Природа и карактер ратова у послехладноратовском свету

1. Природа и карактер ратова у послехладноратовском свету

2. I Појам и врсте рата • II Различита схватања узрока рата • III Карактер и природа ратова у послехладноратовском свету • IV Литература

3. I Појам и врсте рата “Одлучујуће средство у политици је насиље. Свако ко не успева ово да схвати је... политичко дете” (Макс Вебер)

4. Историјат ратова • Од преко 3 300 година познате историје, само раздобље у току 200 година прошло је без ратова • У току 5 500 година историје, водило се преко 14 500 ратова, у којима је погинуло око 4 милијарде људи (Швајцарски научници) • Since 1815 there have been between224 and 559 wars, depending on the definition ofwar that is used (Mingst 2004: 198). • Број жртава је огроман: 17. век- 3 милиона; 18. век- 5, 2 милиона; 19. век- 5, 5 милиона; Први светски рат- 10 милиона мртвих, 20 милиона рањених и осакаћених; други светски рат- 55 милиона мртвих, 35 милиона рањених; Током хладног рата у свету у развоју вођено је 127 ратова у којима је убијено 21, 9 милиона људи (Андреја Милетић, Рут Сивард) • “После краја хладног рата, велики рат је постао мање вероватан, али су се регионални и домаћи сукоби одржали са увек присутним притиском на државе изван и међународне институције да интервенишу. Од 111 сукоба који су се водили од краја хладног рата до почетка новог века, 95 су били унутардржавни, а у девет случајева догодила се и страна интервенција. Више од 80 државних актера је било укључено, као и две међународне организације, и 200 невладиних актера” (Џозеф Нај)

5. Историјат ратова према Мајклу Хауарду • Ратови витезова • Ратови плаћеника • Ратови трговаца • Ратови професионалаца • Ратови револуције • Ратови нација • Ратови технолога • Нуклеарно доба • Сајбер ратови?

6. Појам и дефиниција рата • “Рат је најоштрији облик друштвених сукоба, у коме се, непосредном употребом оружане силе између држава, њихових савеза или организација, покушавају да остваре одређени политички циљеви победом над противничком страном и њеним принуђивањем да прихвати услове победника.” (Андреја Милетић, “Рат”, у, Енциклопедија политичке културе, Савремена администрација, Београд, 1993, стр. 953)

7. ‘a state of usually open and declared armed hostile conflict between states or nations’. (Webster’s Dictionary) • ‘organised violence carried on by political units against each other’ (Bull 1977: 184).

8. It is possible to argue that war is simply any form of armed violence between groups of people, but it is valid to ask what sorts of goals are involved and how much violence is required for an armed clash to be called a ‘war’. • Is a clash between two street gangs in which several people are killed, really the same phenomenon as a military conflict between two or more states in which millions are deliberately killed? • Choosing a particular threshold can also seem arbitrary, as with the influential Singer and Small definition which requires a war to involve at least 1,000 battle deaths per year. By this token the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War between Argentina and the United Kingdom would barely qualify, though few would argue that that conflict was not a war. • Some sense of scale is clearly needed, but perhaps Quincy Wright’s less specific formulation is still reasonable, that war is ‘a conflict among political groups, especially sovereign states, carried on by armed forces of considerable magnitude, for a considerable period of time’ (Wright 1968: 453).

9. Рат је оружани сукоб међу државама а не између приватних лица или њихових група. • Рат није”однос човека према човеку, већ државе према држави.” (Русо) • Рат је сукоб између политичких друштава- политичке групе које још нису државе, као и у државно необликованим друштвима (Вјатр) • Проблематика унутардржавних ратова • IUS AD BELLO ET IUS IN BELLO

10. Физичка и “вољна” димензија рата • Физичка принуда као средство, а воља као циљ рата • Намера да се води рат (ANIMUS BELLIGERENDI) • Рат обухвата не само “стварну борбу” него и “читаво раздобље у коме је видљива спремност на њу.” (Томас Хобс) • Повезаност рата и политике • Бријан/Келогов пакт – 1928. године • Забрана употребе силе и претње силом- члан 2, став 4, Повеље УН

11. Врсте ратова: • Међудржавни и унутардржвни ратови • Нападачки и одбрамбени ратови- • Напaдачки (Blietzkrieg, превентивни рат (preventive war), предухитрујући рат (preemptive war) • Кратки и дуготрајни ратови • Фронтални и герилски или партизански ратови

12. Локални, регионални, светски • Средишњи и периферни • Копнени, поморски, ваздушни и свемирски (ратови звезда) • Ограничени и тотални (неограничени) • Конвенционални и нуклеарни • Праведни и неправедни

13. Специјални рат и психолошки рат • Сукоби ниског интензитета и посреднички ратови • Царински рат • “Хладни” и “топли” ратови • Рат као метафора

14. Preemptivni (preduhitrujući) i preventivni ratovi

15. Проф. др Драган Р. Симић

16. Državni sekretar Danijel Vebster je 1837. godine povodom poznatog slučaja sa brodom „Karolina“ (Carolina Incident), odredio okolnosti pod kojima je preduhitrujuće delovanje opravdano, ističući da to pravo može da se koristi kada je država suočena sa: „Trenutnom, neodoljivom potrebom... Koja ne ostavlja prostor za izbor sredstava niti vremena za razmišljanje.“

17. Posle iskustva od 11. 09. 2001. godine, Amerika više jednostavno ne sme da čeka da se ovakve pretnje materijalizuju, jer bi onda, po rečima Buša i Čejnija, bilo prekasno da se reaguje. Odvraćanje i zastrašivanje kao deo hladnoratovskog strateškog arsenala i načina mišljenja treba da budu zamenjeni tzv. anticipativnom samoodbranom; drugim rečima, SAD sebi daju odrešene ruke, moralno i pravno opravdanje takođe, da preduzmu pruduhitrujuće udare „što dalje od svojih obala“ protiv država, organizacija i/ili pojedinaca koji mogu da ugroze bezbednost Amerike i njenih saveznika. Posebno u naše vreme kada postoje realni izgledi da oružje za masovno uništavanje dođe u ruke terorista, ne sme se čekati da ona budu upotrebljena, pa da se steknu uslovi za legalnu i legitimnu samoodbranu. Premda i dalje kod ovakvih objašnjenja ostaje nejasno, da li će, kada i gde neprijatelj zaista napasti, odlike novih oružja i fanatizam terorista ne daju pravo na pasivnost, tvrdili su zagovornici preemptivnih udara.

18. Ono što je, međutim, izazvalo raspravu povodom prava na anticipativnu samoodbranu, na način kako je obrazložena u Strategiji nacionalne bezbednosti SAD iz 2002. godine, ticalo se najviše mogućnosti eventualne zloupotrebe ovog prava (pravo na samoodbranu je, inače, uređeno u Povelji Ujedinjenih nacija, u članovima 2(4) i 51.). Drugim rečima, postavilo se i jedno suštinsko pitanje: nije li ovako široko tumačeno i samododeljeno pravo na preduhitrujuće delovanje, zapravo, paravan za vođenje preventivnih ratova? Ovde je, razume se, važno praviti razliku između onoga kako države treba da se ponašaju u međusobnim odnosima u cilju očuvanja međunarodnog sistema i međunarodnog poretka i pouke o značaju preventivnog delovanja u načelu iskazanog, između ostalog, i u poslovici da je „vrednija jedna unca prevencije nego funta lečenja“.

19. Oto fon Bizmark, koji je često posezao za ratom kao nastavkom politike drugim sredstvima, govorio je da mu preventivni rat izgleda „kao izvršiti samoubistvo iz straha od smrti“

20. Чарлс Кегли, Грегори Рејмонд

21. Преемптивни (предухитрујући) ратови • The SixDay War between Israel and an alliance of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq was aclassic case of preemption (see Reiter, 1995:16–19). Tensions between Israel and itsArab neighbors had been growing throughout the spring of 1967, and reachedtheir zenith in May when Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser undertook aseries of actions that raised fears in Tel Aviv of an imminent attack. Besidesmobilizing his troops and cementing military ties with Syria, Jordan, and Iraq,Nasser ordered the UN Emergency Force to leave the Sinai, where it had beendeployed since the 1956 Suez War as a buffer between Egypt and Israel.Furthermore, he announced a blockade of the Strait of Tiran, Israel’s vitalwaterway to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, and proclaimed that his goal in anyfuture war with Israel would be the destruction of the Jewish state. Assuming aninvasion was forthcoming and survival doubtful if Egypt landed the first blow,the Israelis launched a surprise attack on June 5, which enabled them to win adecisive victory.

22. Првентивни ратови • the Third Punic War (Prvi punski rat (264 - 241 BC); Drugi punski rat 218-201 B. C.) betweenRome and Carthage (149–146 B.C.E.) illustrates preventive warfare. Although reduced to the status of a minor power bylosses to the Romans in two previous wars, Carthage had undergone an economicresurgence during the first half of the second century, which led some Romanleaders to worry about its future ambitions. Consumed with the fear that Carthagewould regain its former strength and eventually threaten Rome, Marcus PorciusCato ended every speech to the Roman Senate by proclaiming: ‘‘Carthage must bedestroyed!’’ Heeding his advice, Rome annihilated Carthage in a brutal,unprovoked military campaign. • Рат у Ираку из 2003. године

23. Џозеф Нај

24. Ukoliko postoji nedvosmislena i dovoljna pretnja teritorijalnom integritetu i političkom suverenitetu jedne države, ona mora delovati odmah, ili kasnije neće biti prilike za delovanje. Pretnja mora biti, međutim, neposredna. Takav argument ne bi opravdao, na primer, sovjetsku intervenciju u Avganistanu. Postoji razlika između preemptivnih i preventivnih ratova. Preemptivni napad dogadja se kada je opasnost neposredna. Do preventivnog rata dolazi kada su državnici uvereni kako je rat bolje voditi sada nego kasnije. Kao što smo videli, 1914. godine takvo preventivno razmišljanje uticalo je na nemački generalštab. Mnogi su se bojali da će, ako bi čekali do 1916. godine, Rusija biti suviše jaka da bi Šlifenov plan uspeo

25. Збигњев Бжежински

26. Ani мesanje dvaju razlicitih koncepata - prethodnog (preemptive) i preventivnog(preventive) djelovanja nije pomoglo razjasnjavanju stvari. U Poglavlju 5dokumenta 0 Nacionalnoj sigurnosnoj strategiji za 2002. godinu kojije razmatraloNacionalno vijece za sigurnost, naslovljenom Prevent Our Enemies from ThreateningUs, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction (Sprijeeimonaie neprijatelj« da prijete nama, naiim saveznicima i naiim prijateijima oruijem zamasovno unistavanje), ova dva pojma koriste se kao istoznacnice. Zamjenik drtavnogtajnika za obranu dodatno je zamaglio stvar izjavivsi 2. prosinca 2002. na InternationalInstitute for Strategic Studies (IISS) kako "svako tko misli da mi moiemoc!ekati do trenutka kada imamo pouzdane infonnacije da se napad sprema,nije nis~a naucio iz 11. rujna".

27. Ipak, razlika izrnedu prethodnog i preventivnog vrlo je vain a za medunarodniporedak i ne bi smjela biti izgubljena iz vida. Ona podrazumijeva razliku izmedu,npr. izraelske odluke izlipnja 1967. da preduhitri (preempt) arapski napad za kojisu arapske snage okoncavale pripreme i izraelskog zracnog napada 1981. godinena nuklearni reaktoru Osiraqu s ciljem sprecavanja (prevent) Iraka u stjecanjunuklearnog oruzja, U prvom slucaju djelovalo se po izravnoj prijetnji; u drugom sesprijecilo da do prijetnje uopce dode. Na isti se nacin i napad SAD-a na Irak 2003.godine moida moie sagledavati kao preventivan (preventive) protiv neke buduce"ozbiljne i rastuce prijetnje" (kako je to nazvao predsjednik Bush), ali sigurno nekao djelovanje da se preduhitri (preempt) neki konkretan, izravan iracki napad.

28. “Ratovi treće vrste”(Kalevi Holsti)

29. U slučaju ratova treće vrste, rec je o unutrašnjim sukobima najčešće uzrokovanim etnoverski mrazlozima, ili sukobimakoji su izbili usled borbe za izraženiju autonomiju, veća prava ili zaodvajanje od već postojeće države putem njenog razbijanja. Unutrašnjiratovi predstavljaju u naše doba novu bezbednosnu pretnju koja zahtevadrukčije odgovore od dobro poznatih klasičnih, vojnih sredstava - iako su pomestu izbijanja takvi nasilni sukobi unutrašnji, posledice ovakvih ratovatreće vrste utiču na bezbednost u njihovom bližem i širem okruženju, kao i nameđunarodnu bezbednost.

30. Asimetrični ratovi

31. Martin Ewans Conflict in Afghanistan- A Study in Asymmetric Warfare

32. In the wake of the attacks of 11 September 2001, as well as during the ensuing invasionsof Afghanistan and Iraq, much has been heard of the concept of ‘asymmetric warfare’. • Broadly speaking, this purports to describe a means of fighting through which a weakerpower can offset or neutralise the strengths of a more powerful opponent by applyingwhat strengths it has to its opponent’s weaknesses.

33. The concept is as old as history andcould, for example, be used to typify the encounter between David and Goliath. It fits setbattles between trained and organised armies, as, for example, the Battle of Agincourt of1415, where a stronger force including armoured horsemen was defeated by a weakerforce using the armour-piercing longbow. More frequently, however, it is used todescribe situations in which formal state power is confronted by non-state or guerrillaactivity.

34. Since the beginnings of nation-state formation in the seventeenth century, asymmetricwarfare has been the exception rather than the rule, except possibly in colonialenvironments. As states developed and became embroiled in warfare, so they madegreater use of regular armies. These were equipped with progressively more sophisticatedweaponry, and became increasingly permanent and professional. Mechanisation, whichbegan during the First World War, became the principal characteristic of inter-state‘conventional’ warfare from the Second World War onwards. This meant that warfarebecame both more expensive and more destructive, until, with the development ofnuclear weapons, the scale of destruction and expense became self-defeating. In a nuclearwar, there would be no winners.

35. In 9 AD, three Roman legions commanded by Publius Quinctilius Varus weredestroyed in the Teutoburger Wald by German tribesmen, having been lured onto terrainin which they were unable to deploy the tactical formations which would have renderedtheir superiority irresistible. Among the most spectacular of more recent examples werethe Boer and Vietnam Wars, where the use of asymmetric tactics against regular forceswas supplemented by political and public relations activity. The ability to erode thestronger power’s will to fight by adducing a moral dimension to the conflict is a valuableasset in an asymmetric context. For both parties, to ‘win hearts and minds’ is a significantstep towards success.

36. In recent years, with major inter-state warfare largely stalemated, the main focus hasbeen on asymmetric warfare. While ‘conventional’ warfare has not been precluded –Iraq/Iran, India/Pakistan, Britain/Argentina, Iraq/Kuwait – it has generally been eithershort-lived or has been kept within strictly local limits, or both. The threat currentlyfacing the ‘elite’ countries, mainly of Europe and North America, as well as the centresof superior power in the Third World, does not now arise from open warfare betweennations. In its place is a threat from non-state organisations, some based in knownlocalities, as for example Chechnya and Kashmir, others, notably al-Qa ida, with noreadily accessible focus of command or activity. Their ability seriously to challengemajor state power is doubtful, but their potential to inflict material damage and loss oflife is undeniable, the more so if they should gain access to weapons of mass destructionor can find means to disrupt the extensive and intricate infrastructure on which modernsocieties depend. A discussion of the nature of asymmetric warfare and the applicabilityto current circumstances of the lessons to be learnt from its past employment, is thus oneof considerable contemporary interest, if not urgency.

37. Ratovi četvrte generacije

38. Fourth Generation Warfare is defined as conflicts which involve the following elements: • Are complex and long term. • Terrorism • A non-national or transnational base, highly decentralized. • A direct attack on the enemy's culture. • Highly sophisticated psychological warfare especially through media manipulation and lawfare • All available pressures are used - political, economic, social and military. • Occurs in low intensity conflict, involving actors from all networks. • Non-combatants are tactical dilemmas.

39. The concept was first described by the authors William S. Lind, Colonel (US Army), Captain (USMC), Colonel (US Army), and Lieutenant Colonel (USMCR) in a 1989 Marine Corps Gazette article entitled “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation”. • The generations of warfare described by these authors are: • 1st Generation: tactics of line and column; which developed in the age of the smoothbore musket. • 2nd Generation: tactics of linear fire and movement, with reliance on indirect fire. • 3rd Generatin: tactics of infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy's combat forces rather than seeking to close with and destroy them; and defence in depth.

40. In brief, the theory holds that warfare has evolved through fourgenerations: 1) the use of massed manpower, 2) firepower, 3) maneuver,and now 4) an evolved form of insurgency that employs all availablenetworks—political, economic, social, military—to convince anopponent’s decisionmakers that their strategic goals are eitherunachievable or too costly.

41. The theory went through a second incarnation when the notionof nontrinitarian war came into vogue; but it failed to examinethat notion critically. The theory also is founded on myths aboutthe so-called Westphalian system and the theory of blitzkrieg. Thetheory of 4GW reinvented itself once again after September 11, 2001(9/11), when its proponents claimed that Al Qaeda was waging a4GW against the United States.

42. War of Necessity and War of Choice Richard N. Haas, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of two Iraq Wars, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2009

43. “Wars can be defined any number of ways: civil wars, wars of national liberation, world wars, cold wars, counterinsurgencies, a global war on terrorism, wars of attrition, defensive wars, nuclear wars, limited wars, just wars and preventive wars all come to mind. What these and other such descriptions tend to reflect is scale, purpose, duration, the means employed, the nature of conflict, and / or nature of undertaking.”

44. “There is however, another way to think about war. Wars can be either be viewed as essentially unavoidable, that is acts of necessity, or just the opposite, reflecting conscious choice when other reasonable policies are available but are deemed to be less attractive… History offers us numerous examples of each. Any list of modern wars of necessity from the American Perspective would include World War II and the Korean War. Wars of choice undertaken by the United States would include Vietnam, Bosnia, Kosovo and a Century before, the Spanish-American War.”

45. What characterizes Wars of necessity? • The most common situation involves self-defense. More generally, wars of necessity involves the most important national interests, the absence of promising alternatives to the use of force, and the certain and considerable price to be paid if the status quo is stand. Wars of necessity do not require assurances that the overall results of striking or resisting will be positive, only the assessment that the results of not so doing will be unacceptably negative and large.

46. What characterizes Wars of Choice? • Wars of Choice tend to involve stakes or interests that are less clearly “vital”, along with the existence of viable alternative policies, be they diplomacy, inaction, or something else but still other than the use of military force. One result is that wars of choice tend to increase the pressure on the government of the day to demonstrate that the overall or net results of employing force will be positive, that is, that the benefits outweigh the costs. If this test cannot be meet, the choice will appear to be ill-advised and in fact most likely is

47. Menachem Begin, the former prime minister of Israel, differentiated between what he called “wars of choice” and “wars of no alternative” • Maimonides, one of the great scholars in the annals of Judaism, wrote more than eight century ago of wars he judged to be obligatory and those he termed optional. The former were those waged by the king for narrowly defined religious cases and in self-defense, i. e. “to deliver Israel from the enemy attacking him”. He distinguished such necessary wars from those discretionary conflicts undertaken buy a king against neighboring nations “to extend the borders of Israel and to enhance his greatness and prestige”

48. The distinction between wars of necessity and wars of choice is obviously heavily subjective, inevitably reflecting an individual’s analysis and politics. • I introduced the phrases into the Iraq war debate in an op-ed in the Washington Post on November 23, 2003, five months after I left the Administration. The piece argued that the first Iraq war was a classic war of necessity, the second a classic war of choice.

49. Cyber Warfare

50. In the spring of 2007, when Estonian authorities moved a monument to the Red Army from the center of its capital city, Tallinn, to the outskirts of town, a diplomatic row erupted with neighboring Russia. Estonian nationalists regard the army as occupiers and oppressors, a sentiment that dates to the long period of Soviet rule following the Second World War, when the Soviet Union absorbed all three Baltic states. Ethnic Russians, who make up about a quarter of Estonia’s 1.3 million people, were nonetheless incensed by the statue’s treatment and took to the streets in protest. Estonia later blamed Moscow for orchestrating the unrest; order was restored only after U.S. and European diplomatic interventions.