Ultimatum bargaining from synapse to society colin f camerer caltech
This presentation is the property of its rightful owner.
Sponsored Links
1 / 30

Ultimatum bargaining: From synapse to society Colin F. Camerer, Caltech PowerPoint PPT Presentation


  • 94 Views
  • Uploaded on
  • Presentation posted in: General

Ultimatum bargaining: From synapse to society Colin F. Camerer, Caltech. Ultimatum game: Proposer offers division of $10; responder accepts or rejects Theories: Rejections express social preferences (care about $, envy, guilt)

Download Presentation

Ultimatum bargaining: From synapse to society Colin F. Camerer, Caltech

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation

Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author.While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server.


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Presentation Transcript


Ultimatum bargaining from synapse to society colin f camerer caltech

Ultimatum bargaining: From synapse to societyColin F. Camerer, Caltech

  • Ultimatum game:

    • Proposer offers division of $10; responder accepts or rejects

  • Theories:

    • Rejections express social preferences (care about $, envy, guilt)

    • “Unnatural habitat” (adapted to repeated games, one-shot is Stroop)

  • Variants:

    • Dictator games (same responsibility?)

    • Demographics (generally weak)

    • Stakes– rejected $ goes up, % goes down

    • Repetition etc.– weak

    • Low information about “pie” size lower offers (and “pleading poverty ”)

    • Proposer competition offers give most to responder

    • Two-stage games responders (weakly) accept lower offers because proposers have an “excuse” (intentions matter)


Game ending ultimatum rejections are like disadvantageous counterproposals in longer games

Game-ending ultimatum rejections are like “disadvantageous counterproposals” in longer games


Us data roth et al 1991

US data (Roth et al 1991)


Ultimatum vs dictator games forsythe et al 1994 nb dictator games are weak situations more variance

Ultimatum vs dictator “games” (Forsythe et al 1994) NB: Dictator games are “weak situations”, more variance


Low medium high stakes slonim roth 1998

Low, medium, high stakes (Slonim-Roth 1998)


Do players learn to accept low offers at high stakes

Do players learn to accept low offers at high stakes?


Special subject pools conditions

Special subject pools & conditions

  • Neural evidence (ACC, DLPFC, insula for low offers; difference predicts rejection r=.4)

  • Autistics offer less (don’t expect rejection)

    • Adults learn to take “objective stance”

  • Cutting-off-nose effect (Monkeys reject unequal pay, Brosnan and De Waal, Science 9/18/03; F capuchins will refuse exchange for low payoff if others get high payoff)

  • Small-scale societies

    • Variation in mean offer (some offer very little)

    • Fair offers correlated with “market integration” and “cooperativeness”


Market games 9 proposer competition

“Market” games (9-proposer competition)


Intentions matter falk et al 99 cf law e g manslaughter vs murder

Intentions matter (Falk et al 99) (cf. law e.g. manslaughter vs murder)


Sanfey et al fmri study sci 13 march 03

Sanfey et al fMRI study (Sci 13 March ’03)


Ask the brain within l and pooled r correlations of insula and dlpfc activity rejection

“ask the brain”: within (L) and pooled (R) correlations of insula and DLPFC activity & rejection


Feeling this is your brain on unfairness

Feeling: This is your brain on unfairness


Pain circuitry

Pain circuitry


Ultimatum offer experimental sites

Ultimatum offer experimental sites


Ultimatum bargaining from synapse to society colin f camerer caltech

The Machiguenga

independent families

cash cropping

slash & burn

gathered foods

fishing

hunting


Ultimatum bargaining from synapse to society colin f camerer caltech

African pastoralists (Kenya)


Ultimatum bargaining from synapse to society colin f camerer caltech

Whale Hunters

of

Lamalera, Indonesia

High levels of

cooperation among hunters of whales, sharks, dolphins and rays. Protein for carbs trade with inlanders

Researcher: Mike Alvard


Ultimatum offers across societies mean shaded mode is largest circle

Ultimatum offers across societies (mean shaded, mode is largest circle…)


Fair offers correlate with market integration top cooperativeness in everyday life bottom

Fair offers correlate with market integration (top), cooperativeness in everyday life (bottom)


Ultimatum offers of children who failed passed false belief test

Ultimatum offers of children who failed/passed false belief test


Autistics v normals adults top children bottom

Autistics v normals (adults top, children bottom)


Israeli subject autistic complaining post experiment zamir 2000

Israeli subject (autistic?) complaining post-experiment (Zamir, 2000)


Unnatural habit hypothesis

Unnatural habit hypothesis…

  • "Although subjects fully understand the rules of the game and its payoff structure, their behavior is influenced by an unconscious perception that the situation they are facing is part of a much more extended game of similar real-life interactions…We believe that it is practically impossible to create laboratory conditions that would cancel out this effect and induce subjects to act as if they were facing an anonymous one-shot [ultimatum game]." (Winter & Zamir, 1997)


Testing theories new ideas

Testing theories: New ideas

  • How to separate preference vs unnatural habitat views?

    • Role of emotions

    • Look for cross-game regularity in measured preferences

    • Learning (…or is it temporary satiation?)

    • fMRI and ACC Stroop interpretations


  • Login