Dilemmas of integrated development in post-socialist cities. Iván Tosics Metropolitan Research Institute, Budapest Open days of the Regions 08A10 - Putting deprived areas back on track Brussels , 8 October 2013. Structure of the lecture.
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Dilemmas of integrated development in post-socialist cities
Metropolitan Research Institute, Budapest
Open days of theRegions
08A10 - Putting deprived areas back on track
Brussels, 8 October 2013
1) The political and institutional context of urban development in CEE countries: the socialist past and the pecularities of transition
2) Integrated urban development: how to involve residents in post-socialist cities
3) Two cases to regenerate deprived urban areas in Budapest
4) Conclusions: challenges and difficulties to apply CLLD in post-socialist cities
GDP per capita on constant prices (showing the economic development level of selected cities)
80.000 - $: Dublin, Frankfurt, Helsinki, Milan, Stockholm
70 - 80.000 $: London, Turin, Vienna
60 - 70.000 $: Brussels
50 - 60.000 $: Paris, Rome
40 - 50.000 $: Madrid, Munich, Hamburg, Birmingham
30 - 40.000 $: Athens, Budapest, Warsaw, Lyon, Manchester, Lisbon
Source: PwC, based on OECD data reflected on city boundaries
1) Horizontalcoordination: betweendifferentsectoralpolicies
2) Verticalcoordination: betweendifferentlevels of government
3) Territorialcoordination: betweendifferentterritorialunits
Vertical and territorialcoordination
Inthecontextof post-socialisttransitionwithweakand uncoordinatedpublicsectoralpolicies and no tradition of civicorganizations (i.e. weaksocialcapital) specialmethodsarerequiredtoachieveintegrateddevelopment
Local programmeshaveonlychancetoachieveintegrateddevelopmentiflocalgovernmentssuccessfullyusesuchcatalyzatorstoensuretheinvolvement of thelocal community
A projekt terület
Nagyfuvaros utca - Népszínház utca – Fiumei út – Baross utca – Koszorú utca által határolt terület
Budapest belvárosának határán, Józsefváros középső részén
L: 12.068 fő
T: 263.800 m2
The project area
It’s bounded by Nagyfuvaros – Népszínház – Fiumei – Baross – Koszorú streets
Location: in the periphery of the downtown of Budapest, in the middle of the district 8. of Budapest
Area: 263.800 m2
The aim of the programme is not to turn Magdolna into a rich area,but to bring back the colourfullness of Józsefváros and terminate deep poverty.
Mayors offices are too bureaucratic and thematically focused (silos).
National policy and financial frameworks areneeded.
Conclusion: integratedurbanrenewal is a difficult and long-term intervention whichneedsnational policy framework, longterm financing and dedicatedlocal management.
RÉV8 has graduallylostdecision-makingpowerover theyears
Cooperation between politics and management should be close and consistent
Conclusion: politiciansshould keep strategic decisions but should devolve everyday management
The use of EU money is extremely rigid and requires too quick decisions which makesthe involvement of peopledifficult. People only start to believe and being interested when the contract is signed and the money assured. Inthecontractvery detailed plans have to be prepared which can not be discussed any more with the people…
Conclusion: the more EU money, the less opportunity for participatory planning (underpresentrules of Cohesion Policy and nationalapplication)
Conclusion: local actionshavetheirlimits,forthesuccess of social renewal the nationalsocial benefit system has tofollow the increase of thehousing costs of original residents
Conclusion: inMagdolna the fate of the area can not be changed with 2+8+13 mill euros. Theproblemswithschool, crime, bad houses, employment remain unsolved and theneighbourhoodwillfaceseriousdifficultiesafter EU moneydries out
Hungary’s innovation: introduceintegrateddevelopmentinpooresturbanareas of the country, bringing back publicleadershipafterprivatization, organizinginterventionsinareasneglectedbythe market, keepingtheoriginalresidents.
However: only 162 millioneurfrom 24 bneurtotalspending (0,6%) – integratedurbanrenewal is notpopularon local level
The sociallysensitiveurbanrenewaldependstotallyon EU resources and is financiallynotsustainableifinthefuture EU supportterminates
(250-270 people/week in average)
To what extent is there evidence of ERDF housing investments contributing to integrated sustainable urban regeneration of the target areas, i.e. highly populated deprived neighbourhoods?
What are the main challenges encountered in the preparation and implementation of these regeneration projects?
What lessons could be learned from the current ERDF regulation framework regarding housing interventions and its practical implementation?
1) The contradiction between the requirement of transparency (resulting in too high administration burdens and too rigid programming structure) and the need for flexibility in such complex programmes has to be addressed
2) Enough time for planning and implementation has to be ensured (especially in the case of ESF type of measures) in order to enable the programme to work intensively with marginalised inhabitants
3) The roles of politicians and managers should be separated
Over-privatization of housingand weak public leadership lead to sub-optimal models of urban regeneration.
EU fundsarethe main sourcesforarea-basedurbanrenewalbuttheseare used to growing extent for energy improvement aims, with no orweaksocialtargeting
Whatmight go lost: area-basedintegratedrenewal.