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Organised Crime Research in Belgium and Beyond

Organised Crime Research in Belgium and Beyond. Prof. Dr. Tom Vander Beken Research Conference on Organized Crime Bundeskriminalamt, Frankfurt/Main, 18 November 2008. Intro: Research in Belgium and beyond. Organised crime research - in Belgium

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Organised Crime Research in Belgium and Beyond

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  1. Organised Crime Research in Belgiumand Beyond Prof. Dr. Tom Vander Beken Research Conference on Organized Crime Bundeskriminalamt, Frankfurt/Main, 18 November 2008

  2. Intro: Research in Belgium and beyond Organised crime research - in Belgium - with a European view (European research projects, European policy making) - and a focus on the phenomenon (assessing organised crime) rather than on the reaction (tackling organised crime)

  3. Overview • Belgianpolicycallsforbetter reports • EU-intelligence led approach • Research introduces risk approach • Conceptual model • Risk, threat, harm and vulnerability • Vulnerability studies • Assessments and future • Larger EU projects • Research results: the example of itinerantgroups • Conclusion

  4. 1. Belgian policy calls for better reports 1996: Action Plan to fight organised crime (Minister for Justice) 1998: Parliamentary Enquiry Commission on organised crime Need for reports on organised crime that: - do more than reporting on law enforcement activity: (in)significant law enforcement action can “create” (in)significant phenomena; - provide information to think ahead about possible future developments (more than the report on last year’s situation); and - give not only numbers of criminals, groups or activities, but an understanding of the dangerousness and seriousness of the phenomenon including priorities.

  5. 2. EU-intelligence led approach “Continued work is needed to improve the validity, reliability and international comparability of data on organised crime, and on the annual situation reports. In this connection a uniform concept of collection and use of data on organised crime and related phenomena should, to the maximum extent possible, be established so that a practical strategic analysis can be made, leading to the most appropriate measures to combat and prevent organised crime. A more proactive, intelligence-led approach is needed to detect and interrupt organised criminal activities, apprehend offenders, demolish criminal networks, and seize and confiscate the proceeds of crime. The targetting of investigation and the planning of the response of society to organised crime requires knowledge of the profile, motives and modus operandi of the offenders, the scope and trends in organised crime, the impact of organised crime in society, and the effectiveness of the response to organised crime. This knowledge includes operational data (data related to individual suspected and detected cases) and empirical data (qualitative and quantitative criminological data)…” (Millenniumstrategy, 2000) “Analytical capacity within law enforcement agencies of the Member States is a rather new tool and, if available, is usually applied within the context of evidence gathering but not for detection and anticipation of crime-facilitating opportunities and crime trends. Threat assessments, situation reports and risk assessments (identification of vulnerable areas) carried out by law enforcement agencies are often descriptive analysis products. These products should, in addition, be turned into explanatory (understanding the causes of crime) and predictive (prognosis of future developments) analytical products.” (Joint Report by the Commission Services and Europol, 2001)

  6. 3. Research introduces risk approach 2000: Scientific research of IRCP for the Belgian Minister of Justice on the development of a new methodology for the Belgian organised crime report. Introduction of a future oriented, risk based four-pillared reporting system: environmental scan (1), oc-group analysis (2), counter measure analysis (3) and market (illegal and legal) analysis (4) 2001: Acceptance IRCP-methodology at EU-level (Crimorg 133) 2001-2002: A feasability study of a risk based methodology in the EU. A Pilot Study in Belgium, Italy, Sweden and the EU (Hippokrates Programme, European Commission- IRCP, Transcrime (Trento-Milan) and the Swedish Council for Crime Prevention)

  7. 4. Conceptual model Action Plan to Study Organised Crime at European Level (Council of the European Union, 8 January 2002, Crimorg 133, 14959/01)

  8. 5a. Risk, threat, harm and vulnerability Risk is the chance of something happening that will have an impact upon objectives. Threat arises when a source of risk has an intent to occur or has the capability to do so. Harm is the damage occuring should a threat be realised. Vulnerability is an aspect of the environment offering opportunities to the threat to cause harm.

  9. 5b. Risk, threat, harm and vulnerability THREAT (criminals) RISK VULNERABILITY (environment) HARM (society)

  10. 6. Vulnerability studies 2001-2003: Vulnerability of economic sectors to organised crime. Methodology and application to the diamond sector in Belgium (Ministry of Science - IRCP and Antwerp University) 2003-2005: A Method for the Assessment of Vulnerability of Economic Sectors (MAVUS I & II)) and application to four economic sectors: European transport, waste, music, pharmaceutical sector: (AGIS programme European Commission – IRCP, Transcrime (Trento-Milan), Rotterdam University and Max-Planck-Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law Freiburg) 2006-2007: Fashion sector Milan (Calovi) and taxi sector the Netherlands (EIM) 2008-2011: Combining vulnerability studies and threat assessments (Danger project) (Ministry for Science – IRCP, Leuven University (L. Paoli) and Rotterdam University (H. Van de Bunt & N. Dorn)

  11. 7. Assessments and future 2004-2005: Scientific research for the EuropeanCommissionon the method and the assessment of likelyfuture trends in organised crime in Europe (OCO): Development of a methodforenvironmental scanning, draft of an EU scan and threenational scans (Belgium, Sweden and Slovenia) (AGIS-programme- EuropeanCommission – IRCP, SwedishCouncilfor Crime Prevention and the Slovenian Office forPrevention of Corruption) T. Vander Beken (ed.), EuropeanOrganisedScenariosfor 2015, Maklu, Antwerpen-Apeldoorn, 2005, 283p. K. Verfaillie and T. Vander Beken, “Interestingtimes: Europeancriminalmarkets in 2015”, Futures 2008, 438-450.

  12. 8. Larger EU projects • Assessing Organised Crime: Testing the Feasibility of a Common European Approach in a Case Study of the Cigarette Black Market in the EU (AOC), 2004-2006, European Commission, 6th Framework, Tilburg University (van Duyne), IRCP, Berlin University (von Lampe), Talinn University (Markina), Durham University (Hobbs) • Developing Mechanisms for Assessing the Risk of Crime. Due to Legislation and Products in order to proof them against crime at an EU level (Project MARC), 2004-2006, European Commission – 6th framework, Transcrime, IRCP, Cardiff University (Levi and Dorn), Paris 1 Sorbonne (Kopp), Heuni (Leppä), Rotterdam University (Van de Bunt), Max-Planck Institute Freiburg (Kilchling) • Criminal Money Management as a Cutting Edge between Profit Oriented Crime and Terrorism (EDGE), Europese Commission, Agis programme, 2006-2007, Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein-Westfalen, IRCP et al.

  13. 9. Results: the example of itinerant groups • An offendermobilitystudy • The research project • Distancedecaytheory • ICG and distancedecay • Distancedecayproblems • Range • Lookingforexplanations

  14. a. An offender mobility study In the late ’90 Belgianlawenforcementauthorities ‘discover’ a new group of perpetrators of property crime: the itinerant crime groups (ICG) (mobile banditism (NL), Délinquanceitinérante (F), OsteuropäischeTätergruppe (DE)) whichtheyassign the followingfeatures: an association of criminals; systematically committing residential burglaries or burglaries of commercial properties, including ram raids, cargo thefts, metal thefts or thefts of construction vehicles and materials; originating mainly from the former Eastern Bloc; operating or directed from abroad or from large conurbations in Belgium; committing a significant number of crimes over a large area; and possibly using minors to commit crimes. Are ICG really more mobile thanotheroffenders? (offendermobility of property crimes committedby ICG, BOF-projectGhentUniversity, 2007-2011).

  15. b. The research project • 2007-2008: What do we knowaboutoffendermobility (theories) and what does the police databasetellusaboutoffendermobility in Belgium in general and ICG in particular (64,000 offenders & 87,000 crimes in 2002-2006)? • 2008: What do case filestellusaboutmobility (with a special focus on the residenceor anchor points) of ICG (17 major case files analysed)? • 2009-: What do the offenderstellusabouttheirmobility?

  16. c. Distance decay theory • Travelling for crime takes time, costs and efforts and increases risk. • It is argued that most crimes are committed close to home, while the chance of criminal operations declines when the distance increases (distance decay). • Supported by empirical research both on aggregate and individual level.  Crime is local business (cost-benefit)

  17. d1. ICG and distance decay • ICG: multiple, co-offending, EasternEuropeanproperty crime offenders  ‘Core’ ICG • Meantravelled distances for offenders living in Belgium: • General : 17,2km (68264 trips) or 14,6km (28901 offenders) • ICG: 40,0km (2872 trips) or 37,4km (125 offenders)

  18. d2. ICG and distance decay

  19. e. Distance decay problems • Residence has to be known • 48,2% in database, less on non-Belgian (41,2%) and Eastern European (35,8%) offenders. • Residence is not always starting point (Wiles & Costello, 2000) • Residences of ICG are difficult to assess (Ponsaers, 2004)

  20. f1. Range • Do we need to know anchor points to calculate crime travelling? • Offender ranges can be calculated (Morselli & Royer, 2008; but also: geographical profiling) • Here: shortest distance between min(x,y) and max(x,y) • All offenders, who committed 2 or more offences • Offender ranges in Belgium: • General: 21,0km (20156 offenders) • ICG: 101,0km (305 offenders)

  21. f2. range

  22. g. Looking for explanations • Distance decay: ‘crime is local matter’ • Cost-benefit analysis • ICG: less local than other offenders? • Larger distances/ranges • Less decay • Explanation? (files, interviews)

  23. 10. Conclusions Research on the assessment of organised crime in Belgium is focused on risk based methodologies, threat assessments, vulnerability studies, future studies… The reaction side is studied as well: Studies on legal aspects of tackling trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation (of children), corruption,… Explicitly on the reaction to organised crime see e.g. research on the legal consequences of an “armed administrative approach” as an instrument in the fight against organised crime Ghent University, 2000-2002. Embedded in European research consortia and policy (EU, Council of Europe, OSCE, …)

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