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Public Trials For Juvenile Offenders

This article discusses the case of State v. Meade, where a juvenile offender challenged the use of a manifest injustice exception in sentencing. It explores the applicability of Blakely in juvenile court and the rights of juveniles in the adjudicative process.

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Public Trials For Juvenile Offenders

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  1. Public Trials For Juvenile Offenders Class 21

  2. Case of the Day • State v. Meade, 120 P.3d 975 (2005) • Facts • Meade was arrested and charged with 30 theft in March 2004, was tried and sentenced in July 2004. Under Washington’s Juvenile Justice Act, which specifies fixed sentences according to a grid based on prior and current offense history, Meade was eligible for a sentence of probation • While awaiting sentence, Meade committed four new crimes, ran away from home “several” times, admitted to daily use of alcohol and marijuana plus other drugs including amphetamines, attempted suicide four times, and failed to go to court-ordered treatment (a condition of his pretrial release) • Court used a “manifest injustice” exception authorized by WA code to sentence Meade outside the standard range to a term of 39-52 weeks in a correctional institution. MIE is invoked when the scheduled disposition would be too excessive or too lenient. Evidence to justify a MIE must be “clear and convincing” • Court found that Meade was a threat to himself and the community, needed tx, was a risk to re-offend, had several aggravating factors in his current and past behavior, and had tx needs beyond what was available in the community.

  3. Meade challenged under Blakely, claiming that the facts used to support the manifest injustice exception should have been adjudicated by a jury at a “reasonable doubt” standard • Court denied motion, Court of Appeals affirmed • The civil “clear and convincing standard” required by the JJA for a MIE is equivalent to the criminal court’s “reasonable doubt” standard • Need for tx can justify a MIE, consistent with juvenile court mandate • Blakely does not apply to juvenile court proceedings • No right to jury trials in juvenile court; this logic obviates Blakely application under 6th Amendment • JJA is focused on rehabilitation, Blakely is designed to adjudicate punishment • Putting aside Meade’s specifics, is this what Justice Fortas called “the worst of both worlds”? • Role of Blakely in juvenile court still evolving…to be continued

  4. Public Trials • McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,403 U.S. 528 (1971) • Juveniles not entitled to jury trial • SC ruled that juvenile court judges could be as fair as jurors in assessing guilt or innocence, as well as the degree of culpability of the juvenile defendant, consistent with special conditions and jurisprudence of the juvenile court (as expressed in its authorizing legislation) • Part of the “domestication” of the juvenile court (e.g., Gault, Kent) • What, then, is the unique fact-finding process, and what are the rights of juveniles in this adjudicative forum?

  5. Rights In A Domesticated Juvenile Court • In Re Gault • Notice of Charges • Right to Counsel • Right to confront and cross-examine witnesses • Privilege against self-incrimination • Right to transcript of proceedings • Right to Appellate Review

  6. Why not Jury Trials? • Black, in the majority in Gault: juvenile court cases not distinguishable procedurally from most criminal court cases • But rights allocation only went so far as to meet “fundamental fairness” standard, and Court sought to preserve other juvenile court goals such as confidentiality and rehabilitation – again, the separate jurisprudence of the Juvenile Court. • Stewart, dissenting in Gault: “[juvenile court proceedings] simply are not adversary proceedings…The objective is correction of a condition”, no need for jury trials • Blackmun sought to preserve the higher goals of the juvenile court, and therefore wanted to avoid the complexities and entanglements of a jury trial

  7. New Mexico and Alaska Supreme Courts recognize rights of juveniles to a jury trial in juvenile court (both preceded McKeiver) • Louisiana Supreme Court noted increasing criminalization of juvenile court (dispositions) where punishment trumps rehabilitation, therefore necessitating a jury trial guarantee

  8. Burden of Proof • In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) • Preponderance not appropriate, requires “reasonable doubt” for finding of “delinquency” • However, Burger argues (dissent): • Court’s decision further erodes the differences between the juvenile and criminal courts • Juvenile court requires flexibility, not judicial formalism. • Why do McKeiver and Winship decisions seem to contradict one another? • What is the proper analogy for benchmarking the “right” burden of proof for a juvenile court proceeding? • Adult court trial? • Civil commitment of mentally ill?

  9. McKeiver’s Arguments Against Jury Trial • The end of the ideal (or fiction) of the “intimate” and informal and “protective” juvenile court – attack on its uniqueness • Juries are not essential to a process that is “fair and equitable,” no reason to think that juries would do better job that judges for this type of proceeding • Can or should a jury be in the business of determining the “environmental” and other social and psychological factors that cause delinquency? • The distinctive intake processes of the juvenile court mitigate against the unfettered power of the prosecutor • A separate juvenile court is no longer justified if there are jury trials • Jury trials might be injurious or traumatic • Inevitable delay undermines therapeutic process of the juvenile court by temporally distancing the proceedings from the act itself • Not likely that factual accuracy is improved with a jury trial, given other procedural safeguards and “fundamental fairness” standards

  10. Arguments in Favor? • Guggenheim and Hertz • Judges are less accurate than juries (social science evidence from the influential Kalven and Zeisel jury study) • In practice, juvenile court judges often get it wrong (562) • Juvenile court judges tend to side with prosecution, biases that juries are less likely to manifest (true?)

  11. Sources of Distortion in Bench Trials • No buffer from presentation of evidence that would be inadmissible in a jury trial • Familiarity with local police compromises independence • This may cast favorable light on prosecution witnesses • Insulation from group dynamics during deliberation (confirmed by social science evidence) (Ballew, 435 US 232, citing Ellsworth research) • Racial diversity in jury is more likely, given demography of juvenile court judges • Waiver of opening statements in bench trials that are common and important in jury trials • Bench trials undermine the power of narrative in shaping arguments and perceptions of evidence

  12. Are Jury Trials Feasible In Two Examples • Juvenile Sex Offender • 15 year old male, 13 year old female • New Jersey v. T.L.O • Possession of drugs in school • Challenge based on the search

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