1 / 73

The International Climate Change Regime: An Overview COST Workshop November 2009

The International Climate Change Regime: An Overview COST Workshop November 2009. Meinhard Doelle Marine & Environmental Law Institute Dalhousie Law School. UN Treaty Neg. Process. Binding treaties are first negotiated for content

howie
Download Presentation

The International Climate Change Regime: An Overview COST Workshop November 2009

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. The International Climate Change Regime: An OverviewCOST WorkshopNovember 2009 Meinhard Doelle Marine & Environmental Law Institute Dalhousie Law School

  2. UN Treaty Neg. Process • Binding treaties are first negotiated for content • There is usually a clause in the treaty that identifies how many states have to “ratify” to bring it into force • Once “agreement” on content, open for signature • Once states have signed, they can ratify

  3. UN Treaty Neg. Process • Once enough states have ratified, comes into force • Then binding on states who have ratified • States who have signed but not ratified, are not bound, but can’t circumvent objectives of agreement • States who have not signed are free to do as they please unless content becomes customary international law

  4. UN “MEA” Negotiations • MEA’s “usually” start with Framework Convention to deal with principles, process issues, and general objectives • This is then followed with Protocols that have specific targets and measures to get there • Only states who have ratified the Framework Convention can participate in the negotiations of Protocols • Only parties to a Protocol can negotiate its amendment

  5. UN MEA Negotiations • Any UN member state can participate • In case of climate change this means those who contribute the most and those who suffer the most • Agreement is by consensus unless otherwise agreed (which requires consensus) • On rare occasions, power is delegated (OLD) • Achieving consensus takes time and can lead to lowest common denominator agreements • In theory a small country can hold up consensus • In practice, small countries have little influence unless they build alliances

  6. UN MEA Negotiations • G-77 a product of this dynamic, goes well beyond climate change negotiations, and includes AOSIS, OPEC, African, Asian and S. American developing countries • EU tends to negotiate as a group • UG (a less formal alliance) • Other alliances on an issue by issue basis, such as Environmental Integrity Group, etc

  7. The Science is Complex Slide showing energy flux through atmosphere

  8. There are many complex interactions and feedbacks within the global climate system

  9. Chain of Consequences • Start with Global Average Temperature • Change in Precipitation Patterns • Global, Regional, Local Climate Systems • Wind patterns, ocean currents, sea level, ice… • Impacts on ecosystems, agriculture, forests, fisheries, … • Social, economic, cultural impacts

  10. The IPCC is the principal source of advice on climate change science 1990 1992 1995 1997 2001 2007 First Report RIO Second Report Kyoto Third Report Marrakesh Increasing Confidence Cautious Fourth Report

  11. UN General Assembly Resolutions • 1988 • Recognizes climate change as a common concern of mankind • Establishes the IPCC • 1989 • Supports UNEP proposal to prepare for negotiations of a FCCC • Decides to convene UNCED in Rio in 1992 • 1990 • Establishes the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for the FCCC • No signs of integration so far

  12. … negotiations eventually led to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with the following key elements: Principles Objectives Institutions Process

  13. Int’l Climate Change Regime UNFCCC • Preamble • Reference to relative per capita emissions and contribution to GHG emissions to date • Reference to Developed Countries going first • But: • No explicit reference to integrated solutions • No reference to links to biodiversity

  14. Int’l Climate Change Regime (UNFCCC) • Article 2: Goal • The goal of this convention is the stabilization of GHG concentrations at levels that: • prevent dangerous human interference with climate system, • ensure that rate of change allows nature to adapt, • do not threaten food production, and • allow sustainable development to take place.

  15. Future CO2 Levels Depend on What We Do Projected CO2 Concentrationsto 2100 BAU Modest Effort High Effort

  16. UNFCCC • Article 3: Principles • Equity for present and future generations of humans, • Common but differentiated responsibilities, • Precautionary approach to be adopted. • No principle of integration, no formal encouragement of linkages, could read into equity, responsibility, precaution

  17. UNFCCC • Article 4 • Reporting/national inventories of emissions for all Parties • Cooperate in finding solutions to Climate Change • Consider needs of developing countries

  18. UNFCCC • Article 4.2 • Identifies starting point of returning to 1990 levels of emissions by 2000 • Developed countries only • Voluntary (ie no direct consequences) • Did not work: • Not enough • Very low compliance rate

  19. UNFCCC • Process of identifying what needs to be done to achieve objectives of Convention • IPCC to advise on the science • UNFCCC secretariat to provide administrative support • COP to meet annually to address substantive issues and develop agreements on how to meet objectives of UNFCCC • Kyoto the first product of this process, took from 1994 to 1997 • Bottom Line: UNFCCC allows but does not encourage integration

  20. Kyoto Protocol: Broad Overview • Developed Country Targets (Art 3.1, 3.7) • Absolute emission limits • 6 GHGs and comprehensive coverage of sources • Focus on total emissions/country • Kyoto Flexibility Mechanisms • Emissions Trading (Art 17, 4, 3.10-13) • Clean Development Mechanism (Art 12) • Joint Implementation (Art 6)

  21. Kyoto Protocol: Broad Overview • Sinks to offset emissions (Art 3.3, 3.4) • Estimate, report and verify emissions, sinks and credits (Art. 5, 7, 8) • Ensure compliance (Art 18) • Developing country issues (Art 2, 3, 10, 11) • Entry Into Force (Art 25) • Bottom Line: KP allows but does not encourage integration

  22. Kyoto Emission Reduction Obligations Party Per cent reduction from 1990 levels European Union - 8 Switzerland - 8 United States - 7 Canada - 6 Japan - 6 Russian and FSU countries 0 Australia + 8 Overall reduction for all Annex I Parties combined is 5.2%

  23. Kyoto Emission Reduction Obligations 800 Business-As-Usual 748 750 GHG Emissions (Megatonnes of CO2 equivalent) 703 700 671 650 600 1990 Baseline 599 Mt 550 Kyoto target 563 Mt 500 450 • 1995 1990 2000 2005 2010

  24. Kyoto – Marrakech • Role of Kyoto Flexibility Mechanisms • Offset domestic emissions through other means • Different types: • Trade with parties that have their own targets (ET) • Joint projects with parties that have their own targets (JI) • Projects in parties that have no targets (CDM) • Offset emissions with efforts to take GHG out of atmosphere (ie Sinks) • Marrakech Accords set the rules for all this

  25. Kyoto – Marrakech: CDM • Clean Development Mechanism (Art 12) • Baselines • Additionality • Sustainable development test • Small scale projects • Process Issues (certify project, verify credits) • Executive Board • National Entities (SD test, Host Party approval) • Operational Entities (works for EB)

  26. Kyoto – Marrakech: ET • Emissions Trading (Art 17) • What can you trade? • Is a ton = a ton = a ton? Legally yes, but • What about leakage (Gen, SINKS, CDM) • What about impact on trading, value of the credit? • Who is liable? • Seller or buyer liability, impact on integrity of environmental objective and impact on carbon credit market • Commitment Period Reserve, the compromise • How much can you trade? (Supplementarity)

  27. Kyoto – Marrakech: JI • Joint Implementation (Art 6) • Project track • Compare to CDM • Less concern about additionality, as host has GHG limit • Otherwise similar to CDM • Available even when host has reporting problems under Articles 5, 7, 8 • Non-Project (Trading track) • Compare to ET • Only available if host in compliance with Art 5,7, 8 • Can still be project related, but no need to establish baseline and certify, due to impact on host party target

  28. Kyoto – Marrakech: SINKS • Sinks (Art 3.3) • Covers change in land use re forests (+&-, mandatory) • Developed Countries (AI) • Credit for Reforestation (1990) • Credit for Afforestation (50 yrs) • Debit for Deforestation • Harvesting cycles not a land use change

  29. Kyoto – Marrakech: SINKS • Sinks (Art 3.4) • Voluntary, in developed countries (AI) • Land use change other than forests • Management to increase carbon storage • Forest management • Crop land management • Graze land management) • Human induced versus natural • Verification, permanence • Biodiversity impacts

  30. Kyoto – Marrakech: SINKS • Sinks (Art 12) • Sinks in CDM • Applies to sinks projects in developing countries (NAI) • General CDM rules apply • Credit for afforestation • Credit for reforestation • No debit for deforestation • No credit for avoided deforestation • Permanence, accountability beyond 1st com period key challenges

  31. Forest Land-use Change (3.3) • Article 3.3: The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks resulting from direct human-induced land-use change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation and deforestation since 1990, measured as verifiable changes in carbon stocks in each commitment period, shall be used to meet the commitments under this Article of each Party included in Annex I. …

  32. Forest Land Use Change (3.3) • Key Implementation Issues • What is a forest (tree crown cover of more than 10-30% with trees that can reach 2-5 meters in height) • How to deal with the harvesting cycle (not considered deforestation, but in case of afforestation and reforestation will affect the credits granted) • Credits for harvested wood products? No

  33. Forest Management (3.4) • Article 3.4 The COP shall […] decide upon modalities, rules and guidelines as to how, and which, additional human-induced activities related to changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the […] and forestry categories shall be added to, or subtracted from, the assigned amounts for Parties included in Annex I, taking into account uncertainties, transparency in reporting, verifiability …

  34. Current Forest Management Rules • Accounting for carbon stock from forest management is voluntary • Once you invoke Article 3.4 for a certain area of forest, you have to permanently account for the change in carbon stock of that forest • Currently no separation of natural & human induced change, just credit limits for the 1st CP, #’s loosely based on assumption that 85% of carbon uptake is natural (for Canada limit is 60 MT Carbon)

  35. Future of Forest Management • What role should the following play? • Reward efforts to actually increase carbon storage in forests through change in forest management? • Fully account for change in carbon stock from forests over time, regardless of cause • Motivate action where there are synergies between carbon storage & biodiversity • Motivate action where there are synergies between carbon storage & forestry

  36. Future of Forest Management • Some Options • Continue with current rules, which are voluntary, & assume a certain mix of natural & human induced • Country specific baselines for BAU change in carbon stock (bottom up or top down?) • Mandatory accounting for change in carbon stock • Exemption for natural disturbances • Credits limited to carbon stock in natural forests

  37. Forest Management, Comprehensive or Selective • Proposed focus by some ENGOs arguing for selective approach: • Debit reduction in forest biomass • Debit conversion from forests to plantations • Debit conversion from primary forest to modified natural forests • Credit new carbon stock in degraded forests

  38. Forest Management, Comprehensive or Selective • Selective can be good if parties select aspects that encourage integrated solutions • Concern with selective: • Parties will only select what is easy and cheap to get credits for • Parties will leave out what is expensive & likely lead to debits

  39. Comprehensive Forest Management • Accountable for all changes in carbon stock of all forests within state, human and natural • Accountable for all carbon taken out of forest (fuel, pulp for paper, other wood products • Debit if carbon returns to atmosphere, credit if used in a way that stores the carbon long term

  40. Forest Management, Comprehensive or Selective • Concerns with comprehensive: • Complexity, • Risk of unforeseen consequences on GHG emission reduction, • Risk of sinks becoming a competing land use rather than complementing biodiversity protection and SD

  41. Forest Management Choices • Whether to continue with voluntary approach for forest management or go mandatory • How to account for harvested wood products • Harvesting cycle can be positive from carbon storage perspective, but is a threat to biodiversity • Whether to exempt “natural disturbances”

  42. Forest Management Choices • Whether to set individual baselines for forest management (bottom up or top down), ie what change in carbon stock is deemed “natural” • The baseline would reflect the characteristics of the forest just before the beginning of the commitment period. This would include : • age class structure, • growth rates, • decomposition rates and • other factors that affect carbon dynamics and GHG emissions.

  43. Biodiversity Implications for Forests • Use of forests as sinks is a potentially competing, potentially complementary land use • Rules could be changed to further discourage or encourage activities that are a threat to: • Biodiversity • Sustainable resource management • Traditional use of forests • Other potential uses/benefits of forests Bottom Line: Current Rules do not encourage integration

  44. Kyoto – Marrakech:The Fine Print (Art. 5,7,8) • Articles 5, 7, 8 (estimate, report, verify) • All about tracking credits and emissions • Different Credits: AAU, ERU, CER, RMU • What to do with the credits? • Issue Credits (verify and certify) • Trading/Transferring Credits • Retiring Credits (used to meet parties’ obligations) • Canceling credits (eliminated from use) • Recycling credits • Banking credits

  45. Kyoto – Marrakech:The Fine Print (5,7,8) • Articles 5, 7, 8 • Tracking the credits held by each party at the end of the first commitment period • ET, JI • Sinks Credits (adjusting AAUs) • CDM Credits • Trades tracked through Transaction Log • Tracking emissions 2008 - 2012 • Estimate (5), report (7), verify (8) • Expert Review team process (conservative adjust) • True up period

  46. Meeting Emission Reduction Obligations 800 Business-As-Usual 748 750 GHG Emissions (Megatonnes of CO2 equivalent) 703 700 671 Credits Needed for Compliance 650 Domestic Emission Reductions 600 550 1990 Baseline 599 Mt Kyoto target 563 Mt 500 450 • 1995 1990 2000 2005 2010

  47. Compliance System Overview • The Compliance Process • Referral by Expert Review Team, or any Party • Plenary ((Rules of Proc, Annual Rep to COP…) • Bureau (determines which branch, EB or FB, both?) • Facilitative Branch (all commitments, but no enforcement powers) • Enforcement Branch (focus on Article 3.1, 5, 7, 8) • Composition of each branch: 1 from each of five regions, 2 A I, 2 Non-A I, 1 small island states

  48. Compliance through Enforcement • Tools of the Enforcement Branch • Compliance Action Plan • Ton Restoration in 2nd Commitment Period with 1.3 Multiplier (without 2nd period target) • Loss of Eligibility to Sell • Credibility of the Market • Reputation • Integrity of International Rules

  49. Work of the Enforcement Branch Case against Greece • Case involved national system for estimating emissions • Responsibility for maintaining system was in transition from one to another consultant • Case came to EB from ERT report • Greece not eligible to use mechanisms until matter resolved in Nov 2008

  50. Work of the Enforcement Branch Case against Canada • Canada failed to have its national registry up and running by deadline • National registry is key to tracking credits by Annex I parties, linked to ITL • Canada got its registry up and running by hearing date • Finding of past non-compliance, but did not proceed further

More Related