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Information Sharing and Security in Dynamic Coalitions. Charles E. Phillips, Jr. Computer Science & Engineering Department 191 Auditorium Road, Box U-155 The University of Connecticut Storrs, Connecticut 06269-3155 [email protected] Profs. T.C. Ting and Steven A. Demurjian

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information sharing and security in dynamic coalitions
Information Sharing and Security in Dynamic Coalitions

Charles E. Phillips, Jr.

Computer Science & Engineering Department

191 Auditorium Road, Box U-155

The University of Connecticut

Storrs, Connecticut 06269-3155

[email protected]

Profs. T.C. Ting and Steven A. Demurjian

Computer Science & Engineering Department

191 Auditorium Road, Box U-155

The University of Connecticut

Storrs, Connecticut 06269-3155

http://www.engr.uconn.edu/~steve

[email protected]

overview of presentation
Overview of Presentation
  • Introduction
  • The Dynamic Coalition Problem
    • Civilian Organizations
    • Military Involvement/GCCS
  • Information Sharing and Security
    • Federating Resources
    • Data Integrity
    • Access Control (DAC and MAC)
    • Other Critical Security Issues
  • Candidate Security Approach
  • Conclusions and Future Work
introduction crisis and coalitions
IntroductionCrisis and Coalitions
  • A Crisis is Any Situation Requiring National or International Attention as Determined by the President of the United States or UN
  • A Coalition is an Alliance of Organizations: Military, Civilian, International or any Combination
  • A Dynamic Coalition is Formed in a Crisis and Changes as Crisis Develops, with the Key Concern Being the Most Effective way to Solve the Crisis
  • Dynamic Coalition Problem (DCP) is the Inherent Security, Resource, and/or Information Sharing Risks that Occur as a Result of the Coalition Being Formed Quickly
introduction near simultaneous crises
IntroductionNear Simultaneous Crises

Crisis Point

BOSNIA

(NATO)

NATO Hq

KOSOVO

(US,UK)

Olympic Games

Earthquake

(United Nations)

Ship Wreck

(UK,SP)

evaluation vs dcp emergent need for coalitions
Evaluation vs. DCP Emergent Need for Coalitions
  • “Coalitions must be flexible and no one coalition is or has the answer to all situations.”
          • Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld
  • “Whenever possible we must seek to operate alongside alliance or coalition forces, integrating their capabilities and capitalizing on their strengths.”
          • U.S. National Security Strategy
  • “Currently, there is no automated capability for passing command and control information and situational awareness information between nations except by liaison officer, fax, telephone, or loaning equipment.”
          • Undersecretary of Defense for Advanced Technology
the dynamic coalition problem
The Dynamic Coalition Problem
  • Dynamic Coalition Problem (DCP) is the Inherent Security, Resource, and/or Information Sharing Risks that Occur as a Result of the Coalition Being Formed Quickly
  • Private Organizations (PVO)
    • Doctors Without Boarders
    • Red Cross
  • Non-Government Organizations (NGO)
    • NYPD
  • Government Agencies
    • FBI
    • CIA
    • Military
supporting advanced applications dcp objectives for crisis
Supporting Advanced ApplicationsDCP Objectives for Crisis
  • Federate Users Quickly and Dynamically
  • Bring Together Resources (Legacy, COTs, GOTs, DBs, etc.) Without Modification
  • Dynamically Realize/Manage Simultaneous Crises
  • Identify Users by Roles to Finely Tune Access
  • Authorize, Authenticate, and Enforce a Scalable Security Policy that is Flexible in Response to Collation Needs
  • Provide a Security Solution that is Portable, Extensible, and Redundant for Survivability
  • Include Management/Introspection Capabilities to Track and Monitor System Behavior
the dynamic coalition problem coalition architecture
The Dynamic Coalition ProblemCoalition Architecture

Clients Using Services

Resources Provide Services

NATO SYS

Federal Agencies

(FEMA, FBI, CIA, etc.)

Client

COTS

U.S. Army

LFCS

(Canada)

Client

U.S. Navy

SICF

(France)

Client

French

Air Force

Client

HEROS

(Germany)

U.S. Legacy

System

SIACCON

(Italy)

NATO

Database

Client

NGO/PVO

Resource

German

NGO/PVO

(Red Cross, NYPD, etc.)

Client

GCCS (US)

COTS

Client

the dynamic coalition problem joint and combined information flow
The Dynamic Coalition ProblemJoint and Combined Information Flow

GCCS

GCCS-A

CORPS

ABCS

MCS

XX

DIV

FAADC2I

MCS

CSSCS

AFATDS

ASAS

X

BDE

BSA

TOC

MCS

X X

| |

| |

BN

BN

| |

MCS

MCS

CO

FBCB2

Common Operating Environment

Combined: Many Countries

ARMY

Joint Task Force

Adjacent

Marines

Navy

Coalition

Partners

Air Force

GCCS-M

GCCS-N

GCCS-AF

NATO

Systems

TCO

JMCIS

TBMCS

Coalition

Systems

Joint - Marines, Navy, Air Force, Army

the dynamic coalition problem combined information flow
The Dynamic Coalition ProblemCombined Information Flow

Logistics

GCCS - Joint/Coalition -

Maneuver

Air Defense/Air Operations

Fire Support

Combined Database

Intelligence

Network and Resource

Management

the dynamic coalition problem coalition artifacts and information flow
The Dynamic Coalition ProblemCoalition Artifacts and Information Flow

U.S. Global C2 Systems

Air Force

Navy

Joint

Command

System

Battle

Management

System

NGO/

PVO

GCCS

U.N.

Army Battle

Command

System

Combat

Operations

System

NATO

U.S.A

Army

Marine Corps

Dynamic Coalition

AFATDS

FADD

GOAL: Leverage information

in a fluid, dynamic

environment

ASAS

GCCS-A

ABCS

CSSCS

MCS

Other

Army C2

the dynamic coalition problem global command and control system
The Dynamic Coalition ProblemGlobal Command and Control System

GCCS Provides:

- Horizontal and Vertical Integration

of Information to Produce a

Common Picture of the Battlefield

- 20 separate automated systems

- 625 locations worldwide

- private network

Situational Awareness

GLOBAL C2 SYSTEMS

MOBILE SUBSCRIBER EQUIPMENT

DATA RADIO

SATELLITE

MISSION PLANNING

MET

SUPPORT

INTEL

SATCOM

MANEUVER

CONTROL

X X

AIR DEFENCE

ARTY

TOPO

Client/Server

MET

MISSION PLANNING

AIR DEFENCE

SUPPORT

INTEL

X

MANEUVER

CONTROL

Client/Server

SATCOM

ARTY

TOPO

Company

AIR DEFENCE

FBCB2

/EBC

SUPPORT

INTEL

Platoon

Client/Server

ARTY

Tactical

Internet

MANEUVER

CONTROL

BATTLEFIELD C2 SYSTEM

EMBEDDED BATTLE COMMAND

SATCOM

FBCB2

/EBC

Squad

MOBILE SUBSCRIBER EQUIPMENT

the dynamic coalition problem global command and control system13
The Dynamic Coalition ProblemGlobal Command and Control System

Joint Services

:

a.k.a

Weather

METOC

Video Teleconference

TLCF

Joint Operations Planning and Execution System

JOPES

Common Operational Picture

COP

Transportation Flow Analysis

JFAST

Logistics Planning Tool

LOGSAFE

Defense Message System

DMS

NATO Message System

CRONOS

Component Services

:

Army Battle Command System

ABCS

Air Force Battle Management System

TBMCS

Marine Combat Operations System

TCO

JMCIS

Navy Command System

the dynamic coalition problem global command and control system14
The Dynamic Coalition ProblemGlobal Command and Control System

Common Picture

Common Operational Picture

the dynamic coalition problem gccs shortfalls
The Dynamic Coalition ProblemGCCS Shortfalls
  • Difficult to Establish Roles
    • Requires Host Administrator
    • Not Separate Roles
  • No Time Controllable Access
    • Time Limits on Users
    • Time Limits on Resource Availability
    • Time Limits on Roles
  • No Value Constraints
    • Unlimited Common Operational Picture
    • Unlimited Access to Movement Information
  • Difficult to Federate Users and Resources
    • U.S. Only system
    • Private Network (Not Multi-Level Secure)
the dynamic coalition problem gccs shortfalls user roles
The Dynamic Coalition ProblemGCCS Shortfalls: User Roles
  • Currently, GCCS Users have Static Profile Based on Position/Supervisor/Clearance Level
  • Granularity Gives “Too Much Access”
  • Profile Changes are Difficult to Make - Changes Done by System Admin. Not Security Officer
  • What Can User Roles Offer to GCCS?
    • User Roles are Valuable Since They Allow Privileges to be Based on Responsibilities
    • Security Officer Controls Requirements
    • Support for Dynamic Changes in Privileges
    • Towards Least Privilege
the dynamic coalition problem gccs shortfalls time controlled access
The Dynamic Coalition ProblemGCCS Shortfalls: Time Controlled Access
  • Currently, in GCCS, User Profiles are Indefinite with Respect to Time
    • Longer than a Single Crisis
    • Difficult to Distinguish in Multiple Crises
    • No Time Controllable Access on Users or GCCS Resources
  • What can Time Constrained Access offer GCCS?
    • Junior Planners - Air Movements of Equipment Weeks before Deployment
    • Senior Planners - Adjustment in Air Movements Near and During Deployment
    • Similar Actions are Constrained by Time Based on Role
the dynamic coalition problem gccs shortfalls value based access
The Dynamic Coalition ProblemGCCS Shortfalls: Value Based Access
  • Currently, in GCCS, Controlled Access Based on Information Values Difficult to Achieve
    • Unlimited Viewing of Common Operational Picture (COP)
    • Unlimited Access to Movement Information
    • Attempts to Constrain would have to be Programmatic - which is Problematic!
  • What can Value-Based Access Offer to GCCS?
    • In COP
      • Constrain Display of Friendly and Enemy Positions
      • Limit Map Coordinates Displayed
      • Limit Tier of Display (Deployment, Weather, etc.)
the dynamic coalition problem gccs shortfalls federation needs
The Dynamic Coalition ProblemGCCS Shortfalls: Federation Needs
  • Currently, GCCS is Difficult to Use for DCP
    • Difficult to Federate Users and Resources
    • U.S. Only system
    • Incompatibility in Joint and Common Contexts
    • Private Network (Not Multi-Level Secure)
  • What are Security/Federation Needs for GCCS?
    • Quick Admin. While Still Constraining US and Non-US Access
    • Employ Middleware for Flexibility/Robustness
    • Security Definition/Enforcement Framework
    • Extend GCCS for Coalition Compatibility that Respects Coalition and US Security Policies
information sharing and security federated resources
Information Sharing and SecurityFederated Resources

RESOURCES

Command&Control Vehicles

Army Airborne Command & Control System

Army Battle Command System

Embedded Command System

JSTARS

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

Satellites

INTEL FUSION

Embedded Battle Command

FIELD ARTILLERY

Embedded Battle Command

AIR DEFENCE

Embedded Battle Command

MANEUVER CONTROL

Embedded Battle Command

ABCS

Common Picture

PERSONNEL AND LOGISTICS

Embedded Battle Command

Bradley / EBC

Embedded Battle Command

Fwd Support Element

Ammo/Fuel

Refit

information sharing and security syntactic considerations
Information Sharing and SecuritySyntactic Considerations
  • Syntax is Structure and Format of the Information That is Needed to Support a Coalition
  • Incorrect Structure or Format Could Result in Simple Error Message to Catastrophic Event
  • For Sharing, Strict Formats Need to be Maintained
  • In US Military, Message Formats Include
    • Heading and Ending Section
      • United States Message Text Formats (USMTF)
      • 128 Different Message Formats
    • Text Body of Actual Message
  • Problem: Formats Non-Standard Across Different Branches of Military and Countries
information sharing and security semantics concerns
Information Sharing and SecuritySemantics Concerns
  • Semantics (Meaning and Interpretation)
    • USMTF - Different Format, Different Meaning
      • Each of 128 Messages has Semantic Interpretation
      • Communicate Logistical, Intelligence, and Operational Information
  • Semantic Problems
    • NATO and US - Different Message Formats
    • Different Interpretation of Values
      • Distances (Miles vs. Kilometers)
      • Grid Coordinates (Mils, Degrees)
      • Maps (Grid, True, and Magnetic North)
information sharing and security pragmatics issues
Information Sharing and SecurityPragmatics Issues
  • Pragmatics - The Way that Information is Utilized and Understood in its Specific Context
  • For Example, in GCCS
information sharing and security pragmatics issues24
Information Sharing and Security Pragmatics Issues

GBS

DSCS

DR

DR

DR

Node Estimate

Current FDD laydown has 53 autonomous Command Post/TOCs (i.e., nodes)

For a full Corps >200 nodes

299ENG

DR

GBS

GBS

CMDRBCV

TAC

DR

SEN

GBS

SEN

DISCOM

DR

DR

GBS

DR

DR

VTel

DIV REAR

BVTC

1st BDE

MVR BN

SINCGARS (FS)

EPLRS (AD)

Info/Intel/Plans

GBS

BVTC

BVTC

GBS

Sustainment

DR

DR

SEN

BVTC

XX

GBS

DR

DR

GBS

MVR BN

Mobility

GBS

BVTC

204FSB

Relay

GBS

DR

SEN

GBS

TGT/Fires

DR

DR

BVTC

704MSB

GBS

GBS

DR

DR

MVR BN

SINCGARS (FS)

EPLRS (AD)

GBS

4-42FA

SEN

LEN

XXX

X

DR

SEN

DR

DR

GBS

DIVARTY

DR

588ENG

GBS

DR

BVTC

GBS

CMDRBCV

TAC

SINCGARS (FS)

EPLRS (AD)

HCLOS

  • Basic Distribution Requirement
  • Distribution Polices
  • Automation & Notification
  • User Controls
  • Transport Mechanisms
  • System and Process Monitors
  • Security, Logs, and Archives

SEN

DR

DR

GBS

DR

DR

XX

Division Slice

2nd BDE

MVR BN

GBS

BVTC

DR

GBS

DR

DR

DR

GBS

SEN

124th SIG BN

GBS

DR

DR

C2V

MVR BN

GBS

4 FSB

Relay

HCLOS

DIV CDR

DR

DR

Theater Injection Point (TIP)

DR

GBS

DR

DR

MVR BN

GBS

GBS

A2C2S

3-16FA

XXX

SEN

SEN

X

GBS

GBS

VTel

DIV CDR

DMAIN

DR

DR

DR

BVTC

SINCGARS (FS)

EPLRS (AD)

4ENG

DR

DR

GBS

CMDRBCV

GBS

TAC

SEN

GBS

DR

DR

404 ASB

SEN

DR

DR

GBS

MVR BN

GBS

3rd BDE

BVTC

XX

DR

DR

DR

DR

SEN

SEN

GBS

GBS

DR

DR

4th BDE

DTAC 1

Distribution Policy

SEN

MVR BN

GBS

DR

DR

GBS

BVTC

BVTC

SINCGARS (FS)

EPLRS (AD)

SINCGARS (FS)

EPLRS (AD)

64 FSB

Relay

DR

DR

  • What
  • When
  • Where
  • How
  • - Prioritized
  • - Encrypted
  • - Network

MVR BN

GBS

GBS

DR

DR

GBS

DR

DR

DR

DR

GBS

GBS

3-29FA

SEN

1/4 AVN BN

2/4 AVN BN

9-1FA

DR

DR

GBS

1/10CAV

1/10 CAV Sqdn

CMDRBCV

Note: 3rd BDE not part of 1DD in Sep 2000.

  • Pragmatics in GCCS
information sharing and security data integrity
Information Sharing and SecurityData Integrity
  • Concerns: Consistency, Accuracy, Reliability
  • Accidental Errors
    • Crashes, Concurrent Access, Logical Errors
    • Actions:
      • Integrity Constraints
      • GUIs
      • Redundancy
  • Malicious Errors
    • Not Totally Preventable
    • Actions:
      • Authorization, Authentication, Enforcement Policy
      • Concurrent Updates to Backup DBs
      • Dual Homing
information sharing and security discretionary access control
Information Sharing and Security Discretionary Access Control
  • What is Discretionary Access Control (DAC)?
    • Restricts Access to Objects Based on the Identity of Group and /or Subject
    • Discretion with Access Permissions Supports the Ability to “Pass-on” Permissions
  • DAC and DCP
    • Pass on from Subject to Subject is a Problem
      • Information Could be Passed from Subject (Owner) to Subject to Party Who Should be Restricted
    • For Example,
      • Local Commanders Can’t Release Information
      • Rely on Discretion by Foreign Disclosure Officer
    • Pass on of DAC Must be Carefully Controlled!
information sharing and security role based access control
Information Sharing and Security Role Based Access Control
  • What is Role Based Access Control (RBAC)?
    • Roles Provide Means for Permissions to Objects, Resources, Based on Responsibilities
    • Users May have Multiple Roles Each with Different Set of Permissions
    • Role-Based Security Policy Flexible in both Management and Usage
  • Issues for RBAC and DCP
    • Who Creates the Roles?
    • Who Determines Permissions (Access)?
    • Who Assigns Users to Roles?
    • Are there Constraints Placed on Users Within Those Roles?
information sharing and security mandatory access control
Information Sharing and Security Mandatory Access Control
  • What is Mandatory Access Control (MAC)?
    • Restrict Access to Information, Resources, Based on Sensitivity Level (Classification) Classified Information - MAC Required
    • If Clearance (of User) Dominates Classification, Access is Allowed
  • MAC and DCP
    • MAC will be Present in Coalition Assets
    • Need to Support MAC of US and Partners
    • Partners have Different Levels/Labels
    • Need to Reconcile Levels/Labels of Coalition Partners (which Include Past Adversaries!)
information sharing and security other issues
Information Sharing and SecurityOther Issues
  • Intrusion Detection
    • Not Prevention
    • Intrusion Types:
      • Trojan Horse, Data Manipulation, Snooping
    • Defense:
      • Tracking and Accountability
  • Survivability
    • Reliability and Accessibility
    • Defense:
      • Redundancy
  • Cryptography
    • Fundamental to Security
    • Implementation Details (key distribution)
conclusions and ongoing work
Conclusions and Ongoing Work
  • Explored Information Sharing Issues
  • Defined the Dynamic Coalition Problem
  • Discussed Coalition Participants
  • Examined GCCS and Needed Improvements
  • Offered Candidate Security Approach
  • Related/Ongoing Research Includes
    • Support for Mandatory Access Controls
    • Role Deconfliction and Mutual Exclusion
    • User Constraints
    • User Role Delegation Authority
    • www.engr.uconn.edu/~steve/DSEC/dsec.html
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