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Myanmar – An SQP Case Study

Myanmar – An SQP Case Study. Safeguards Policy Course – Monterey Institute of International Studies. June 2012. Bill Moore. Myanmar is an SQP State (INFCIRC/477). Myanmar / IAEA engagement. 1957 Myanmar (then called “Union of Burma”) joins IAEA 1992- Joins the NPT

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Myanmar – An SQP Case Study

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  1. Myanmar – An SQP Case Study Safeguards Policy Course – Monterey Institute of International Studies • June 2012 Bill Moore

  2. Myanmar is an SQP State (INFCIRC/477)

  3. Myanmar / IAEA engagement • 1957 Myanmar (then called “Union of Burma”) joins IAEA • 1992- Joins the NPT • 1995 – Brings into force CSA (INFCIRC/477), supplemented by SQP • 2000 – Requests IAEA assistance in acquiring research reactor • 2007 – Signs nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia for the purchase of 10MWt research reactor • 2008 – Indicates “willingness” to discuss its safeguards agreement in the context of the reactor sale

  4. Meanwhile, where there is smoke…? Throughout the 2000’s allegations trickle out from defectors, open source imagery analysts, and even USG officials of suspicious activities and relationships (eg.) Alleged North Korean assistance in digging tunnels (Report by Bertil Linter, 2008)

  5. US Officials voice concerns…. • July 2009 – "We know that there are also growing concerns about military cooperation between North Korea and Burma, which we take seriously," Clinton told reporters after talks in the Thai capital. "It would be destabilizing for the region. It would pose a direct threat to Burma's neighbors.” U.S. officials traveling with Clinton, who is in Thailand to attend a regional security forum, said the worries about Burma and North Korea extend to possible nuclear cooperation.

  6. Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) Report • 2010 – The Democratic Voice of Burma publishes an extensive defector report, complete with photographs, that alleges Myanmar is developing a covert nuclear weapons program Defector SaiThein Win

  7. Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) Report • 2010 – The DVB report contains many photographs of equipment with enticing names such as “bomb reactor” and references to “nuclear battalion”

  8. Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) Report • 2010 – The DVB report also provides the locations of specific sites of interest, from suspected uranium mines and mills to suspected warehouses for equipment storage

  9. Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) Report • 2010 – RobertKelley, an American former UN Weapons Inspector, performs an analysis of the information and holds a press conference in Washington DC “I state this very clearly and very strongly, this is a clandestine nuclear program” June 9th, 2010 - Robert Kelley

  10. Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) Report • 2010 - Not everyone is convinced….. “There is no smoking gun. There is no one single piece which puts your mind at rest telling that this solely for nuclear purposes and for nothing else.” - Ollie Heinonen, Former Deputy Director General IAEA

  11. Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) Report • The IAEA engages, but what authorities do they hold? “We have seen the related articles in the media, and we are now assessing the information. If necessary, we will seek clarification from Myanmar.” June 7th, 2010 -Yukiya Amano, Director General IAEA

  12. Myanmar’s SQP holds most IAEA authorities in abeyance • Myanmar is not under obligation to submit any safeguards reports to the Agency • Concurrently, the IAEA has no right to conduct routine or ad-hocsafeguards inspections • Therefore the IAEA does not have the right to inspect the specific sites and allegations contained in the DVB report, short of calling for “Mandatory Access” • The IAEA does have the ability to conduct a “Mandatory Access” under Article 18, Part I of the CSA

  13. IAEA Response to DVB allegations • By December, 2010 Herman Nackaerts, Deputy Director General of the IAEA, had sent 3 letters to Myanmar requesting clarification from the Government as to the allegations contained in the DVB report. There was no official response.

  14. Excerpt from Myanmar Statement to IAEA General Conference, September 2011 “ Myanmar would like to restate that Myanmar is in no position to consider the production and use of nuclear weapons and does not have enough economic strength to do so. While supporting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Myanmar also supports the legitimate rights of every state to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Myanmar has halted its previous arrangement of nuclear research as international community may misunderstand Myanmar over the issue.” -Statement by the Leader of Myanmar Delegation H.E. U Tin Win

  15. If Myanmar had adopted the Modified SQP before the allegations, would the IAEA have been better equipped to investigate? It depends.. • If Myanmar adopted the Modified SQP in 2005 or later, the initial declaration that is a requirement may have contained some of the sites and/or locations named in the DVB report. • If so, YES • If not, if the initial declaration said no nuclear material and no nuclear facilities, NO REMEMBER - THE MODIFIED SQP STILL RELIES ON THE INITIAL DECLARATION AS ITS BASIS. NOTHING TO DECLARE, NOTHING TO INSPECT

  16. If Myanmar had adopted the Modified SQP with the Additional Protocol, would the IAEA’s ability to investigate be improved? YES

  17. Questions?

  18. SQP States (As of 2012) • Barbados • Belize • Bhutan • Bolivia • Brunei Darussalam • Cambodia • Cameroon • Dominica • Ethiopia • Grenada • Guyana • Lao P.D.R • Maldives • Myanmar • Nauru • Nepal • Oman • Papa New Guinea • St. Kitts & Nevis • Saint Lucia • St. V. & The Grandines • Samoa • Saudi Arabia • Sierra Leone • Solomon Islands • Sudan • Suriname • Tonga • Trinidad & Tobago • Tuvulu • Yemen

  19. Modified SQP States (As of 2012) • Antigua and Barbados • Azerbaijan • The Bahamas • Bahrain • Benin • Burkina Fasso • Burundi • Cape Verde • Central African Republic • Chad • Comoros • Congo • Costa Rica • Croatia • Djibouti • Dominican Republic • Ecuador • El Salvador • Gambia • Guatemala • Guinea • Holy See • Honduras • Iceland • Kenya • Lebanon • Lesotho • Madagascar • Malawi • Mali • Mauritius • Monaco • Montenegro • Mozambique • Nicaragua • Palau • Panama • Qatar • Republic of Moldova • Rwanda • San Marino • Senegal • Seychelles • Singapore • Swaziland • Tajikistan • The F.Y.R. of Macedonia • Timor-Leste • Togo • Uganda • United Rep. of Tanzania • Vanuatu • Zimbabwe

  20. Modified SQP States with an Additional Protocol (As of 2012) • Antigua and Barbados • Azerbaijan • The Bahamas • Bahrain • Benin • Burkina Fasso • Burundi • Cape Verde • Central African Republic • Chad • Comoros • Congo • Costa Rica • Croatia • Djibouti • Dominican Republic • Ecuador • El Salvador • Gambia • Guatemala • Guinea • Holy See • Honduras • Iceland • Kenya • Lebanon • Lesotho • Madagascar • Malawi • Mali • Mauritius • Monaco • Montenegro • Mozambique • Nicaragua • Palau • Panama • Qatar • Republic of Moldova • Rwanda • San Marino • Senegal • Seychelles • Singapore • Swaziland • Tajikistan • The F.Y.R. of Macedonia • Timor-Leste • Togo • Uganda • United Rep. of Tanzania • Vanuatu • Zimbabwe

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