Land Reform and Land Relations in Rural Russia

1. LandReform and LandRelations in RuralRussia By ValeryPatsiorkovsky, DavidO´Brien, Stephen K. Wergen Presented by: Linda Mankovecká, IBAC 2010/2011

2. Keywords • Farmingenterprise • Ruralhousehold • Household plot – area, estate, parcel • Privatisation

3. Introduction • FallofCommunism in Russia – privatisation (as society and economymovedawayfromtheprinciplesofMarxism) • By the end ofthe 1990´s Russiaseconomywas more privatethannot • Primarygoalofprivatization – to transfer landfromthe state to privatecitizens • The study focuses on theimpactofLandReform in Russia on landrelations and landusewithinruralpopulation

4. Legislation • Legislativefoundationfor LR in Russia – adoptedduring 1990-1995 • Severaldecreeswereissued – initiatedtheprocessofcreatinginstitutions to support a marketeconomy in agriculture • 1,2 million km² (60% oftotalagriculturalland) – privatisedduring 1992-1997 • Distributionofland – sharecertificatesystem

5. 11,9 millionlandshareswereissued – majority wasdistributed to privateowners (membersofcollective and state farms, pensioners, socialserviceworkers, teachers and medicalpersonell) • 70,8% - landused by largeenterprisesfor rent • 25,6% - landinvestedas a physicalcapitalofthelargeenterprise – no control over thatland • 3,8% - peoplewhoretainthecontrol over thelandtheyhavereceived • Lowusageofagriculturalland

6. 2001 – President Putin signedthe new LandCode – broughtclarity to landrelations by establishingcertainrights (expected to increaselandtransfers) • Right to own and transfer privateproperty • Right to leaseland However, therestillremains a greatdealofconfusionamongalllandusers (industry, agriculture, households) - Rejectionofthe new LandCode by someregions

7. Regions´ ownlandlaws and landmarkets • e. g.: in theLandLawofSaratovthere are determinationsof minimum and maximum sizesforland to beclassiffiedforprivateagriculturaluse • By 2002 therewerefourcategoriesofregionsaccording to theirresponsesto LR and privatisation • Placeswhereregionallawdoesn´trecogniselandasprivateproperty – stronglegalbarriers to thepurchase or saleofland (evenprohibition)

8. Regionswhere 40 – 49% ofagriculturalland has beenprivatised • Regionswhere 50 – 59% ofagriculturalland has beenprivatised • Regionswhere 60% or more ofagriculturalland has beenprivatised

9. Change in landuse – surveydata • 2 surveysweretaken in variousRussianvillages Threevillages (in Rostov, Belgorod and Tverregions) weresurveyed in 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2003 and 800 householdswereinterviewed in 2001 Belgorod – Vengerovka, Veseloe, Zasosno, Kazaskoe, Streletskoe Volgograd – Dubrinka, Dubovsky, Katovsky, Mikhailovskaya Krasnodar – KartushinaBalka, Novoivanovskoe, Razdolnoe, Shkurinskaya Novgorod – Berezovik, Borovenka, Melnitsy, Ozerki Rostov – Latonovo Tver – Bolshoe, Sviattsovo Chuvash – Vurmankasy-Munsut, Mikhailovka, Tuvsi, Churachiki

10. Fromthesesurveydata, certain patterns/trendswereevident: • Only a verysmall % (1,3) ofhouseholdsreportedbuying or sellingland – althoughthiswasthegoalofthereformers in Moscow • The majority ofchangesinvolved new typesofformal and informallandrentalarrangements - FRA – localvillageadministrationsusing a portionofthelandofthehouseholds - IRA – onehouseholdrentslandfromanotherhouseholdusually in returnforsomeportionofthefoodproduced on thatland

11. throuhghoutruralRussia - smallernumberofhouseholdscontrolls/ownsslightlylargerplots • Anincrease in formally leasing landforagricultureuse by households (56,3% in 1993 and 75,9% in 2003) Uniqueaspectsoflandrelations – insteadofeschewing new opportunitiespresented by landreform, householdsfound new and creativewaysofcombiningdifferenttypesoflandforusage

12. Averagesizeofdifferenttypesoflandusearrangements in 2001 • thebiggestdifferenceoccur in thecategoriesofformal • and informalleasedland – reflectionofregionallegal • institutions (Volgograd vs. Krasnodar)

13. Anotheruniqueaspectthatcomesfromthesurveyconcernslandshares (theirdistribution) Differencesbetweenregions in theaveragesize and numberofhouseholdswithlandshares: e. g.: in theChuvasrepublicwithhighpopulationdensity (74.2 p/km²) only 40% of Householdsreceivedlandshares. By contrast, Volgograd withmuchlowerpopulation density (23.5 p/km²) 69.8% ofhouseholdsreceivedlandshares

14. Thethirdnotableaspect – manyhouseholdsnotonlyhaveenough/sufficientland, buttheymayactuallyhave more landthattheycaneffectivelyuse (-suggestionthat in someregionsthedisctinctionbetweenruralhouseholdlandholdings and smallerprivatefarmsmightbeblurred -ruralhouseholdstookadvantageofreform and obtainedlandforuse in agriculturalproduction)

15. Conclusion • There has beenmuch more change in landrelationsintheRussiancountrysidethan has beenpreviouslyacknowledged • Ruralhouseholds and individualshaveresponded in opportunisticway – importantrestructuringoflanduse and landownership • Ifmacro-economictrendscontinue to improve and incomescontinuetheirincrease, therurallandmarketmaybeexpected to become more robust and take on a greateconomicsignificance

16. Resources

17. Thankyouforyourattention