MORE HASTE, LESS SPEED? Evaluation of Fast Track Feb 2003 – Jan 2005

1. MORE HASTE, LESS SPEED?EvaluationofFast Track Feb 2003 – Jan 2005 Universities of Glasgow Stirling Strathclyde

2. TWO STRANDS A. New approach forchildren’s hearings to tackleyouth crime What works? Evidence-based policy and practice

3. Innovation and evaluation New policy or service Pilot Evaluate Evidence of lack of success Evidence of success CARRY ON ROLL OUT STOP ! MODIFY (AND CARRY ON)

4. Children’s hearings and crime • Children’s hearings not courts deal with nearly all offences by young people age < 16 years, where compulsory measures may be required • The processes for dealing with offences are the same as for other ‘grounds of referral’ to the hearings (e.g. care and protection concerns) • Reporters handle referrals; lay panel members make decisions • Decisions should be made giving paramount consideration to the welfare of the child or young person

5. Children’s hearings and persistent offending • Young people who persistently offend account for a large % crime (and hence trouble to society) • Persistent offending is a risk factor for adult/life-course offending • Hearings have been regarded as ‘ineffective’ in dealing with persistent offending (though so have other systems too) • Delays in response encourage repeat offending

6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS • Improve (risk) assessment • Target interventions on young people who • persistently offend • Speed up processes FAST TRACK

7. The Fast Track Pilot • Aims[Targets] • reduce time taken for decisions [maximum duration for each stage in all cases] • promote comprehensive assessments [all cases with risk assessment – YLS or ASSET] • ensure access to appropriate programmes [each young person - specific plan; a programme when needed] • reduce re-offending

8. The Fast Track Pilot Criterion 5 or more offence referrals in 6 months OR reporter discretion

9. The Fast Track Pilot 3 SITES – 6 AUTHORITIES Dundee East, North and South Ayrshire East Lothian and Scottish Borders Began February 2003

10. The Fast Track Pilot ADDITIONAL RESOURCES Mainly went to reporters, local authority social work and voluntary agencies Small amounts for police and for panel member training • Most spending was on: • front line reporters and social work personnel • IT • admin support • specialist services e.g. youth offending schemes, mentors

11. The Fast Track Pilot Like all areas in Scotland, the pilots had received additional Youth Justice funding in the previous few years Expenditure on individual cases continued to be mainly from other sources, with the single largest component being residential and secure accommodation The policy innovation had multiple components affecting several sets of agencies and decision-makers superimposed on a complex web of decision-making and services

12. THE EVALUATION Purpose to assess effectiveness, including cost effectiveness Comparison in similar authorities of policies, service inputs and persistent offending cases Multi-stranded – data types and sources

13. UNEMPLOYMENT FREE SCHOOL MEALS SCHOOL EXCLUSION HEARINGS REFERRALS SIMILAR RANGES The Comparison: I Comparison sites’ approaches to youth crime were varied

14. The Comparison: II 42% increase 8% increase

15. 42 x 2/3 58 84 167 + 56 = 223 MAIN SAMPLE 111, 142, 151 10 x 3/4 Research Elements Key contact interviews Key contact information SCRA RAD data Case questionnaire survey Cost –effectiveness data Service provider study Intensive case study

16. FAST TRACK CASES • 307 In first 18 months • Two thirds aged 14-15 PERSISTENT OFFENDING CASES IN COMPARISON SITES 114 In first 18 months Similar age pattern Source: SCRA Update

17. FAST TRACK CASESSupervision Just over half (55%) on supervision at the start Just under one in five ceased being on supervision Just over one in five began supervision after flagging One fifth – no supervision during Fast track Source: Main Sample

18. TIME-SCALES • Evidence showed that police, reporters and social workers • provided reports and took decisions more quickly • in Fast Track areas • compared with previously • compared with other authorities/forces • Targets met in 90%+ cases Fast Track did speed up processing of cases

19. Issue of electronic transfer of reports from police and social work Technological, operational and ethical considerations

20. RISK ASSESSMENT Use of YLS or ASSET Pilot site cases - nearly all (95%) Comparison sites – only one third Source: Case questionnaires

21. ASESSMENTS AND ACTION PLANS Reporters and panel members mostly saw these as improved, more comprehensive and specific Some social workers thought that the time-pressures threatened the quality and thoroughness of work done Source: Key contacts and case questionnaires

22. SERVICE/TIME INPUTS • Comparison site cases had higher proportions of both low and high service time inputs (under 5hrs per week or over 11 hrs). Use of voluntary agencies occurred in fewer cases • Twice as many young people in Pilot sites (40%) attended a standard programme as in Comparison sites (20%) Source: Cost sub-sample and case questionnaire information

23. SERVICE COSTS: COMPARISON Mean expenditure per case for young people living in the community Fast track cases £8,200 Comparison cases £9,200 Mean expenditure for young people accommodated residentially Fast track cases £87,300 Comparison cases £95,500 Source: Key informant information

24. VIEWS OF FAST TRACK Key contacts welcomed: concerted attention to offending additional resources emphasis on faster action “All children’s hearings should be like this” Improved time-scales, assessments, action plans Good inter-agency collaboration Source: Key contacts

25. VIEWS OF FAST TRACK • In most cases, panel members believed Fast Track had • promoted a focus on offending • BUT not adversely affected • attention to young people’s needs A minority of social work respondents believed that attention to Fast Track had diverted resources away from other work Source: Case questionnaires

26. Perceived impacts Intervention in FT cases seen by panel members to have: Positive impact on young person - half Mixed impact – quarter Made little difference – nearly a quarter Intervention seen by reporters as very effective in 32% of FT cases 26% of Comparison cases Source: case questionnaires

27. Risk offending changes YLS + ASSET SCORES 2+ occasions N = 146 Increased 10% Stable 56% Decreased 34% Source: Key informants

28. Reasons for exitImproved/responded 70% Adult system 16% Not improved/responded 9% N = 88 Source: Key informant information

29. Changes in offending The samples in Fast Track and comparison areas were not matched, but there were only slight differences as regards age, gender, living situation and prior offending Source: RAD data on Main sample

30. Changes in offending The study data showed that there had been a significant decrease in offending for young people in Fast Track X BUT: the reduction was even greater in comparison sites ? Source: RAD data on Main sample

31. DATA ON OFFENDING:COMPARISON % of young people whose offending reduced or not Decrease (FT) 69% Decrease (C) 81% Increase (FT) 24% Increase (C) 14% Source: RAD and Main sample

32. DATA ON OFFENDING:COMPARISON Mean number of offences Source: RAD and Main sample

33. Changes in offending Therefore SCRA were asked to carry out an analysis for all cases of persistent offending (where enough time had elapsed for follow up)

34. DATA ON OFFENDING:COMPARISON Changes in numbers of offences after ‘implementation’ compared with before Changes in numbers of offence referrals after ‘implementation’ compared with before Source: SCRA

35. The Executive decided to discontinue Fast Track and concentrate instead on Standards

36. CONCLUSIONS Fast track worked well in speeding up procedures Assessment, action plans and inter-agency co-operation were widely reported to have improved Some improvements diffused beyond persistent offending Transfer of information was problematic in some respects There was wide support for seriousness as well as persistence in offending to underpin targeting Official evidence of offending indicated that reductions in Fast Track cases were less than elsewhere

37. Possible explanations Perhaps variations in police practice accounted for the difference It may have been too soon to judgeSetting up period; short follow-up Comparison site lower numbers: a tribute to early intervention? Comparison sites – able to focus resources on fewer cases The time and effort spent on assessment and report writing was at the cost of direct intervention Did some Fast track cases receive too many interventions? Too small % of funds spent on community based interventions Too little attention given to neighbourhood work, education and health services, residential provision etc.

38. QUESTIONS ARISINGon Evidence-based Policy How wise is it to base policy decisions on official offending data? “Official data…depend strongly on police efforts and the willingness of victims to report crime. They are also affected by political and police priorities” Van der Laan and Smit 2006 How can evaluations of complex policies best be carried out? For a reasonable price? How should policy-makers balance varied evidence about processes and outcomes? Does evidence of ‘success’ receive as close a scrutiny as evidence of ‘failure’?