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Wildlife and Fisheries: A Commons to Trust

Wildlife and Fisheries: A Commons to Trust. Ross Saxton. The Lack of a Commons Management Agency (CMA)…. Anyone with the initial necessary capital can harvest.

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Wildlife and Fisheries: A Commons to Trust

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  1. Wildlife and Fisheries: A Commons to Trust Ross Saxton

  2. The Lack of a Commons Management Agency (CMA)… Anyone with the initial necessary capital can harvest. • Example: Distant water fleets (DWFs) fishing off the coast of Namibia has decreased their domestic economic rent (resource rent) by about 50% from 1970-1990. • “Slave-like” conditions for workers (The Namibia Food and Allied Workers Union)

  3. If a CMA existed… • Namibia’s economic rent would be increased short-term and long-term. -regulated catch amounts, especially for DWFs -new incentives available for sustainable harvesting -Namibian Permanent Fund? • Slave-like conditions would disappear; less fierce competition for fish and more equality for all.

  4. Those dang commercial fishers…Taxing commercial fishers does not work: • Transfers all economic rent (resource rent) to the government, so harvesters will use political power to prevent the tax from being implemented. • Computing the optimal tax is extremely difficult due to the complexity of the demand for wildlife and biological processes. • Taxing harvesting effort can be difficult because fishers have an incentive to substitute types of effort that are taxed for types that are not taxed.

  5. Tradable quotas… • Governments and communities will sometimes freely distribute permits and licenses to pollute or gather a resource (e.g oil). selling them for any fee will produce economic rent • Every state does sells licenses and permits to hunt or fish...sometimes auction off limited licenses for the most scarce wildlife.

  6. Botswana • Hunting permit fees • The more scarce the species, the more the permit costs. -Elephant, lion: $5,000 -Leopard: $2,500 -Cape Buffalo: $1,200

  7. Botswana • Additional fees collected from recreational hunters go to local communities: -Elephant: $20,000 -Lion: $30,000 -Leopard: $4,000 -Buffalo: $3,300 (per animal)

  8. Direct Use Value • Historically, poorer people generally have had a higher direct use value for wildlife than the wealthy. • Recently, the direct use value of wildlife has decreased for the poor. Wildlife valued less. Lower class living in more urban areas and the dependence on wildlife for food is diminishing.

  9. -Economic Incentives and Wildlife Conservation. Bulte, E. H., Kootan, G. Cornelis van, and Swanson, T.-Simulation of ecological and economic impacts of distant water fleets on Namibian fisheries. Sumaila, U. R. and Vasconcellos, M.http://www.safarihuntingafrica.com

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