Volatile capital flows monitoring systemic risks
1 / 26

Volatile Capital Flows: Monitoring Systemic Risks - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

  • Uploaded on

Volatile Capital Flows: Monitoring Systemic Risks. Giampiero M. Gallo DiSIA Università di Firenze, Italy [email protected] South East Europe in an Environment of Volatile Capital Flows CBBH Sarajevo June 6, 2014. Concentrate on Potential Global Factors.

I am the owner, or an agent authorized to act on behalf of the owner, of the copyrighted work described.
Download Presentation

PowerPoint Slideshow about ' Volatile Capital Flows: Monitoring Systemic Risks ' - jonas-baxter

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation

Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author.While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Presentation Transcript
Volatile capital flows monitoring systemic risks

Volatile Capital Flows:Monitoring Systemic Risks

Giampiero M. Gallo


Università di Firenze, Italy

[email protected]

South East Europe in an Environment of Volatile Capital Flows

CBBH Sarajevo June 6, 2014

Concentrate on potential global factors
Concentrate on Potential Global Factors

  • Main view: EMs (hence SEE) suffer from cascading effects, possibly dominating domestic factors

  • Domestic financing needs crucially depend on international capital market conditions

    • Government needs

      • Market yields depend on evolution of risk premia (domestic –debt, deficit, growth, inflation - and external factors)

    • Financing needs for domestically operating financial institutions (composition across equity, deposits, debt)

    • Financing needs for the economy (credit, money and capital markets – level of development of such markets?): recent phenomenon of huge excess reserves by banks

  • Lessons for regulations (e.g. carry trade)

CBBH – Sarajevo June 6, 2014

Public and corporate debt management in em
Public and Corporate Debt Management in EM

  • Overall improvement in the management of debt

    • Extend time to maturity

    • Reduce exposure in foreign currency

    • Reduce floating rate exposure

    • Better awareness of controlling public spending

  • On the demand side: rising foreign participation

    • Broader investment base (reduce funding costs, risk diversification)

    • Capital outflows related to reactions to global news

  • Need to track

    • Investors’ base and

    • Systemic risks

CBBH- Sarajevo June 6, 2014

Investors base for sovereigns arslanap and tsuda 2014
Investors’ Base for Sovereigns (Arslanap and Tsuda, 2014)

  • Shifts in the composition of the investor base can have implications for governments’ borrowing costs

  • A rising share of foreign investors in the investor base can make borrowers more sensitive to external funding conditions

  • A high share of domestic banks in the investor base may jeopardize domestic financial stability

  • A diverse investor base, reflecting different investor characteristics in terms of risk tolerance and trading motives, may increase the liquidity of government debt securities in the secondary market (may be limited if herding effects)

CBBH- Sarajevo June 6, 2014

Monitoring investors base composition
Monitoring Investors’ Base Composition

CBBH – Sarajevo June 6, 2014

Different compositions different risks
Different Compositions, Different Risks

CBBH – Sarajevo June 6, 2014

The interdependences at stake
The Interdependences at Stake

CBBH – Sarajevo June 6, 2014

Ingredients of a monitoring system
Ingredients of a Monitoring System

Monitor whataffectsinvestors’ portfolio choices by type of investor (leadingindicators of impendingshifts)

  • Sovereign Bonds (yields, spreads and volatility)

  • Corporate Bonds (yields, spreads and volatility)

  • Equities (volatilities and spreads in volatilities)

  • Correlationsacrossassetclasses

  • SystemicImportant Financial Institutions:

    • Estimation of MarginalExpectedShortfall

    • Capital Shortfall vs volatility

    • Estimation of SRISK and ranking of SIFIs

CBBH – Sarajevo June 6, 2014

Us corporate risk
US Corporate Risk

CBBH – Sarajevo June 6, 2014

Country risk
Country Risk

CBBH – Sarajevo June 6, 2014

Spillover effects
Spillover Effects

CBBH – Sarajevo June 6, 2014

Monitoring systemic risk
Monitoring Systemic Risk

  • Two main common features behind systemic risk:

    • initial impairment to the financial system

    • consequent spillover to the real economy

  • Soundnessof individual institutions is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition to guarantee systemic stability

  • Monitoring market volatility as a potential source of transmission channel but it is the joint distribution of asset returns that matters, mainly the tail dependence.

CBBH – Sarajevo June 6, 2014

The fear index and the fear premium
The Fear Index and the Fear Premium

CBBH – Sarajevo June 6, 2014

Correlation across asset classes
Correlation across Asset Classes

CBBH – Sarajevo June 6, 2014

Systemic important financial institutions
Systemic Important Financial Institutions


  • their big size,

  • their scant substitutability as service providers, and

  • their extremely high interconnectedness that greatly contributes to spread out individual vulnerabilities

    Relevance for the debate today

  • Monitoring the SIFI’s risk dynamics has implications for the volatility of Capital Flows

CBBH – Sarajevo June 6, 2014

Beyond var
Beyond VaR

  • The CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, is the VaR of one financial institution conditional on the whole system being in distress.

  • The difference between the CoVaR and the unconditional VaR of the financial system gives the marginal contribution of that particular institution to systemic risk.

  • Key point: some institutions can have a low VaR, but a high CoVaR. This is why the simple VaR is not a sufficient measure to evaluate the systemic riskiness of financial institutions.

  • CoVar has complement in Marginal Expected Shortfall

CBBH – Sarajevo June 6, 2014

Acharya engle and richardson 2012
Acharya, Engle and Richardson (2012)

  • Systemic risk should not be described in terms of a financial firm’s failure per se but in the context of a firm’s overall contribution to system‐wide failure.

  • When only an individual financial firm’s capital is low, the firm can no longer financially intermediate. This has minimal consequences though because other financial firms can fill in for the failed firm’s void.

  • When capital is low in the aggregate, however, it is not possible for other financial firms to step into the breach. This breakdown in aggregate financial intermediation is the reason there are severe consequences for the broader economy.

CBBH – Sarajevo June 6, 2014

Capital shortfall as a source of volatile capital flows
Capital Shortfall as a Source of Volatile Capital Flows

  • Real systemic risk of a firm =

    • Real social costs of a crisis per dollar of capital shortage times

    • Probability of a crisis i.e., an aggregate capital shortfall times

    • Expected capital shortfall of the firm in a crisis

  • Expected capital shortfall captures in a single measure many of the characteristics considered important for systemic risk such as size, leverage, and interconnectedness

  • Alternative or complement to stress tests

CBBH – Sarajevo June 6, 2014


  • Market volatility and Firm’sVolatility

  • Econometricmodels for volatility and correlations

CBBH – Sarajevo June 6, 2014

Evaluating losses under crisis scenarios
Evaluating Losses under Crisis Scenarios

  • To calculate the systemic risk, this system first evaluates the losses that an equity holder would face if there is a future crisis.

  • To do this, the system is simulated for six months into the future many times.

  • The most pessimistic scenarios for the market return are treated as Crisis scenarios

  • The expected loss of equity value of firm i is called the Long Run Marginal Expected Shortfall or LRMES. This is just the average of the fractional returns of the firm’s equity in the crisis scenarios.

CBBH – Sarajevo June 6, 2014

Construction of srisk from balance sheets
Construction of SRISK from Balance Sheets

  • Capital shortfall with a prudential capital ratio of k

  • If SRISK=0

CBBH – Sarajevo June 6, 2014

Srisk for deutsche bank
SRISK for Deutsche Bank

CBBH – Sarajevo June 6, 2014

Volatility for deutsche bank
Volatility for Deutsche Bank

CBBH – Sarajevo June 6, 2014

Rankings as of may 30 2014
Rankings as of May 30, 2014

CBBH – Sarajevo June 6, 2014

A silver lining
A Silver Lining?

CBBH – Sarajevo June 6, 2014

Implications for see
Implications for SEE

  • Use the monitoringsystem to evaluate the relevance of indicators for the specificdomestic banking/capital market dynamics

  • Monitoring SRISK for major EuropeanSEFIsmaysignalimpendingreversals in global strategies

  • Compare differencesacross SEE countries to isolate possibleinstitutionaldifferences

  • Indications for regulatoryscenarios

CBBH – Sarajevo June 6, 2014