Conditions for Chinese cooperation in nuclear disarmament

1. Conditions for Chinese cooperation in nuclear disarmament Susan Turner Haynes, PhDStrategic Multilayer AssessmentResearch Presentation1.17.18

2. Global nuclear stockpile

3. US & Russian strategic nuclear weapons, 1990-2012

4. China’s strategic nuclear weapons, 1990-2012

5. Additional nuclear capabilities

6. Df-41 icbm

7. Type 096 ssbn & JL-3

9. Additional nuclear capabilities

10. A different type of arms race • US develops US Ballistic Missile Defense • China increases ICBM production • US develops long-range prompt strategic weapons • China develops & deploys SLBMS • US increases ABMs • China adds ICBMs and SLBMS • US increases ABMs • China tests hypersonics

11. Chinese perceptions re: Bmd + cpgs “Although the [the US] anti-missile system…alone cannot effectively protect from…nuclear weapons; once combined with the ability to strike first…the US could offset…strategic nuclear deterrence.” -Strategic Nuclear Escalation, 2007

12. Existing proposals • Cap Chinese strategic nuclear forces in exchange for continued reductions in US and Russian strategic nuclear forces • Cap Chinese strategic nuclear forces in exchange for continued reductions in US and Russian strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces • Have China commit to continue de-mating weapons in exchange for continued reductions in US and Russian strategicnuclear forces

13. Additional Trilateral options • Stay in INF Treaty with Russia • Renegotiate INF Treaty to include China

14. BMD • Continue assurances in BMDR Review that BMD is not focused on China • Increase transparency regarding GMD capabilities • Limit number of GMD interceptors • Restrictions on ICBM interceptor testing • Agree to a ceiling on GMD interceptors

15. cpgs • Publish a CPGS review to increase transparency as to aims and intended scope of program • Clarify Chinese nuclear weapons are not intended targets • Conduct assessment as to how to mitigate Chinese misunderstanding

16. Other suggestions • Cease/Limit US pursuit of hypersonic weapons in exchange for a commitment from China to keep its hypersonic weapons conventional • Cease/Limit US pursuit of hypersonic weapons in exchange for numeric limits on China’s hypersonic nuclear weapons • Issue a “No First Use of Force” (NFUF) statement relating specifically to China. • Cooperate with China on a “Transparency Agreement” where the US is transparent as to intent of its BMD and CPGS programs and China reiterates its commitment to NFU and intent with hypersonic weapons.

17. Questions?

18. Thank you.

19. China’s threat environment INTENT CAPABILITIES

20. Chinese perceptions of bmd • “Its aim is to render other countries’ ‘spears’ useless, while making itself both offensive and defensive and ensuring its absolute security” (RMRB Article Criticizes, 2000). • China is not an “imagined enemy…Consider the perspective from the bottom-line: China cannot help but worry that the stability of future Sino-US relations is liable to be damaged by such TMD deployment" (Hu, 2004). • “Once they discover the evidence that states have the capability to develop nuclear weapons, [the US] quickly uses the methods of nuclear sanctions and armed force to destroy such capabilities, so how is it in this case they have the patience to wait? The America’s development of NMD is primarily to target Russia & China…” (Zhang, 2000) • … “We’re not idiots in China who think you [the US] are transparent in your BMD intentions. It is incredulous to assume that the US BMD efforts are solely targeted at Iran and North Korea” (Track 2 Dialogue, 2011)

21. Chinese perceptions of Cpgs • US CPGS further enhances US “absolute security” (Ren, 2006; Li, 2010; Li & Li, 2011; Zhang, 2011) • “Although the anti-missile system…alone cannot effectively protect [the US] from…nuclear weapons; once combined with the ability to strike first…the US could offset…strategic nuclear deterrence.” (Strategic Nuclear Escalation, 2007) • “the most profound and fundamental readjustment since the end of the Cold War” (Zhou, 2002) • The “’new’ US nuclear strategy” requires other countries “for their own security…to adopt countermeasures, raise the quality and striking capabilities of their nuclear weapons [and] to improve the systems of their own nuclear forces to maintain the effectiveness of nuclear reprisals” (Wang & Li, 2002)

22. China’s Strategy shift • US Hegemony + US Missile Defense + US CPGS = A perception of strategy shift from Limited to Maximum Deterrence. • This perceived shift has caused many in China to reevaluate their own state’s nuclear strategy. As a consequence, China appears to be shifting away from minimum deterrence and building up its nuclear arsenal to meet future strategic requirements.