WEEK #8 THE THEORY OF FORMS ( Phaedo, Symposium, Phaedrus ) (3-7-06)

1. WEEK #8THETHEORYOFFORMS(Phaedo, Symposium, Phaedrus)(3-7-06)

2. Agenda • Does Plato have a Theory of Forms? • Theory? • Existence of Forms? • Evidence for a Theory of Forms • Passages which refer to Forms • Motivations for Forms • Arguments for Forms • Arguments for Forms • Motivations for Forms • Two Competing Models of Forms • Passages in the Phaedo, Symposium, Phaedrus

3. Does Plato Have a Theory of Forms • Annas 1981 • Is Plato committed to Forms? • What is it to be so committed? • Aristotle • Eidos/idea • Genos • Ousia

4. Metaphysics XIII.4 1078b17-1079a4 The theory of Forms occurred to those who enunciated it because they were convinced as to the true nature of reality by the doctrine of Heraclitus, that all sensible things are always in a state of flux; so that if there is to be any knowledge or thought about anything, there must be certain other entities, besides sensible ones, which persist. For there can be no knowledge of that which is in flux. Now Socrates devoted his attention to the moral virtues, and was the first to seek a general definition of these [20] (…); and he naturally inquired into the essence of things; for he was trying to reason logically, and the starting-point of all logical reasoning is the essence. … There are two innovations which, may fairly be ascribed to Socrates: inductive reasoning and general definition. Both of these are associated with the starting-point of scientific knowledge. But whereas Socrates regarded neither universals nor definitions as existing in separation, the Idealists gave them a separate existence, and to these universals and definitions of existing things they gave the name of Ideas.

5. Continued Hence on their view it followed by virtually the same argument that there are Ideas of all terms which are predicated universally; and the result was very nearly the same as if a man who wishes to count a number of things were to suppose that he could not do so when they are few, and yet were to try to count them when he has added to them. For it is hardly an exaggeration to say that there are more Forms than there are particular sensible things (in seeking for whose causes these thinkers were led on from particulars to Ideas); because corresponding to each thing there is a synonymous entity, apart from the substances (and in the case of non-substantial things there is a One over the Many) both in our everyday world and in the realm of eternal entities.

6. Metaphysics XIII.91086a30-b14 … but as for those who speak of the Ideas, we can observe at the same time their way of thinking and the difficulties which befall them. For they not only treat the Ideas as universal substances, but also as separable and particular. … The reason why those who hold substances to be universal combined these two views was that they did not identify substances with sensible things. They considered that the particulars in the sensible world are in a state of flux, and that none of them persists, but that the universal exists besides them and is something distinct from them. This theory, as we have said in an earlier passage, was initiated by Socrates as a result of his definitions, but he did not separate universals from particulars; and he was right in not separating them. This is evident from the facts; for without the universal we cannot acquire knowledge, and the separation of the universal is the cause of the difficulties which we find in the Ideal theory. Others, regarding it as necessary, if there are to be any substances besides those which are sensible and transitory, that they should be separable, and having no other substances, assigned separate existence to those which are universally predicated; thus it followed that universals and particulars are practically the same kind of thing.

7. Metaphysics I.6 987a29-b13 The philosophies described above were succeeded by the system of Plato, which in most respects accorded with them, but contained also certain peculiar features distinct from the philosophy of the Italians. In his youth Plato first became acquainted with Cratylus and the Heraclitean doctrines -- that the whole sensible world is always in a state of flux, and that there is no scientific knowledge of it -- and in after years he still held these opinions. And when Socrates, disregarding the physical universe and confining his study to moral questions, sought in this sphere for the universal and was the first to concentrate upon definition, Plato followed him and assumed that the problem of definition is concerned not with any sensible thing but with entities of another kind; for the reason that there can be no general definition of sensible things which are always changing. These entities he called “Ideas,” and held that all sensible things are named after them sensible and in virtue of their relation to them; for the plurality of things which bear the same name as the Forms exist by participation in them. (With regard to the “participation,” it was only the term that he changed; for whereas the Pythagoreans say that things exist by imitation of numbers, Plato says that they exist by participation -- merely a change of term. As to what this “participation” or “imitation” may be, they left this an open question.)

8. Evidence • Passages which presuppose the theory of Forms • Motivations for the theory of Forms (Cherniss) • Arguments for the theory of Forms

9. Arguments for the Theory of Forms • Phaedo 74a9-c5 – The Equality Argument • Republic 475d-476b – The Argument from Opposites • Republic 596a5-b4 – The One Over Many Argument • Timaeus 51d3-e6 – The Argument from Knowledge

10. The One Over Many Argument Do you want us to begin our examination, then, by adopting our usual procedure? As you know, we customarily hypothesize a single form in connection with each of the many things to which we apply the same name. Or don't you understand? I do. Then let's now take any of the manys you like. For example, there are many beds and tables. Of course. But there are only two forms of such furniture, one of the bed and one of the table. (Republic 596a5-b4; Grube/Reeve trans.]

11. The Argument • If there is a plurality of F-things, then there is a Form to which we apply the same name (F-ness.) • There is a plurality of beds • So, there is the Form, Bed-ness

12. The Argument from Knowledge If understanding and true opinion are distinct, then these "by themselves" things definitely exist-these Forms, the objects not of our sense perception, but of our understanding only. But if-as some people think-true opinion does not differ in any way from understanding, then all the things we perceive through our bodily senses must be assumed to be the most stable things there are. But we do have to speak of understanding and true opinion as distinct, of course, because we can come to have one without the other, and the one is not like the other. It is through instruction that we come to have understanding, and through persuasion that we come to have true belief. Understanding always involves a true account while true belief lacks any account. And while understanding remains unmoved by persuasion, true belief gives in to persuasion. And of true belief, it must be said, all men have a share, but of understanding, only the gods and a small group of people do. (Timaeus 51d3-e6; Zeyl trans.)

13. The Argument • If nous≠ true belief, then there are Forms • Nous becomes through instruction; true belief through persuasion • Nous involves a true logos; true belief is alogon • Nous is unmoved by persuasion; true belief is not • Nous is possessed by few; true belief by many • So, nous≠ true belief • So, there are Forms

14. The Equality Argument Do not equal stones and sticks sometimes, while remaining the same, appear to one to be equal and to another to be unequal? - Certainly they do. But what of the equals themselves? Have they ever appeared unequal to you, or Equality to be Inequality? Never, Socrates. These equal things and the Equal itself are therefore not the same? [Phaedo 74b7-c5; Grube trans.]

15. The Argument • The equals seems unequal to A • The Equals themselves do not seem unequal to A, nor does Equality seem to be Inequality to A • So, the equals ≠ the equal itself Apparent Form • A is p • B is not-p • So, A ≠ B

16. Frege & Superman • The evening star seems to me to be romantic. • The morning star does not seem to me to be romantic • So, the evening star ≠ the morning star. • CK seems to Lois to be a nerd • SM does not seem to be a nerd • So, CK ≠ SM

17. De Re & De Dicto • Ralph believes that someone is a spy • There is someone whom R believes is a spy (de re) • R believes that there are spies (de dicto) • Lois believes that CK is a nerd • CK = SM • So, SM is the man that Lois believes is a nerd • But not, Lois believes that SM is a nerd

18. Motivations for the Theory of Forms • TF accounts for objectivity in ethics (Cherniss) • TF accounts for the distinction between knowledge and sensation/opinion (Cherniss) • TF accounts for the instability in the phenomena (Cherniss) • TF accounts for how words get their meaning (White)

19. Motivations from the Elenctic Dialogues • TF may provide substance to Socratic Eudaemonism • TF may account for the possibility of inquiry (and knowledge in general) • TF may provide a justification for the Socratic concern with definition

20. Basic Motivation: Sample Expressions • “Socrates is virtuous” • “Euthyphro’s prosecution of his father for murder is pious” • “Martha is strong” • “My shirt is blue” • “If anything else is beautiful besides the beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason at all other than that it participates in that beautiful; and the same goes for all of them.” [Phaedo 100c4-6; Gallop trans.]

21. Secondary Expressions • “Piety is good” • “Virtue is teachable” • “Yellow is a color” • F-ness is G • X is F

22. Three Components of Analysans • the ordinary objects - Euthyphro’s prosecution, Socrates, Martha, my shirt • the Form - virtue/the virtuous itself, piety/the pious itself, strength/the strong itself, and yellowness/the yellow itself • a relationship that holds or fails to hold between the ordinary object and the Form; when the ordinary object stands in this relation to the Form, the sentence is true, and when it does not the sentence is false. [R] ‘a is F’ iff [Ex] ‘a’ refers to x, [EF] ‘F’ refers to F, and x is appropriately related F.

23. Two Models Paradigm Model [P] ‘a is F’ iff [Ex] ‘a’ refers to x, [EF] ‘F’ names F and F is a paradigmatic example, and x resembles (sufficiently) F. Property Model [U] “a is F” iff [Ex] ‘a’ refers to x, [EF] ‘F’ refers to F and F is a property, and x has or instantiates F.

24. Phaedo 65d4-66a10 Well now, what about things of this sort, Simmias? Do we say that there is something just, or nothing? … And again, something beautiful and good? … Now did you ever yet see any such with your eyes? … Well did you grasp them with any other bodily sense-perception? And I’m talking about them all - about largeness, health, and strength, for example, - and, in short, about the Being of all other such things, what each one actually is; is it through the body that their truest element is viewed, or isn’t it rather thus: whoever of us is prepared to think most fully and minutely of each object of his inquiry, in itself, will come closest to knowledge of each? … Then would that be achieved most purely by the man who approached each object with the intellect alone as far as possible, neither adducing sight in his thinking, nor dragging in any other sense to accompany his reasoning; rather using his intellect alone by itself and unsullied, he would undertake the hunt for each of the things that are, each alone by itself and unsullied ; he would be separated as far as possible from his eyes and ears, and virtually from his whole body, on the ground that it confuses the soul, and doesn’t allow it to gain truth and wisdom when in partnership with it: isn’t it this man, Simmias, who will attain that which is, if anyone will? … [Phaedo 65d4-66a10; Gallop trans.]

25. Data Set 1 • Examples: • The just itself • The beautiful • The good • Largeness • Health • Strength • A General statement: “in short, about the Being of all other such things, what each one actually is” (ton allon heni logoi hapanton tes ousias ho tugxanei hekaston on) [Phaedo 65d13-e1; Gallop trans.] • Properties of Forms: • epistemological access through reason alone (dianoia & logimos) • alone by themselves and unsullied (auto kath’ hauto eilikrines)

26. Second Argument • “if anyone is to be reminded of a thing, he must have known that thing at some time previously.” [73c1-2; Gallop trans.] • “if someone, on seeing a thing, or hearing it, or getting any other sense-perception of it, [a] not only recognizes that thing, but also thinks of something else, [b] which is the object not of the same knowledge but of another, don’t we then rightly say that he’s been ‘reminded’ of the object of which he has got the thought?” [73c6-d1; Gallop trans.] • There is equality (74a9-b1) • We know what it is (74b2-3) • We got this knowledge of equality by perceiving equal things (74b4-7) • Equality is distinct from equal things (74b8-74c6) – [2b] • We learn equality by perceiving equal things by noticing the latter’s deficiency to the former (74c7-75a10) – [2a] • So, we knew equality before noticing this deficiency (75b1-c6) • Generalized to all forms (75c7-d5) • But, we have not always had this knowledge (75d6-76d6) • So, TR <-> Forms (76d7-77a5)

27. Data Set 2 • Examples • The equal itself, equality • Beauty • Justice • Holiness • Goodness • A General statement: “it concerns everything on which we set this seal ‘what it is’ (to auto ho esti), in the questions we ask and in the answers we give.” [Phaedo 75d1-3; Gallop trans.] • Properties of Forms • distinct from sensibles/ordinary objects • superior to sensibles/ordinary objects • Sensibles/ordinary objects resemble Forms, but are in some way deficient • Forms are known prior to birth • Perception stimulates knowledge of Forms

28. Phaedo 78c10-79a7 Let us then return to those same things with which we were dealing earlier, to that reality of whose existence we are giving an account in our questions and answers; are they ever the same and in the same state, or do they vary from one time to another; can the Equal itself, the Beautiful itself, each thing in itself, the real, ever be affected by any change whatever? Or does each of them that real is, being uniform by itself, remain the same and never in any way tolerate any change whatever? It must remain the same, said Cebes, and in the same state, Socrates. What of the many beautiful particulars, be they men, horses, clothes, or other such things, or the many equal particulars, and all those which bear the same name as those others? Do they remain the same or in total contrast to those other realities, one might say, never in any way remain the same as themselves or in relation to each other? The latter is the case, they are never in the same state These latter you could touch and see and perceive with the other senses, but those that always remain the same can only be grasped by the reasoning power of the mind? They are not seen but are invisible? That is altogether true, he said. Do you then want us to assume two kinds of existences the visible and the invisible? (Grube trans.)

29. Data Set 3 • Examples • The equal itself • The beautiful itself • A General Statement: “each thing in itself, the real” (auto hekaston ho estin, to on) (78d3-4) • Properties of forms • Unchanging • Uniform (moneides) • Independent (auto kath’ hauto) • Invisible • Known by reason

30. Phaedo 100b1-c2 This, he said, is what I mean. It is nothing new, but what I have never stopped talking about, both elsewhere and in the earlier part of our conversation. I am going to try to show you the kind of cause with which I have concerned myself. I turn back to those oft-mentioned things and proceed from them. I assume the existence of a Beautiful, itself by itself, of a Good and a Great and all the rest. If you grant me these and agree that they exist, I hope to show you the cause as a result, and so to find the soul to be immortal. Take it that I grant you this, said Cebes, and hasten to your conclusion. [Grube trans.]

31. Phaedo 100c3-e7 Consider then, he said, whether you share my opinion as to what follows, for I think that if there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in that beautiful, and I say so with everything. … I no longer understand or recognize those other sophisticated causes, and if someone tells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a bright colour or shape or any such thing, I ignore these other reasons - for all these confuse me - but I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe is relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. That, I think is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else. And if I stick to this I think I shall never fall into error. This is the safe answer for me or anyone else to give, namely, that it is through Beauty that beautiful things are made beautiful. Or do you not think so too? … And it is through Bigness that big things are big and the bigger are bigger, and that smaller things are made small by Smallness? [Grube trans.]

32. Examples The beautiful Largeness Smallness Tallness Shortness Bigness/numerousness Duality/twoness Unity/ Oneness Relations between Forms and ordinary objects Participate (metexei) Present in (parousia) Associates with (koinonia) Data Set 4

33. Continued General statements: • “If there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in (metexei) that Beautiful, and I say so with everything. Do you agree to this sort of cause (aitia)?” [Phaedo 100c4-6; Grube trans.] • “that nothing else makes it beautiful other than presence of (parousia), or the sharing in (koinonia), or however you describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful.” [100d4-8; Grube trans.] • “it is through Beauty that beautiful things are made beautiful.” [100e2-3; Grube trans.]

34. Symposium 210-211 • it is ever-existent and neither comes to be nor perishes, neither waxes nor wanes (210e6-211a2) • it is not beautiful in part and in part ugly, nor is it such at such a time and other at another, nor in one respect beautiful and in another ugly, nor so affected by position as to seem beautiful to some and ugly to others (211a2-5) • existing (on) ever (aei) in singularity of form (monoeides) independent (auto kath’ hauto) by itself (meth’ hauto) (211b1-2) • while all the multitude of beautiful things partake of (metexonta) it in such wise that, though all of them are coming to be and perishing, it grows neither greater nor less, and is affected by nothing (211b2-5) • But tell me, what would happen if one of you had the fortune to look upon essential beauty (auto to kalon) entire, pure (eilikrines) and unalloyed (katharon, ameikton); not infected with (anapleon) the flesh and color of humanity, and ever so much more of mortal trash? What if he could behold (katidein) the divine beauty itself (auto to theion kalon), in its unique form (monoeides)? (211e1-4)

35. Data Set 5 • The Beautiful itself • Properties: • Immortal • Unchanging • Absolute, i.e. unqualified or non-relative • Independent (auto kath’ hauto meth’ hauto) • Pure (eilikrines, katharon, ameikton, anapleon) • Moneides • Relation: participation • Epistemological access: stimulated through ordinary objects, but directly viewed

36. Phaedrus 247 & 249 • What is in this place is without color and without shape and without solidity, a being that really is what it is (ousia ontos ousa), the subject of all true knowledge, visible only to intelligence, the soul’s steersman. (247c6-d1; Nehamas/Woodruff trans.) • On the way around it has view of Justice as it is; it has a view of Self-control; it has a view of Knowledge – not the kind of knowledge that is close to change, that becomes different as it knows the different things which we consider real down here. No, it is knowledge of what really is what it is (ho estin on ontos). (247d5-e4; N/W trans.) • But a soul that never saw the truth cannot take a human shape, since a human being must understand speech in terms of general forms (kat’ eidos), proceeding to bring many perceptions (ek pollon ion aistheseon) together into a reasoned unity (eis hen logismoi). That process is the recollection of the things our soul saw when it was traveling with god, when it disregarded the things we now call real and lifted up its head to what is truly real instead (to on ontos). (249b6-c4; N/W trans.)

37. Data Set 6 • Examples • Justice • Temperance • Knowledge • Properties • Colorless • Shapeless • Not solid • Visible only to nous • General • what really is what it is (ho estin on ontos)