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Sheltering-in-Place April 20 , 2005. Angelo Grima Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. Building Owners and Managers Association New York. Large Facility Emergency Planning. What is Emergency Planning?. Establishing Policy and Organizational Structure – Then:

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Sheltering-in-Place April 20, 2005

Angelo Grima Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc.

Building Owners and Managers Association New York

Large Facility Emergency Planning


What is Emergency Planning?

Establishing Policy and Organizational Structure – Then:

Assessment: Identifying Hazards, Risks, & Assets Available

Preparedness: Developing a Plan for Readiness

Response: Developing a Plan for Action

Recovery: Developing a Plan for Recovery

Testing the Plan: Training, Drills, and Exercises


Traditionally, Emergency Planning has meant preparing for and responding to:

Fire

Earthquake

Bomb Threat/Explosion

Severe Weather

Power Outage

Civil Disobedience

Health Emergency

Etc.



Main Focus Today and responding to:

Sheltering-in-Place

With respect to Large Facilities and High Rise Office Buildings

  • “Sheltering-in-Place” Defined

  • What might create a Shelter-in-Place scenario

  • Why add Shelter-in-Place as part of your all hazard plans

  • How long is Sheltering-in-Place practical

  • Case Study “Defense Threat Reduction Data Gathering Exercise”

  • Who would order a Shelter-in-Place situation

  • What is the role of local government


  • Pre-event planning, training, and communications preparedness: supplies and materials readiness

  • Recognition of the emergency response need

  • Shelter-in-Place Action Steps & Considerations

  • Testing or measuring the building indoor air environment

  • Public address announcements

  • Access – ingress and egress control

  • Building Vulnerability Assessment Methodology

  • Distinguishing between a biological, chemical, or radiological contaminant

  • Understanding your building and its systems


  • NIOSH Guidance for Protecting Building Environments From Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • Building mechanical system alterations, upgrades, and design change considerations

  • Creating a clean space or safe space within a building

  • Emergency response operations by government

  • Practical limits on sheltering-in-place


What situations that might bring about a “Shelter-in-Place” request from Government

  • Civil disturbance or riot

  • Curfew ordered by government

  • Major Earthquake or other natural disaster closing roadways, etc.

  • Biological incident or threat

  • Chemical incident or threat

  • Radiological Dispersion Device (Dirty Bomb)

  • Quarantine ordered by government


However, when we are prepared for “Shelter-in-Place” request from Government

Earthquake, Fire, Flood

We are also somewhat prepared for other emergency situations


Fire Safety Director “Shelter-in-Place” request from Government

Emergency Operations Plan

Fired Drills

Floor Wardens

Confidence testing


Study building
Study building “Shelter-in-Place” request from Government

1970s-style retrofit: 14 stories with outside air intakes at ground and roof levels. 15 HVAC systems, most vertically zoned


Study building diagram

E intake “Shelter-in-Place” request from Government

14

8

F15 return

W intake

Measurement Locations

Common Return Shaft

7

2

F5 return

NE intake (street level)

1

B

SB

Study Building Diagram


  • Sheltering within buildings can be effective means of reducing exposure to transient outdoor contaminants

  • Optimized sheltering requires improved predictions of indoor and outdoor concentrations

  • Contaminant losses indoors can significantly reduce acute exposures

  • Contaminant losses indoors create decontamination requirements


Defense Threat Reduction Data Gathering Exercise – Experiment using a tracer gas outside an office building with respect to infiltration and dispersal within the building - the results of a NOISH experiment on the infiltration of a “Tracer Gas” on a commercial office building in Oklahoma City (National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health


Airborne Contaminant Concentration over Time Experiment using a tracer gas outside an office building with respect to infiltration and dispersal within the building - the results of a NOISH experiment on the infiltration of a “Tracer Gas” on a commercial office building in Oklahoma City (National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health

About 90 minutes

Red = Outside

Blue = Inside


Threat Assessment Experiment using a tracer gas outside an office building with respect to infiltration and dispersal within the building - the results of a NOISH experiment on the infiltration of a “Tracer Gas” on a commercial office building in Oklahoma City (National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health

With respect to terror threat to office buildings, the level of security action to be considered is dependant on two considerations:

1. Risk assessment based upon the current perceived terror-threat in the country and community based upon terror activity, warnings, or threats.

2. Risk assessment based upon the perceived prominence of the building as a target.


As one might expect, security operations tighten as terror activity increases and as a function of:

  • The profile of the building with respect to its status, image, or prominence.

  • The profile of the building with respect to its political or historical symbolism.

  • The profile of the building with respect to its tenants as target risks.

  • The profile of the building with respect to its function and importance in infrastructure support.

  • Potential vulnerability to attack – ease of target.

  • Location of the building with respect to neighboring potential targets.


The higher the threat-profile the higher the corresponding level of security measures.

It is clear that security and convenience are proportionally opposite of each other.

As one increases, the other decreases.

“Lock Down” being the highest alert status of building operations.


Graduating levels of security action based upon perceived threat:

  • Small increase in security operations - operating as normal with a somewhat higher level of security.

  • Utilization of building housekeeping, maintenance staff to be more aware of security issues and suspicious persons

  • Compress hours of building operation to fewer core business hours

  • Increasing security patrols and checks by two and three times.

  • 4. Logging all deliveries and visiting vehicles – recording license numbers as well


Elevated increase in security operations - Operating with increased stationary security and patrols and inspecting deliveries and vehicles.

  • Restrict access to the property,close some entrances and post guards requiring check in at the open entrances

  • Restrict deliveries hours and require special check-in

  • Reconfiguring garage access so one entrance is card key access only and shifting security to the other entrance for check in access.

  • Assigning a Loading Dock “Dock Master”

  • Prohibit large bags and backpacks from entering the facility and check smaller packages. (This is a facility that houses performances and events).

  • Sign visitors in and out

  • Access only by key card or security guard

  • Requiring an identification check before a delivery driver can enter the building or park next to it.

  • Inspecting bills of lading on all deliveries.

  • 24 x 7 security in the building


Significant Threat - Operating on lock-down increased stationary security and patrols and inspecting deliveries and vehicles.

Controlled access via a limited number of entrances that are staffed round the clock with security. Requiring all visitors and deliveries to be met, signed in, and escorted by building tenants from the lobby or loading dock and back out again. Restricting all vehicles that enter the garage to permitted drivers. Restricting access to the loading dock to persons and deliveries that have been inspected.

  • Tenants have to meet deliveries and guests and sign them in and escort them while in the building

  • Security at garage ticket spitter asking questions of each arriving driver

  • No packages into building unless searched

  • No visitor parking allowed, only regular monthly parkers with card access and required sign in.

  • Requiring photo ID for building entrance


6. Towing of abandoned vehicles increased stationary security and patrols and inspecting deliveries and vehicles.

7. Security stationed on the service elevator

8. Access only by key card

9. All person accessing the building must pass through a metal detector and be checked in by security, all packages are examined via x-ray technology. (This is a high security Federal Building).

10. Total lockdown, no access, elevator moved to a floor above the lobby level.


A list of new security measures being undertaken by some large facilities since 911
A List of new security measures being undertaken by some large facilities since 911

  • Establishing an alert status for increasing levels of security procedures culminating in complete lock down if the threat level requires it.

  • Obtaining radio systems

  • Providing the parking contractor’s staff with building radios.

  • Installing emergency shut off switches to HVAC systems that will shut down the buildings air intake in quick to access locations.

  • Relocating HVAC intakes to more secure locations if possible


Infrastructure systems
Infrastructure Systems large facilities since 911

Environmental systems (HVAC)


  • Developing a tighter list of key vendor 24/7 emergency contact numbers and list of government emergency phone numbers and contacts

  • Procuring special hats or vests for use in identifying staff in an emergency

  • Reassessment of evacuation assembly areas for safety

  • Meetings with speakers from hospitals to inform tenants and staff about bio-terrorism and chemical attack.

  • Reassessment of the safety of any nuclear materials in medical tenant offices.

  • Procurement of any air monitoring equipment that can detect poisons, toxins, radiation.

  • Share crisis management plans and ideas with other real estate professional and organizations.


  • Performing a building access card audit, ensuring old cards are cancelled and active cards are property assigned and accounted for.

  • Requesting background checks on all persons who work essentially full time in the building for contracted vendors

  • Increasing and upgrading security devises for roof and mechanical space access.

  • Practicing emergency lockdown procedures

  • Training on how to handle the discovery of abandoned packages

  • Working with the Post Office to initiating secure mailroom procedures


  • Closing off the drive up and drop off area of the building with barricades extending vehicles proximity to the building.

  • Requiring background checks on all persons who work essentially full time in the building for contracted vendors

  • Posting signs informing drivers that if they have not signed in and given us their vehicles license number their vehicle will be towed, and they are towing vehicles.

  • Collecting and sharing the emergency phone numbers of neighboring properties to facilitate emergency exchange of information and notification in the event of an incident.


  • Installing a phone on the loading dock requiring delivery personnel to call for an escort before they can use the freight elevator.

  • Entrance barriers to garage that hinder a an attempt to drive past security into the garage

  • Retraining on bomb threat procedures

  • Distribute building ID cards for regular on site all day vendors

  • Stocking of special supplies


  • Joint fire drills with fire department and tenants and practice evacuation drills

  • Label building stairwells not just in the stairway but also in the hallway

  • Install treds on stairway for safety when wet during emergency evacuation

  • Procuring bullhorns as back up communication devices during evacuations

  • Keeping tapes current in security cameras and expanding camera networks


Vulnerability Assessment practice evacuation drills

Assessing Building Vulnerabilities to:

Chemical or Biological Agent Attack

Vehicle Explosives

Etc.


Assessment protocol
Assessment Protocol practice evacuation drills

  • Building Walkthrough

  • Building Assessment Program

    (CDC Interactive Questionnaire)

    (Contractor assistance)

    (Assessment with Local First Responders

  • Vulnerability and Mitigation Report leading to an action plan


Assessments vulnerability and capability
Assessments: practice evacuation drillsVulnerability and Capability

  • Security – how effective is yours?

  • Critical systems – are they protected?

  • Emergency Plans – do you have them?

  • Pre-Planning – do you?

  • Defenses – what are your strengths?


  • Get Prepared: Know Your Building practice evacuation drills

  • Understand how building systems were designed and currently function.

  • Encourages a detailed building walkthrough:

  • Does installation resemble your design info.?

  • Building zoning, smoke control?

  • Mechanical condition of equipment?

  • Equipment appropriately installed/connected?

  • Filtration systems (type, efficiency, installation)?

  • Damper cond. & location (OA, RA, bypass, fire/smoke)

  • HVAC control systems, including fire response

  • Building access points, current security practices




HVAC Control practice evacuation drills



Building Evacuation Routes practice evacuation drills


Protecting Building Environments From Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks

First we must understand what Bio-Chem and radiological threats mean – what is reliable information and what is unhelpful myth, hype, or hoax?

Protecting From What?


Weapons of mass destruction wmd
Weapons of Mass Destruction WMD Biological, or Radiological Attacks

B iological

N uclear

I ncendiary

C hemical

E xplosive


Potential and probability

NUCLEAR Biological, or Radiological Attacks

WEAPON

BIOLOGICAL

AGENT

IMPROVISED

NUCLEAR

DEVICE

CHEMICAL AGENT

OR TOXIC

INDUSTRIAL

CHEMICAL

POTENTIAL

IMPACT

RADIOACTIVE

MATERIAL

PROBABILITY/LIKELIHOOD

Potential and Probability


Wmd concerns
WMD Concerns Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • Recipes readily available from the Internet

  • Available precursors or readymade targets

  • Not expensive to produce

  • Not easy to manufacture and disseminate


Nuclear
Nuclear Biological, or Radiological Attacks

Avon calling ?

Suitcase nuclear devices

are very unlikely


Nuclear1
Nuclear Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • Point Dispenser

  • Mechanical

  • Point Source

  • Significant downwind hazard

  • Fairly controllable

“Dirty bombs” are

the most likely

Radioactive

material

Timer

Explosive

with

Igniter

Agent

Reservoir


Nuclear exposure is all about
Nuclear Exposure is all about Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • Time

  • Distance

  • Shielding


What is radiation
What is Radiation? Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • Radiation is energy transmitted as particles or waves.

    • Ionizing radiation

      • Nuclear radiation: alpha, beta, gamma, neutron and x-ray

    • Non-ionizing radiation

      • Visible light

      • Infrared light

      • Microwaves

      • Radio waves

      • Radar


What is radiation1
What is Radiation? Biological, or Radiological Attacks

α

  • Alpha particles

    • Positively charged particles (2 protons + 2 neutrons)

    • Relatively heavy in mass

    • Cannot penetrate very far but the radionuclides that emit them can be carried by wind

    • Can be stopped by paper

    • Energy ranges from 2.5 MeV to 5.5 MeV

    • Sample emitters: Plutonium 239 and Americium 241


What is radiation2
What is Radiation? Biological, or Radiological Attacks

β

  • Beta particles

    • Negatively charged particles

    • Relatively light in mass

    • Can penetrate more deeply than alpha particles

    • Can be stopped by a few millimeters of aluminum

    • Energy ranges from 7 keV to 2.2 MeV

    • Sample emitters: Carbon 14 and Strontium 90


What is radiation3
What is Radiation? Biological, or Radiological Attacks

γ

  • Gamma rays

    • Waves that have no charge and no mass

    • Can be much more penetrating than alpha or beta particles

    • Most can be stopped by thick concrete or lead

    • Energy ranges from 10 keV to several MeV

    • Sample emitters: Barium 140 and Cobalt 60


What is radiation4
What is Radiation? Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • X-rays

    • Waves that have no charge or mass

    • Characteristics are the same as gamma rays

    • Difference: x-rays are generally man made and gamma rays occur naturally


What is radiation5
What is Radiation? Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • Neutron particles

    • No charge

    • Relatively high mass

    • More penetrating than alpha and beta particles but less penetrating than gamma rays

    • Can be stopped by thick concrete or lead

    • Energy ranges from 40 keV to 35 MeV

    • Sample emitters: Plutonium 239 (man-made)


Biological
Biological Biological, or Radiological Attacks

History

Types


Biological history
Biological – History Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • In use for over 2,500 years

  • Plague infected bodies catapulted – 1346

  • Smallpox contaminated blankets given to Native Americans in the 1600’s

  • Persian Gulf War – botulinum and anthrax

  • Japanese plague to China – 1940


Biological four types
Biological – Four Types Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • Bacteria

    • Living organisms that reproduce

    • May or may not be contagious

    • Anthrax, plague, tularemia

  • Toxins

    • Poisonous byproducts of microorganisms

    • Not living nor contagious

    • SEB, botulinum (neurotoxin – faster acting)

    • Ricin (cytotoxin – slower acting)


Biological four types1
Biological - Four Types Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • Virus

    • Simplest type of microorganism

    • Depend on living cells to multiply

    • Will not live long outside of host

  • Rickettsia (a type of virus)

    • Smallpox

    • Ebola

    • Lassa fever


Agents of biological terrorism
Agents of Biological Terrorism Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • Bacterial

    • Anthrax

    • Brucellosis

    • Cholera

    • Glanders*

    • Plague***

    • Tularemia

    • Q Fever


Agents biological terrorism
Agents Biological Terrorism Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • Viral

    • Smallpox***

    • Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis

    • Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers**

  • Toxins

    • Botulism

    • Ricin

    • Staphylococcal enterotoxin B

    • T-2 Mycotoxins


Chemical history
Chemical - History Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • WWI – Germans vs Allies – Chlorine

  • WWI (end) – Germans develop Mustard Gas

  • 1935 Italians vs Ethiopians – Mustard Gas

  • 1937 Germany develop Nerve Agents

  • 1977-89 Soviets vs Afghan. – Nerve & Must.

  • 1979-89 Iran/Iraq – both sides Nerve & Must.


Chemical history1
Chemical - History Biological, or Radiological Attacks

Chlorine is commonly

used and transported

throughout the country.

It was the first battle-

field chemical agent

during WWI.

Warning Next Slide Graphic


Chemical history2
Chemical - History Biological, or Radiological Attacks

One of the blister

agents, or vesicants:

Mustard Gas


Characteristics of bio agents
Characteristics of Bio Agents Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • Easily disseminated and contagious

  • Most people are susceptible

  • Causes severe illness and/or death

  • Some are communicable person-to-person*

  • Unfamiliar to doctors and hard to diagnose


Why bioterrorism
Why Bioterrorism? Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • Potential for large numbers of casualties

  • Fear is multiplying factor - Not necessary to kill lots of people to create a climate of fear

    • East Coast anthrax outbreak - 22 cases, 5 deaths

  • Social and economic chaos

  • Profound psychological impact on community

  • “Weapon of Mass Disruption”


Biological attacks
Biological Attacks Biological, or Radiological Attacks

Two types of attack scenarios:

  • Overt release- obvious use of weapon, notification, credit taken

  • Covert release - “silent” - most likely scenario


Chemical types
Chemical – Types Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • Nerve agents (organophosphates : human insecticides)

    • Sarin, Soman, Tabun, VX

  • Vesicants (blister producers)

    • Mustard, Lewisite

  • Blood poisons

    • Hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride

  • Choking agents

    • Chlorine, phosgene, diphosgene

  • Incapacitating / Riot control

    • Tear gas, mace, oleoresin capsicum (pepper)


Chemical lethality
Chemical Lethality Biological, or Radiological Attacks


Clues to a chemical release
Clues to a Chemical Release? Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • Victim’s symptoms

  • Dissemination device

  • Dead animals or birds

  • Unusual odors or liquids

  • Called-in threat


Signs and symptoms
Signs and Symptoms Biological, or Radiological Attacks

SLUDGE - M(plus convulsions)

  • S alivation

  • L acrimation

  • U rination

  • D efecation

  • G astrointestinal

  • E mesis

  • M iosis


Poison or biological attack: Biological, or Radiological Attacks

Poison gas release inside a building (Sarin or similar).

Poison gas release outside a building.

Biological germ release inside a building (Anthrax or similar).

Biological germ release outside a building.

Poison gas or biological germ release directly into a buildings air intake system.


Understanding and responding to cbr events
Understanding and Responding to CBR Events Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • No right answers - maybe “good” and “better”

  • Much subjective judgment

  • Dynamic issue

  • Informed by both technical change and ‘real-world’ events

  • Private and public sector interaction is essential


Public health s role
Public Health’s role Biological, or Radiological Attacks

In the event of a biological incident, Public Health:

  • Detects and evaluates biological disasters

  • Facilitates medical management of exposed persons

  • Provides information to health professionals, government leaders & the public

  • Coordinates countywide preparedness & response


Internal coordination
Internal coordination Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • Public Health created the Biological Emergency Response Team (BERT) within Communicable Disease, Epidemiology and Immunization

    • Response coordination among King County, City of Seattle & Public Health Emergency Operations Centers

    • The team is on call 24 hours a day


Surveillance and detection
Surveillance and detection Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • Public Health established and maintains a county-wide reporting system

  • Allows for the quick investigation of suspicious illness and communicable disease outbreaks

  • Depends on ability to identify a greater than expected number of “cases” or syndromes


Informing the public
Informing the public Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • Responding to concerned residents and providing access to factual information

  • Providing expertise to management of at-risk workplaces

  • Providing group trainings for local government, business and community groups

  • Training Public Health staff

  • Utilizing news media


Fire department first responders concept of operations
Fire Department Biological, or Radiological Attacks – First responders “Concept of Operations”

  • Do no harm

  • Risk benefit analyses save lives

  • Risk much to safe a life, risk little to save property, and risk nothing to save nothing

  • Rescue rescuers first, victims second

  • Stay part of the solution, not the problem

  • Go slowly and under control


First arriving units
First Arriving Units Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • Fire suppression

  • Emergency medical services

  • Defensive actions for Hazmat or WMD

  • Evacuate (from outside)

  • Isolate and deny entry

  • Identify

  • Incident Command


Hazardous materials unit
Hazardous Materials Unit Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • Set-up, planning, and preparation

  • Entry

    • Reconnaissance

    • Detection

    • Sampling

    • Extraction

  • Decontamination


Set up and infrastructure
Set-Up and Infrastructure Biological, or Radiological Attacks


Set up and infrastructure1
Set-Up and Infrastructure Biological, or Radiological Attacks


Set up and infrastructure2
Set-Up and Infrastructure Biological, or Radiological Attacks


Detection and sampling
Detection and Sampling Biological, or Radiological Attacks


Federal response plan

F E M A Biological, or Radiological Attacks

D O E

P H S

F B I

DoD

E P A

Federal Response Plan

You’re at the center


Understanding relationships large facilities managers and first responders
Understanding Relationships: Large Facilities Managers and First Responders

  • More proactive means less reactive

  • Know your public safety agencies

  • Talk with your utilities reps

  • Meet your neighbors and collaborate

  • Be involved in the community

  • Know your role and how you fit in with each other


What is r a i n

Notify First Responders

What Is R-A-I-N ?

Recognize

Avoid

Isolate


What about pepper spray
What About Pepper Spray? First Responders

  • What are the signs?

    • Coughing, tearing, mucous production

  • What is different than a nerve agent?

    • No miosis – pinpoint pupils (and headache)

    • No emesis

    • No convulsions

    • No other SLUDGE


Infrastructure systems1
Infrastructure Systems First Responders

Environmental Systems (HVAC)


HVAC system vulnerabilities First Responders

New HVAC system design considerations

HVAC system retrofit consideration

HVAC system operations, expectations and limitations


NIOSH Guidance for Protecting Building Environments From Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks

Getting Prepared

Recommendations

Things Not To Do

Physical Security

Relocation

Extension Design Recommendations

Security Zones

Physical Security

Ventilation and Filtration

Filtration Guidance

Air Contaminant Sizes

Air Filtration Principles

Filtration Mechanisms

Types of Particulate Filters

Various Filter Types

Filter Efficiency Ratings

Recommendations...

Infiltration & Bypass

Issues To Consider

Economic Issues To Consider

Ventilation and Filtration

Maintenance, Administration and Training

Conclusions


Things Not To Do Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks

Do not permanently seal outdoor air intakes.

Do not modify HVAC systems (includes filter upgrades) without understanding the effects on building systems or occupants.

Do not interfere with fire protection and life safety systems.

Physical Security

Prevent Access to Outdoor Air Intakes.

Relocation

Relocate OA intake to a high sidewall or secure roof

Physical Security

Restrict Access to Mechanical Areas and Roofs

Mechanical areas located throughout building

Provide access to centralized mechanical systems (HVAC, elevator, water, etc.)

Unauthorized roof access can lead to building ingress and/or access to roof-mounted mechanical equipment

Mechanical systems are susceptible to tampering & contamination


Protection of hvac systems

Protection Of HVAC Systems Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks

From Use As A Distribution System For Biological And Chemical Weapons Agents


Security measures to limit access to hvac system
Security Measures to Limit Access to HVAC System Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • Use fencing and screens to restrict access to air intakes

  • Relocate ventilation intakes to limit access to the public

  • Secure equipment rooms

  • Lock access doors built into air handling systems

  • Provide surveillance of intake areas, grounds and roof with video cameras, dogs and guards

  • Maintenance personnel should be escorted by security

  • Maintenance should be scheduled and documented

  • Persons loitering near ventilation intakes should be carefully watched or removed


Hvac system protection technologies
HVAC System Protection Technologies Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • HEPA filters & issues related to their addition

  • Carbon filters

  • UVGI ( Ultra Violet Germicidal Irradiation)

  • CPS ( Collective Protective Systems)

  • Controls

    • Rapid detection systems

    • Ventilation system operation / shutdown

  • Equipment maintenance and monitoring


High efficiency particulate filtration
High Efficiency Particulate Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological AttacksFiltration

Conventional HVAC filtration is not a viable line of protection. Although HEPA filters cannot protect against all airborne hazards, they can provide additional protection against many biological agents. Understanding their limitations will allow one to apply them in the most effective manner.


High efficiency particulate filtration hepa
High Efficiency Particulate Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological AttacksFiltration (HEPA)

  • To effectively arrest Anthrax spores in the 1 to 5 micron size, you need a filter which has a filtration efficiency approaching 100% at this size

  • HEPA filters have a filtration efficiency of 99.7% for particles 0.3 micron in size

  • HEPA filters are not effective at removing gases or vapors

  • Standard filters such as a FARR 30/30 ( listed as 30-40% efficient at 1 micron) are not effective at arresting Anthrax or most biological agents

  • HEPA filters are not considered to be effective at arresting many types of viruses (0.003 - 0.004 microns). However, there is evidence that viruses, which tend to attach themselves to large particles can be arrested


Retrofitting with hepa filters
Retrofitting with HEPA Filters Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks

Some issues and considerations are:

  • Space Limitations

  • High Efficiency filters have large air flow pressure drops. A clean High Flow HEPA filter has a pressure drop at 500 FPM of around 1.45” w.c.

  • Fan retrofits or upgrades may be required to deliver existing airflow at new pressure requirements.

  • New electrical service may be needed to accommodate additional power requirements

  • Additional fan energy costs


Retrofitting with hepa filters1
Retrofitting with HEPA Filters Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • Installation methods must be designed to prevent leakage around the filter elements.

    • holding frames

    • path between filter edge and double skin housing

  • The installed filter assembly should be tested to validate integrity

  • Cooling capacity loss associated with additional fan heat gain

    • Using the 10,000 CFM with additional 2” pressure example, the approximate capacity lost is 1.2 tons.

  • New filter location should address protection of both outside air and recirculated air paths


Additional energy and horsepower calculations
Additional Energy and Horsepower Calculations Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • Additional Fan Horsepower Requirement Estimate

  • Given Following Assumptions

    • Design CFM/sqft = 1.0

    • Additional Pressure associated with HEPA Filter Installation = 2.0” w.c.

    • Fan Fff = 0.65, Mtr Eff = 0.90

      HP/sqft = (1.0 x 2.0) / ( 6350 x 0.65 x 0.90)

      HP/sqft = 0.000538 (For 10,000 sqft = 5.38 HP)

  • Additional Annual Fan Energy Cost Estimate

  • Given Following Assumptions

    • Design CFM/sqft = 1.0, Average CFM / sqft = 0.7

    • Cost of energy = $ 0.12 KWH

    • Hrs of operation = 50 wks x 60 hrs/wk

      = 3000 hrs

      $/sqft-yr =(0.7x (.7/1)² x2 )/(6350x .65 x.90)x 0.746kw/hp x 3000 hrs/yr x $0.12 /kwh

      $/sqft-yr = 0.5


Carbon filters
Carbon Filters Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks

Carbon Filters treated with various coatings do provide a degree of protection against chemical agents. Some of the considerations associated with using carbon filters are:

  • Saturation Characteristic: Carbon filters have specific adsorption capacities for various contaminants. When the carbon becomes saturated, the chemical agent will pass through relatively unaffected.

  • Monitoring Requirement: As a result of the saturation characteristic, carbon filters should be provided with a broad-spectrum chemical monitoring system. Carbon filter systems with monitoring and alarming capabilities are very expensive and are currently being used by the military.


Ultra violet germicidal irradiation
Ultra Violet Germicidal Irradiation Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • UV lighting installed in air handling plenums is purported to kill off some types of static molds and fungi attached to equipment surfaces. This same technology may possibly contribute to the control of biological agents; bacteria and viruses

  • Two companies, Sterile-Aire and MRAD, both promote and sell UVGI systems.

  • UVGI is currently being used in some healthcare facilities as a supplemental air cleaning measure.

    • Their effectiveness in dealing with aerosolized particles in moving air-streams is not definitive, possibly due to the limited “contact time” between UV and Contaminant.

    • Scientific studies are few and rather limited in evaluating this technology.


Cps collective protective systems
CPS ( Collective Protective Systems) Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks

  • CPS, a packaged HEPA and Carbon filter unit manufactured by Flanders, is commercially available and is currently being used by the military.

  • These units are designed to provide ventilation air and building pressurization during chemical or biological attack, while the normal AC units are shutdown.

  • Effective use of this type of protection system would require either advance notice or rapid detection technology.

  • Budget costs for this system is approximately $6-10/cfm.


Controls
Controls Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks

Rapid Detection Systems :

  • At this time, it appears that the technology for rapid ( time in minutes) detection of specific biological agents is available only to the military.

  • The Department of Defense in conjunction with National Nuclear Security Administration is currently developing BASIS (Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information Systems) for commercial application. This system is being designed to detect a biological incident within a few hours.

  • Detection with this system would be early enough to mount an effective medical response, but too slow to alarm and reconfigure an HVAC system.

  • Recent reports indicate furious efforts to develop more rapid detection systems which may become appropriate for use in automatic HVAC control systems.


Controls1
Controls Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks

Ventilation System Operation :

  • Changes to the ventilation system operation should only be performed by authorized individuals and when the effects of these changes on the building’s interior and exterior environment are thoroughly understood.


Controls2
Controls Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks

Possible Configurations Ventilation System Operation

Emergency Ventilation Shutdown:

  • To minimize the spread of contaminant through the building via the ventilation system, air circulation systems can be shut down.

  • Current configuration recommendation from CDC, cautioned by ASHRAE

  • EmergencyPurge:

    • Operation of the ventilation system in this configuration may provide a dilution benefit for rescue workers and building victims. This system operational configuration should only be activated by emergency first responders. Unauthorized activation needs to be guarded against.

    • Cautioned by ASHRAE

  • Space Isolation :


  • Facility security
    Facility Security Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks

    Hardware:

    -Card Scans

    -Access Gates

    -Cameras


    Facility security1
    Facility Security Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks

    Access


    Facility security2

    Pres. Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks

    V-Pres.

    COO

    CFO

    HR

    MGR

    Rec’p

    MailRM

    Janitor

    1stDay

    Facility Security

    Culture:

    -Top down

    -Team effort

    -Planning

    -Practice


    Communications Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks


    ALERT 03-026 - May 30, 2003 Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks

    Homeland Security Advisory System Lowered to National Level (YELLOW)

    Elevated Condition (YELLOW).  An Elevated Condition is declared when there is a significant risk of terrorist attacks.  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Alerts recommend the immediate implementation of protective actions, including best practices when available.

    OVERVIEW

    As of 1500 on May 30, 2003, following a review of intelligence and an assessment of threats by the intelligence community, DHS, in consultation with the Homeland Security Council, has made the decision to lower the threat level to an Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) to Elevated, or "YELLOW" level risk of terrorist attack.


    What do tenants expect from building managers Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks

    Both tenants and managers appreciate communication and information, where and how to get good information before and during a crisis.

    Managers want to be able to demonstrate to corporate office and investors what is being done at their buildings to foresee and prevent a terror act to persons or the property.

    Managers and firms want to know what other firms are doing


    Managers want to recruit tenants into the security consciousness of the building and train them on what to look for and how to report it

    Managers want to be able to identify and utilize a credible person/expert able to speak to tenants

    Managers want to know what real estate managers in other cities and regions are doing

    Managers want to promote tenant self-sufficiency


    How to establish building managers authority with city officials

    Managers want to know what authorities will and will not tell them about threats

    Managers are concerned about they should and should not say when making building public address announcements – especially about evacuation

    Tenants want to know how they will know when its safe to return to the building after an evacuation


    Managers want floor wardens better trained to act independently if communications are down

    Managers want to see a list of all possible terror-threat actions that could be taken against their occupants and facilities

    Managers want officials that can come in and teach their staff and tenants on security procedures

    Managers want a reliable back up communication system during an emergency

    Managers appreciate the communications link BOMA has been able to provide during the WTO, Nisqually earthquake, and September 11th tragedies.


    Shelter-In-Place independently if communications are down


    Sheltering in Place Considerations due to independently if communications are down

    What situations that might bring about a “Shelter-in-Place” request from Government

    When might the Director of Health order a quarantine and what would that mean for downtown office buildings – basically what can building management teams expect and how should they prepare for a shelter – in place situation if ever asked or ordered to do so – etc – anything on this topic – including how will KC health know there is a biological or chemical agent – etc.

    • Quarantine ordered by government

    • Biological incident or threat

    • Chemical incident or threat

    • Dirty Bomb incident or threat

    • Contagious Disease outbreak

    • Civil disturbance or riot

    • Curfew ordered by government

    • Blackout

    • Severe Weather

    • Major Earthquake or other natural disaster closing roadways, etc.


    • "Shelter in Place" Preparation and Action Considerations independently if communications are down

    • Pre-event supplies and materials procurement and readiness

    • Signage and attachment devices and location placement maps for temporary Shelter-in-Place building signage

    • Materials to create a decontamination station for potentially contaminated persons entering the building - corridor and station construction materials, hoses, plastic, disposal bags, etc.

    • Supply of disposable respirator masks that can be distributed to building occupants

    • Supply of full face/head disposable hoods that last 2-3 hours for building emergency ops staff.

    • Obtain protective clothing and equipment for persons manning the wash down stations

    • Obtain a supply of disposable paper coveralls or hospital type garments for those who might have to remove clothing and quarantine clothing at the wash down station.

    • Obtain a supply of plastics bags to hold potentially contaminated clothing and materials

    • Temporary restroom facility needs if plumbing is down - disposable toilet kits - toilet seats that can be purchased that snap on to 5 gallon buckets such as paint buckets

    • Food, blankets, water

    • Independent heat source


    • Signage and attachment devices and location placement maps for temporary Shelter-in-Place building signage

    • Materials to create a decontamination station for potentially contaminated persons entering the building - corridor and station construction materials, hoses, plastic, disposal bags, etc.

    • Supply of disposable respirator masks that can be distributed to building occupants

    • Supply of full face/head disposable hoods that last 2-3 hours for building emergency ops staff.

    • Obtain protective clothing and equipment for persons manning the wash down stations

    • Obtain a supply of disposable paper coveralls or hospital type garments for those who might have to remove clothing and quarantine clothing at the wash down station.

    • Obtain a supply of plastics bags to hold potentially contaminated clothing and materials

    • Temporary restroom facility needs if plumbing is down - disposable toilet kits - toilet seats that can be purchased that snap on to 5 gallon buckets such as paint buckets

    • Food, blankets, water

    • Independent heat source

    • Portable bull horn

    • Lighting issues if extends past our emergency generator capabilities

    • AM FM portable Radio



    • Pre-event planning, training, and communications preparedness

    • Devise a plan to quickly close all but one controlled entrance and exit to the property

    • Decide on where to set up the one controlled entrance and exit to the property and how this site will be manned and controlled

    • Develop assignments and identify security stations to be manned in order to control ingress and egress.

    • Pre-make the various signage elements that will need to be posted especially near entrances and exits, etc.

    • Determine how and where to set up a decontaminate station (if necessary) for people entering the building

    • Determine if there is any ability to set up a "safe shelter area" within the building where air control and filtering can best be accomplished. There are some products on the market that can help establish such an area.

    • Consider where potentially exposed persons to unknown bio or chemical agents might be segregated from the general building population until the crisis has ended.

    • Determine ahead of time how to minimize air infiltration for possible contamination of outside air.

    • Determine how to establish temporary rest room facility needs if plumbing is down


    • Key phone and email contact lists – hard copies preparedness

    • Tenant lists – key contacts – hard copy

    • How will you communicate with occupants quickly and efficiently

    • If plumbing and water supply is shut down - how will you work

    • Instruction manuals so that in the event most of the staff are unable to respond any one can operate the systems of the building (using a step by step approach. These manuals are in a locked location that can be opened by our staff, security and selected other people).

    • Interface with the tenants to have the knowledge of what things they have in place that if needed we can draw from.

    • Prepare an all hazards Shelter-in-Place public announcement that can be modified quickly and used.

    • We also have a procedure for drawing water from the main riser in the event of power loss

    • Decide how to react to persons who want to enter or leave the building – prepare a document to give to persons leaving explaining that they may not be allowed back into the building and giving directions to potential government refuge and reassembly sites


    • Shelter-in-Place Action step considerations preparedness

    • ØHVAC operations

    • ØSecurity – ingress and egress operations

    • ØCommunications

    • ØCrisis operations

    • (Depending on the reason for sheltering-in-place and individual building issues such as location, size, HVAC and building systems, staffing, etc.)

    • Announce the Shelter-in-Place action


    If potential external contaminate situation exists – HAVC: preparedness

    Shut off HVAC fans.

    Close fresh air intake dampers.

    Close exhaust dampers: with the HVAC off, they can act as intakes.

    Turn off exhaust fans in bathrooms, utility rooms, kitchens, etc.; these are commonly controlled separately from the HVAC system.

    Close windows and doors.

    Seal cracks and points of air infiltration to the extent possible


    Inform internal leaders preparedness

    Edit prepared statement and release it via public announcement or posting

    Control ingress/egress – establish one controlled entrance and exit

    Set up the Shelter-in-Place signage that has been pre-made and locations pre-mapped

    People should stay indoors, unless authorities give an evacuation order.

    People should retreat to a safe zone in the interior of the building.

    Establish a public information officer near the highest tenant and visitor traffic location

    Set up emergency situation information monitoring - radio, TV, and government contact and neighboring buildings and businesses

    If potential contaminate situation exists - set up a decontaminate station for persons entering the building (a wash down station at or near the controlled entrance).

    Move potentially contaminated persons to isolated area

    If potential contaminate situation exists - pull out and distribute respirator masks

    If potential contaminate situation exists - 0pen and staff a trauma center to include having staff training in trauma first aid

    If potential Internal contaminate situation exists exhaust 100% air to the outside

    Consider vending machines and office bottled water as a source of food and water

    Monitor radioactive exposure with Geiger Counter


    Shelter-in-Place preparedness


    Future Considerations preparedness


    • Main Focus Today preparedness

    • With respect to Large Facilities and High Rise Office Buildings

    • Threat assessment

    • Vulnerability assessment

    • Protecting Building Environments From Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks

    • Communications

    • Shelter in place

    • Future Considerations


    Resources
    Resources preparedness

    • Public Health

      • http://www.metrokc.gov/health/bioterrorism

      • Additonal links to other relevant sites

    • Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)

      • http://www.bt.cdc.gov

    • Washington State Department of Health

      • http://www.doh.wa.gov/Alerts/BioTerrorism.htm


    Guidelines Availability preparedness

    http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/bldvent/2002-139.html

    1-800-35-NIOSH (1-800-356-4674)


    10 Things to Do Now preparedness

    • Get and store water – at least 5 gallons per family member – more if possible.

    • Place shoes, smoke mask or dust masks, flashlight, etc. under your bed.

    • Procure a good family first aid kit and place it where you can access it quickly.

    • Recruit neighbor-partners and make an agreement to check on each others families.

    • Download the preparedness files at the web site and edit them to fit your family – create and communicate your new family disaster recovery plan with the family, practice the plan. Communicate important information ahead of time in case you can’t talk to them later. [www.bomaseattle.org] and supplies at [http://www.seattleredcross.org/ChapterStore.htm].

    • Establish an eastern Washington or eastern state emergency family contact persona nd phone # and email address - place this number and email and other key phone numbers, back up numbers and emails in your wallet/purse for both sides fo your family.

    • Begin shopping for survival supplies, make a list for birthday and Christmas!

    • Create survival kits for Home, Work and Cars, obtain extra medications if applicable.

    • Make your list of things you would take out of house/office if you only had only 5 minutes.

    • Obtain and fill out permission to treat minor children cards and place them where they can be found along with photos of family members to aid in a possible search.


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