Security morality a tale of user deceit
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Security & Morality: A Tale of User Deceit. Models of Trust on the Web Edinburgh, UK May 2006 L. Jean Camp, C. McGrath, A. Genkina. Security & Morality: A Tale of User Deceit? . Hypotheses about human trust behavior developed from social science

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Security morality a tale of user deceit

Security & Morality:A Tale of User Deceit

Models of Trust on the Web

Edinburgh, UK

May 2006

L. Jean Camp, C. McGrath, A. Genkina

Camp, McGrath, Genkina


Security morality a tale of user deceit1

Security & Morality:A Tale of User Deceit?

  • Hypotheses about human trust behavior developed from social science

  • Compared with implicit assumptions in common technical mechanisms

  • Test computer-human trust behaviors

  • Conclude with guidance for trust design

Camp, McGrath, Genkina


Design for trust

Design for Trust

Start with human trust behaviors

Trust

Used for simplification

Encompasses discrete technical problems

privacy, integrity, data security

Embeds discrete policy problems

business behavior, customer service, quality of goods, privacy

Camp, McGrath, Genkina


Human and computer trust

Human and Computer Trust

Trust is approached differently by different disciplines

Social Studies of Human Behavior

Studies based on a micro approach

Experiments to evaluate how people extend trust

Game theory

Common assumption: information exposure == trust

Philosophy

Macro approach

Trust is a need

high default to trust

Trust is a tool for simplification

Examine societies and cultural practices

Camp, McGrath, Genkina


Experimental definition of trust

Experimental Definition of Trust

  • Coleman’s Three Part Test

    • enables something not otherwise possible

      • individual who trusts is worse off if the trusted party acts in an untrustworthy manner

      • individuals who trust are better off if the trusted party acts in a trustworthy manner

    • there is no constraint placed on the trusted party

    • a time lag exists between a decision to trust and the outcome

Camp, McGrath, Genkina


Trust individiation

Trust & Individiation

  • People interacting with a computer do not distinguish between computers as individuals but rather respond to their experience with "computers”

    • People begin too trusting

    • People learn to trust computers

      • first observed by Sproull on net in computer scientists in 1991

      • confirmed by later experiments

    • Computers are perceived as moral agents

  • People will continue to extend trust - so creating another source of trust doesn’t defeat trusting behaviors

Camp, McGrath, Genkina


Research on humans suggest

Research on Humans Suggest...

  • Humans may not differentiate between machines

  • Humans become more trusting of ‘the network’

  • Humans begin with too much trust for computers

    • Confirmed by philosophical macro observation

    • Confirmed by computer security incidents

      • E-mail based Scams, Viruses & Hoaxes

      • Masquerade attacks

Camp, McGrath, Genkina


Three hypotheses

Three Hypotheses

  • Do humans respond differently to human or computer "betrayals" in terms of forgiveness?

  • Do people interacting with a computer distinguish between computers as individuals or respond to their experience with "computers”?

    • Does tendency to differentiate between remote machines increase with computer experience?

Camp, McGrath, Genkina


Security morality a tale of user deceit2

Security & Morality:A Tale of User Deceit

  • Hypotheses about human trust behavior developed from social science

  • Compared with implicit assumptions in common technical mechanisms

  • Test computer-human trust behaviors

  • Conclude with guidance for trust design

Camp, McGrath, Genkina


H1 response to failure

H1: Response to Failure

  • Do humans respond differently to human or computer "betrayals" in terms of forgiveness?

    • Attacks which are viewed as failures as ‘ignored’ or forgiven

    • Technical failures as seen as accidents rather than design decisions

      • May explain why people tolerate repeated security failures

Camp, McGrath, Genkina


H2 differentiation

H2: Differentiation

  • When people interact with networked computers, they discriminate among distinct computers (hosts, websites), treating them as distinct entities, particularly in their readiness to extend trust and secure themselves from possible harms.

    • People become more trusting over time

    • People differentiate more not less with experience

    • Do people learn to differentiate or trust?

      • “educate the user” may not work

Camp, McGrath, Genkina


Security morality a tale of user deceit3

Security & Morality:A Tale of User Deceit

  • Hypotheses about human trust behavior developed from social science

  • Compared with implicit assumptions in common technical mechanisms

  • Test computer-human trust behaviors

  • Conclude with guidance for trust design

Camp, McGrath, Genkina


The experiment

The Experiment

  • Developed three websites

    • “life management”

      • Elephantmine.com

      • Reminders.name

      • MemoryMinder.us

Camp, McGrath, Genkina


Initial tests

Initial Tests

  • What information would you share with each site?

  • Do you trust the site?

    • user-defined trust, no macro definition given

  • Rejected MemoryMinders.us

    • people dislike lime green?

  • Other two designs had similar evaluations

  • Camp, McGrath, Genkina


    Two betrayal types

    Two “Betrayal” Types

    • One group faced a technical betrayal

      • Another person’s data is displayed

      • “John Q. Wilson”

      • DoB, Credit Card Number, social network data

    • One group faced a moral betrayal

      • Change in privacy policy announced

      • Collection of third party information correlated with compiled data

        • very common policy

        • eBay, Face Book, mySpace

    Camp, McGrath, Genkina


    Three step process

    Three Step Process

    • Users introduced to first site

      • Sites in the same order

    • Users experience betrayal

      • Half the users have technical failure

      • Half had privacy change

      • Both sets of users experience a failure upon departure of first site

    • Then users go to second site

    Camp, McGrath, Genkina


    Findings differentiation

    Findings: Differentiation

    • Users respond to first site betrayal with significant change in behavior wrt second site

      • users had on average seven years experience with Internet

      • computer experience not at all significant

      • second site not seen as “new” entity

    • Cannot support the hypothesis that users differentiate

      • users do not enter each transaction with a new calculation of risk

    Camp, McGrath, Genkina


    Findings betrayal type

    Findings: Betrayal Type

    • Stronger reaction to privacy change

      • Yet technical failure indicated an inability to protect privacy

    Camp, McGrath, Genkina


    Security morality a tale of user deceit4

    Security & Morality:A Tale of User Deceit

    • Hypotheses about human trust behavior developed from social science

    • Compared with implicit assumptions in common technical mechanisms

    • Test computer-human trust behaviors

    • Conclude with guidance for trust design

    Camp, McGrath, Genkina


    What to conclude

    What To Conclude

    • Assuming the human will act like the computer has been a core design problem

    • Either remove assumptions about humans

    • Or computer security must be designed with social science in mind

    Camp, McGrath, Genkina


    Differentiation

    Differentiation

    • The tendency to differentiate between remote machines decreases with computer experience

      • More use results in more lumping

        • Make better lumping

      • Explains common logon/passwords

        • along with cognitive limits

        • “My Internet is Down”

    • Need explicit DO NOT TRUST signals

    Camp, McGrath, Genkina


    Observations

    Observations

    • Users are bad security managers

      • PGP, P3P, passwords, ….

    • Security should necessarily be a default

    • Surveys illustrate a continuing confusion of privacy & security

      • educate All Net Users OR

      • build upon the connection between the moral (privacy) and technical (security)

    Camp, McGrath, Genkina


    Computer security is built for machines

    Computer security is built for machines

    • Passwords

      • Humans are a bad source of entropy

    • SSL

      • Two categories: secure and not secure

        • By requiring per-site differentiation does not enable human differentiation

        • Every site should include a unique graphic with the lock

      • Trust all machines with the lock

      • SSL - secured phishing has already occurred

    Camp, McGrath, Genkina


    Pki is built for machines

    PKI is built for Machines

    • Better lumping, not demands for user differentiation

      • Different levels of key revocation are needed

        • Falsified initial credential

          • All past transactions suspect

        • Change in status

          • Future transactions prohibited

        • Unrecognized hierarchy

          • Messages are confusing

        • No domain

          • No alert when moving to IP address space not connected to DNS

    Camp, McGrath, Genkina


    Building for trust

    Building for Trust

    • Security technologies are not adopted

      • patching, PGP

    • Security technologies do not address user conceptions of trust

      • Patching

        • more secure machine with regular updates to Microsoft?

      • PGP

        • signed email w/o confidentiality to most people

    • Technologies linking security (competence) to privacy (beneficence) may prove more effective in trust building than security alone

    Camp, McGrath, Genkina


    Example project

    Example Project

    • Focused on individuals

      • computer - computer trust

      • computer- human trust

    • Explicit “do not trust” signals

    Camp, McGrath, Genkina


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