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HCI in Aircraft

HCI in Aircraft. Serious Business Or Monkey Business January 31, 1961 “Ham”, a chimpanzee, worked levers during his 16 minute space flight. The astrochimp traveled 5,800 mph in a Project Mercury capsule. Human Factors Ergonomics Human Automation Factors Human Computer Interaction.

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HCI in Aircraft

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  1. HCI in Aircraft Serious Business Or Monkey Business January 31, 1961 “Ham”, a chimpanzee, worked levers during his 16 minute space flight. The astrochimp traveled 5,800 mph in a Project Mercury capsule.

  2. Human Factors ErgonomicsHuman Automation Factors Human Computer Interaction

  3. Since the Beginning

  4. Deregulation of the Airlines in 1978 Leads to further stimulation of the economy

  5. Horizontal Situation Indicators(HIS)LoranGlobal Positioning Satellites (GPS)Ground Collision Avoidance

  6. My Personal Favorite By the early 80’s the term “The glass cock-pit had immerged.

  7. Today's modern equipment

  8. The Modern Glass Cockpit A340 Airbus most popular airplane today.

  9. Strangely enough these aircraft keep turning up in crash sites, sometimes killing hundreds of people! There is only one answer in most cases investigated by the FAA, NTSB, and NASA.

  10. “Pilot Error”

  11. “Work-load” and “Complacency”

  12. (Moscow, 1991 and Nagoya, Japan 1994), an auto flight mode commanded nose-up pitch while the pilot commanded nose-down pitch during an autopilot-coupled go-around. In the Moscow incident, the airplane went through a number of extreme pitch oscillations until the crew was able to disconnect the automation and gain control. In Nagoya, the crew inadvertently activated the go-around mode during a normal approach. The crew attempted to reacquire the glide slope by commanding nose down elevator, but this conflicted with the auto flight mode’s logic and pitch up commands. In addition, the automated stabilizer system had trimmed the aircraft to maximum nose-up, following its go-around logic (which may not have been clearly annunciated to the crew).

  13. The crew should have allowed the automated flight mode to control the aircraft, or should have completely disconnected the automation. The situation was recoverable, but the crew, interacting with the automation (and in the presence of reduced feedback), put the aircraft into an unrecoverable position. An underlying issue relates to the mechanism enabling a pilot to disconnect the auto flight mode and regain manual control. The autopilot was designed not to disconnect using the standard control column force when in go-around mode below a specific altitude (for protection), and needed to be disconnected by an alternate mode; the crew may have believed they disconnected the autopilot and were manually controlling the aircraft when, in fact, the automation was still operating. Ultimately, the automated flight mode dominated, the aircraft pitched up, stalled and crashed” (Rudisill, March 1, 2000).

  14. Night flying, in bad weather is one of the deadliest combinations for airline pilots

  15. December 20, 1995 – 160 die when an American Airlines 757 crashes into a mountainside near Cali, Colombia

  16. August 6, 1997 – 228 people die when a Korean Air 747 plunges into a hill at night on the island of Guam

  17. A look at what a Synthetic Vision screen might appear like, showing the oncoming terrain

  18. But more technology only adds to the work load.

  19. 70% of aircraft accidents are still attributed to human error.

  20. Then what's fueling the changes today to maintain and keep the glass cock pit?

  21. Analog gauges and systems are not compatible with the airlines needs to survive! • NEXCOM • Controller Pilot Data Link Control (CPDLC)

  22. “The most common questions pilots ask with regard to flight deck automation are:”

  23. “What’s it doing now?”“Why did it do that?”and“What will it do next?”.(Wiener, 1989)

  24. Surprise Functions Vertical navigation logic Data entry Infrequently used features & modes Data propagation Partial system failures (Sarter & Woods, 1992a)

  25. Not all that different Neilsen’s 10 HeuristicsNaval Aviation Human Factors • Visibility of system status 1. Sensory-Perceptual • Match between system and the real world 2. Medical/Physiological • User control and freedom 3. Attitude/Personality • Consistency and standards 4. Judgment/Decision • Error prevention 5. Communication • Recognition rather than recall 6. Crew Factors • Flexibility and efficiency of use 7. Design/Systems • Aesthetics and minimalist design 8. Supervisory • Help users recognize, diagnose, and recover from errors 10. Help and documentation

  26. Another significant set of standards Billings - Aviation Automation Human Factors 1.Accountable 2. Subordinate 3. Predictable 4. Adaptable 5. Comprehensible 6. Simple 7. Flexible 8. Dependable 9. Informative 10. Error resistant and Error tolerant

  27. M. Neville - Ag Cat photo Proctor, P., (1995). “What price is a mistake?” Industry Outlook. New York: McGraw-Hill. Pg. 17. Nordwall, D., “FAA launches Nexcom with ATC radio contact” Aviation Week & Space Technology. Pg. 47. Aug. 6th, 2001. Rudisill, M.Ph.D., “Crew Automation Interaction…” NASA. March 1, 2000. Online. Internet. Feb.6,2002.Available: <http://techreports.larc.nasa.gov/ltrs/PDF/2000/mtg/NASA-2000-hstew-mr.pdf ftp://techreports.larc.nasa.gov/pub/techreports/larc/2000/mtg/NASA-2000-hstew-mr.ps.Z > Flottau, J., “Runway Incursion Kills 118 at Milan-Linate” Aviation Week & Space Technology. Pg. 47. Oct. 15th, 2001. Wells, A., (2001). Commercial Aviation Safety New York: McGraw-Hill. Billings, C.E. (1991) “Human-Centered Aircraft Automation: A concept and guidelines” NASA. Technical Memorandum 103885. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. Billings, C.E. (1997) “Aviation automation: The search for a human-centered approach” Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence-Erlbaum Associates. Norman, D.A. (1989) “The “problem” of automation: Inappropriate feedback and interaction, not “over-automation.” Human Factors in High-Risk Situations, The Royal Society. Wiener, E.L. (1989) “Human factors of advanced technology (“glass cockpit”) transport Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: Ames Research Center. Sarter, N.B. and Woods, D.D. (1991) “Pilot Interaction with Cockpit Automation I: Operational Experiences with the Flight Management System (FMS”). Cognitive Systems Engineering Laboratory, Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, The Ohio State University. Sarter, N.B. and Woods, D.D. (1992a) “Pilot Interaction with Cockpit Automation II: An experimental study of pilots’ models and awareness of the Flight Management System”. Cognitive Systems Engineering Laboratory, Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, The Ohio State University. Sarter, N. B. and Woods, D. D. (1992b) “Pilot interaction with cockpit automation I: Operational experiences with the flight management system”. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Bibliography

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