2. Disutility of Calculating (Kagan, 66-8; A to Q2b)

1. 2. Disutility of Calculating (Kagan, 66-8; A to Q2b) • Acting on consequentialism has bad consequences because if we were to take time to calculate before acting, we would frequently not be acting in a timely manner. • According to consequentialism, it is wrong to act on consequentialism. Therefore, consequentialism refutes itself.

2. Disutility of Calculating • Illustration: the innocent child drowns while the good moralist calculates the overall goodness of actions.

3. A Note (Kagan, 66) • Again, this alleged problem is not unique to consequentialism. If it is really a problem, it befalls to every position that admits that the value of the consequences of an action is a factor in determining the rightness of actions. • Thus, this is a problem almost everyone should be concerned with.

4. An Analysis of the Argument • Consequentialism (or any theory that takes consequences into account) holds that the rightness of an action depends on whether the consequences are comparatively good. • Consequentialism (or any theory that takes consequences into account) holds that we should try to calculate the goodness of consequences every time before the action. • If we try to calculate every time before acting, we would waste time and opportunities to do good. • Therefore, acting on consequentialism (or any theory that takes consequences into account) has bad consequences. • Because of (1) and (4), consequentialism (or any theory that takes consequences into account) tells us not to act according to the theory. • (5) amounts to the self-refutation of the theory.

5. Reply: Reject the Premise (2) • In general, consequentialism (or any other theory that takes consequences into account) does NOT hold thatwe should try to calculate the goodness of consequences every time before the action. • To understand this point, you need to understand two points: • 1. the distinction between the standard of rightness and the decision procedure; and, • 2. sometimes the effective way to meet a standard or achieve an aim is not directly trying to do so, but adopting indirect strategies.

6. 1. The Standard of Rightness and the Decision Procedure • Consequentialism etc. provide the standard of rightness, which tells us by virtue of what right actions are right. That is, they provide the standard of rightness, according to which right actions are right by virtue of their consequences. (Thus, the premise (1) is true.) • Consequentialism etc. are in themselves not the decision procedure, which tells agents what to do for each occasion of action, e.g., “before every action, try to work out the best consequences, and pick the act with the best consequences.”

7. Analogy to Games • The standard of rightness is like the standard of winning in a game, while the decision procedure is like the strategies of the game. • Consider games, such as chess, checkers etc. • There is a standard of winning in any game. For example, in chess, you win if you checkmate the opponent’s king. The rule book provides the standard. • However, no human can win a game merely with the standard of winning. If we can, the beginners can win as easily as the experienced can. In order to win, we need to use effective strategies (based on the generalization of experiences).

8. Analogy to Games (Continued) • Consequentialism (or any theory that takes consequences into account) directly provides only the standard of rightness, as a rulebook provides only the standard of winning in a game. • No human can act rightly merely with the standard of rightness (e.g., the best outcome makes the action right), as no human can win a game merely with the standard of winning. • To take right actions, we need something analogous to strategies in games, which effectively guide us to actions with the best outcome. This is called the decision procedure.

9. 2. Direct Strategies Sometimes Do Not Work Well. • This distinction between the standard of rightness and the decision procedure is important because directly trying to meet the standard is not necessarily the most efficient decision procedure to meet the standard. • This is why the consequentialist standard of rightness (an action is right in virtue of its best consequences) does not imply the decision procedure, “Try to calculate the goodness of consequences every time before acting.”

10. Direct Strategies Sometimes Do Not Work Well. • This can seem initially paradoxical, but it is not. • Some Examples • Insomnia (Can you sleep by trying to sleep?) • Ulysses and the Sirens • Clyde the Cautious Investor • All of these cases suggest that some standards or goals are best met indirectly.

11. Ulysses & the Sirens Ulysses and the Sirens, 1891 John William Waterhouse The Sirens sink ships by luring the sailors by their beautiful voices onto rocks. Ulysses aims at both listening to their voices and safely sailing through the sea. Ulysses knows that he will fail if he directly tries to do so. Thus, he tells his subordinates to put on earplugs, tie him to the mast, and ignore him while the Siren sing to him.

12. Clyde the Cautious Investor • Clyde wants only to make as much money as possible. • Clyde tells his investment broker to invest his money in the most beneficial way possible, but never to invest in commodity futures. • The broker is puzzled, arguing that there’s plenty of money to be made by investing in commodity futures. • Clyde explains that considering that no one is knowledgeable enough to rationally expect to make money, not investing in them at all is the best policy in the long run.

13. The Failure of the Calculation Objection • According to consequentialism etc., actions are right in virtue of their comparatively good consequences. • As critics point out, directly trying to meet this standard – i.e., trying to calculate the goodness of outcome at every occasion of action – does not have good consequences. Therefore, consequentialism etc. tell us not to adopt this direct strategy as our decision procedure. • Thus, the premise (2) is false, and the calculation argument fails.

14. The Decision Procedure of Consequentialsim • The defenders of consequentialism generally hold that the decision procedure for us includes the adoption and and habituation of secondary rules that tell us to take the types of actions that tend to realize the best total value. Why? • Usefulness of Generalizations based on Experience. • Due to past experiences, observations and scientific theories, we have established generalizations about whether a type of actions tends to succeed or fail in realizing the best overall value.

15. Secondary Rules: • Secondary Rules are rules derived from Consequentialism and Empirical Generalization. • Examples (Kagan, 67-8) • Empirical generalization: Killing someone almost always has had bad consequences overall. • Then, consequentialists say, we should adopt and internalize a rule: don’t kill. • Empirical generalization: Keeping one’s promise generally has had the best consequences overall. • Then, consequentialists say, we should adopt and internalize a rule: keep your promise.

16. The Use of Secondary Rules and The Places of Calculation • In normal circumstances, all the agent needs to do is to see which of these secondary rules applies in the given situation and follow the rules. • Calculation is called for only in three cases: • In establishing and refining secondary rules; • In deciding which action to take when secondary rules conflict with each other; • Ex.: when you need to lie to your child not to hurt him • In deciding which action to take when following a secondary rule might have serious consequences. • Ex.: when you have promised to meet someone, but on the way to the appointed place you find someone with a grave injury

17. Two Attractions of Consequentialism(Kagan, 68; The Answers to Q3a & Q3b) • Consequentialism offers a unified and systematic basis and justification for various ordinary moral rules. All of them are derived from empirical generalizations and a more fundamental principle – the requirement to pick the act with the best outcome. • Consequentialism offers a way to evaluate, refine and systematize ordinary moral rules.

18. Consequentialist Refinement of Moral Rules • The Example of Self-Defense (Kagan, 67-8) • Consequentialists will refine a moral rule, “Don’t kill,” so that it will have the exception clause for self-defense. Why? • Self-defense has a deterrent effect on would-be aggressors, so it typically leads to the better results overall. • Consequentialists will further refine the rule “Don’t kill except for self-defense.” They will forbid you to kill in self-defense when the person trying to harm you is only defending herself from your unprovoked attack. Why? • Because it will not lead to the better results overall if aggressors kill their victims to defend themselves.

19. Consequentialist Systematization of Moral Rules (Kagan, 68) • We find ordinary moral rules conflict in some situations. • Ex.: “Don’t tell a lie” and “Save a life” conflict with each other when you need to lie to save lives. • For these situations, Consequentialits can provide priority rules. • Priority rules are rules that tell us what to do in cases where two or more rules conflict. • Ex.: A priority rule may well say that you should follow “Save lives” rather than “Don’t tell a lie” when they conflict. This is because the good done by saving a life normally outweighs the damage done by lying. • This capacity of systematically resolving the conflicts of moral rules is a big attraction of consequentialism.

20. Consequentialism Requires Much Ex.: Maxine, the Moral Movie-Goer • Maxine is on her way to the theater when someone with a charity box points out that the money she is about to spend could be used to provide food for starving people or inoculations in the third-world children. Surely, the money spent that way will lead to the best account when everyone’s well-being is counted. So Maxine forgoes her entertainment and put the money to the charity box. • The next day Maxine goes to the theater again. Once more she meets the guy a charity box. Considering which action produces the best outcome, she forges her entertainment and put the money to the charity box. • Considering the best outcome, Maxine repeats the donation until she cannot make other people happy to the extent that outweighs the sacrifice, esp. the sacrifice of her well-being.

21. Apparently Excessive Demands: The Diagnosis • The Problem is Usually Attributed to: • Consequentialism’s Not Giving Special weight to the Costs to the Agent , and/or • Consequentialism’s Insistence on Maximization

22. Apparently Excessive Demands: The Solution • Agent Prerogative: Give Special Weight to Costs to Agent • Reject Maximization • “Satisficing” Consequentialism

23. Special Weight for Costs to Agent • According to (maximizing) consequentialism, A is right. • But if we give more weight to the agent’s good, C is right. Overall Good Good to the Agent Weighted Good Bad Good A Actions C

24. Criticisms of Giving Special Weight to Costs to Agent • Illegitimate Double Counting • The costs to the agent, insofar as these are morally relevant, have already been counted in the overall good. • An Incorrect Answer • The action A (the action that has the overall best consequences) is not wrong: from the moral point of view, A is more recommendable than C.

25. The Illustration of the 2nd Point • Consider two people, Alex and Makoto. • Alex uses her spare time for helping the poor and the disadvantaged. She donates the large portion of her salary to Oxfam America. • Makoto uses his spare time for enjoying himself. He spends the large part of his salary for eating fancy food, drinking beers, buying CDs and so on. • Which person is morally superior? • It seems Alex is morally superior to Makoto. And presumably that is because Alex’s actions are more morally recommendable than Makoto’s. • This comparison suggests an action that has the overall best consequences is morally recommendable even if it involves a great sacrifice to the agent. That action is morally superior to the action that has less good consequences with less cost to the agent.

26. Satisficing Consequentialism • It is permissible to take any actions whose overall good are above some point M. C is not the best but good enough. • It is forbidden to take any actions whose overall good are below M. • Thus, C as well as A are right, but B is wrong. Overall Good Good to the Agent Bad Good M A B Actions C

27. A Criticism of Satisficing Consequentialism • Arbitrary Threshold Objection: Why is “good enough” good enough? Or, why not the best? • Satisficing consequentialism put a threshold (“M” in the graph) in the level of good consequences. If the good consequences of an action is over the point, an action is right; and if the good consequences of an action is under which, it is wrong. • However, it seems arbitrary to put such a threshold except at the point where the consequences are the best.