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The Role Of BMC3I Simulation In Advancing The NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) Programme

The Role Of BMC3I Simulation In Advancing The NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) Programme . Nicholas J Hatton Jim Watkins NC3A USASMDC. Presentation Outline. NATO ALTBMD Programme

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The Role Of BMC3I Simulation In Advancing The NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) Programme

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  1. The Role Of BMC3I Simulation In Advancing The NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) Programme Nicholas J Hatton Jim Watkins NC3A USASMDC

  2. Presentation Outline • NATO ALTBMD Programme • Integrated assessment of system architectures and BMC3I options • Battle Management options analysis • Modes of control • Impact of varying the location of BMC3I functions • EADSIM Capabilities Overview • Systems • BMC3I • Rulesets

  3. Background • Objective: By 2010, to field an Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) capability that will protect forces deployed on NATO missions from theatre ballistic missiles • Progress: On 11 March 2005, the North Atlantic Council approved the Charter for the ALTBMD Programme Management Organisation (PMO)

  4. 1991 Gulf War February 25th. Hit US barracks at Dharan, killing 28 and injuring over 100. Context 88 TBMs launched Coalition forces knew the ballistic missiles that Iraq developed from Soviet Scud Bs as "Scuds," regardless of Iraq's Arabic names for their longer-range variants. Iraq fired mainly the Al Hussein model at the Kuwait theater of operations and Israel.

  5. NATO COMMAND & CONTROL SENSORS WEAPON SYSTEMS THREAT NATO UNCLASSIFIED 3 System Architecture • Flexible, reliable BMC3I arrangements are fundamental

  6. Centralised: C2 Centre (Level 1, 2 or 3) monitors status of subordinate Fire Units (FUs) and conducts TEWA • Decentralised (Level 1, 2 or 3 C2): • By Negation – C2 Centre monitors engagement status of subordinate FUs and issues veto commands for deconfliction & inventory balancing (proactive) Engage Order FU Status Engage Approval Engage Request Engage Denial Engage Status Engage Veto • By Authorisation – C2 Centre approves or denies engagement requests from subordinate FUs (reactive) Method of Operation (MOO) CAOC C2 Level 3 ARS ARS C2 Level 2 SAM C3* SAM C3* C2 Level 1 Upper Layer Weapon System Lower Layer Weapon System Lower Layer Weapon System Upper Layer Weapon System Boost Phase Interceptor System Upper Layer Weapon System Autonomous: Each Fire Unit acts independently and conducts its own localised TEWA Sensor Sensor Interceptor Interceptor BMC3I Sensor Sensor BMC3I Interceptor Interceptor Sensor BMC3I BMC3I Interceptor BMC3I Sensor Interceptor BMC3I The ALTBMD architecture shall enable mixed MOOs for ALTBMD assets * Probable implementation as a SAM C2 capability within the ARS

  7. BMC3I Options • Option 1: Purely autonomous • Option 2: Decentralized (by negation) at level 1; isolated upper-tier systems operate autonomously • Option 3: Centralized at level 1, autonomous elsewhere • Option 4: Decentralized (by negation) at level 1 with coordination • Option 5: Centralized at level 1 with coordination • Option 6: Decentralized (by negation) at level 2 • Option 7: Centralized at level 3.

  8. Mode of Control Analysis • BMC3I system will be required to support all of the modes of control

  9. Summary (Part 1) • NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) Programme is underway • Integrated assessment of system architectures and BMC3I options supported by EADSIM • Sensors • Weapon Systems • BMC3I • M&S provided the analytical foundation from which the Architecture-level and System-level technical requirements were derived

  10. Extended Air Defense SimulationOverview • Force-On-Force simulation of air, missile, and space • Analysis, Training, Test, And Operational Planning in a single, integrated package • Community accepted model • Supports worldwide user base of over 390 users • MDA Core Model • NATO (NC3A) Use For Over 10 Years • Industry Use (US, Europe) For ALTBMD Feasibility Studies DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

  11. PROGRAM OVERVIEW • Baseline funding provided by MDA and SMDFWC • User-funded enhancements are the key to EADSIM growth and success • Version 12.00 is the latest released version (Jan 2005) • Multiple ongoing enhancements, User funded site support, Exercise support, User’s hotline • Configuration managed with joint CCB. • EADSIM is strongly supported by the user community DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

  12. EADSIM Models ...... DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

  13. SENSORS WEAPON SYSTEMS NATO UNCLASSIFIED 3 EADSIM – Applicability to ALTBMD NATO COMMAND & CONTROL • Models all the elements of the problem • Provides the flexibility to explore solutions • Methods of operation • Flexibility of representation • Each element constructed using composable models • Behavior and interaction flexibility THREAT DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

  14. User - Composable Some Factors In Platform Behavior Decisions: Select Rulesets • Relationships • Select Behaviors • Cdr/subordinate • Assets • • Engagement Supporter • Flight Leader/Wingman • Home Base • Perceived Situation • Sensed • Reported • Other Elements of the Player • Type (Such as Movement Element Data Element Data Model) Linked Together At Weapons Available • SYSTEMS SYSTEMS Run Time To Form Rulesets Rulesets Protocols Protocols Network Connections • The Specified Sensors Sensors Formations Formations Behavior Jammers Jammers Icons Icons Every Player Has A Every Player Has A Communication Communication Unique Perception Airframe Airframe Unique Perception Devices Devices Radar Radar Pk, Flyout Pk, Flyout Infrared Infrared Identification Identification Cross Cross Weapons Weapons Signature Signature Classes Classes Tables Tables Section Section Behavior Modeling Decision And Engagement Battle Processes Management/c3 (BM/C3) Phases Set Parameters Program Trigger • Responses To Message Event/response Messages Processing Combinations User Tailors Track Processing Handling Of • Behavior Different Types Of Track Data DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

  15. Weapon Models • EADSIM Models Multiple Classes of Weapons • Conventional • Nuclear • Chemical / Biological • Directed Energy • Electromagnetic Pulse / High Power Radio Frequency Explicit Flyout Model Has Been Updated. Used in RS05, JPOW VIII, IMD Exercises Earth Rotation In Interceptor Flight Added User Configurable Weapons Allow Almost Any Weapon to be Represented Ballistic Missile Flight Model Compared To Standard Threat Developer Suites Integration Effort • User Selectable Levels of Fidelity • Explicit Flyout • Flyout Tables • Constant Velocity Guidance Updates for Missile Defense Underway in FY05 DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

  16. RADAR DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

  17. SUMMARY • EADSIM is extensively used in NATO Missile Defense Studies • EADSIM has the capabilities to support studies in many other areas (C4ISR, Space, Attack Operations, and Directed Energy). • EADSIM flexibility has been significantly enhanced in Version 12.00. • Planned enhancements emphasize Missile Defense study support. DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

  18. NC3A Brussels Visiting address: Bâtiment ZAvenue du Bourget 140B-1110 BrusselsTelephone +32 (0)2 7074111Fax +32 (0)2 7078770 Postal address:NATO C3 AgencyBoulevard Leopold IIIB-1110 BrusselsBelgium NC3A The Hague Visiting address: Oude Waalsdorperweg 612597 AK The HagueTelephone +31 (0)70 3743000Fax +31 (0)70 3743239 Postal address:NATO C3 AgencyP.O. Box 1742501 CD The HagueThe Netherlands Contacts SMDC Future Warfare Center Visiting address: Building 5220Redstone Arsenal, AlabamaTelephone +1 (256) 9551681 Fax +1 (256) 9552455 Postal address:USASMDCP.O. Box 1500, SDMC-FW-SMHuntsville, Alabama 35870-3801United States

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