Jean Maurice Crete Division of Concepts and Planning, Safeguards Training Section

1. MANAGING THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR NUCLEAR POWER Vienna 9 - 12 February 2010 Capacity Building for Safeguards : Some Perspectives Jean Maurice Crete Division of Concepts and Planning, Safeguards Training Section

2. Outline • Safeguards: • An international challenge • A national challenge • Preparing for a nuclear industry • Capacity building • Support activities

3. Safeguards Obligations : why? NPT preamble (extract) • “Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples”

4. Safeguards Obligations : why? In other words: A legal framework An historical background A technical challenge

5. IAEA Board of Governors March 1995 “...the safeguards system for implementing comprehensive safeguards agreements should be designed to provide for verification by the Agency of the correctness and completeness of States’ declarations, so that there is credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities.”

6. Objectives of National Verification SSAC obligation: • account for and control of nuclear material • collect and maintain information on nuclear and related activities • provide information to IAEA (reports, declarations)

7. International Safeguards Implementation HQ Activities In field Activities Other sources Inspection Reports, Samples,etc Safeguards Implementation Report Evaluation Conclusions REFERENCE: State Reports Effectiveness Evaluation

8. At a Domestic Level A possible objective for national purpose: Making sure that no one in a place under state’s control is circumventing the national safeguards requirements “with the full knowledge of the facts” or “without the full knowledge of the facts”

9. Bridging International and National Safeguards Compliance with NPT through Safeguards Agreements imposes a very accurate knowledge of the entire industrial, research and commercial status and its evolution within the state, not to mention an adequate knowledge of the conditions offered to the IAEA inspectors to perform their duty. This can only be achieved with a well informed and powerful state body. In other words, such a body is the first element of a continuous chain for successfully fulfilling national and international commitment towards non proliferation.

10. Preparing for a Nuclear Power Industry – Legislation • Is the national safeguards legislation and regulation suitable for implementing and regulating safeguards for a nuclear power industry? • some safeguards legislations may be tailored to low level of nuclear activities or e.g. to research reactors, and will need amending • Legal framework between operator and regulator is a key issue • Does the national safeguards legislation cover all nuclear materials and activities in the state? • Legislative independence: accepted international standard for national safeguards authorities is to be independent of operations of facilities

11. Preparing for a Nuclear Power Industry – IAEA & Safeguards • Early and continued interactions with the IAEA very important • Consult at an early stage with the IAEA for advice on safeguards: • incorporating safeguards in the design of the facility is extremely cost effective and resources saving (including safeguards requirements in the licensing process may be considered) • some reactor types may require more intensive safeguards verification activities than others

12. Preparing for a Nuclear Power Industry – Training • Preparing and training national safeguards regulators and inspectors • training takes many years • more national inspectors will probably be required throughout the project • Preparing and training reactor operators and managers in safeguards requirements • Experience with SSS (safeguards, security, safety) with running a research reactor provides a good base for running a nuclear power reactor

13. Capacity Building : Synergies Domestic “safeguards” verification activities may build on or contribute to other domestic control regimes: • control of radioactive materials • radiation safety • physical protection • export/import control system

14. Capacity Building : Safeguards and National Infrastructure Three-floor building: Policy makers : Reference and Objective, Law, Resources, Vision Managerial level : Organization, Allotment of resources, Regulations, Control Technical/Working level : Collecting/Processing/Reporting information

15. ACCESS ACTIVITIES REPORTING LEGAL SSAC NMAC EXPORT 1st Pu core NM MEASUREMENT SSAC’s Skills, Knowledge and Abilities

16. DECISION ACTION Three Sets of Skills, Knowledge, Abilities Expertise Decision making and action line Control loop

17. Support provided by the IAEA • Advisory service • Legal assistance (Office of Legal Affairs) • Technical support • Guidance Publications (examples) • Nuclear Material Handbook • “Facility Design and Plant Operation Features That Facilitate the Implementation of IAEA Safeguards”, STR360,dated February 2009 • Other technical reports • Training

18. Member States Training : Highlights In 2009: 245 PARTICIPANTS FROM 77 COUNTRIES TRAINED • Basic training: • International SSAC course in US • International SSAC course for countries with Small Quantity Protocols (SQP) in the USA • Regional SSAC courses in Brazil, China, Japan, Uzbekistan • National Training Course in Turkmenistan • Regional Technical Meeting on AP and SQP Implementation in Asia and the Pacific Region (held In the Republic of Korea in cooperation with KINAC) • As more oriented training: • National Training Course on DIQ in US for Indonesia • regional SSAC course in Namibia in 2008 (2010: Burkina Faso) with emphasis on uranium mining • “SSAC Advisory Service” Missions • Romania, Niger, Georgia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, • As follow-ups of ISSAS Missions: • two national training courses in 2008, in Armenia and Switzerland • In close cooperation with other departments or offices of the Agency: • a SQP Seminar at Headquarters in 2008 • Regional Training Course on Nuclear Security, Safety and Nuclear Material Accountancy organized in Ghana • Expert Meeting on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Non-proliferation in Thailand • INIR missions in Jordan and Vietnam, as well as a similar mission in Chile • With Australia and USA : assistance on AP implementation in Malaysia, assistance on national inspectorate training for Vietnam and Thailand

19. As a Summary • Safeguards have to be considered • For international purpose • As well as for national purpose • The sooner the better • Safety and Security of course, but also Safeguards. Take advantage of synergies (e.g. NMAC requirements, safety design of fuel handling system) • Currently safeguards are often introduced after a facility’s design has been frozen which results in costly redesign and project delays • Without starting from scratch: • Radioactive sources management is a sound basis • Collecting existing information (e.g. customs or operators data) rather than duplicating or overlapping

20. THANK YOU!