Peer-to-Peer Access Control Architecture Using Trusted Computing Technology
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Peer-to-Peer Access Control Architecture Using Trusted Computing Technology Ravi Sandhu and Xinwen Zhang George Mason University SACMAT05, June 1--3, 2005, Stockholm, Sweden. With thanks to our Intel colleagues Kumar Ranganathan, Carlos Rozas and Michael Covington. What is trust?. Trust

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Peer-to-Peer Access Control Architecture Using Trusted Computing Technology

Ravi Sandhu and Xinwen Zhang

George Mason University

SACMAT05, June 1--3, 2005, Stockholm, Sweden

With thanks to our Intel colleagues Kumar Ranganathan, Carlos Rozas and Michael Covington


What is trust
What is trust? Computing Technology

  • Trust

    • “An entity can be trusted if it always behaves in the expected manner for the intended purpose.”

    • Trusted Computing Group (TCG)

      • Previously called Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA)

      • Includes Intel, Microsoft, IBM, HP

  • Entity

    • A platform, or an application or service running on a platform.

      • personal computer, personal digital assistant (PDA), smart phone, etc.

    • A client is a computing platform that can initiate communication with other clients to transfer or share data and resources


Need trust on the client
Need Trust on the Client Computing Technology

  • Traditional Client/Server Architecture

    • Trust is on the server side.

    • Trust is obtained with multi-layer protection mechanisms.

      • Access control

      • Firewall

      • Intrusion detection and intrusion prevention systems

    • There is little trust on client side.

      • Clients are generally lightly protected.

      • Ubiquitous connectivity in clients

      • Attacks outpacing today’s protection models

      • Attack tools readily available

  • Information resident on the client becomes susceptible to software-based attacks.

    • Mismatch between security and high value of data in client platforms.


Trusted computing technology
Trusted Computing Technology Computing Technology

  • Basic premise

    • software alone cannot provide an adequate foundation for trust on the client

  • Old style TC

    • Multics system

    • Capability-based computers

      • Intel 432

    • Trust with security kernel based on military-style security labels

      • Orange Book, eliminate trust from applications

  • What’s new

    • Hardware and crypto-based root of trust

      • Ubiquitous availability

    • Trust within a platform

    • Trust across platforms

    • Trust in applications

      • No Trojan Horses, ergo no covert channels

Little participation

from academia or larger

research community


Trusted computing
Trusted Computing Computing Technology

  • Recent TC activities:

    • TCG Specifications of TPM (Trusted Platform Module)

      • TPM is hardware root of trust

      • Needs to be ubiquitous

        • cheap, cheap, cheap

        • therefore a performance bottleneck

    • Additional Hardware

      • Intel’s LaGrande Technology (LT)

      • ARM TrustZone

    • OS/Software

      • Microsoft Palladium -> NGSCB -> ??

      • Linux, SE Linux, Trusted BSD

        • Mostly NSA funded

    • Supporting PKI


Trusted platform module tpm

Adapted from TCG presentation Computing Technology

TPM is connected to the motherboard

CPU

RAM

MCH

AGP

TPM

ICH

LPC

BIOS

Network

Port

Trusted Platform Module(TPM)

  • Specified by TCPA/TCG

  • “Smartcard” on board


From TCG presentation Computing Technology

Protected by the TPM

Storage Root Key(SRK)

Endorsement Key

Protected by the RTS

Non-Migratable Storage Key

Migratable Storage Key

Attestation ID Keys

Non-Migratable Storage Key

Non-Migratable Signing Key

Migratable Storage Key

Migratable Signing Key

Migratable Signing Key

Migratable Signing or Storage Key

Migratable Signing or Storage Key

TPM

  • Key Hierarchy

    • Non-Migratable Keys :Permanently bound specific TPM, i.e., platform

    • Migratable Keys: Can be migrated to other platforms


Attestation

From Intel presentation Computing Technology

Attestation


Intel s lagrande technology lt
Intel’s LaGrande Technology (LT) Computing Technology

  • LT includes:

    • Chipset

      • Protected graphics and memory management

    • Extended CPU:

      • Enable domain separation

      • Enforce policy for protected memory

        • Currently DMA bypasses memory protection

        • Sleep mode on laptops looses memory protection guarantee

    • Protected I/O:

      • Trusted channel between keyboard/mouse and trusted software

    • TCG TPM v1.2

      • Protect keys

      • Provide platform authentication and attestation

    • Ultra privileged ring -1

      • Existing ring 0 has too much stuff in it (principally device drivers)

      • Rings 1 and 2 unused, everything outside OS kernel runs in ring 3

      • New ring -1 privileged beyond OS kernel


Contributions of this paper
Contributions of this paper Computing Technology

  • Integrate user attributes into TC architecture

  • Support a user's ability to roam between platforms by migrating user identities and attribute certificates

  • Consider specific applications


Motivating applications
Motivating Applications Computing Technology

  • Trust on client needed in emerging applications

    • Information Sharing (sometimes called Dissemination Control or DCON)

      • Health records of a patient may be transmitted from a primary physician to a consultant who can access them for some limited period of time and cannot transmit them to anyone else

    • P2P VOIP application

      • Realtime protection of audio data in a platform

        • conversation is not eavesdropped or illegally recorded.

      • Forward control of audio object (e.g., voice mail)

        • control the platform and user to forward

    • M-commerce

      • electronic currency between peer platforms

      • payment systems for p2p e-commerce (e.g., micropayment, mobile-payment)


Architecture
Architecture Computing Technology

  • Platform with trusted reference monitor (TRM)

  • Assumptions:

    • Tamper resistent hardware

    • A homogeneous environment

      • Each platform is equipped uniformly with necessary TC hardware.


Available credentials
Available Credentials Computing Technology

  • TPM AIK pair (PKTPM.AIK, SKTPM.AIK)

    • private key is protected by a TPM with SRK.

    • Public key is certified by a privacy CA.

  • TRM key pair (PKTRM,SKTRM)

    • The private key is protected by the TPM.

    • The public key is certified by AIK.

  • Application key pair (PKAPP,SKAPP)

    • Similar to TRM key pair

  • TPM storage key(s)

    • Either the SRK of a TPM, or a key protected by the SRK

    • Protect TRM's credential

    • Protect secrets and policies


Functions of trm
Functions of TRM Computing Technology

  • TRM.Seal(H(TRM),x):

    • seals data x by TRM with integrity measurement of H(TRM).

    • x can only be unsealed under this TRM when the corresponding PCR value is H(TRM).

    • In practical a set of PCRs may be included.

  • TRM.GenerateKey(k)

    • generates a secret key k

  • TRM.Attest(H(TRM), PKTRM)

    • Return {H(TRM) || PKTRM} SK_TPM.AIK

    • Attestation response signed by AIK of TPM


Architecture1
Architecture Computing Technology

  • Policy and Secret Distribution:

    • Each object has a policy.

    • Object is encrypted with secret key before distribution.

    • Policy specifies what platform and application can access this object

      • migratable or non-migratable policy


Architecture2
Architecture Computing Technology

  • Policy Enforcement in a client platform

    • Only valid TRM can unseal the policy info and secret.

    • This valid TRM (specified by integrity measurement) can enforce the policy.


Revocation
Revocation Computing Technology

  • Revocation because of

    • Trust revocation of a requesting application

    • Trust revocation of a TRM

    • Trust revocation of a platform

  • Two approaches:

    • Push: Object owner sends updated policy to client side

    • Pull: client side check policy update from object owner

    • Both may have delayed revocation

    • Instant revocation needs centralized policy server


Support user attributes
Support User Attributes Computing Technology

  • Each platform has a user agent (UA)

    • Controlled by platform administrator

    • A key pair (PKUA,SKUA)

  • Each user has an identity key pair (PKu, SKu)

    • Migratable key

  • Identity and role certificates:


Support user attribute
Support User Attribute Computing Technology

  • Binding of identity and role certificates

    • tightly-coupled binding: by signature

    • loosely-coupled binding: by other components


Support user attribute1
Support User Attribute Computing Technology

  • Role-based policy enforcement:

    • TRM sends attestation challenge message to the UA.

    • UA responds with attestation information.

    • If the TRM trusts the running UA, it sends requesting message for role information of the user.

    • The UA sends back the role certificate of the user.

      • UA may submit the proof-of-possession for the corresponding private key of the identity public key

    • Mutual attestation may be needed

      • UA needs to ensure that TRM does not release role information.

      • Role certificate is private information of a user.


Support user attribute2
Support User Attribute Computing Technology

  • Migration of User Credentials

    • Identity credential and role credential are migratable.

      • Not bounded to specific platform

      • Can be moved or copied between platforms

    • Destination platforms determined by identity owner (user)


Applications
Applications Computing Technology

  • Secure VOIP:

    • Realtime Protection of Conversation

      • Secure channel between VOIP software and device driver

      • Attestation between TRM and VOIP software

      • Attestation between TRM and UA

      • Attestation between TRM and device driver

    • Secure Storage and Forward of Voice Mail

      • A policy specifying authorized platform and user attribute

      • Similar to DCON


Related work includes
Related Work Includes Computing Technology

  • Secure Boot:

    • Arbaugh et al., Oakland97

    • Boot only signed and verified software

  • Secure coporcessors

    • IBM 4758 crypto coprocessor

    • Closed system to run certified and signed software

  • Behavior-based attestation

    • Haldar et al. USENIX04.

    • Trusted VM

  • Trusted operating systems

    • SELinux, Trusted Solaris, TrustedBSD

  • Attestation-based policy enforcement

    • Sailer et al. CCS04

    • Controlled access from client to server by attesting client platform


Conclusion
Conclusion Computing Technology

  • Summary

    • Architecture with TC to support peer-to-peer based access control

    • General architecture for client-side access control

    • Consider trust of platforms and applications in access control policy

    • Integrate user attributes in TC

  • Future work opportunities include:

    • Performance

      • TPM is highly performance challenged

    • Access control model with TC

      • A new model?

      • Fit in some component of existing models?

    • Consider other applications

      • P2P and Ad Hoc networks

      • Grid systems

      • Ubiquitous and pervasive computing environments

      • Information sharing

      • Digital home


Om am
OM-AM Computing Technology

A

s

s

u

r

a

n

c

e

  • Objectives

  • Model

  • Architecture

  • Mechanism

What?

Information Sharing,

VoIP, etc

Future work

This paper focuses here

TPM, LT, PKI

How?


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