1 / 15

matt barrie mattb@alumni.stanford

ELEC5616 computer and network security. matt barrie mattb@alumni.stanford.org. quantum cryptography. What is quantum cryptography? Using quantum computers to do cryptography What are quantum computers? Quantum physics applied to computational tasks

frieda
Download Presentation

matt barrie mattb@alumni.stanford

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. ELEC5616computer and network security matt barriemattb@alumni.stanford.org handout 21 :: quantum cryptography

  2. quantum cryptography • What is quantum cryptography? • Using quantum computers to do cryptography • What are quantum computers? • Quantum physics applied to computational tasks • What does quantum cryptanalysis mean for classical cryptography? • Is it feasible? • Can we exploit quantum effects to solve our security woes? handout 21 :: quantum cryptography

  3. what we are NOT doing handout 21 :: quantum cryptography

  4. quantum physics • Stuff is “quantised” • Atoms don’t behave like little billiard balls • Atoms emit energy in discrete quanta, called “photons” • Atoms sometimes interact in unexpected ways handout 21 :: quantum cryptography

  5. quantum physics • Measurements are uncertain • Planck Length: 1.6x10-35 m • Planck Mass: 2.2x10-8 kg • Planck Time: 5.4x10-44 s • Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle • Atomic properties are often undefined, expressed as a “superposition” of states • Atomic spin might be up, down, or both • Only defined when observed (“decoherence”) handout 21 :: quantum cryptography

  6. Classical bit 0 1 qubit 0 ? 1 qubits handout 21 :: quantum cryptography

  7. Classical bit registers 000 100 001 101 010 110 011 111 qubits registers (entangled qubits) ??? qubit registers handout 21 :: quantum cryptography

  8. Classical bits 000 001 101    000 010 010 qubits ???  ??0 qubit computationf(x) = 2*x (mod 8) handout 21 :: quantum cryptography

  9. Classical bits (y=15=1111) 010 011 100 …     001 000 011 … qubits ???  000 qubit computation (factoring y)f(x) = y mod x handout 21 :: quantum cryptography

  10. shor’s algorithm • Peter Shor, AT&T (1994) • Efficient factoring of n-bit integers with 2n-qubit registers • IBM implemented the largest so far (December 2001) • 7 qubit register • Factored 15 into 3*5 handout 21 :: quantum cryptography

  11. quantum computer complexity • BQP (Bounded-error, Quantum, Polynomial time) • P  BQP • NP-complete ? BQP (probably disjoint) • Primality testing  P [Agrawal et al, 2004] • Integer factorisation  BQP [Shor, 1994] handout 21 :: quantum cryptography

  12. most classical algorithms don’t last • Anything relying on integer factorisation or the discrete logarithm problem can’t resist quantum cryptanalysis • RSA, DSA, Diffie-Hellman, El Gamal, ECC • One-Time Pad is still fine – why? handout 21 :: quantum cryptography

  13. BB84: Bennett & Brassard (1984) • Quantum key exchange with polarised photons • Two basis pairs of two states (rectilinear and diagonal) • Alice generates random bit string, and random basis sequence • e.g. 0110101 and • Alice sends a photon per bit, polarised with the chosen basis • Bob randomly picks a basis for each bit • Alice and Bob compare notes later, only about chosen basis • Any interception by Eve destroys initial photon state • Immune to MITM if Alice and Bob can verify each other’s identity handout 21 :: quantum cryptography

  14. Practicality of BB84 • Implementations are getting better • 1989: 32 cm • March 2007: 148 km • Still very slow and difficult, and doesn’t solve everything • authentication • non-repudiation (digital signatures) • and more … • Moral: there are no “silver bullets” for security problems handout 21 :: quantum cryptography

  15. references • Quantiki • www.quantiki.org handout 21 :: quantum cryptography

More Related