s life (Shiota 1999; OECD 2001 in Scheer and Rubik 2006) -the extension is not limited to end-of-life management of products (Davis 1998; Lindhqvist in Scheer and Rubik 2006) Who is the polluter? ? should be answered under traditional liability principles by assigning liability to the entity in the product chain that is the cheapest cost avoider.

6. EPR??1 6 "Extended producer responsibility" (EPR) means that the responsibility of producers for their products is extended to the post-consumer stage. In other words, under EPR, a company must be concerned not only with making the product and how it functions, but also with appropriate treatment and disposal of the product at the end of its useful life. This means that producers have responsibility for appropriate recycling as well as final disposal of their product. While EPR is intended to reduce the amount of materials going to landfills, it is also aimed at promoting environmental consideration at "upstream“ like at product design and material selection. Its underlying theory is that if producers must pay for waste, they will have an incentive to make products that are less wasteful. EPR provides the missing link between product design and recycling, which is key for making recycling efficient and economic. The movement toward designing for disassembly, developing reverse logistical systems, and de-manufacturing are strategies industry has used in response to the new incentives posed by EPR."Extended producer responsibility" (EPR) means that the responsibility of producers for their products is extended to the post-consumer stage. In other words, under EPR, a company must be concerned not only with making the product and how it functions, but also with appropriate treatment and disposal of the product at the end of its useful life. This means that producers have responsibility for appropriate recycling as well as final disposal of their product. While EPR is intended to reduce the amount of materials going to landfills, it is also aimed at promoting environmental consideration at "upstream“ like at product design and material selection. Its underlying theory is that if producers must pay for waste, they will have an incentive to make products that are less wasteful. EPR provides the missing link between product design and recycling, which is key for making recycling efficient and economic. The movement toward designing for disassembly, developing reverse logistical systems, and de-manufacturing are strategies industry has used in response to the new incentives posed by EPR.

7. EPR???2 EPR??? “Environmental policy approach in which a producer’s responsibility, physical and/or financial; fully or partially, for a product is extended to the post-consumer stage of a product’s life cycle” (OECD, 2003). EPR????3???? 1. ???? 2. ???????????? 3. ???????????? (Scheer and Rubik, 2006) EPR?????? ????????? ? ??????????????????? ? ??????? ? ? ??????? ? 7 EPR: Policy Principle rather than Policy Instrument Three Features of EPR 1. Preventive Measure: Prevent environmental impact at source 2. Lifecycle Thinking: responsible for env. impacts throughout the life-cycle 3. Incentive Mechanism: giving incentive continuously to improve products/process ? opposite to the command and control approaches Downstream Changes: improvement in waste management practices Upstream Changes: source prevention, design change of products and product systems EPR Mechanism Demand for separation and recycling created by EPR programs may induce development of separation/recycling technology. Sufficient and steady supply of high-quality recycled materials would help create demand for the recycled materials EPR: Policy Principle rather than Policy Instrument Three Features of EPR 1. Preventive Measure: Prevent environmental impact at source 2. Lifecycle Thinking: responsible for env. impacts throughout the life-cycle 3. Incentive Mechanism: giving incentive continuously to improve products/process ? opposite to the command and control approaches Downstream Changes: improvement in waste management practices Upstream Changes: source prevention, design change of products and product systems EPR Mechanism Demand for separation and recycling created by EPR programs may induce development of separation/recycling technology. Sufficient and steady supply of high-quality recycled materials would help create demand for the recycled materials

8. ?????????3???? ????? ????????????????????????????????????????????? ????? ?????????????????????? ????? ???????????????????????? (Lindhquist, 1992) 8

9. EPR????? ????: ????????????·???????????????????? ????: ??? vs. ??? ??? WEEE?? (2003?~) ????????(??:2001?~) ??? Product Stewardship Programs (California, US) Electronics Product Stewardship Canada (2004, Canada) ???? vs. ???? ???????? PC????? (??) ???????? (PRO???) WEEE (EU) & ????????(??) ???/???/??? ???:?????????????????????????????? ???:????????·????????????? ???:???????????????? ? EPR?????????????????????????? 9 Since the early 1990s, a number of OECD countries begun to incorporate the EPR concept into their regulations on end-of-life management. Now, it is spreading to non-OECD countries. Voluntary (US & Canada: Product Steward Program/ Extended Product Stewardship) ?Responsibility is shared among stakeholders (producer, consumer, gov’t.......) Since the early 1990s, a number of OECD countries begun to incorporate the EPR concept into their regulations on end-of-life management. Now, it is spreading to non-OECD countries. Voluntary (US & Canada: Product Steward Program/ Extended Product Stewardship) ?Responsibility is shared among stakeholders (producer, consumer, gov’t.......)

10. ?. OECD??????????? 10

11. 1. ????? (1) ???? ?????? ?????: ??????????????????????? ?????: ???????(PRO)?????????????????? ???? :?????????DfE?????????????????? ??????????????????????????? (Lifset and Lindhqvist, 2003, 2008; Castell et al. 2004; Mayers, 2007; Nnorom and Osibanjo, 2008) ???? ????????????????(??????) ??????????:???????????????? ?????: ?????????? (Nnorom and Osibanjo, 2008) (+ ?????/ - ??????) 11 Shared Responsibility: Producers of the same group together fulfill their responsibility for the end-of-life management regardless of the brand All producers jointly share the costs of managing EoL products. Collectively financed by forming PROs Individual Responsibility: A producer takes responsibility for the end-of-life management of his or her own products. they pay specifically for the recycling of their own brand products. Individually financed for the EoL products * There is a general assumption that an EPR programme based on individual responsibility would promote design change more than that based on collective responsibility. Individual Financial Responsibility: visible flat fees for same types of product Collective Financial Responsibility: differentiation of the fees that reflect the cost of EoL managemet Monopolistic System: often subsidized by government Flat-rate & non-visible fees: No incentive for improving DfE. (lighting weight and material selection) Two Obstacles to provide economic incentive to improve products design Individual responsibility of financing take-back has not been fully implemented. Recycling target and requirement are not focus on specific waste treatment or env. requirement for different materials and components. Advance fees vs. End Users fees Advance fees: - Difficult to estimate the costs of recycling in more than ten years after putting on market - Cannot cover the costs of historical products - End Users fees: - Can be financed for products already put on market - Incentive for illegal dumping - Shared Responsibility: Producers of the same group together fulfill their responsibility for the end-of-life management regardless of the brand All producers jointly share the costs of managing EoL products. Collectively financed by forming PROs Individual Responsibility: A producer takes responsibility for the end-of-life management of his or her own products. they pay specifically for the recycling of their own brand products. Individually financed for the EoL products * There is a general assumption that an EPR programme based on individual responsibility would promote design change more than that based on collective responsibility. Individual Financial Responsibility: visible flat fees for same types of product Collective Financial Responsibility: differentiation of the fees that reflect the cost of EoL managemet Monopolistic System: often subsidized by government Flat-rate & non-visible fees: No incentive for improving DfE. (lighting weight and material selection) Two Obstacles to provide economic incentive to improve products design Individual responsibility of financing take-back has not been fully implemented. Recycling target and requirement are not focus on specific waste treatment or env. requirement for different materials and components. Advance fees vs. End Users fees Advance fees: - Difficult to estimate the costs of recycling in more than ten years after putting on market - Cannot cover the costs of historical products - End Users fees: - Can be financed for products already put on market - Incentive for illegal dumping -

12. 1. ?????(2) ????? vs. ????? ????: ?????????????????????????????????? ??????: ?????????????????????????????? ????: ?????????????????????? ????: ?????????? ????: ?????????????????????????????? ??????????: ?????????????????????(????:10?) ??????????????: ???????????????????? 12 Advance Fees vs. End users fees Illegal dumping: selling second hand shops or informal actors to avoid fees Usage of products: Incentive to use products longer Equity Issues: First users are usually most affordable to cover the recycling costs Product prices: it could be increased incorporating Historical products: cannot cover the recycle costs for products already in market Estimation of recycle costs: difficult to estimate costs in advance Orphan products: company who receive the fees would be bankrupted Time-lag: lag between when to pay the fees and when to recycle Advance Fees vs. End users fees Illegal dumping: selling second hand shops or informal actors to avoid fees Usage of products: Incentive to use products longer Equity Issues: First users are usually most affordable to cover the recycling costs Product prices: it could be increased incorporating Historical products: cannot cover the recycle costs for products already in market Estimation of recycle costs: difficult to estimate costs in advance Orphan products: company who receive the fees would be bankrupted Time-lag: lag between when to pay the fees and when to recycle

13. 2. ????? ???? ???????(PRO)??????? ????????: ??????????????????????? ????: ??????????? ?????????: ???????????????????????????? ??????????: ???????????????????????????? ???????????????????????? (Lifset and Lindhqvist, 2008; Hosoda, 2008) ???? ???????????? PRO??????: ??????? ?????????: ????????????????????? ?????: ??????????????????????? (Mayers, 2007; Nnorom and Osibanjo, 2008) (+ ?????/ - ??????) 13 Orphan Products: products from defunct producers Free Riders: producers who never register with the system ERP (European Recycling Platform) was set up in December, 2002 by Braun, Electrolux, HP, and Sony ERP represents an estimated 15% of the European WEEE take-back market Orphan Products: products from defunct producers Free Riders: producers who never register with the system ERP (European Recycling Platform) was set up in December, 2002 by Braun, Electrolux, HP, and Sony ERP represents an estimated 15% of the European WEEE take-back market

14. 3. ????? ????????????? ?????????????: ????????? (?: GHS, RoHS) ???????????????: ?????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????? ?????????: ????????????????????????????????????????DfE?????? ??????(???): ???????????????????????????????????????? (Hosoda, 2008) (+ ?????/ - ??????) ?????? v.s. ?????? ?????? (???EPR????): ??????????????????????????????????????? ??????(???????(IPR)): ????????????????????????? 14 Reporting for Compliance Visible costs should be apparent ? (e.g. labeling to distinguish from “historical products”) Feedback: From downstream to upstream to reflect DfE is central objective of EPR Incomplete info (Non-compliance): Informal actors try to reduce costs without disseminating recycle info through inappropriate treatment, illegal dumping, and illegal trade. Reporting for Compliance Visible costs should be apparent ? (e.g. labeling to distinguish from “historical products”) Feedback: From downstream to upstream to reflect DfE is central objective of EPR Incomplete info (Non-compliance): Informal actors try to reduce costs without disseminating recycle info through inappropriate treatment, illegal dumping, and illegal trade.

15. ?? vs. ????(1) ???? (???EPR????) ?????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????(Clift, 2006) ???? (IPR) (?: Green dot system) ?????????: ????????????????? ? DfE??? ?????????: ??????? & ??????? +/- ??????????????????? <???????????> ?????? (Electolux, IBM, Sony?)?IPR???? ?? ??????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????? ???????????????????????? ??:???????????????????????????????? (Scheer and Rubik 2006) 15 Shared Responsibility vs. Individual Responsibility - Collective Funding Mechanism to reduce risks - No Collective Funds - No Economic Incentive - Strong Economic Incentive Shared Responsibility vs. Individual Responsibility - Collective Funding Mechanism to reduce risks - No Collective Funds - No Economic Incentive - Strong Economic Incentive

16. ?? vs. ????(2) 16

17. EPR?????: ???????? 17

18. ?.?????????EPR?????(E-waste????) 18

19. ????????(??) 19

20. EPR??????? 20

21. ?????????EPR????? 21

22. 1)?? 22

23. 2)?? 23

24. 3)??? 24

25. EPR????E-waste?????????? 25

26. ???????? 26

27. ???????EPR???? OECD?????????????(DfE???)?EPR????????????????????????????????????????? EPR??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? EPR???????????????????????????????? EPR?????????E-waste??????????????????????? ??????????????“???”??????????????? 27

28. ?? ???????????????????E-waste????????????????? ?????EPR?????/???????????????????????????????????????? 28

29. ???? 29

30. ???????????? C?m on 30

31. ????1 <????> Hotta, Y., Hayashi, S., Bengtsson, M., and Mori, H. eds. (2009), Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) Policy in Easte Asia - in Consideration of International Resource Circulation - . Hayama. Institute for Global Environmental Strategies. http://enviroscope.iges.or.jp/modules/envirolib/view.php?docid=2607 UNEP and UNU. (2009), Sustainable Innovation and Technology Transfer Industrial Sector Studies: Recycling – From E-waste to Resources. United Nations Environment Programe & United Nations University, 2009. OECD (2001), Extended Producer Responsibility: A Guidance Manual for Governments, OECD, Paris. OECD (2003), Proceeding of OECD Seminar on Extended Producer Responsibility: EPR Programme Implementation and Assessment, OECD, Paris. OECD (2005), Analytical Framework for Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Extended Producer Responsibility Programmes, ENV/EPOC/WGWPR(2005)6/FINAL, OECD, Paris. Lindhquist, T. (1992), Extended Producer Responsibility as a Strategy to Promote Cleaner Production, U Proceedings of an Invitational Expert Seminar, Sweden. Sander, K., S. Stephanie, N. Tojo, C. van Rossem, J. Vernon, and C. George. (2007), The Producer Responsibility Principle of the WEEE directive, DG ENV, Hamburg, Germany: Okopol Gmbh. Kojima, M., Yoshida, A., and Sasaki, So. (2009), Difficulties in applying extended producer responsibility policies in developing countries: case studies in e-waste recycling in China and Thailand, Journal of Material Cycles and Waste Management, 11(3): 263-269. 31

32. ????2 Mayers, C. K. (2007), Strategic, Financial, and Design Implications of Extended Producer Responsibility in Europe: A Producer Case Study, Journal of Industrial Ecology, 11(3): 113-131. Lifset, R. and Lindhqvist, T. (2003), Can We Take the Concept of Individual Producer Responsibility from Theory to Practice? Journal of Industrial Ecology, 7(2): 3-7. Lifset, R. and Lindhqvist, T. (2008), Producer Responsibility at a Turing Point? Journal of Industrial Ecology. Hosoda, E. (2008), Design of a Material Circulating Society: Institutional Design and Policy Outlook, Keio University Press, Tokyo. (written in Japanese). Clift, R. and France C. (2006), Extended Producer Responsibility in the EU: A Visible March of Folly. Journal of Industrial Ecology, 10(4): 5-7. Scheer, D. and Rubik, F. (2006), Governance of Integrated Product Policy: In Search of Sustainable Production and Consumption, Greenleaf Publishing, Sheffield, UK. Sachs, N. (2006). EPR in the European Union and the United States, Harvard Environmental Law Review, 30: 51-98. 32