Dr. Ali Hamed Al-Mulla, Ph.D. Manager Corporate Environment & Sustainable Development, QATAR PETROLEUM

1. Post 2012 Kyoto Protocol Climate Change Negotiations: Issues & Strategic Challenges to Qatar Dr. Ali Hamed Al-Mulla, Ph.D. Manager Corporate Environment & Sustainable Development, QATAR PETROLEUM

2. Negotiations under the Subsidiary Bodies • ****** • The Convention & Kyoto Protocol agreements take into account the equitable and just distribution of the rights and responsibilities of all nations under these agreements; • The Convention & KP contain provisions which reflect the special national circumstances and rights for development for developing country Parties including those for Qatar and other OPEC member States; Page 2 of 14

3. Negotiations under the Subsidiary Bodies • Developing country Parties including OPEC member States, have relied on these specific provisions to prop up their negotiation position seeking to secure their national interest. • Primary provisions and issues in UNFCCC and KP that are strategically important to Qatar include: • Articles 4.3, 4.1 of the Convention on commitment by developed countries for finance, technology transfer and capacity building. • Article 4.8 of the Convention on specific needs and concerns of oil & gas producing exporting countries (OPEC). • Article 3.14 of KP on minimizing the effects on developing country dependent on fossil fuel export. • Article 2.3 of KP, Article 12, and issues pertaining to flexible mechanisms (CDM). • Article 2,2 of KP on issues relating to bunker fuel (International Aviation and Maritime Transport) . Page 3 of 14

4. Negotiations under the Subsidiary Bodies • Up to COP14/CMP4 in Poland, little or no progress has been made on the foregoing issues. • Article 4.8 of the Convention (5/CP.7, 1/CP.10): Disagreement, mainly on the issue of the impact of the response measures, persisted. • Clean Development Mechanism: More important to OPEC and Qatar is the inclusion of CCS in geological formations under the CDM. There is an uphill struggle due to opposition by Brazil, Small Island States, the African Group and surprisingly Venezuela (an OPEC member State) despite support from the EU and Japan. Page 4 of 14

5. Negotiations under the Subsidiary Bodies Bunker fuel:. • Qatar and OPEC member States, argue that Article 2.2 of the KP is clear on the responsibility of Annex-1 Parties for these emissions and that their control is within the mandate of the ICAO and IMO, not the UNFCCC. • Industrial countries are using various tactics to lure Parties to their position, including bargaining progress in this issue with that of KP Article 2.3 ,held in abeyance for a number of years. • Positive outcomes from the negotiation: • Strategic program on technology transfer, renamed the “Poznan strategic program on technology transfer”, was adopted. • Review of the Convention Articles 4.1(c) and 4.5 on technology transfer and finance was also agreed. • Adaptation Fund made operational. Page 5 of 14

6. Negotiations Under the AWG-KP • Article 3.9 of KP mandates Annex-1 Parties to consider subsequent commitments at least 7 years before the end of the first period in 31 December 2012. • The AWG-KP held its first meeting in Bonn during May 2006. Subsequent meetings followed, the last of which, the 6th session, was held during COP14/MOP4 in Poznan, Poland. Work program includes: • Analysis of the mitigation potential and ranges of emission reduction objectives of Annex-1 Parties; • Analysis of the possible means that may be available to Annex-1Parties to achieve mitigation objectives; • Consideration of further commitments by Annex-1 Parties. Page 6 of 14

7. Negotiations Under the AWG-KP • An important issue to Qatar under the AWG-KP negotiation is the adverse “spill-over effects” on developing country Parties resulting from the domestic policies and measures adopted by developed country Parties while addressing climate change. • Despite strong opposition, from the developing countries and the USA, to attempts of linking the Convention and the Protocol tracks, Annex-1 Parties are buying time to merge the negotiations into a single package, for all countries, under a new climate agreement to be agreed upon in Copenhagen. Page 7 of 14

8. Bali Action Plan: Kick off for post 2012 • The Conference of Parties (COP13/CMP 3) held in Bali in 2007 signaled the kick off of Post-2012 negotiation due to agreement between developing and developed countries that led to the Bali Roadmap and the Bali Action Plan (BAP, decision 1/CP.13). • The BAP agreement meant converting “non-binding” discussions under the “dialogue” into a negotiation platform for all Parties; hence negotiation to run on 2-tracks (an AWG-KP track and a BAP track); • BAP consists of 13 paragraphs, most important of which is paragraph 1 on the scope and mandate. • Paragraph 2 provides for establishment of the AWG-LCA and entrusts it with BAP implementation. It also mandates the completion of its work and presentation of the outcome to the 15th Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen in 2009, for adoption. • The rest of BAP’s paragraphs cover other less important elements of the decision including logistics, organizational issues and administration. Differentiated Mitigation Responsibility. Paragraphs 1b (i) and 1b (ii) are unquestionably the most central and perhaps revolutionary elements in the entire BAP agreement: Page 8 of 14

9. Bali Action Plan : Kick off for post 2012 • Paragraph 1 b (i): Measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions, including quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives, by all developed country Parties, while ensuring the comparability of efforts among them, taking into account differences in their national circumstances; • Paragraph 1 b (ii) Nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner. • ******* • The anticipated commitments on developing country Parties are contingent on being nationally appropriate and in line with sustainable development, in addition to being financially and technologically supported by the developed countries. • ***** • Commitments on the developing country Parties would have to be matched by measurable, reportable and verifiable (MRV) support from the industrial countries. Page 9 of 14

10. Bali Action Plan : Kick off for post 2012 Developed/Developing Vs Annex/non-Annex • Commitments on the developed country Parties, is explicit and unconditional according to paragraph 1b (i) of BAP. • Another important aspect of paragraph 1(b) (i) and (ii) of BAP is its language which moves away from the UNFCCC classical classification code of “Annex 1, non-Annex Parties” to “developing and developed country Parties” • New terminology is leading the negotiation into a possibility of differentiation among developing countries on basis of respective capabilities and economic development. • Developing countries with booming economies, like China, India, Brazil and South Korea, and arguably rich OPEC member States, will be targeted for mitigation commitments. • Consensus on appropriate socioeconomic coefficients to determine the degree of development among developing Parties is probably one of the most contentious issues to be dealt with in the upcoming negotiations. • Qatar has submitted a position paper to the upcoming negotiation rounds of the AWG-LCA on interpretation of Paragraph 1 b (ii); issues covered include NAMAs, differentiation among developing country Parties and proposals for establishing a registry under the UNFCCC; Page 10 of 14

11. Bali Action Plan : Kick off for post 2012 Sectoral Approaches: A strategic challenge to Qatar • Conducted under both the AWG-LCA and AWG-KP; • AWG-LCA platform deals with paragraph 1 b (iv) of BAP which addresses cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions, in order to enhance implementation of Article 4, paragraph 1(c), of the Convention. • The Article calls on Parties to “promote and cooperate in the development, application and diffusion, including transfer of technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic emissions of GHGs…” • AWG-KP are focused on possible approaches targeting sectoral emissions and potential for broadening of the coverage of GHGs. The objective is to enable developed countries to accomplish their emission reduction targets under Article 3.9 of the KP. • Approaches to limit GHGs emissions from aviation and marine bunker fuels, pursuant to Article 2.2 of the KP, are being considered, by developed country Parties. • Japan and EU are pushing to combine discussions on sectoral approaches under AWG-LCA and AWG-KP on pretext of sharing best available technologies and practices, but in reality targeting GHG/Energy-intensive industries in developing countries. Page 11 of 14

12. Bali Action Plan: Kick off for post 2012 Sectoral Approaches: A strategic challenge to Qatar • Sectoral approaches can be used to justify the creation of new international standards on a sector by sector basis for GHG/energy intensive industries (Steel, cement, petrochemical, Aluminum etc.) • May lead to added cost on products exported from developing countries, making them less competitive; • May justify trade barriers by developed countries against products from developing country Parties (justifiable trade bans, border adjustments that limit trade on basis of GHG/energy standards) • May be used by developed countries to enable disproportionate market access in developing countries and also may be used to strengthen the intellectual property rights over low carbon emission technologies or climate-resilient crops owned by companies in the developed countries. • Qatar has submitted a position paper on the issue of sectoral approaches to the upcoming negotiation round of the AWG-LCA. Page 12 of 14

13. Conclusion • Agreement to Bali Action Plan at COP13/CMP 3 in 2007 signaled integration of climate change negotiation, which now runs on two tracks a Convention track for all and a KP track for industrial countries; • Current state of the negotiations indicates that the possibility of introduction of mitigation responsibilities on some developing countries has become real; • Qatar may need to accept some nationally appropriate mitigation actions, provided they are in line with sustainable development and specific national circumstances. Moreover, mitigation initiatives need to be supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building from developed countries, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner. • Efforts by industrial countries to differentiate between developing countries on basis of GDP or GHG per capita are detrimental to Qatar and other “low population”-oil producing and exporting countries. • Efforts to sneak-in trade-related regulations and standards in the AWG-LCA under the disguise of sectoral approaches must be forcibly opposed by developing countries. They contravene the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and other provisions of the Convention……..end Page 13 of 14

14. Thank you for attention… Page 14 of 14