ATS2840 Philosophy of Mind Semester 1, 2017

1. ATS2840Philosophy of MindSemester 1, 2017 Dr Ron Gallagher ron.gallagher@monash.edu Tutorial 11 (1 to go) Dennett Office Hours: Caulfield: Wed 2.30-3.30 (RoomS908) Please email for an appointment. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y4MoFNWB-_s https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R-Nj_rEqkyQ Dennett Lecturer and Unit Coordinator: Dr Jennifer Windt (Jennifer.Windt@monash.edu) Phone:03 9905 1519

6. SHORT-ANSWER As in the expository assignments, make sure you answer all parts of the question and define all technical terms. 1. Machine state functionalists like Putnam maintain that the mind can be identified with a suitably programmed computer. Explain this position, as well as one main motivation for it. How does Block’s homunculi-headed robot objection raise problems for this view? Do you think that Block’s objection is successful, and why / why not? 2. How exactly does the Armstrong/Lewis approach differ from classical identity theory? Do you believe Lewis can capture something like multiple realizability in a way that Smart couldn’t? Defend your answer as best you can. 3. What is Jackson’s Knowledge Argument against physicalism? (Note that you will need to explain what physicalism is in addition to the argument.) What is Lewis’s ‘ability hypothesis’ and how does it respond to this argument? And why, briefly, might Raffman’s argument on ineffability spell trouble for the ability hypothesis? 4. What is Chalmers’s Zombie Argument, and how exactly does it spell trouble for supervenience physicalism? Briefly explain what you take to be the strongest of Patricia Churchland’s replies to this argument. 5. What exactly is panpsychism, and how does it aim to offer an alternative to emergentism? Why might one, according to Nagel, support a panpsychist view? And how, briefly, might a panpsychist go about arguing that the view is empirically plausible? 6. What is the Intentional Systems Theory and what does it take, according to Dennett, to be a true believer? (Make sure you make reference to the intentional stance and how it is different from the other stances Dennett discusses.) Which basic dilemma, according to Baker, does Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory face?

7. 6. What is the Intentional Systems Theory and what does it take, according to Dennett, to be a true believer? (Make sure you make reference to the intentional stance and how it is different from the other stances Dennett discusses.) Which basic dilemma, according to Baker, does Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory face? Here is how it works: first you decide to treat the object whose behavior is to be predicted as a rational agent; then you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have, given its place in the world and its purpose. Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on the same considerations, and finally you predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs. A little practical reasoning from the chosen set of beliefs and desires will in most instances yield a decision about what the agent ought to do; that is what you predict the agent will do. — Daniel Dennett, The Intentional Stance, p. 17