Unionism and Loyalism

1. Unionism and Loyalism Gordon Gillespie July 2017

2. Unionism: Historical Viewpoint • Defines itself in opposition to Irish nationalism. • Rejects the idea of a historic Irish nation. Ireland only became a nation after the Act of Union in 1800 (ie within the UK). • The 26 counties of the Free State/Irish Republic seceded from the United Kingdom – the six counties of NI did not withdraw from an Irish state. • After partition in 1921 the Irish government encouraged political instability in NI by continuing the territorial claim to NI in the Irish constitution (removed in 1999).

3. Academic Definitions • Jennifer Todd: • Ulster Loyalist – primary loyalty to the NI Protestant community. • Ulster British – primary loyalty to the British state/nation. • In practice there is an overlap between the two. • John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary: • Devolutionists – a NI assembly provides best defence against Irish nationalism because British government is unreliable. • Integrationists – Union best maintained by legal, political, electoral and administrative integration with the rest of the UK. • Norman Porter: • Cultural Unionism – rooted in Protestantism. The concepts of liberty and loyalty are central. • Liberal Unionism – aims to achieve a similar political way of life as the rest of the UK

4. Unionist and Loyalist Organisations • Organisations reflect social and economic divisions in the PUL community. • Complicated by emergence of organisations in response to the Troubles or to specific political initiatives. • Churches: Presbyterian, Church of Ireland, Methodist, Baptist, etc. • Political parties: Ulster Unionist Party, Democratic Unionist Party, Vanguard, etc. • Loyal Orders: Orange Order, Apprentice Boys of Derry, Royal Black Preceptory. • Paramilitary Organisations: Ulster Volunteer Force, Ulster Defence Association and associated organisations. • Loyalist Workers’ Organisations: Loyalist Association of Workers and Ulster Workers’ Council

5. Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) • Founded 1905. Largest party in NI until 21st century and formed the government 1921-72. • Party ruling body is the Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) with around 800 delegates from branches, women’s representatives, Young Unionists and (until 2005) the Orange Order. • Fairly democratic structure made it open to internal disputes and splits. Party leaders often found it difficult to bring supporters along with political initiatives such as Sunningdale and GFA. • 2016 – 16 seats (of 108), 12.6%. Entitled to 1 Executive seat but went into Opposition instead. • 2017 – 10 seats (of 90), 12.9%

6. Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) • Founded 1971 and led by Rev. Ian Paisley until 2008. Now Arlene Foster. • Traditionally less open to negotiation than the UUP in politics and on many social issues (Paisley leader of Free Presbyterian Church). • Hard to categorise the DUP as either just a loyalist or unionist party. • With unionist dissatisfaction with the GFA it overtook the UUP in 2003 becoming the largest political party in NI. • 2016 – 38 seats (of 108), 29.2%. Four seats in the Executive plus First Minister • 2017 – 28 Assembly seats (of 90), 28.1%. • UK General Election 10 seats – balance of power

7. Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party • Formed as a right-wing pressure group within the UUP 1972. Became a political party 1973 to oppose Power-sharing and Irish Dimension. • Leader William Craig (centre) proposed an independent Dominion of Ulster. • Support from disillusioned UUP voters. • Ties with the UDA caused tensions with more middle class supporters. • Split in 1975 when Craig proposed a voluntary coalition with the SDLP. Lost support and wound up in 1978.

8. Ulster Defence Association • Founded September 1971 by Protestant vigilante groups. Localised structure made it hard to control. • Andy Tyrie (leader 1973-1988) said objective was ‘to terrorise the terrorist’. Often became attacks on Catholics at large. • By 1990s increasingly corrupt. • Not illegal until 1992 - banned after upsurge in UDA violence. • Military wing, the Ulster Freedom Fighters (1973), banned from the outset. • Intermittent feuds with other loyalist paramilitary groups. • Responsible for an estimated 431 deaths while 96 UDA and UFF members were killed.

9. ‘The UDA’s Finest Hour’ • 3 July 1972 attempt to establish no-go area between Shankill and Springfield Roads. Army objects to a barricade which would cut off 50 Catholic families. • UDA assembles c.8,000 men in 90 minutes facing 250 soldiers. Army given permission to open fire if necessary but eventually agree to man a checkpoint at the disputed area. • The Belfast Telegraph comments: • ‘The trial of strength in the area between the Shankill and Springfield Roads last night is as near as the UDA has come to a pitched battle with the army. It was averted only at the cost of the generals admitting that a private paramilitary group has the right, through might, to mount patrols in a sealed-off enclave of a British city. Both sides may claim a “victory” of sorts, with some justification, but in fact the losers are all those who value democratic rights.’ • Belfast Telegraph 4 July 1972

10. Ulster Volunteer Force • Founded 1966 in opposition to O’Neill reforms - smaller than UDA but more disciplined and politically aware – often more ruthless. • Shankill Butchers, responsible for at least 19 murders, connected to the UVF. Dublin and Monaghan bombs 1974 killed 33. • Leading UVF figure Gusty Spence credited with politicisation of the UVF. Spence died 2011. • Intermittent feuds with the UDA and the breakaway LVF. Closely linked with the Red Hand Commandos. • UVF and RHC responsible for at least 569 deaths while 65 members killed during the Troubles.

11. Dublin and Monaghan Bombings 1974 • Dublin 1 Dec 1972 – 2 killed 127 injured by 2 car bombs • 20 January 1973 – 1 killed • 17 May 1974 – 33 killed nearly 260 injured: • ‘The dead and injured lay on the pavement, the roadway and inside shop windows. A fleet of ambulances, private cars and a CIE single-decker bus took the dead and injured, many of whom were badly mutilated, to city hospitals. • Crowds stood among the debris in the street before gardai cleared Talbot Street and adjoining areas. Several bodies were covered by newspapers from a nearby newsboy’s stand, at the corner of Gardiner Street.’ (Irish Times 18 May 1974) • UVF denied responsibility • 19 December 1975 – 2 killed by RHC car bomb in Dundalk • Barron Report (Ireland) 2003 concludes there may have been collusion between loyalists and individual members of police and army in 1974 bombs. Talbot Street Dublin 17 May 1974

12. 1921-63 • Ulster Unionist Party dominated political life in NI • Gerrymandered local council areas in some border areas. Allocation of jobs, housing other resources favoured unionists over nationalists. Public order policing not applied evenly. • Political culture favoured Unionists and restricted nationalism. The Twelfth a public holiday while nationalist displays often restricted • Unionist political behaviour influenced by: • Grass-roots unionism (often more hard-line than leadership) • Concern Britain was an unreliable ally • Continuing (if intermittent) IRA attacks in NI • Continuing anti-partitionist attitude of nationalists both in NI and the South

13. Mutual Antipathy: State Building • February 1932 Fianna Fail leader Eamon De Valera tells an election meeting in Dublin: • ‘The majority of the people of Ireland are Catholic and we believe in Catholic principles. And as the majority are Catholics, it is right and natural that the principles to be applied by us will be principles consistent with Catholicity.’ • October 1933 Sean T O’Kelly (Deputy Premier) in Geneva says: ‘the [Irish] Free State government was inspired in its every administrative action by Catholic principles and doctrine.’ • ‘I am an Orangeman first and a politician … afterwards. In the South they boasted of a Catholic state. They still boast of Southern Ireland being a Catholic state. All I boast is that we are a Protestant Parliament and a Protestant state.’ Sir James Craig, Lord Craigavon, Prime Minister of NI, 1934

14. The O’Neill Years: 1963-68 • Terence O’Neill becomes Unionist leader in 1963. A moderniser – aims to reform the economy (traditional industries in decline), create jobs, win back working-class Unionist votes lost to NI Labour Party, improve relations with Catholic community and the Republic. • But: • Opposition within the UUP – reform unnecessary or too fast • Outside the party Ian Paisley (fundamentalist Protestant) says change is undermining NI • UVF paramilitary group formed 1966 as unionist fears increase • From c.1963 growing demands from civil rights groups to end discrimination • From 1964 the UK Labour govt taking a greater interest in NI affairs

15. The Fall of Stormont: 1968-69 • October 1968 Civil Rights march in Derry sees marchers beaten by police. Unionist government appears repressive. • Unionists introduce reforms but radical student group People’s Democracy continues campaign • January 1969 PD Belfast-Derry march a turning point. • Attacked by loyalists (including off-duty B Special members) outside Derry. Protestant-Catholic views increasingly polarised

16. The Fall of Stormont: 1969-72 • August 1969 Apprentice Boys march in Derry leads to riots in Derry and sectarian conflict in Belfast. British soldiers on streets of NI • Republican and loyalist paramilitary groups become established – state forces unable to defeat them • Internment in August 1971 increases violence. • Bloody Sunday January 1972 leads British to suspend (abolish) NI parliament in March 1972.

17. Unionists and the Troubles • Unionists view the conflict as a terrorist campaign against a democratic state. IRA campaign was a form of ethnic cleansing • Constitutional nationalists and Irish government used IRA violence to further the nationalist agenda • Reform within NI a way to address nationalist concerns and strengthen Union – changes should not threaten NI’s constitutional status

18. Republican Atrocities • Republican murders a key factor in unionist views of the Troubles. Among the most significant are: • Abercorn Restaurant Bomb (Belfast 1972) • Bloody Friday (Belfast 1972) • Claudy (Co. Londonderry 1972) • Kingsmill Massacre (Co. Armagh 1976) • LaMon House Hotel (Co. Down 1978) • Ballykelly Bomb (Co. Londonderry 1982) • Darkley Massacre (Co. Armagh 1983) • Enniskillen Bomb (Co. Fermanagh 1987) • Teebane Massacre (Co. Tyrone 1992) • Shankill Bomb (Belfast 1993) • Omagh Bomb (Co. Tyrone 1998)

19. Impact of the IRA Bombing Campaign Donegall Street Belfast. 20 March 1972 • IRA car bomb kills 7 injures 150 • ‘It was business as usual until the bomb exploded. For it was not in Church Street but in the street into which so many of the innocent had been lured. • Suddenly a street full of people had become a front-line battlefield. No one knew where the blast had taken place. All they knew was the tons of glass and rubble crashing round them where they fell. • Choking smoke and dust filled the air and even before it had started to settle the screaming began. The bleeding, twisted bodies of men and women were strewn about the street. • Others began to pour out of the nearby premises. The walking wounded helped to carry the others. People carried out searches of their offices and found more injured, some screaming with shock rather than pain.’ (News Letter 21 March 1972)

20. Sunningdale 1973-74 • Unionists dubious on power-sharing with SDLP. Strongly opposed Council of Ireland - SDLP said would, ‘trundle unionists into a united Ireland.’ • Power-sharing Executive takes office January 1974 but rejected by UUP several days later Faulkner continues as Chief Executive but without a formal party • February 1974 a UK Gen Election shows large unionist majority against Sunningdale • IRA launches bombing offensive in the spring increasing unionist opposition • May Ulster Workers’ Council strike brings industry to a halt and electricity grid to near collapse. Faulkner unionists resign from Executive ending Sunningdale deal

21. The Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985 • Gave the Irish Government a right to consultation on some NI affairs – see it as a move towards joint authority • Unionist opposition includes a near 200,000 rally at Belfast City Hall in opposition to AIA. • By-elections in 1986, petition, etc fail to halt the operation of the AIA. Plan to have devolution in context of AIA rejected by Unionists. • Loyalist paramilitaries attack police homes and stretch RUC to breaking point. NI SoS Tom King fears Unionists might be moving towards declaring independence. • Unionist opposition encouraged by nationalist triumphalism – John Hume on the AIA, ‘the Protestant boil had to be lanced.’

22. Brooke-Mayhew Talks: 1991-92 • Three Strand Approach: • Strand 1 Northern Ireland structures • Strand 2 North-South relations • Strand 3 East-West British-Irish relations • Brooke-Mayhew talks bring NI parties and British and Irish governments close to agreement on political structures for NI. • Unionists agree to power-sharing. UUP and DUP meet Irish Government for talks. • Rejected by John Hume who believed an IRA ceasefire is needed first.

23. The Downing Street Declaration 1993 • British government agrees: ‘It is for the people of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish.’ • Accepted by the Ulster Unionist Party but rejected by the DUP. In subsequent negotiations David Trimble (leader from 1995) managed to keep a majority of the party in favour of talks.

24. ‘New Unionism’ and the Peace Process • Arthur Aughey: Nationalism, Devolution and the challenge to the UK State (2001) • Distinctions - made to create space for political compromise: • Irishness of place – not political Irishness • Devolution as part of UK-wide trend - not aiming for a united Ireland • Practical cross-border co-operation – not for nationalist reasons • Propositions: • Consent principle must govern North-South relations • Nationalists must forego idea of British Govt as ‘persuaders’ for a united Ireland • Articles 2 and 3 of Irish constitution must be changed to improve North-South relations John Hume, David Trimble And Bono promote GFA

25. The Good Friday Agreement 1998 • Supported by UUP, Progressive Unionist Party (UVF) and Ulster Democratic Party (UDA). Opposed by DUP and some smaller unionist groups • UUP strong input into role and extent of North South Ministerial Council (Strand 2) - limited and power for expansion carefully circumscribed • Main concerns security – prisoner releases, decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, extent of police reform • In run up to referendum on GFA Blair tells people of NI: ‘Those who use or threaten violence to be excluded from the government of Northern Ireland.’ • ‘Prisoners to be kept in prison unless violence is given up for good.’ – neither promise kept

26. The Troubles: Who Was to Blame? • Adapted from Colin Irwin ‘How Public Opinion Polls were used in support of the Northern Ireland Peace Process’ The Global Review of Ethnopolitics. Vol.1 No.1 September 2001. • (Ranking on a list of 19 factors) • Protestants • The IRA and their use of violence 87% (Catholics 11 – 45%) • All paramilitary groups and their use of violence 67% (Catholics 7 – 56%) • Failure of govt/security forces to deal with terrorism 56% (Catholics 12 -34%) • Republic’s territorial claim on NI 53% (Catholics 16 – 21%) • Loyalist paramilitaries and their use of violence 53% (Catholics 6 – 57%) • Republic’s involvement in NI 42% (Catholics 18 – 16%) • Catholics • The lack of equality and continued discrimination 71% (Protestants 14 – 21%) • The sectarian division of NI politics 66% (Protestants 10 – 30%) • Failure to provide a police service acceptable to all 62% (Protestants 18 – 9%) • The failures of NI politicians 59% (Protestants 7 – 31%) • Lack of respect for people of the ‘other’ tradition 57% (Protestants 9 – 30%) • Loyalist paramilitaries and their use of violence 57% (Protestants 5 – 53%) • All paramilitary groups and their use of violence 56% (Protestants 2 – 67%) • Unaccountable and secretive government 52% (Protestants 8 – 31%) • Continued British presence in Ireland 51% (Protestants 16 – 17%)

27. Declining Protestant Support for the GFA • Protestants believed peace process benefited nationalists • The belief the GFA benefited unionists and nationalists equally fell from 41% of Protestants in 1998 to 22% in 2003 (NI Life and Times survey) • Belief that nationalists benefited a lot more than unionists rose from 11% in 1998 to 55% in 2002 (NILT) • Security issues – prisoner releases, police reform without decommissioning key factors • DUP overtakes UUP as major party RUC poster showing images of 303 officers killed during the Troubles

28. David Trimble on Unionist Record • Former UUP leader David Trimble Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech 10 December 1998: • ‘Ulster Unionists, fearful of being isolated on the island, built a solid house, but it was a cold house for Catholics. And northern nationalists, although they had a roof over their heads, seemed to us as if they meant to burn the house down. • None of us are entirely innocent. But thanks to our strong sense of civil society, thanks to our religious recognition that none of us are perfect, thanks to the thousands of people from both sides who made countless acts of good authority, thanks to a tradition of parliamentary democracy which meant that paramilitarism never displaced politics, thanks to all these specific, concrete circumstances we, Thank God, stopped short of that abyss that engulfed Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia and Rwanda.’

29. The Future: The Union is safe? • Combined Loyalist Military Command ceasefire statement October 1994 says: • ‘The Union is safe.’ • BUT: • What happens if loyalist groups do not believe the Union is safe? • ‘Peace dividend’ little or no impact • Academic under-achievement of working-class Protestant boys • Perception their culture is under threat • Impact of UK exit from EU unclear • Declining unionist percentage of vote -2017 no overall unionist majority in Assembly election

30. Ongoing Loyalist Violence • 28 May 2017: Man murdered in loyalist feud

31. ‘Show Me The Money’ – The Peace Dividend Arrives? • 2017 UK General Election leaves DUP with balance of power and potential to support minority Conservative government. • Leads to heated reaction from some liberal and Irish nationalist commentators often centred round DUP conservative social policies (especially marriage equality issue). • More realistic attitude is that DUP wants more money for NI. • On wider issues a senior DUP figure says: • ‘The DUP isn’t asking the Government to take sides on the devolution issue or on the politics of Northern Ireland. It does expect the government of the day to be an advocate of the Union but that is a wider UK issue than an exclusively Northern Ireland one.’ (Belfast Telegraph 21 June 2017) • 26 June Conservatives agree £1 billion extra funds for NI infrastructure projects over two years.