The State

1. The State Origin, Transformation, and Collapse

2. I. Defining the State • Definition based on politics: community or institution with a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force over people in its territory • Definition based on language: The totality of a country’s governmental institutions and officials, together with the laws & procedures that structure their activities • Key feature: Sovereignty (sole legal authority over people and territory)

3. II. Theories of the State • Formalism (a.k.a. the “Old” Institutionalism) – Constitutions and laws determine resource allocation and political outcomes • Look at successful states to copy design features (success attributed to formal laws). Freedom preserved by Bill of Rights, etc. • Problems: • Same constitutions = different outcomes (Swiss, Filipinos, Liberians all modeled US Constitution) • People sometimes obey states but other times overthrow them • Difficult to predict which mechanisms will be effective because no theory about why some work while others fail

4. B. Functionalism: The state serves functions for society • Assumptions: • Every society must perform certain functions in order to survive (reproduction, education, defense, etc.) • Both formal and informal rules needed to preserve social stability • Existing customs and laws serve certain universal functions. Which ones? • State failure explained as “disequilibrium” – some parts failed to fulfill functions • Problems: • Theory is tautological –What predictions can we make? • Treats status quo as “normal” state of affairs – but some institutions seem to have negative effects (ag agencies decreasing ag production…)

5. C. Social Forces: The state is an object of struggle • Assumption: Political outcomes are the result of interest groups fighting over the control of resources • Method: Examine group strength and position, then calculate “sum of forces” to arrive at result • Problems: • Similar group alignments produce different outcomes in different states • Some groups appear to have influence out of proportion to objective power (resources) • States intervene to alter group power

6. D. Rational Choice: The state is composed of rational individuals • Focuses on individuals. • Rationality = • Connected preferences: People know what they want (although they might not know what’s really good for them) • Transitory preferences: People are consistent about what they want • Method: Given preferences, how can individuals get what they want? Private enterprise, collective action, or politics? • Problem: “Rules of the game” differ in different countries  incentives to behave differently

7. E. The “New” Institutionalism: Institutions as “Rules of the Game” • Assumes social forces or rational choice: Actors pursuing interests do construct or alter states, often to solve collective action problems or security dilemmas • Argues that state institutions in turn structure group/individual decision-making by changing incentives (indeed, this was their purpose) • Implication: Different group relations produce different institutions (Example: Presidentialism inappropriate for competition between ethnically-based parties) • Problem: Still no theory of preferences. Why do people have different desires?

8. III. Evolution of the State • State formation: • Early polities: Socially-stratified groups in which people specialize, with some specializing in administration or governance. • Large polities become empires through conquest and relaxing criteria for inclusion (beyond the family or tribe) • States become territorial: Clovis is “King of the Franks” in late 5th Century but Capetians are “Kings of France” in 6th Century. Laws of people (wherever they might be) replaced by laws of territories. • Loyalty still personal: To the person, not the position. • “Capstone governments” – States are composed of different groups ruled by their own customs and only occasionally interacting with government. “Early states ran wide but not deep.”

9. B. Transition to the Supremacy of States • Centralization: Technology, economic growth, trade, better defense enable rulers to centralize authority and “deepen” ties to the state through taxation and policing • Rule of Law: Formal law is enforced, contracts become written, etc. • Sovereignty: Clash between sources of authority (Church and state) produces huge wars and leads to development of sovereignty norm (only the state has control over its people and territory) Note: From here on, everything is disputed…

10. C. Colonialism and Institution-Building • European states ignored sovereignty of non-Europeans, imposed new institutions • Institutions selected for benefit of colonial powers or colonists • Densely populated areas (tropics): Native labor exploited through slavery and feudalism • Sparsely populated areas: Institutions set up to encourage further colonization by Europeans (representation, autonomy)

11. 3. The Institution-Based Reversal: Colonial Development and Population

12. D. The Constitutional State • Why would rulers limit their own power? • Increased trade enriches merchant class  able to finance rebellion (stick) or Crown (carrot) • Absolutism restrains trade (no secure property rights): only Crown enriched

13. Voyages Per Year: Mediterranean (Pink) vs. Atlantic (Blue) Trade

15. D. The Constitutional State • Why would rulers limit their own power? • Increased trade enriches merchant class  able to finance rebellion (stick) or Crown (carrot) • Absolutism restrains trade (no secure property rights): only Crown enriched • Result: Bifurcation of Europe into constitutional (England, Netherlands) and absolutist (Spain, Portugal) regimes • Expansion of franchise: Threat of revolution when industrialization empowers poor (unskilled labor)

16. E. Post-Colonial States • Most “born” with institutions designed for benefit of others • Pre-independence institutions enriched some local elites and impoverished others (divide and rule -- or mobilization of revolutionary armies) • Existing elites use economic power to preserve political power (institutions designed to perpetuate rule)

17. IV. Future of the State: Threats to Legitimacy and Power • A New World Order? Undermining the legitimacy of state sovereignty • International Relations: Sovereign states sometimes have to bargain with other sovereign states to solve common problems • Problem: Treaties should be unenforceable • Solution: Create “self-enforcing” agreements like multilateral treaties that sanction violators • Alternative solution: Create common decision-making entity (UN, EU, IMF, etc.) • Either solution constrains the state, eroding sovereignty in practice (#3) or law (#4)

18. B. State failure: Sovereignty without authority • Routes to state failure • Catastrophe: Something overwhelms state’s ability to provide even minimal protection or enforce law. • Sovereignty without institutionalization: State is created which lacks de-personalized institutions or capacity to extract taxes and monopolize force (de-colonization in Congo) • Poverty trap: State is so poor than virtually no surplus exists to support political institutions (like catastrophe, but long-standing)

19. 2. Civil War: Sovereignty under siege • Causes of civil war: Weak states and opportunism • Weak States • Recent civil war (security dilemma) • Low GDP! • Anocracy (weak semi-autocracy)

20. Anocracy and State Failure

21. 2. Civil War: Sovereignty under seige • Causes of civil war: Weak states and opportunism • Weak States • Recent civil war (Security Dilemma) • Low GDP! • Anocracy (weak semi-autocracy) • Opportunism • Lootable resources: drugs, diamonds, even oil! • Diasporas from Previous Conflicts: Money, Supplies, Agenda-Setting • Rough terrain: Mountainous areas • Threatened Dominance: Single ethnic group 45%-90% of population

22. b. Non-causes of civil war • Inequality: No statistical evidence of relationship • Personal poverty • Easier to recruit – but for both sides! • Rich regions with key commodities frequently rebel • Ethnic diversity • Low and High levels are “safe” – middle is danger zone in non-democracies

23. Relationship: Diversity and Freedom

24. C. Predicting State Failure

25. 1. Predicting the catastrophic route to failure • Capacity to absorb catastrophe: essentially determined by wealth and efficient governance (GDP, Corruption) • Predicting catastrophe • Civil war – Recent civil war is best predictor, followed by Low GDP, then other factors • Disease – Compare disease prevalence with health care resources

27. TB Incidence per 100,000

28. Per-Capita Health Spending

29. 1. Predicting the catastrophic route to failure • Capacity to absorb catastrophe: essentially determined by wealth and efficient governance (GDP, Corruption) • Predicting catastrophe • Civil war – Recent civil war is best predictor, followed by Low GDP, then other factors • Disease – Compare disease prevalence with health care resources • Natural disasters – Analysis by the UN

31. 2. Predicting the de-institutionalization route to state failure • Recent decolonization/independence -- “New” states at risk

32. b. State “birth” type and institutional strength • Hypothesis: States born in revolution, secession, or nonviolent struggle for independence should be stronger than those granted independence without struggle (examples: Congo, Uzbekistan) • IV = Better birth experience (requiring organization and solution of collective action problems) • Tests using both GDP and Rotberg’s (2004) index of state failure as DVs reveal…

33. iv. The puzzle of state birth • Good births increase later GDP and decrease odds of state failure but… • Relationship disappears when war participation is also included as a (control) IV. Why? • Theory: War produces state strength. • Interstate war increases later growth! • Civil war decreases later growth • Another finding: States with imposed borders different from pre-colonization ones have lower growth, higher rates of failure

34. c. Personalized regimes: Difficult to measure • One indicator = unconstrained executives (very similar to autocracy measures). Test Results:

35. Estimated risk of genocide – it goes up when unconstrained executives have a powerful Army Index of Military Personnel

36. c. Personalized regimes: Difficult to measure • One indicator = unconstrained executives (very similar to autocracy measures). Test Results: unconstrained executive + large military = danger • Alternative experiment: Compare personalist post-Soviet regimes to institutionalized or previously-independent regimes. DV = violent deaths… • Everyone agrees Turkmenistan is personalized. Why?

37. Welcome to Turkmenistan • A statue of our glorious leader, President-for-Life Turkmenbashi (meaning Great Leader of All Turkmen). • This is one of a half-dozen statues of him we made out of gold. (Really, it was the least we could do.)

38. You’ll be hearing a lot about Turkmenbashi here… • This one revolves so he may always face the sun!

39. He’s everywhere!

40. Turkmenbashi the Spiritual Guide • Ruhnama is the combination autobiography, historical fiction, and spiritual guidebook written by Turkmenbashi himself • Must be prominently displayed in bookstores and government offices • Required to be displayed next to and equal to the Islamic Qur'an in mosques • Main component of education from primary school to university. Ability to exactly recite passages from it is required for state employment – and even a driver’s license • Ruhnama was sent into space in 2006

41. Every night this enormous mechanical Ruhnama opens and passages are recited with video

42. More interesting construction projects • In Niyazov's home village of Kipchak, a complex has been built to the memory of his mother, including a mosque (est. at US$100 million) conceived as a symbol of the rebirth of the Turkmen people. The walls of this edifice display precepts from the Ruhnama along with Qur'an suras. • August 2004: Turkmenbashi orders an ice palace to be built – in the desert. This “wonder of the world” ends up being an ice skating rink.

43. But wait, there’s more… • Recent decrees: • Turkmenbashi ordered the closure of all rural libraries because “village Turkmen do not read” • Ban on opera and ballet – they are “unnecessary” • Young people may not get gold tooth caps/teeth, but rather should chew on bones • Closure of all hospitals outside Ashgabat, saying that sick people could just come to the capital • Ordering that physicians swear an oath to him instead of the Hippocratic Oath • All recorded music is banned • The city of Krasnovodsk is now the city of…Turkmenbashi

44. In case you’re not convinced… • In 1991 he introduced a new Turkmen alphabet, which all are required to use • He renamed the days of the week • Then he renamed the months of the year: • January is now “Turkmenbashi” • February is now “Flag” – (Flag Day is celebrated on Turkmenbashi’s birthday) • April is “Gurbansoltan Eje”, the name of Turkmenbashi’s mother • September is “Ruhnama” • And so forth…

45. Is Turkmenistan headed for failure?

46. Turkmenistan’s Path • Exports natural gas and cotton • 1990s: Depression (Russia cut off trans-shipment of gas) • 2000s: Recovery as non-Russia pipelines began operation • Government follows free trade policy, received MFN status from Europe and WTO • January 2006: Government eliminates pensions to one third of elderly, cuts pensions of remaining two-thirds – and then orders elderly to repay the pensions received in the past two years back to the State. Reports indicate that this may be killing old people, whose $10 - $90 pensions were their sole sources of support

47. 3. The Poverty Trapa. Official data: Concentration in Africa

48. b. Satellite estimates (areas with lots of people but few lights are assumed to be poor)

49. c. Combined National Poverty Estimates