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DNSSEC An Update

DNSSEC An Update. Olaf M. Kolkman olaf@ripe.net. Zone administrator. Registry/Registrar. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Zone file. Provisioning. slaves. DNS: Data Flow. master. Caching forwarder. Dynamic updates. resolver. Zone administrator. Registry/Registrar. 3. 5. 4. 2. 1.

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DNSSEC An Update

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  1. DNSSECAn Update Olaf M. Kolkman olaf@ripe.net

  2. Zone administrator Registry/Registrar 1 2 3 4 5 Zone file Provisioning slaves DNS: Data Flow master Caching forwarder Dynamic updates resolver

  3. Zone administrator Registry/Registrar 3 5 4 2 1 Provisioning Zone file slaves DNS Vulnerabilities Impersonating master Cache impersonation master Caching forwarder Corrupting data Dynamic updates resolver Cache pollution by Data spoofing Unauthorized updates Altered zone data

  4. example.com A 10.8.0.1 example.com A 10.8.0.1 Zone administrator Registry/Registrar Zone file Provisioning DNSSEC Provides Data Security example.com A 10.8.0.1 master Caching forwarder Dynamic updates slaves resolver

  5. ` APP STUB DEPLOYMENT NOWDNS server infrastructure related signing Protocol spec is clear on: • Signing • Serving • Validating Implemented in • Signer • Authoritative servers • Security aware recursive nameservers serving validating

  6. DNSSEC Implementations • BIND 9.3. • NSD 2. ( authoritative only) • Net::DNS::SEC for scripting tools

  7. Main Improvement Areas • “the last mile” • Key management and key distribution • NSEC walk

  8. ` APP STUB The last mile • How to get validation results back to the user • The user may want to make different decisions based on the validation result • Not secured • Time out • Crypto failure • Query failure • From the recursive resolver to the stub resolver to the Application validating

  9. ` APP STUB Problem Area signing Key Management • Keys need to propagate from the signer to the validating entity • The validating entity will need to “trust” the key to “trust” the signature. • Possibly many islands of security validating

  10. Secure Islands and key management . com. net. os.net. money.net. kids.net. corp geerthe mac unix nt marnick dev market dilbert

  11. Secure Islands • Server Side • Different key management policies for all these islands • Different rollover mechanisms and frequencies • Client Side (Clients with a few to 10, 100 or more trust-anchors) • How to keep the configured trust anchors in sync with the rollover • Bootstrapping the trust relation

  12. NSEC walk • The record for proving the non-existence of data allows for zone enumeration • Providing privacy was not a requirement for DNSSEC • Zone enumeration does provide a deployment barrier • Work starting to study possible solutions • Requirements are gathered • If and when a solution is developed it will be co-existing with DNSSEC-BIS !!! • Until then on-line keys will do the trick.

  13. Conclusion • DNSSEC Deployment can be started now. • .SE is preparing for deployment by end of this year • Improvements will come, some work may take one or more years

  14. References • Some links • www.dnssec.net • www.dnssec-deployment.org • www.ripe.net/disi/dnssec_howto • Apster number 12

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