Market entry, privatisation and bank performance in transition
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EIASM Workshop on Financial Development Prague, 26 May 2006 PowerPoint PPT Presentation


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Market entry, privatisation and bank performance in transition Steven Fries, Damien Neven, Paul Seabright and Anita Taci. EIASM Workshop on Financial Development Prague, 26 May 2006. Introduction. Many policies used to change socialist banking systems into market-oriented ones, including

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Eiasm workshop on financial development prague 26 may 2006

Market entry, privatisation and bank performance in transitionSteven Fries, Damien Neven, Paul Seabright and Anita Taci

EIASM Workshop on Financial Development

Prague, 26 May 2006


Introduction

Introduction

  • Many policies used to change socialist banking systems into market-oriented ones, including

    • Restructuring and privatisation of state banks

    • Entry of new private banks, including foreign

  • Gauge impact of reforms on banking development by examining revenue and costs

    • Foreign banks are low marginal cost entrants

    • Privatised banks attract greater demand

    • Differences among private banks diminish over time

    • State banks under perform on both demand and costs


Approach of the paper

Approach of the paper

  • Develop unique model of monopolistic competition in bank lending and deposit taking to analyse revenues

    • Look for effects of market entry and ownership on deposit and loan margins

  • Use standard trans-log specification for costs

    • Estimate marginal costs by ownership type

  • Compare margins and marginal costs for mark-ups

    • Indicates ability to attract demand for loans and deposits

  • Allow parameters of revenues and costs to vary over time


Existing literature

Existing literature

  • Banking market structures in transition economies (TEs)

    • Gelos and Roldós (2002), Yildirim and Philippatos (2002a) and Drakos and Konstantinou (2003)

    • Evidence of monopolistically competitive markets

    • Increasing competition over time

  • Cost / profit efficiency of banks in TEs

    • Grigorian and Manole (2002), Yildirim and Philippatos (2002b), Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel (2005) and Fries and Taci (2005)

    • Greater efficiency of foreign banks


Existing literature cont d

Existing literature (cont’d)

  • Determinants of bank net interest margins in TEs

    • Drakos (2003)

    • State-owned banks have relatively low margins

  • Theoretical models of imperfect competition and institutional development in TEs

    • Hainz (2003a, 2003b)

    • Studies show that the market power of banks decreases as the quality of institutions improves


The starting point bank profit function

Loan

margin

Operating costs

Deposit

margin

Non-loan assets

margin

Interbank rate

The starting point: bank profit function

  • Accounting identity

i  rilLi - ridDi + rinNi - R(Li + Ni - Ei - Di) - C(Di,Ni,Li,Wi)

i  (ril - R)Li + (R - rid)Di + (rin - R)Ni + Rei - C(Di,Ni,Li,Wi)

  • Equilibrium determination of loan and deposit margins in monopolistically competitive markets


The empirical specification

The empirical specification

  • Revenue function is therefore

REVijt = Mijtl(•)Likt + Mijtd(•)Dikt + ρNijt + σEijt + ijt

  • Margins are a function of number of competitors, market shares and bank ownership

  • Combine loans and deposits into a single scale variable because of their co-linearity

REVijt = Mijtl+d(•)(Likt + Dikt) + ρNijt + σEijt + εijt


Empirical specification cont d

Empirical specification (cont’d)

  • Trans-log specification for costs

lnCijt = αo +ΣstβslnQs,ijt + Σmn XmlnWm,ijt

  • Higher order terms omitted because they were insignificant in preliminary estimations

  • Allow estimated constants to vary by bank ownership and over time

    • Identifies differences in average costs across bank types


Dataset

Dataset

  • Bankscope database for accounting data

    • 477 banks in 15 transition economies

    • Sample period covers 1995 – 2004

    • Unbalanced panel, 115 banks for entire sample period

  • Unique coverage of bank ownership

    • Time varying measures of ownership based on EBRD staff research

    • Newly established, privatised and state-owned

    • Domestic and foreign


Basic data on bank revenues

Basic data on bank revenues

  • Revenues to total assets in per cent


Basic data on bank costs

Basic data on bank costs

  • Operating costs to total assets in per cent


Results revenue equation revenue adjusted for inflation

1999 - 2001

2002 - 2004

1995 - 1998

Explanatory variables

Loans

0.0320***

0.0194

-0.0350***

Deposits

0.0007

0.0609***

0.0475***

Interacted with loans plus deposits

Newly established, domestic

Newly established, foreign

Privatised, domestic

Privatised, foreign

Number of banks per million of population

Share of loan and deposit market

IAS dummy variable

-0.0096

-0.0184***

0.0199***

0.0052**

-0.0005

0.0015***

-0.0101

0.0095***

-0.0094***

0.0275***

0.0051**

-0.0012**

0.0289***

-0.0289***

0.0105***

0.0081***

0.0282***

0.0038***

0.0002

0.0063*

-0.0089**

Non-Loan financial assets

0.0125

0.0391***

0.0194***

0.2906***

0.2408***

0.2749***

Equity

Results – Revenue equation (revenue adjusted for inflation)


Results cost equation

1999 - 2001

2002 - 2004

1995 - 1998

0.7995***

0.0021

0.3681***

0.1715***

0.0331

-0.0019

-0.2649***

-0.3767***

-0.2767***

-0.0209

0.6101***

0.0360***

1.3556***

0.2036***

0.1075***

-0.1170

-0.0833*

-0.0051

-0.0340

0.0263

0.6332***

0.0410**

0.9657***

0.0370*

0.0529***

0.3072**

-0.0298

0.0303

0.0083

-0.0377

Ln (loans + deposits)

Ln (loans + deposits ^ 2

Ln (operating costs / total assets)

Ln (operating costs / total assets) ^ 2

Ln (non-loan financial assets)

Equity to total assets ratio

Newly established, domestic

Newly established, foreign

Privatised, domestic

Privatised, foreign

Results – Cost equation


Marginal costs and mark ups

Marginal costs and mark-ups

  • Foreign bank marginal costs below that of state bank


Marginal costs and mark ups1

Marginal costs and mark-ups

  • Mark-ups above state bank benchmark


Conclusion

Conclusion

  • Foreign banks are low marginal cost entrants

  • Privatised banks attract greater demand

    • Evidence that newly established banks attract more demand with a lag

  • New domestic banks had weaker performance than other private banks

    • While differences diminish over time, this casts doubts on liberal entry policies for domestic banks

  • State banks are the weakest performers throughout

  • Policy implications

    • Openness to foreign entry (costs) and privatisation of state banks to both domestic and foreign owners (demand)


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