1 / 11

Designing Democratic Institutions: Endogenous Seniority

Designing Democratic Institutions: Endogenous Seniority. Kenneth A. Shepsle Roundtable Remarks LSE May 13, 2008. Introduction. imposed -- institutional designers chosen -- institutional players. Ubiquity of Seniority. Legislatures Age grading LIFO union contracts PAYG pensions

gus
Download Presentation

Designing Democratic Institutions: Endogenous Seniority

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Designing Democratic Institutions:Endogenous Seniority Kenneth A. Shepsle Roundtable RemarksLSEMay 13, 2008

  2. Introduction • imposed--institutional designers • chosen -- institutional players

  3. Ubiquity of Seniority • Legislatures • Age grading • LIFO union contracts • PAYG pensions • Academic & bureaucratic grade-and-step systems

  4. Previous Modeling Approaches • Binmore’s Mother-Daughter game • Hammond’s Charity game • Cremer and Shepsle-Nalebuff on ongoing cooperation

  5. Modeling Choice of Institutions • Legislators choose a seniority system • Tribes choose ceremonies and rights-of-passage between age-grades • Unions and management negotiate last-in-first-out hiring/firing rules • Social security and pension policies are political choices • Grade-and-step civil service and academic schemes are arranged

  6. McKelvey-Riezman • A legislator is senior if he or she was a legislator in the previous term and was reelected • Legislative game: Baron-Ferejohn divide-the-dollar • Seniority system choice • if yes, then seniors have higher initial recognition probabilities • if no, the recognition probability is 1/n for all legislators • Voters maximize portion of the dollar • Legislators care only about perks of office

  7. McKelvey-Riezman • Time Line • Decision on seniority system • Divide-the-dollar game • Election • Main Result • At Stage 1, incumbents will always select a seniority system • In equilibrium it will have no impact on Stage 2 • Because in Stage 3 it will induce voters to re-elect incumbents

  8. Muthoo-Shepsle Extension • Seniority still categorical • But the cut-off criterion is an endogenous choice • Mechanism for cut-off choice • At stage 1 each legislator announces a cut-off • The median announcement is the cut-off • Median of zero – no seniority system

  9. Muthoo-Shepsle Extension • Result • Cut-off criterion determined by distribution of previous terms of service • Under specified conditions the legislator with the median number of previous terms served will be pivotal • She will set the cut-off criterion at her seniority level • Selected categorical seniority system: most junior senior legislator has median number of previous terms of service

  10. Muthoo-Shepsle Extension Open Question Under what conditions will a fully ordinal seniority system emerge? Watch this space

  11. THANK YOU!

More Related