Intrusion detection network forensics
Download
1 / 65

Intrusion Detection & Network Forensics - PowerPoint PPT Presentation


  • 103 Views
  • Uploaded on

Intrusion Detection & Network Forensics. Lucius L. Millinder Jr. [email protected] Chief Technology Officer Secure-IT Consulting, Inc. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of detection. Why Talk about IDS?. Emerging new technology Very interesting ...but...

loader
I am the owner, or an agent authorized to act on behalf of the owner, of the copyrighted work described.
capcha
Download Presentation

PowerPoint Slideshow about ' Intrusion Detection & Network Forensics' - holt


An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation

Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author.While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server.


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Presentation Transcript
Intrusion detection network forensics

Intrusion Detection&Network Forensics

Lucius L. Millinder Jr.

[email protected]

Chief Technology Officer

Secure-IT Consulting, Inc.



Why talk about ids
Why Talk about IDS?

  • Emerging new technology

    • Very interesting

      ...but...

    • About to be over-hyped

  • Being informed is the best weapon in the security analyst’s arsenal

    • It also helps keep vendors honest!


What is an intrusion
What is an Intrusion?!

  • Difficult to define

    • Not everyone agrees

    • This is a big problem

      • How about someone telneting your system?

        • And trying to log in as “root”?

      • What about a ping sweep?

      • What about them running an ISS scan?

      • What about them trying phf on your webserver?

        • What about succeeding with phf and logging in?


What is ids
What is IDS?

  • The ideal Intrusion Detection System will notify the system/network manager of a successful attack in progress:

    • With 100% accuracy

    • Promptly (in under a minute)

    • With complete diagnosis of the attack

    • With recommendations on how to block it

      …Too bad it doesn’t exist!!


Objectives 100 accuracy and 0 false positives
Objectives: 100% Accuracy and 0% False Positives

  • A False Positive is when a system raises an incorrect alert

    • “The boy who cried ‘wolf!’” syndrome

  • 0% false positives is the goal

    • It’s easy to achieve this: simply detect nothing

  • 0% false negatives is another goal: don’t let an attack pass undetected


Objectives prompt notification
Objectives: Prompt Notification

  • To be maximally accurate the system may need to “sit on” information for a while until all the details come in

    • e.g.: Slow-scan attacks may not be detected for hours

    • This has important implications for how “real-time” IDS can be!

    • IDS should notify user as to detection lag


Objectives prompt notification cont
Objectives: Prompt Notification (cont)

  • Notification channel must be protected

    • What if attacker is able to sever/block notification mechanism?

    • An IDS that uses E-mail to notify you is going to have problems notifying you that your E-mail server is under a denial of service attack!


Objectives diagnosis
Objectives: Diagnosis

  • Ideally, an IDS will categorize/identify the attack

    • Few network managers have the time to know intimately how many network attacks are performed

  • This is a difficult thing to do

    • Especially with things that “look weird” and don’t match well-known attacks


Objectives recommendation
Objectives: Recommendation

  • The ultimate IDS would not only identify an attack, it would:

    • Assess the target’s vulnerability

    • If the target is vulnerable it would notify the administrator

    • If the vulnerability has a known “fix” it would include directions for applying the fix

  • This requires huge, detailed knowledge


Ids pros
IDS: Pros

  • A reasonably effective IDS can identify

    • Internal hacking

    • External hacking attempts

  • Allows the system administrator to quantify the level of attack the site is under

  • May act as a backstop if a firewall or other security measures fail


Ids cons
IDS: Cons

  • IDS’ don’t typically act to prevent or block attacks

    • They don’t replace firewalls, routers, etc.

  • If the IDS detects trouble on your interior network what are you going to do?

    • By definition it is already too late


Paradigms for deploying ids
Paradigms for Deploying IDS

  • Attack Detection

  • Intrusion Detection


Attack detection

Desktop

IDS

WWW

Server

Firewall

Attack Detection

DMZ

Network

Internal

Network

Internet

Router

w/some

screening

IDS detects (and counts) attacks against

the Web Server and firewall


Attack detection1
Attack Detection

  • Placing an IDS outside of the security perimeter records attack level

    • Presumably if the perimeter is well designed the attacks should not affect it!

    • Still useful information for management (“we have been attacked 3,201 times this month…)

    • Prediction: AD Will generate a lot of noise and be ignored quickly


Intrusion detection

Desktop

IDS

WWW

Server

Firewall

Intrusion Detection

DMZ

Network

Internal

Network

Internet

Router

w/some

screening

IDS detects hacking activity WITHIN

the protected network, incoming or outgoing


Intrusion detection1
Intrusion Detection

  • Placing an IDS within the perimeter will detect instances of clearly improper behavior

    • Hacks via backdoors

    • Hacks from staff against other sites

    • Hacks that got through the firewall

  • When the IDS alarm goes off, it’s a red alert


Attack vs intrusion detection
Attack vs Intrusion Detection

  • Ideally do both

  • Realistically, do ID first then AD

    • Or, deploy AD to justify security effort to management, then deploy ID (more of a political problem than a technical one)

  • The real question here is one of staffing costs to deal with alerts generated by AD systems


Ids data source paradigms
IDS Data Source Paradigms

  • Host Based

  • Network Based


Host based ids
Host Based IDS

  • Collect data usually from within the operating system

    • C2 audit logs

    • System logs

    • Application logs

  • Data collected in very compact form

    • But application / system specific


Host based pro
Host Based: Pro

  • Quality of information is very high

    • Software can “tune” what information it needs (e.g.: C2 logs are configurable)

    • Kernel logs “know” who user is

  • Density of information is very high

    • Often logs contain pre-processed information (e.g.: “badsu” in syslog)


Host based con
Host Based: Con

  • Capture is often highly system specific

    • Usually only 1, 2 or 3 platforms are supported (“you can detect intrusions on any platform you like as long as it’s Solaris or NT!”)

  • Performance is a wild-card

    • To unload computation from host logs are usually sent to an external processor system


Host based con cont
Host Based: Con (cont)

  • Hosts are often the target of attack

    • If they are compromised their logs may be subverted

    • Data sent to the IDS may be corrupted

    • If the IDS runs on the host itself it may be subverted


Host based ids1
Host Based IDS

  • Signature log analysis

    • application and system

  • File integrity checking

    • MD5 checksums

  • Enhanced Kernel Security

    • API access control

    • Stack security

  • Network Monitoring Hybrids


Host based ids limitations
Host Based IDS Limitations

  • Places load on system

  • Disabling system logging

  • Kernel modifications to avoid file integrity checking (and other stuff)

  • Management overhead

  • Network IDS Limitations


messages

xfer

access_log

secure

sendmail


messages

xfer

One

Security

Log

access_log

secure

sendmail


Network ids
Network IDS

  • Searches for patterns in packets

  • Searches for patterns of packets

  • Searches for packets that shouldn't be there

  • May ‘understand’ a protocol for effective pattern searching and anomaly detection

  • May passively log, alert with SMTP/SNMP or have real-time GUI


Network ids limitations
Network IDS Limitations

  • Obtaining packets - topology & encryption

  • Number of signatures

  • Quality of signatures

  • Performance

  • Network session integrity

  • Understanding the observed protocol

  • Disk storage


Jane used

the PHF

attack!

/cgi-bin/phf


Jane did

a port

sweep!

NMAP


Network based ids
Network Based IDS

  • Collect data from the network or a hub / switch

    • Reassemble packets

    • Look at headers

  • Try to determine what is happening from the contents of the network traffic

    • User identities, etc inferred from actions


Network based pro
Network Based: Pro

  • No performance impact

  • More tamper resistant

  • No management impact on platforms

  • Works across O/S’

  • Can derive information that host based logs might not provide (packet fragmenting, port scanning, etc.)


Network based con
Network Based: Con

  • May lose packets on flooded networks

  • May mis-reassemble packets

  • May not understand O/S specific application protocols (e.g.: SMB)

  • May not understand obsolete network protocols (e.g.: anything non-IP)

  • Does not handle encrypted data


Ids paradigms
IDS Paradigms

  • Anomaly Detection - the AI approach

  • Misuse Detection - simple and easy

  • Burglar Alarms - policy based detection

  • Honey Pots - lure the hackers in

  • Hybrids - a bit of this and that


Anomaly detection
Anomaly Detection

  • Goals:

    • Analyse the network or system and infer what is normal

    • Apply statistical or heuristic measures to subsequent events and determine if they match the model/statistic of “normal”

    • If events are outside of a probability window of “normal” generate an alert (tuneable control of false positives)


Anomaly detection cont
Anomaly Detection (cont)

  • Typical anomaly detection approaches:

    • Neural networks - probability-based pattern recognition

    • Statistical analysis - modelling behavior of users and looking for deviations from the norm

    • State change analysis - modelling system’s state and looking for deviations from the norm


Anomaly detection pro
Anomaly Detection: Pro

  • If it works it could conceivably catch any possible attack

  • If it works it could conceivably catch attacks that we haven’t seen before

    • Or close variants to previously-known attacks

  • Best of all it won’t require constantly keeping up on hacking technique


Anomaly detection con
Anomaly Detection: Con

  • Current implementations don’t work very well

    • Too many false positives/negatives

  • Cannot categorize attacks very well

    • “Something looks abnormal”

    • Requires expertise to figure out what triggered the alert

    • Ex: Neural nets can’t say why they trigger


Anomaly detection examples
Anomaly Detection: Examples

  • Most of the research is in anomaly detection

    • Because it’s a harder problem

    • Because it’s a more interesting problem

  • There are many examples, these are just a few

    • Most are at the proof of concept stage


Misuse detection
Misuse Detection

  • Goals:

    • Know what constitutes an attack

    • Detect it


Misuse detection cont
Misuse Detection (cont)

  • Typical misuse detection approaches:

    • “Network grep” - look for strings in network connections which might indicate an attack in progress

    • Pattern matching - encode series of states that are passed through during the course of an attack

      • e.g.: “change ownership of /etc/passwd” -> “open /etc/passwd for write” -> alert


Misuse detection pro
Misuse Detection: Pro

  • Easy to implement

  • Easy to deploy

  • Easy to update

  • Easy to understand

  • Low false positives

  • Fast


Misuse detection con
Misuse Detection: Con

  • Cannot detect something previously unknown

  • Constantly needs to be updated with new rules

  • Easier to fool


Burglar alarms
Burglar Alarms

  • A burglar alarm is a misuse detection system that is carefully targeted

    • You may not care about people port-scanning your firewall from the outside

    • You may care profoundly about people port-scanning your mainframe from the inside

    • Set up a misuse detector to watch for misuses violating site policy


Burglar alarms cont
Burglar Alarms (cont)

  • Goals:

    • Based on site policy alert administrator to policy violations

    • Detect events that may not be “security” events which may indicate a policy violation

      • New routers

      • New subnets

      • New web servers


Burglar alarms cont1
Burglar Alarms (cont)

  • Trivial burglar alarms can be built with tcpdump and perl

  • Netlog and NFR are useful event recorders which may be used to trigger alarms

    http://www.nswc.navy.mil/ISSEC/Docs/loggingproject.html

    ftp://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/netlog/

    http://www.nfr.net/download


Burglar alarms cont2
Burglar Alarms (cont)

  • The ideal burglar alarm will be situated so that it fires when an attacker performs an action that they normally would try once they have successfully broken in

    • Adding a userid

    • Zapping a log file

    • Making a program setuid root


Burglar alarms cont3
Burglar Alarms (cont)

  • Burglar alarms are a big win for the network manager:

    • Leverage local knowledge of the local network layout

    • Leverage knowledge of commonly used hacker tricks


Burglar alarms pro
Burglar Alarms: Pro

  • Reliable

  • Predictable

  • Easy to implement

  • Easy to understand

  • Generate next to no false positives

  • Can (sometimes) detect previously unknown attacks


Burglar alarms con
Burglar Alarms: Con

  • Policy-directed

    • Requires knowledge about your network

    • Requires a certain amount of stability within your network

  • Requires care not to trigger them yourself


Honey pots
Honey Pots

  • A honey pot is a system that is deliberately named and configured so as to invite attack

    • swift-terminal.bigbank.com

    • www-transact.site.com

    • source-r-us.company.com

    • admincenter.noc.company.net


Honey pots cont
Honey Pots (cont)

  • Goals:

    • Make it look inviting

    • Make it look weak and easy to crack

    • Instrument every piece of the system

    • Monitor all traffic going in or out

    • Alert administrator whenever someone accesses the system


Honey pots cont1
Honey Pots (cont)

  • Trivial honey pots can be built using tools like:

    • tcpwrapper

    • Burglar alarm tools (see “burglar alarms”)

    • restricted/logging shells (sudo, adminshell)

    • C2 security features (ugh!)

  • See Cheswick’s paper “An evening with Berferd” for examples


Honey pots pro
Honey Pots: Pro

  • Easy to implement

  • Easy to understand

  • Reliable

  • No performance cost


Honey pots con
Honey Pots: Con

  • Assumes hackers are really stupid

    • They aren’t


Firewalls as an ids
Firewalls as an IDS

  • Excellent source of network probe, attack and misuse information

  • Detect policy deviations based on access control lists

  • Some have “NIDS” capabilities


Network honeypots
Network Honeypots

  • Sacrificial system(s) or sophisticated simulations

  • Any traffic to the honeypot is considered suspicious

  • If a scanner bypassed the NIDS, HIDS and firewalls, they still may not know that a Honeypot has been deployed


Firewall

honeypot

HTTP

DNS


Hybrid ids
Hybrid IDS

  • The current crop of commercial IDS are mostly hybrids

    • Misuse detection (signatures or simple patterns)

    • Expert logic (network-based inference of common attacks)

    • Statistical anomaly detection (values that are out of bounds)


Hybrid ids cont
Hybrid IDS (cont)

  • At present, the hybrids’ main strength appears to be the misuse detection capability

    • Statistical anomaly detection is useful more as backfill information in the case of something going wrong

    • Too many false positives - many sites turn anomaly detection off


Hybrid ids cont1
Hybrid IDS (cont)

  • The ultimate hybrid IDS would incorporate logic from vulnerability scanners*

    • Build maps of existing vulnerabilities into its logic of where to watch for attacks

  • Backfeed statistical information into misuse detection via a user interface

* Presumably, a clueful network

admin would just fix the vulnerabilty


Books
Books

  • Internet Security and Firewalls: Repelling the Wily Hacker, by Bill Cheswick and Steve Bellovin, from Addison Wesley

  • Internet Firewalls, by Brent Chapman and Elizabeth Zwicky


URLs

  • Hacker sites: the fringe

    • http://www.2600.com

    • http://www.digicrime.com

    • http://www.zone-h.org/defaced/2003/01/30/www.defensivethinking.com/hacked.html

    • http://www.website.to/hacker


Addresses
Addresses

  • CERT

    • [email protected]

  • Firewalls mailing list

    • [email protected]: subscribe firewalls

  • Web security mailing list

    • [email protected]: subscribe www-security


ad