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Privacy of profile-based ad targeting

Privacy of profile-based ad targeting. Alexander Smal and Ilya Mironov. User-profile targeting. Goal: increase impact of your ads by targeting a group potentially interested in your product. Examples: Social Network Profile = user’s personal information + friends Search Engine

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Privacy of profile-based ad targeting

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  1. Privacy of profile-based ad targeting Alexander Smal and Ilya Mironov

  2. Privacy of profile-based targeting User-profile targeting • Goal: increase impact of your ads by targeting a group potentially interested in your product. • Examples: • Social Network Profile = user’s personal information + friends • Search Engine Profile = search queries + webpages visited by user

  3. Privacy of profile-based targeting Facebook ad targeting

  4. Privacy of profile-based targeting Characters Advertising company Privacy researcher My system is private!

  5. Privacy of profile-based targeting Amazing cat food for $0.99! Simple attack [Korolova’10] Likes fishing Nice! - 32 y.o. single man - Mountain View, CA …. - has cat - likes fishing Targeted ad noise Show Jon Likes fishing Public: - 32 y.o. single man - Mountain View, CA - …. - has cat Private: - likes fishing # of impressions Eve

  6. Privacy of profile-based targeting Advertising company Privacy researcher My system is private! Unless your targeting is not private, it is not! How can I target privately?

  7. Privacy of profile-based targeting How to protect information? • Basic idea: add some noise • Explicitly • Implicit in the data • noiseless privacy [BBGLT11] • natural privacy [BD11] • Two types of explicit noise • Output perturbation • Dynamically add noise to answers • Input perturbation • Modify the database

  8. Privacy of profile-based targeting Advertising company Privacy researcher I like input perturbation better…

  9. Privacy of profile-based targeting Input perturbation • Pro: • Pan-private (not storing initial data) • Do it once • Simpler architecture

  10. Privacy of profile-based targeting Advertising company Privacy researcher I like input perturbation better… Signal is sparse and non-random

  11. Privacy of profile-based targeting Adding noise • Two main difficulties in adding noise: • Sparse profiles • Dependent bits differential privacy “Smart noise” deniability

  12. Privacy of profile-based targeting Advertising company Privacy researcher I like input perturbation better… Signal is sparse and non-random Let’s shoot for deniability, and add “smart noise”!

  13. Privacy of profile-based targeting “Smart noise” • Consider two extreme cases • All bits are independent independent noise • All bits are correlated with correlation coefficient 1 correlatednoise • “Smart noise” hypothesis: “If we know the exact model we can add right noise” Aha!

  14. Privacy of profile-based targeting Dependent bits in real data • Netflix prize competition data • ~480k users, ~18k movies, ~100m ratings • Estimate movie-to-movie correlation • Fact that a user rated a movie • Visualize graph of correlations • Edge – correlation with correlation coefficient > 0.5

  15. Privacy of profile-based targeting Netflix movie correlations

  16. Privacy of profile-based targeting Let’s shoot for deniability, and add “smart noise”! Advertising company Privacy researcher Let’s construct models where “smart noise” fails

  17. Privacy of profile-based targeting How can “smart noise” fail? large large = relative distance

  18. Privacy of profile-based targeting Models of user profiles hidden bits • hidden independent bits • public bits • Public bits are some functions of hidden bits public bits • Are users well separated?

  19. Privacy of profile-based targeting • Error-correcting codes • Constant relative distance • Unique decoding • Explicit, efficient

  20. Privacy of profile-based targeting See — unless the noise is >25%, no privacy Advertising company Privacy researcher But this model is unrealistic! Let me see what I can do with monotone functions…

  21. Privacy of profile-based targeting Monotone functions • Monotone function: for all and for all values of , • Monotonicity is a natural property • Monotone functions are bad for constructing error-correcting codes

  22. Privacy of profile-based targeting Approximate error-correcting codes • -approximate error-correcting code with distance : function such that • If less than fraction of is corrupted then we can reconstruct within fraction of bits. • We need -approximate error-correcting code with constant distance. blatant non-privacy

  23. Privacy of profile-based targeting Noise sensitivity • Noise sensitivity of function :where is chosen uniformly at random, is formed by flipping each bit of with probability . • If is big • If is small hidden bits public bits hidden bits public bits

  24. Privacy of profile-based targeting Monotone functions • There exist highly sensitive monotone functions [MO’03]. • Theorem: there exists monotone -approximate error-correcting code with constant distance on average. • Idea of proof: Let be random independent monotone boolean functions, such that and depends only on bits of . • Let . • With high probability for random there is no such that and • For Talagrand-approximate error-correcting code with constant distance on average.

  25. Privacy of profile-based targeting Advertising company Privacy researcher If the model is monotone, blatant non-privacy is still possible Hmmm. Does smart noise ever work?

  26. Privacy of profile-based targeting Linear threshold model • Function is a linear threshold function, if there exist real numbers ’s such that • Theorem[Peres’04]: Let be a linear threshold function, then  No o(1)-approximate error-correcting code with O(1) distance

  27. Privacy of profile-based targeting Conclusion • Two separate issues with input perturbation: • Sparseness • Dependencies • “Smart noise” hypothesis: Even for a publicly known, relatively simple model, constant corruption of profiles may lead to blatant non-privacy. • Connection between noise sensitivity of boolean functions and privacy • Open questions: • Linear threshold privacy-preserving mechanism? • Existence of interactive privacy-preserving solutions? Arbitrary Monotone Linear threshold fallacy

  28. Privacy of profile-based targeting Thank for your attention! Special thanks for Cynthia Dwork, MoisesGoldszmidt, Parikshit Gopalan, Frank McSherry, MoniNaor, KunalTalwar, and Sergey Yekhanin.

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