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School of Political Science & Sociology

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School of Political Science & Sociology

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  1. “NATO’S NEW STRATEGIC DOCTRINE THAT ISN’T”Presentation for Dept. of Politics & Public Administration,University of Limerick 2011,March 23rd, 2011.Dr. Brendan FlynnSchool of Political Science & Sociology,Árus Moyola, NUI, Galway.Galway CityTel: +353 (0)91 493160E: brendan.flynn@nuigalway.ie School of Political Science & Sociology

  2. This presentation as .ppt file can be downloaded from my academic blog http://brendanflynn.wordpress.com

  3. Structure I. Introduction. II. Theoretical Reflection. III. Background to NATO’s new strategic doctrine-why a strategic concept now? IV. The recommendations of the Report of Experts IIIa. Rethinking Article 5? IIIb. And end to NATO unanimity decision-making? IIIc. The nuclear question. IIId. Co-operation with the EU: plus Berlin plus? V. Implications for neutral states? VI. Conclusions

  4. At the Lisbon Summit on 19th November 2010 NATO formally adopted a ‘New Strategic Concept’. The full text of the document can be found here: http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf This relatively short document draws an much more detailed and discursive “Report of Experts” from April 2010. The actual strategy statement is Spartan and not very revealing of the wider debates..... BOTH documents should be read together...they reflect a debate as such and rarely provide hard and fast new institutional rules....where there are some divergences I will highlight it.

  5. I. Introduction: a key question? NATO: building something new.....or more of the same? Photograph of a sign showing an artist's impression of the new NATO HQ, in front of the site in Haren, Brussels, where it will be built. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:NewNatoHQconstructionSite.jpg

  6. II. Theoretical Reflection Why bother study IR or security “doctrine” ‘soft’ data of documents-better to study/explain ‘hard’ actions! My approach here fits within a conventional ‘Social Constructionist’ account of Security Studies-following Wendt/Ruggie which stresses the importance of ideas in security policy and actors identities and perceptions....also the normative implications of security doctrines......alongside an acknowledgement of the importance of the state as a primary security actor, territory/geography and other ‘hard’ variables in shaping security problems.... Studying NATO new security concept does not allow us to explain or predict how NATO will evolve...but it reveals important divisions and issues within the Alliance....and it can suggest changes in the doctrinal ‘software’ that rest upon the institutional ‘hardware’.....this doctrine can itself be important and criticized....not trivial....

  7. Arguments offered: Likely to be ‘more of the same’.....more ‘out of area’...BUT ‘out of area’ operations risk putting NATO ‘out of focus’...ignores Afghanistan debacle....how does NATO extricate itself? New Doctrine and Report of Experts is a relatively conservative document....could have been more radical.....more specific.....etc. The doctrine is not strategic but rather a diplomatic exercise in reassurance. In particular it has little specific detail on how to ‘manage’ and deter Russia, post-Georgian War 2008. Reflects thinking on war which arguably exaggerates unconventional threats and places uncritical faith in ‘military transformation’ agendas (4th generation warfare. etc.) Implications for partnership with EU, and therefore EU neutrals, somewhat unclear...except ‘more’ links are promised.....this is challenging given the Afghan debacle.....will Afghanistan be dumped on the EU under the guise of ‘partnership’?

  8. For much of the 1990s NATO had the mantra: “Out of area, OR out of business” BUT For the last decade NATO’s out of area drift (in Afghanistan) now risks slowly putting the Alliance “out of business” Strategic concept does NOT address this.....

  9. III. Background-why now a strategic concept? 60th anniversary ‘mood’?-Post Bush reconciliation?-Taking stock of post-2001 security-Post Georgia 2008 crisis-alliance strains over Afghan mission-new leaders-new opportunities?

  10. IV. The Report of Experts-signposting the doctrine or cooking it up? “We have an open but fleeting moment to forge a more effective Atlantic partnership. We must seize it now. European and North American allies have allowed their relations to become discordant, yet the times demand vigor and unity. Courageous decisions need to breathe new life and relevance into the Atlantic partnership, which must be recast to tackle a diverse range of serious challenges at home and abroad.” Hamilton, Daniel (2009) Alliance Reborn An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century The Washington NATO Project. Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA494624&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (L to R) Madeline Albright (Chair), Tomas Valasek (Centre for European Reform), Hans Binnendijk (National Defence University, USA), General Rupert Smith (ex BA).....etc.... An Atlanticist bias....?

  11. From the Report of Experts “NATO states cannot allow twenty-first century dangers to do what past perils could not: divide their leaders and weaken their collective resolve. Thus the new Strategic Concept must clarify both what NATO should be doing for each Ally and what each Ally should be doing for NATO.” p.6 BUT what divides NATO today is conflict over what its supposed to do...and how to do it...the Bush era was very divisive.....does this Strategy heal the alliance? “Alliance members remain concerned about the possibility that regional disputes or efforts at political intimidation could undermine security along its borders. However, NATO must also cope with hazards of a more volatile and less predictable nature-including acts of terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear and other advanced weapons technologies, cyber attacks....the sabotage of energy pipelines, and the disruption of critical maritime supply routes. Often, an effective defence against these unconventional security threats must begin well beyond the territory of the Alliance.” p.7 BUT are the unconventional threats really as serious the old fashioned ones (Russia), especially given Georgia (2008)? “NATO is a regional, not a global organisation”, p.9 BUT at times the reports makes it seem as if NATO needs to become primarily a global player....

  12. Report of Experts suggests NATO’s ‘to do list’: Consolidate old fashioned collective defence of the territory of the 28 members..... Protecting against new unconventional threats (terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, cyber warfare, etc.) Continuing out of area operations as essential to both traditional defence and unconventional risks... Transforming NATO militaries for greater ‘expeditionary’ potential for both collective defence and ‘out of area’ Stabilising Afghanistan (before quitting?) Better security consultations within NATO Better ‘partnerships’ of need and value between NATO and the EU, UN, OSCE, etc. Being flexible about whether NATO leads or ‘enables’ missions with ‘others’. Engaging with Russia Keeping an open door on membership for Ukraine, Georgia, Balkan states? NATO to remain nuclear armed , and keep existing weapons in place whilst beginning dialogue with Russia on reductions. Ensuring that NATO can make internal decisions without vetoes. Engaging with public opinion to ‘tell NATO’s story’. (p.8-12)

  13. Media response to the new strategy-lukewarm The Economist (Nov. 11th, 2010) “The new strategic concept itself should be easy to agree to. It is a sensible document..... The five principles drawn up by Hillary Clinton, America’s secretary of state, at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Tallinn earlier this year (2010) appear to have been accepted for now. These are that NATO remains a nuclear alliance; as a nuclear alliance, member states share risks and responsibilities; NATO should reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons; the allies should pursue territorial missile defence; and NATO should draw up plans for future arms-control talks with the Russians. The nuclear issue, however, will not go away.”http://www.economist.com/node/17460712?story_id=17460712 New York Times “As NATO adopts a new Strategic Concept, it should also set out a NATO-Russia Strategic Concept- a new strategy for NATO-Russia relations. This should set the goal of bringing Russia closer to NATO (though not yet into NATO) through enhanced confidence-building mechanisms, improved joint decision-making and expanded areas of practical cooperation.” Antonenko, O. And I. Yurgens, Nov. 18th, 2010 Financial Times (Nov. 17th 2008) “As well as finalising the alliance’s new strategic concept, they will discuss relations with Russia, as well as progress in Afghanistan. As important, however, is a topic that is not on the agenda. Fiscal retrenchment will severely constrain European defence spending over the next decade, leaving the US to bear a growing share of the alliance’s burden...the thaw in relations with Russia should not be an excuse for Nato’s members to scale back their military spending. Russia may currently be keen on detente. But it is not clear whether this will remain the case after the presidential election in 2012. Even if Russia proves a more benign neighbour, Nato members cannot afford to drop their guard.”

  14. In practice much media attention went towards the presence of Russian President Medvedev at the summit.... suggesting a ‘re-set’...but in fact not really clear...... Kulhanek (2011) argues that we should not over state the significance of the so-called ‘re-set’.....NATO its ignoring Russia pet alliance the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).....”Russia’s strategic anxiety is unlikely to have been alleviated by the reported progress at Lisbon...Moscow will not abandon what it sees as its share of Europe’s balance of power, particularly as the issue of NATO military presence near its borders remains unresolved...the question of the European missile defence system, however, ...is likely to become the most contentious and potentially the most damaging issue...so far it seems that the self-congratulation and mutual praise of the Lisbon summit has clouded the fact that surprisingly little has been substantively resolved between NATO and Russia.” See: Kulhanek, Jakub ‘Russia’s Uncertain Rapproachment with NATO’, RUSI Journal, Vol.156, No.1, pp.40-45.

  15. The Group of Experts Report downplays conventional war...and talks up unconventional threats.... “the likelihood of military conflict-whether international or civil is relatively low” p.15 YET..... ‘the Allies must pursue the goal of cooperation [with Russia] while also guarding against the possibility that Russia could decide to move in a more adversarial direction’, p.16. Then go on to cite Iran and North Korea as serious concerns..... This thinking is muddled. It privileges what is most probable to happen over what would be most serious or substantive as a threat, even if less likely to happen. The major threat of significance (but also remote) to the NATO members remains arguably Russia. The conflict in Georgia should have been a wake-up call. It could easily continue. Note also ongoing internal problems in Moldova (with ethnic Russian enclave) and Kosovo.....also internal ethnic Russian tension within Estonia/Latvia.... How can NATO engage with Russia on its ‘near abroad’....and how can the Russians be deterred? If Georgia was a full NATO member would this have (a) prevented Russian aggression, or (b) not prevented the conflict, but actually, made it much more serious....a limited NATO Russian war is possible.........?

  16. “the pattern of great power struggles for primacy is far from over. What matters is the need to avoid being over-impressed by the more active conflicts of the moment, conflicts which, admittedly, are overwhelmingly of an irregular character. There will be much terrorism and insurgency to blight the future, especially the near term future. But the mischief promoted by irregular conflict pales into near insignificance when compared with the potential for harm that resides in great power antagonism”. p.383 Gray, Colin. S. (2005) Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare. London: Phoneix.

  17. POSSIBLE CONFLICTS WITHIN/NEAR EUROPE INVOLVING RUSSIA

  18. IVa. Rethinking Article 5: Article 5 The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security . The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949: Source: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm Report of experts advise that this be broadened to include non-armed attacks, such as Cyber attacks (Estonia, 2008) and that it include attacks that occur outside Europe/North America......but against NATO forces/citizens, or economic interests? In the end the actual Strategic Concept simply restates Article 5 but places it alongside of a discussion on ‘crisis management’ and novel threats...beyond NATO borders..... How wise& how workable? Obvious risk here is that a broadening of Article 5 ‘guarantee’ will dilute it...and reduce its effectiveness.....currently its a flexible ‘firewall’ or threshold...would lowering that threshold merely be an invitation to test NATO? A recipe for over-reach by NATO who can and will be easily now provoked anywhere in the globe....and not even by an armed attack?

  19. IVb An end to unanimity? From the Report of Experts...quotes 2009 proposals by Secretary General...which would....’ “preserve the consensus rule for the most important decisions such as those involving Article 5 commitments, budgets, new missions, or new members....[but would allow]...’means on less vital questions for Allies to register concerns short of a veto...and establish the principle that the implementation of decisions arrived at by consensus should not be delayed by efforts to review those decisions at lower levels before they are carried out’. p.35 The Secretary-General or NATO military leaders might also have“pre-delegated authorities, based on agreed rules-of-engagement, to respond in an emergency situation such as a missile or cyber attack.” (Ibid.) This means some kind of shift to either simple or qualified majority voting...like the EU....BUT must be agreed by all!

  20. Consensus based de facto Vetoes are not a remote academic concern....have been used by France, Germany, Belgium, and Turkey in 2003 over military cover for Turkey during invasion of Iraq and Macedonian peace-keeping mission .....where EU took over from NATO...operation Concordia In fact this proposal is (a) not unproblematic to implement and (b) is as likely to reinforce existing divisions than heal them.....because (c) it may quickly mutate into ‘coalitions of the willing’..... See: Noetzel, Timo and Benjamin Schreer (2009) ‘Does a multi-tier NATO matter? The Atlantic alliance and the process of strategic change’, International Affairs, Vol. 85, No.2, pp.211-226.

  21. IVc. NATO is divided over ‘legacy’ tactical nukes.....Germans, etc., want them gone, other states want them to stay, US wants them to probably stay and links their removal to Russian concessions... General Roger Brady, USAFE Commander, is shown B61 nuclear weapon disarming procedures on a “dummy” in an underground Weapons Security and Storage System (WS3) vault at Volkel Air Base, Holland, on June 11, 2008. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:703MUNSS061108.jpg

  22. Report of experts tartly states the American line: “Under current security conditions, the retention of some U.S forward-deployed systems on European soil reinforces the principle of extended nuclear deterrence and collective defence”, p.43. However the Final draft of the Strategic Concept states at pt.26 “In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members. Any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian of short range nuclear weapons”. This links possible removal of US ‘legacy’ tactical nukes to Russian moves on an estimated 2,000+ weapons.....some sort of minimal concession.... NOTE a recent reworking of Russian nuclear weapons doctrine in 2010 which is arguably modest and somewhat reassuring: “Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against her and (or) her allies, and in a case of an aggression against her with conventional weapons that would put in danger the very existence of the state.” NOTE: France remains aloof from the Nuclear Planning Group within NATO although it has rejoined the Military Command Structure.....France was also reportedly ‘difficult’ on the Nuclear question in the run up to Lisbon.... See: http://russianforces.org/blog/2010/02/new_russian_military_doctrine.shtml and for full text (in a poor translation perhaps) see: http://scisec.net/?p=231

  23. IVd Plus Berlin Plus...closer NATO co-operation with the EU? Partnerships are seen as multiple…formal/informal…within PfP…partnership with UN…..Nato-Russia Council On the EU: ‘detailed mechanisms for co-operation, these have not always worked as well as hoped’…a reference to Berlin Plus assets sharing agreement…but note policy of NATO ‘first refusal’ remains…this is problematic for EU….and perhaps a clearer division of labour could have been offered? Speaks of the need for ‘full complementarity’….’the EU will often have more relevant expertise than NATO in countering non-military threats’….but there is recognition that the Lisbon Treaty raises the ambition of the EU to achieve a defence policy and capabilities……

  24. Report of Experts states that ‘full complementarity is only possible if non-EU NATO members and non-NATO EU members are accorded the same degree of transparency and involvement when joint activities are conducted’…….this implies Swedes/Finns/Irish should/could be allowed participate more in NATO operations/decisions….and vice versa that Turkish, Norwegians, Albanians could be participants in EU operations/decisions…..note difficult ‘Cyprus’..... BUT ….already happens…Nordic Battlegroup is a good example…combines neutral Sweden, Finland, Ireland with NATO members Norway and Estonia…..and EU mission in Darfur included non-EU member states as participants……. NOT CLEAR WHAT IS TO BE DIFFERENT ABOUT SUCH PARTNERSHIP…except greater frequency/intensity….. ‘NATO should seek to agree with EU leaders on a plan for regular joint participation in meetings, fuller communication between military staffs, and more extensive coordination with respect to crisis management, threat assessments, and sharing assets’, p.24.

  25. In October 2010 an Irish Reconnaissance Unit of 100 troops was tested for readiness for service with the Nordic Battle Group. See: http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/Organisation/Nordic-Battlegroup/News/Irish-Evaluation/...and below neutral Swedish, Finnish and NATO Norwegian troops together within the NBG. Source: http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00060/Tre-presseoffTK_1352_60291a.jpg

  26. In fact the obvious political question is whether NATO want or expect the EU to replace them in Afghanistan…as indeed was done in Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo….. Moreover, given decisions by Dutch to withdraw in 2010, Canadians to withdraw 2011, and British, Polish and even American troops to begin drawing down troops levels thereafter (2014 is the exit date)……the pressure is really on ISAF and those remaining….notably Germany…..the Germans….may in a few years attempt to switch the mission to a smaller EU operation focused on training/humanitarian aid…..there is currently only a small EU police training mission……. This could massively test EU capabilities and political consensus…..given level of conflict in Afghanistan…. There is also a brief suggestion for the establishment of a NATO/EU defence capabilities agency……. In fact EDA-NATO cooperation is not that new.....EDA are seeking to “develop Staff to Staff contacts...to ensure the appropriate level of transparency and complementary between EDA and NATO on improving the availability of helicopters, within the framework provided by the EU-NATO Capability Group.” See: http://www.eda.europa.eu/EDAVacancies/Notice.aspx?IDVano=167 This EU-NATO capabilities group was established in May 2003...and its job is to ensure no duplication nor excessive ‘double hatting’ in procurement and allocation of resources (such as helicopters).....not clear what moving it to ‘Agency’ status will mean....see http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm

  27. “We must stop wasting valuable money and effort by duplicating our capabilities and development programmes. Forces are national, and the EU and NATO have exactly the same needs”, speech by NATO -ex-Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, July 2008 (see: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-27900518-FFEEBFEC/natolive/opinions_7879.htm?selectedLocale=en) BUT....Darfur showed up serious weakness in willingness/ability of EU and NATO states to provide non-combat helicopters.......see http://www.savedarfur.org/pages/helicopters, and see also Pop, Valentina (2008) ‘NATO and EU to pool helicopters and air carriers’, October 2nd, at http://euobserver.com/9/26843

  28. Partners, Competitors, Alternatives? The idea of partnership with the EU….seems reasonable…..but should the relationship be more a functional division of labour (soft/hard security…more civilian/military)…and is there merit in institutional competition/redundancy…EU defence identity emerged in part as a hedge against US unwillingness to commit ground troops in Yugoslavia (1993-1995)….and further threats of US divergent interests….that logic remains valid today….

  29. V. Implications for Neutral States The debate about whether to join NATO outright or remain neutral has become less relevant because as NATO becomes more ‘partnered’ and ‘flexible’….neutral states can work with NATO and operationally deploy in practice…..the only thing they don’t get is the Article 5 guarantee but this is likely to be made more flexible anyhow to cover areas beyond the 28 formal member states……and not even armed attacks….. Centre-Right governments in Finland and especially Sweden have pursued greater co-operation on security matters with EU and NATO….it is possible Sweden may formally drop neutrality….however, crucially, opposition Social Democrats in both countries remain wedded to some version of flexible neutrality and do not support formal membership of NATO. This suggests continuities alongside evolutionary ‘partnering’ through the EU/NATO. Yet, if BOTH of these states were to formally join NATO outright…..this would isolate Ireland’s position….however, why should they join outright? They can instead co-operate. What might make them join formally would be some kind of Russian ‘aggression’….

  30. European post-neutrals are quite a puzzle... “the resilience of military non-alliance in both these countries (Finland and Sweden)...has to do with the persistence of a strategic feedback mechanism. In Finland, military non-alliance, substantiated with a credible national defence, is still the least bad option to protecting its territorial integrity to Russia. In Sweden, the wish to maintain national autonomy towards the United States prevails”...‘Finland’s outspoken readiness towards future NATO membership is primarily a signal to the Eastern neighbour: should Russia turn capricious or even hostile, Finland will not hesitate to seek further security guarantees through a military alliance’ (but perhaps an EU one NOT NATO?) (p.378) Moller, Ulrika and Ulf Bjereld (2010) ‘From Nordic Neutrals to post-neutral Europeans: Differences in Finnish and Swedish policy transformation’, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 45, No.4, pp.363-386 I would add here.... Importance of normative security discourses of key Social Democratic Parties Continued Nationalism in the face of Globalization The ambiguity of EU and NATO shifts.....which on the one hand demand a response but on the other hand prolong the benefts of ‘ambiguous neutrality’ They are becoming Irish in their neutrality...”we are all ambiguously neutral now!”

  31. ‘As you know we have already been involved in NATO led crisis management operations as a result of cooperation that exists between the EU and NATO in Kosovo, in Bosnia, in Afghanistan…so it is important to point out that relationships between these organisations have to be considered but there’s no one questioning our particular position in relation to our domestic policy.’ Taoiseach Brian Cowen, Galway September 14th, 2010. ‘And we have a range of opt-outs and legal guarantees that copper fasten our position, so I don’t see any danger in this’. Foreign Minister Micheál Martin, Galway September 14th, 2010. From: de Bréadún, Deaglán and Arthur Beesley (2010) ‘EU-NATO ties will not affect Irish Neutrality, says Cowen’, The Irish Times, Tuesday September 14th.

  32. Closer and systematic partnership between NATO and EU may however create ‘contagion risks’ as regards public support for overseas peace missions…..especially if NATO ‘pass the parcel’ of Afghanistan/ISAF to EU…..this suggests for neutral states it is rational to keep a distinctive EU security identity/profile viable….. NATO states have seen dropping support for their Afghanistan mission and overall a drop in support for NATO…..would such a mission also undermine support for EU peace-keeping? For Ireland in particular participation in any Afghanistan mission would be challenging and likely unpopular…… Operationally it would be feasible at the level of our commitment to the Nordic Battlegroup (operational from January 2011)……above this level it would be riskier and as costly as the Darfur operation…… Any such mission may well have a UN mandate but would be closer to the ‘peace-enforcement’ end of the Petersberg tasks….

  33. Existing Irish Defence doctrine is minimalist on co-operation with EU and NATO: “Participation in peace support activities by Ireland in the European domain will take place in the context of the Petersberg Tasks and when authorised by the UN.” Participation in PfP does not involve membership of NATO and will not bring Ireland into any form of alliance involving mutual defence commitments. It does not constitute or imply any undertaking or intention to become a member of NATO at any time in the future. Participation in PfP does not affect Ireland's long-standing policy of military neutrality nor is PfP in conflict with our traditional support for UN peacekeeping operations. Indeed, it will enhance our capacity to contribute to such operations.” Irish Defence White Paper (February 2000). p.67 See:http://www.defence.ie/website.nsf/fba727373c93a4f080256c53004d976e/93191a155924dad5802570c8005065d3/$FILE/whiteppr.pdf Ireland will have a new Defence Whitepaper for the period 2011-2020. http://www.defence.ie/WebSite.nsf/Speech+ID/EC201FB306D8D6168025776600590780?OpenDocument

  34. Issue of joining NATO or EU alliance is constitutionally impossible with referendum change- Ireland has formally firmed up her neutrality as a result of Nice/Lisbon referendums……but in fact….this may be less relevant if EU/NATO partnership becomes more routine…….casual...incestuous.....? Key issues for Ireland may be the debate about whether a UN mandate should remain necessary for overseas missions…whether EU or NATO brokered….(Fine Gael currently appear to favour abandoning this, see Fitzgerald, Mary (2010) ‘Fine Gael want review of ‘triple lock’ troop deployment system, Irish Times, Sept 4th.) Another key focus should be the nature of such missions….are they high intensity ‘peace-enforcement’….if so is that appropriate….. Should we express some limits on partnership with NATO through EU security policy….? How will we respond as other neutrals become perhaps closer/routine NATO partners…..? If EU chooses to move towards formal defence alliance we cannot constitutionally participate….is it not in our interest for EU to remain distinct from NATO….and leave NATO to lead on military defence?

  35. VI. Conclusions The Report of Experts/Strategic Concept is a mixed bag..not very strategic…does not heal NATO..a divided alliance….with less focus than ever…. However rumours of NATO’s demise are overstated….many reasons why states want it to remain the predominant security institution for Europeans….. Implications for neutrals are not clear…but does closer co-operation with NATO erode neutrality…or in fact pragmatically side-step the issue…? NATO strategic debate reflects recent academic thinking on security/war….whose consequences may be profound….However, a shift away from ‘war between states’ may be both misguided and controversial ENDS

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