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Belief, Truth, and Reality - 1

Belief, Truth, and Reality - 1. Just because you believe that something is true doesn’t mean that it is. Just because a group of people believe that something is true doesn’t mean that it is.

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Belief, Truth, and Reality - 1

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  1. Belief, Truth, and Reality - 1 • Just because you believe that something is true doesn’t mean that it is. • Just because a group of people believe that something is true doesn’t mean that it is. • There is such a thing as objective truth. A common reality exists – a pragmatic non-disproved assumption.

  2. Belief, Truth, and Reality - 2 • Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored. • Truth is something we can attempt to doubt, and then perhaps, after much exertion, discover that part of the doubt is unjustified. • “I am obliged not to belief” - René Magritte.

  3. Knowledge, Belief, and Evidence - 1 • We are justified in believing a proposition when we have no good reason to doubt it, i.e. when we have no evidence to the contrary for the moment. • There is good reason to doubt a proposition if it conflicts with other propositions we have good reason to believe, i.e. which are entrenched. • The more background information a proposition conflicts with, the more reason there is to doubt it.

  4. Knowledge, Belief, and Evidence - 2 • When there is good reason to doubt a proposition, we should proportion our belief to the evidence. • There is good reason to doubt a proposition if it conflicts with expert opinion. • Just because someone is an expert in one field doesn’t mean that he is an expert in another.

  5. Knowledge, Belief, and Evidence - 3 • If we have no reason to doubt what’s disclosed to us through perception, introspection, memory, or reason, then we’re justified in believing it. • To doubt everything or to believe everything are two equally excessive convenient solutions: they both dispense with the necessity of reflection.

  6. Error - 1 • The three prime spheres of human concern are belief, behaviour,and evaluation, which correlate with matters of fact, action,and value. • Cognitive error arises from failures in the attainment of correct beliefs. • Practical error arises from failures in relation to the objectives of action. • Axiological error appertains to mistakes in regard to evaluation.

  7. Error - 2 • Where there is cognitiveerror, one inclines to question the quality of the agent’s intellectual competence; with practicalerror, the quality of the agent’s performancecompetence; and with evaluativeerror, the quality of the agent’s judgement, if not character. • In an intelligent being, whose actions issue from beliefs through the mediation of judgements, the three kinds of error are closely interrelated.

  8. Error - 3 • Error is commonplace in human affairs because Homo sapiens are limited creatures whose needs and wants outrun their available capabilities. • A liability to error is thus inherent in the very nature of our situation as beings of limited experience in a world of endless complexity. • Specifically, cognitive error roots in our human need to resolve issues of thought and action in conditions ofimperfect information.

  9. Error - 4 • Errors generally arise in relation to aims and purposes. They require intention – at least implicitly – regarding the sorts of purposes that people should have. Error is a fundamental purposive concept that takes the realization of certain objectives into view. Expectations might not be met. • Not only individual actions but entire processes and procedures for belief establishment can be erroneous. This is the case with those who are enmeshed in fallacies of reasoning of any sort.

  10. Error - 5 • One can err not only in point of some specific belief, action, or evaluation but also in regard to the general way in which one proceeds in these matters. Such systemic errors are of course more serious. • This points to the important difference between procedural and substantive error. While procedural error is apt to issue in substantive error as well, it is not inevitable that it do so. The flaw of procedural error lies not in the necessarily incorrectness of its result – it may ocasionally be correct – but rather on its total unreliability.

  11. Error - 6 • The magnitude of an error depends on two factors, its extent and its gravity. • Extent is a matter of the range of issues involved in an error: its substantitive ramifications. It stands correlative to the scale of the requisite corrections: to the volume and scope of what must be done to put matters right.

  12. Error - 7 • Gravity is a matter of the magnitude of consequences. • A cognitive erroris serious to the extent that it carries further errors in its wake, be they themselves practical or merely cognitive. • And practical erroris serious to the extent that the actions involved result in harm or other misfortune.

  13. Error - 8 • Some evaluative questions relate to what is entirely a matter of taste, of sheer subjectivepreference rather than inherently objective preferability. • However, with many evaluative matters error is indeed possible, though here we tend to talk of errors of judgement or decision making.

  14. Error - 9 • Evaluative errors excepted, errors come in two basic forms: those of omission and those of commission. • Errors of omission are failures to accept true facts in the cognitive case, and failures to do what is circumstantially required in the practical. • Errors of commission lie in accepting falsehoods in the cognitive case, performing counterproductive actions in the practical.

  15. Error - 10 • In cognitive contexts, errors of omission consist in giving partial and incomplete answers to the questions at issue. • Most serious here are misleading answers, which, while in themselves correct nevertheless embody suggestions and implications that point in an entirely wrong direction and could or would be corrected if only the ommitted information were also supplied.

  16. Error - 11 • In practical goal-directed contexts, errors of omission consist in failing, for whatever reason, to do those things required to facilitate realization of the goal at issue. • This is, of course, most serious in the case of mandatorygoals, be they prudential or moral. It is, or should be, clear that errors (sins) of omission can be every bit as serious as those of commission.

  17. Error - 12 • The ultimate ideal of absolute perfection is outside our grasp: the prospect of proceeding in ways wholly free from the risk of error is not attainable because there is an inherent trade-off between errors of commission and omission. • They stand in inseparable coordination: any realistically workable mechanism of cognition can only avoid errors of commission – i.e. excluding truths – at the expense of incurring errors of omission – i.e. including untruths.

  18. Error - 13 • The risk of error is unavoidable throughout the cognitive enterprise, and the control of error is a key aspect of rational inquiry. Since error cannot be eliminated from human affairs, we have little choice but to make the most of it. • Our only route to cognitive progress proceeds along a pathway paved with error – we are creatures to whom truth becomes available only by risking error. Our knowledge grows by eliminating error.

  19. Error - 14 • Clearly, this via negativa of error elimination is not the most promising way to knowledge acquisition. • Nevertheless, one of the best and most effective standards by which to test any proposed method or process of knowledge production lies in its capacity to minimize the chances of error.

  20. Error - 15 • The roadways to error are too numerous to admit of anything like a compreehensive listing. • The best we can do is to give a handful of prominent examples with regard to cognitive error: inattention, misjudgement, confusion and conflation, miscalculation, under- and over-estimation, leaping to conclusions. • Correspondingly, error reduction can take many forms: concentration of effort, double checking, proofreading, getting second opinions.

  21. Error - 16 • There is also the issue of damage control – of measures we can take to mitigate the consequences of errors if and when they occur despite our best efforts at minimizing them. • Safety engineering is the enterprise of error management. Its definite aims are two: reducing the chance of an occurrence of error and reducing the negative consequences of error should it occur. • Safety engineering, even in inquiry, requires a proper balance between costs and benefits.

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