Analysis and improvements over dos attacks against ieee 802 11i standard
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Analysis and Improvements over DoS Attacks against IEEE 802.11i Standard. Networks Security, Wireless Communications and Trusted Computing(NSWCTC) , 2010 Author : Li Wang , Balasubramaniam Srinivasan Reporter : Ming- Chieh Lee Date : 2013/10/07. Outline.

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Analysis and Improvements over DoS Attacks against IEEE 802.11i Standard

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Analysis and improvements over dos attacks against ieee 802 11i standard

Analysis and Improvements over DoS Attacks against IEEE 802.11i Standard

Networks Security, Wireless Communications and Trusted Computing(NSWCTC) , 2010

Author : Li Wang, Balasubramaniam Srinivasan

Reporter : Ming-Chieh Lee

Date : 2013/10/07


Outline

Outline

  • Introductionof IEEE 802.11i Standard

  • DoS attack

    • De-authentication / Disassociation Attacks

    • DoS attacks to 4-way handshakes

  • Conclusion


Ieee 802 11i standard

IEEE 802.11i Standard

  • IEEE 802.11i : A security standard of 802.11 series WLAN

    • RSN (Robust Security Network)

    • Supplicant,Authenticator , Authentication Server

    • RSNA Establishment Procedures

    • Network and Security Capability Discovery

    • 802.11 Open System Authentication and Association

    • EAP/802.1X/RADIUS Authentication

    • 4-Way Handshake

    • Group Key Handshake

    • Secure Data Communications


De authentication disassociation attacks

De-authentication/ DisassociationAttacks

  • management frames are unprotected

  • all WLAN users can be disconnected by broadcasting the frameby setting the destination address as FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF

Attacker

Attacker

Authenticator

Supplicant

Supplicant

Authenticator

Authentication request

Authentication request

Authentication response

Authentication response

Association request

Association request

Association response

Association response

De-authentication

Disassociation

data

data

Disassociation

De-authentication


Proposed mechanism to prevent this attack

Proposed Mechanism to Prevent this Attack

  • Before PTK is generated

    • defer the execution for 5 sec

  • After the PTK exchange protocol

    • protected by the sequence number (SN) and KCK


  • Proposed mechanism to prevent this attack1

    Proposed Mechanism to Prevent this Attack

    • authenticator wants to de-authenticate or disassociate all the supplicants

      • broadcast messages with secret key K

      • (message)

      • comparison with the received one in Message 3 of 4-way Handshake


    4 way handshake

    4-way Handshake

    • Handshake Goals

      • Confirm the possession of PMK

      • Derive a fresh session key(PTK) for data transmission

      • PTK = PRF{PMK, AA, SPA, ANonce, SNonce}

    Supplicant(PMK)

    Authenticator(PMK)

    {AA , ANonce , SN ,msg1}

    Derive PTK

    {SPA , SNonce ,SN , msg2 ,(SNonce , SN , msg2) }

    Derive PTK

    Verify MIC

    {AA , Anonce ,SN+1 , msg3 ,(Anonce , SN+1 , msg3) }

    Verify MIC

    install PTK

    {SPA ,SNonce , SN+1 , msg4 ,(SNonce ,SN+1 , msg4) }

    Verify MIC

    install PTK


    Dos attack in 4 way handshake phase

    DoS attack in 4-way Handshake phase

    Attacker

    Supplicant(PMK)

    Authenticator(PMK)

    {AA , ANonce , SN ,msg1}

    Derive PTK

    {SPA , SNonce ,SN , msg2 ,(SNonce , SN , msg2) }

    Derive PTK

    Verify MIC

    {AA , ANonce’ , SN ,msg1}

    Calculate PTK’

    {AA , ANonce ,SN+1 , msg3 ,(ANonce , SN+1 , msg3) }

    Weak point: No protection of Message 1

    PTK ≠ PTK’

    Verify MIC fail - > discard

    Timeout - > De-authentication


    Analysis and improvements over dos attacks against ieee 802 11i standard

    DoS attack in 4-way Handshakephase

    Supplicant(PMK)

    Authenticator(PMK)

    Attacker

    {AA , ANonce , SN ,msg1}

    Derive PTK

    {SPA , SNonce ,SN , msg2 ,(SNonce , SN , msg2) }

    Derive PTK

    Verify MIC

    {AA , ANonce’ , SN ,msg1}

    Calculate PTK’

    Store PTK’ & ANonce’

    {AA , ANonce’’ , SN ,msg1}

    memory exhaustion attack

    {AA , ANonce’’’ , SN ,msg1}

    {AA , , SN ,msg1}

    Calculate

    Store &

    9/11


    Enhanced 3 way handshake

    Enhanced 3-way Handshake

    • Solution

    • ANonce is not involved in the PTK generation

      • PTK = PRF{PMK, AA, SPA, SNonce}

    • supplicant won’t store the received ANonce

    Authenticator(PMK)

    Supplicant(PMK)

    {AA , ANonce , SN ,msg1}

    Derive PTK

    • Advantages

      • Eliminate the memory DoS attack

    Verify ANonce

    Derive PTK

    Verify MIC

    install PTK

    {SPA , ANonce , SNonce ,SN , msg2 (ANonce , SNonce , SN,msg2) }

    Verify SNonce

    Verify MIC

    install PTK

    {AA , SNonce ,SN+1 , msg3 ,(SNonce , SN+1 , msg3) }

    10/11


    Conclusions

    Conclusions

    • IEEE 802.11i standard was defined in order to overcome thevulnerabilities in WEP and WPA but still it is not secure against DoS attacks

    • de-authentication/ disassociation attacks

      • hybrid mechanism

    • 4-wayHandshakeattacks

      • Parallel instances exist => Forged Message 1 attack

      • Keep all states =>memory exhaustionattack

      • Enhanced 3-way Handshake


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