CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN BULGARIAN SEA WATERS. as. prof. DS К iril N . Ко lev а s . Syana B. Lutzkanova Naval Academy “N . J . Vaptzarov ”, Varna. INTRODUCTION. In Greek, the word “crisis” has both the meaning of “emergency” and “judgment” .
In Greek, the word “crisis” has both the meaning of “emergency” and “judgment”.
Maritime Security and Maritime Safety are very much interconnected and although the natural working context of institution’ and corporation’ activities are both Maritime Security and Maritime Safety Missions (Tasks) and subsequent their Maritime Security Crisis Management and Maritime Safety (natural / man-made disaster, etc.) Crisis Maritime Safety Management.
Looking closely, at the definition of Maritime Security (or Safety) it is easy to appreciate the complexity of such an activity where a larger number of organizations, working processes and an ambiguous legal framework are involved. In order to simplify, Maritime Security (or Safety) is to be considered the combination of Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) and Maritime Security (or Safety – SAR, Oil Spill Cleaning, etc.) Operations (MSO).
Maritime Security and Maritime Safety implies information analysis and action at sea, and both complement each other. Maritime Security and Maritime Safety requires much more than just two components but, as far as institution’ and corporation’ participation in the overall Maritime Security (or Safety) system is concerned, those are the two main ones to consider and that will require specific doctrine.
This means that MSA and MSO work together to accomplish Maritime Security (or Safety) but also that they are two independent activities. MSA and MSO may be carried out by different authorities that will in turn depend on a higher authority responsible subsequently for Maritime Security (or Safety) as a whole. It also means that they both need specific procedures and doctrine for their execution.
MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS (MSO)
ACTION AT SEA (Surveillance, Reconnaissance, MIO, …)
EITHER AS PRIMARY / SECONDARY MISSION
CASE BY CASE
NAVAL, INTERAGENCY OR INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME SITUATIONAL AWARENESS (MSA)
MARITIME SITUATIONAL AWARENESS (MSA)
MARITIME SAFETY OPERATIONS (MSO)
ACTION AT SEA (Monitoring, SAR operation, Oil Spill Cleaning operation, …)
EITHER AS PRIMARY / SECONDARY MISSION
CASE BY CASE
Exclusive Economic Zone
200 nm (+)
seabed and subsoil + WATER COLUMN
seabed and subsoil
Needs to be proclaimed for enforcement
ab initio and ipso facto
(inherent right – no need for proclamation)
most important differences are
Fisheries, Search and Rescue (SAR) nation responsible zones
Judgment of International Court of Justice, 3 February 2009
Line between the claims of each country
Maritime boundary lines
Romania claim – RED LINE
Ukraine claim –BLUE LINE
Five of the six Black Sea Coastal states have ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. After the dissolution of the USSR, Georgia, The Russia Federation and Ukraine confirmed the validity the USSR-Turkey maritime boundary delimitations. In 1997 Turkey and Bulgaria agreed upon their boundary. Romania and Ukraine resolved a long-stated dispute on the delimitation of the continental shelf and their exclusive economic zones through the International Court of Justice in 2009. The boundaries between Romania and Bulgaria, Ukraine and Russia, and Russia and Georgia are not agreed upon and are drawn on the map as median or equidistant lines
The 2008 Russia – Georgia War
(Provisional arrangements until final delimitation is also possible)
ICJ or Arbitration
IF NO DELIMITATION IS ACHIEVED
OVERLAPPING & DISPUTED CLAIMS
Overlapping entitlements to maritime rights and jurisdiction
Illegal fishery case on 30 may 2011. The incident occurred early Friday (30 may 2011) when the Turkish flagged fishing boat, intentionally or not unintentionally – crossed into Romania’s exclusive economic zone for fishing purposes. The Romanian coast guard spotted the boat and called on it to stop, but the instead took
evasive action. The pursuit continued for a few hours and ended when the Romanian coast guard stopped the boat in the Bulgarian exclusive economic zone. The crew of the fishing boat meanwhile communicated with Turkish officials, saying their boat had been seriously hit and was at risk to sinking. After the call reached Ankara, the Turkish Foreign Ministry contacted Romanian authorities for information, with the demand of protecting the security of the Turkish fishermen. Romanian officials confirmed the incident and informed Ankara that there had been no casualties.
In state practice and in jurisprudence of international courts pertaining to CS/EEZ
equidistance line is modified / adjusted by giving due to a number of circumstances in order to produce an equitable result.
Terrorist Attack during Maritime Transport Ships at sea are at risk becoming targets for a terrorist attack for several reasons:
a)security countermeasures onboard are usually limited to high-pressure water hoses or high-powered sirens to ward off potential attackers
b) the number of crew available for defense is rather low
c) external security support is only available with considerable time delay, if at all.
Coordinated Terrorist Attacks on Multiple Development and Exploration Sites Oil or gas exploration occurs usually in fields encompassing many individual exploration sites, stretching over large distances in remote areas. It is difficult to prevent intrusion from the outside, since attackers can use speed-boats (e.g. Nigeria), 4 WD vehicles (e.g. Saudi Arabia) or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Consequently terrorists can carry out coordinated attacks on individual oil and gas exploration sites within the field. The amount of explosives required for such an attack is relatively small (e.g., it has been shown that 5 kg THT for a single site is sufficient), enabling one individual to carry several such devices at once
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE (OVERPRESSURE ISO-CURVES) RESULTING FROM THE DETONATION OF A SHAPED CHARGE (5kg TNT) ATTACHED TO A PIPELINE SECTION
The destruction of a pipeline resulting from the detonation of a shaped charge: the pipeline is totally destroyed (red and yellow contours).
LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A COORDINATED ATTACK ON MULTIPLE OIL-/GAS EXPLORATION SITES
Suicide Attack of an Offshore Platform Offshore platforms are subject to increased protection as a part of the national framework of critical infrastructure, i.e., the airspace and the approach by sea is subject to continuous surveillance and optional military intervention. However, as the terrorist attack on the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000 demonstrated, even a battle ship with enhanced technical and operational capabilities to ward off an enemy attack has proven to be vulnerable to a suicide boat attack.
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE (OVERPRESSURE ISO-CURVES) TO AN OFFSHORE PLATFORM RESULTING FROM A SUICIDE BOAT ATTACK WITH 1,000 kg TNT ONBOARD
The damage to an offshore platform due to the attack with a boat detonating 1,000 kg TNT upon impact at one of the columns carrying the structure. The platform suffers extensive structural damage (red and yellow overpressure iso-curves), rendering it inoperable.
LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUICIDE TERRORIST ATTACK AGAINST AN OFFSHORE PLATFORM
Illegal immigrants The routes used for smuggling and trafficking people to Europe are not exactly clandestine in nature; they can be mapped quite well combining various types of materials available. These routes overlap, in part, those used to smuggle drugs, cigarettes, and stolen cars.
Turkey is one of the main gateways to Europe for immigrants from Syria, Iraq (especially Kurds), Iran, Afghanistan, and many other Asian countries, including China. The smuggling routes go either overland to Bulgaria and Greece, and from there to Albania, Macedonia, and Bosnia, or directly by sea to Greece. In Italy, the destination is more often than not the open coast of Apulia in its southeastern corner. This area can be easily reached by speed boats from the other side of the Adriatic Sea from which the shortest distance is some 60 miles.
Oil Spills There are 1000 offshore installations in the EU (including Norway), and nearly half are in the UK. Most offshore oil and gas installations in Europe are in UK, Norway, the Netherlands and Italy. Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Spain, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and Poland have fewer, and more are planned in Cyprus and Malta. (Photo V. Dimitrov, Bulgarian maritime gas drilling installation)
The international and interagency dimension of Maritime Security/Safetyis strategic in nature because of the global effects of the existing risks and threats and the enormous amount of security/safety activities that need to be coordinated. The allied (NATO, EU) navies need to agree on a common concept of use for naval assets, gather expertise and develop specific capabilities to confront their responsibilities in the field of Maritime Security/Safety.
Involvement of navies
TRADITIONAL NAVAL WARFARE
MARITIME SECURITY AGAINST GLOBAL THREATS
LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS AGAINST ORGANISED CRIME
STANDING SECURITY CONTROL MEASURES (ISPS Code, MARITIME SURVEILLANCE)
Shipping, Trade, Energy Transport
Search and Rescue
Drug trafficking and smuggling
Proliferation of WMDs
There are a common relationship between navies’ involvement in Maritime Security/Safety missions and level of the risks and threats; the higher the risks and threats the more likely it is navies will be involved in maritime security/safety missions. Therefore can establish three basic levels:
In this regard, navies should consider :
This type of operation is normally under the responsibility of Police Forces, Coast Guard or the like, especially inside territorial waters. There are some consideration that should be taken into account:
The navies must prepare to act:
There are four types of Maritime Security Scenarios:
Arrested group illegal immigrants (Joint Naval-Border Police Exercise SEEBREEZ)
MSO may take different forms. Depending on the desired end state, they may range from simple reconnaissance, to marking or shadowing up to MIO or neutralization of the threat. All these different types of operations, triggered by MSA results, are termed Pre-planned Maritime Security Operations. The first two scenarios described above apply to regional and sub-regional theatres, whether national or international.
Boarding team in the action. Bulgarian Navy exercise
In this regard navies should consider activity to:
The following guidelines could be used by all navies:
There are a number of areas inn which units can take action in support of MSO:
Bulgarian oil spill cleaning ships in the action
Concept of Integrated Physical Protection on maritime assets includes:
Bulgarian fire-fighting team in the action
Bulgarian SAR teams in the action