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Philosophy of Mind

Philosophy of Mind. I. Introduction II. Ontological Issues. I. Introduction. The philosophy of mind: Attempts to answer the questions like: - Does the mind exist? - What is the nature of the mind? - How is the mind related to the body (i.e., brain)? - Can a machine have a mind?

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Philosophy of Mind

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  1. Philosophy of Mind I. Introduction II. Ontological Issues

  2. I. Introduction • The philosophy of mind: Attempts to answer the questions like: • - Does the mind exist? • - What is the nature of the mind? • - How is the mind related to the body (i.e., brain)? • - Can a machine have a mind? • - How can a mind emerge from purely physical processes (i.e., mind-body problem)? • - What is the relation between conscious awareness (mind) and neuronal activity in the brain (body)? • - How exactly do neurobiological processes in the brain give rise to consciousness?

  3. Some Observations about Mind • 1. The mind is mental (vs. physical) in nature, encompassing a variety of mental phenomenon such as • Sensation, Perception, Feeling, Emotion, • Thinking, Pain, Dreams, Love, … • 2. These mental states are subjective and private: • They cannot be witnessed by other observers (e.g., color perception) • - Does a surface-to-air missile have mental states?

  4. (e.g.,) Color Perception • Imagine two persons who have same experiences of the world but with different colors: • Alice’s world Mike’s world • Red <==> Green • Green <==> Blue • Blue <==> Red • Can this difference be discovered by observing their behaviors and brain states? • The difference may lie only in the quality of their visual experiences, but not in any physically and behavioral identifiable ways.

  5. Qualia • Philosopher’s term for the introspectively accessible, distinctively subjective experiences of mental states. • (e.g.) • - Perceptual experience (seeing red, hearing music, smelling the sea air) • - Bodily sensations (pains, feeling itchy) • Not all mental states possess qualia: • - Experience of suddenly understanding of a math problem • Hotly debated, hypothetical construct that is non-physical • - Are qualia irreducible (i.e., intrinsic qualities of their bearers)? • - How do qualia relate themselves to the world outside? • (this is the mind-body problem)

  6. 3. An infinite recursion problem • Is it possible or even allowed for one mind to study and understand another?

  7. The mind-body problem is a “hard” problem: • Ill-defined? • Unanswerable? • Forever unknowable? • Asking a wrong question? • Not a single problem but multiple problems? • Language/ definition? • Too sacred to attempt to answer?

  8. II. Ontological Issues • The ontology of mind is the study of the nature of mental states and their relation to physical states. • Theories of the Mind: • 1. Materialism (only matter exists) • 2. Immaterialism/Idealism (only mind/ideas exists) • 3. Dualism (both mind and matter exist) • 4. Functionalism (neither matters but functions) • (Note: What follows is based on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entires))

  9. 1. Materialism • Nothing exists but matter. Mental states are nothing but sophisticated states of the brain (physical system), and thus can be reduced to bio-physico-chemical phenomenon. • - Pattern of neural firings defines mental state • - Reductionism in neuroscience • Counterarguments: • - How can we account for qualia (seeing red, feeling happy/angry), thoughts, desires, intentions, expectations, beliefs…? • - What else??

  10. 2. Immaterialism/Idealism (Berkeley) • Everything that exists is mental, and there is no such things as the material. No material things exist. • The world (self and surrounds) is nothing but a pure creation of the mind. Reality, as we know it, consists wholly of minds and their ideas. No mind, no reality. • Material things are nothing but collections of “ideas” • “Esse est persipi aut percipere.” • (To be is to be perceived or to perceive)

  11. Do not deny the existence of what “appears” to be the world around us such as trees, buildings, people, sky,… According to Berkeley, however, what such objects turn out to be are no more than bundles or collection of ideas, all created in the bearer’s mind or “consciousness”. • Observer-dependent reality in Buddhistic psychology: “Seeds and plants, beams and structurally intact roofs – none of them are entities with permanent, totally independent existence [outside the mind]… In the absence of human beings, reality as human beings perceive it would cease to be.” (M. Ricard, The Monk and the Philosopher, 1998) • Quantum Physics and Reality: What is the sound of a tree falling deep in the woods when no one is around to hear it? (R. Pine, Science and the Human Prospect, 1988) “What we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning.” (W. Heisenberg)

  12. 3. Dualism (Pluto, Decartes) • Mind and matter/body are two completely different kinds of substances, each capable of existing independently of the other and one being causally linked to the other. • Mental states are not reducible to physical states. - Sensation of pain (mind) vs physical object that caused the pain (matter/body) • The question that arises naturally is then: -How is the mind related to the body? (mind-body problem) • Counterarguments??

  13. 4. Functionalism • A mental state is nothing but physical sates described “functionally.” • A mental state is defined by the function it serves or performs, and is characterized in terms of its role in relating inputs to outputs and its relations to other mental states, nothing more and nothing less. • (e.g.) Feeling pain (mental state): • (1) Input: injury/trauma to body • (2) Causal relation: produce the belief that something is wrong with the body and the desire to be out of that state • (3] output: moaning or wincing

  14. Multiple realizability of functionalism: • According to the functionalistic view, any other physical system that undergoes the same causal sequence as above can be characterized as a mental state of “feeling pain.” • - DNA solving Hamiltonian path problem vs PC solving the same problem • - Software-vs-hardware analogy • - Neither materialism nor dualism • - No mind-body problem • - Popular view in cognitive science • Counterarguments: • - Color perception (sense of red vs green)

  15. UAV • Discussion of the Paper “Where Am I?” by D C Dennett

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