Sequential bargaining on a perishable goods market: The influence of the seller’s beliefs and the buyers’ times constraints. S. Moulet and J. Rouchier mettre greqam logo. The Presentation. Introduction: Our question and the studied case Bargaining models Economics and games theory
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S. Moulet and J. Rouchier mettre greqam logo
We looked at the process that leads to the transaction price and more generally to the state of the market (prices, nature of meetings…).
We have made a survey on the individuals’ behaviour on the MIN
to get a better understanding in sellers attitude facing their customers: We have constructed a learning process model
We studied results and compared them to empirical facts.
It is face to face institutional form.
Difficult to modelize in a analytical way:
Allows toreproduce« in vitro » phenomenons
By the time gathered information transformed core beliefs’ agents.
The buyer chooses a seller. emerge?
The seller makes an offer p
The buyer accepts p.
It decides if it wants to make a counter-offer
The buyer makes a counter-offer c
The seller accepts c
The seller makes a second offer s
The buyer accepts the second offer. s
* We consider:
are set as equal for all simulations.
* Parameters :
The learning takes place through reinforcement :
At the beginning:
No precise idea of the sellers’ price.
Same limit value for all sellers
Behavioural adaptation according to the new information: the seller’s price and it adapts its.
At each moment,
Decision to take:
Either they benefit from the actual situation
Or continue to acquire information.
Maximize the probability to acquire the good without losing money.
With our learning process we consider that potential buyers visit more (in probability) the sellers who have already conclude in the past a transaction at a low price during the first step.
The buyer has got in its mind an idea of the seller’s reservation value. At each step, it will offer the best price that maximise its probability to acquire the good according to its beliefs.)
At each step:
we assume that:
according to the nature of buyers’ answer (acceptance/refusal), sellers update their beliefs involving an increase or decrease function
The variation depends only on the stage of the bargain in which the answer is made.
Decision on quantity to supply
the same sold quantity than added to a fixed quantity (m).
Two reasons to optimize the profits keeping one margin:
keeping good contacts with their suppliers
not losing opportunities in the future.
Notes: The discount depends only on the time.
Notes: To simplify, we can consider that the price is negatively correlated to the ratio: remaining stock/ remaining time.
Indeed, more time to explore the market, involve receiving more information, and behavioural adaptation improves.
This result is not comparable from the empirical observation as far as agents’ limit value is not revealed. But it could explain a possible market disappearance in the future…