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BUSINESS IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE NPP ’ SYSTEM FOR REMOVING THE HEAT

This workshop aims to conduct a Business Impact Analysis of the NPP heat removal system to assess risks, impacts, and mitigation strategies in the face of multilateral terrorist threats. The focus will be on ensuring the continuity of the system for secure and uninterrupted power production.

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BUSINESS IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE NPP ’ SYSTEM FOR REMOVING THE HEAT

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  1. With the financial support of the Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and other Security-related Risks Programme. European Commission-Directorate-General Home Affairs BUSINESS IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE NPP’ SYSTEM FOR REMOVING THE HEAT PROJECT: “DEVELOPMENT OF TOOLS NEEDED TO COORDINATE INTER-SEKTORAL POWER AND TRANSPORT CIP ACTIVITIES AT A SITUATION OF MULTILATERAL TERRORIST THREAT. INCREASE OF THE CAPACITY OF KEY CIP OBJECTS IN BULGARIA - HOME/2010/CIPS/AG/019” WORKSHOP: “Business Continuity Management (BCM) of the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) System. Modeling and Procedures Development of Advanced System for Security and Water Channel Protection (ASSWCP) of the NPP” KOZLODUY NPP, 05 of JUNE, 2012 ASSOCIATED PROFESSOR KIRIL STOICHEV, PhD

  2. MODULE 1 BUSINESS IMPACT ANALYZE OF THE “KOZLODUY” NPP SYSTEM FOR REMOVING THE HEAT, ITS TRANSFORMING INTO KINETIC POWER OF THE STREAM TURBINE ROTATION AND INCREASING OF THE SYSTEM PROTECTION AGAINST TERRORIST THREATS TASK1 BUSINESS IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE NPP’ SYSTEM FOR REMOVING THE HEAT

  3. PARTICIPANTS Project Manager: Associated Professor Kiril Stoichev, PhD - Institute of Metal Science, Equipment and Technology with Hydroaerodynamics Centre "Academician Angel Balevski” (IMSETCHA-BAS). Participants: а) IMSETCHA-BAS: Associated Professor Tsanka Kamenova, PhD, Associated Professor Todor Stoichev, PhD, Еng. Dimitar Dimitrov. b) NPP “Kozloduy”PLC: Emil Kichev, PhD, Eng. Dimitar Popov, Eng. Cvetan Topalov

  4. 1.2 TASK DESCRIPTION The implementation of this task requires elaboration of Business Impact Analyis (BIA) of the System for heat removal and its transformation into kinetic energy of the Steam Generator of reactors WWER - PWR type of NPP “Kozloduy” PLC– further below presented as “the System”. The system consists of the following subsystems: Circulating water system – from the Circulation pump station to the turbine condensers and from there to the warm water channel and through it to the Danube River; System for industrial water supply of the normal operation systems consumers – from Danube River through Coastal pump station in the cold water channel to the Circulation pump station; System for industrial water supply of the safety systems consumers – to the spray cooling ponds and from there to the atmosphere. The function, subject of this analysis, is securing the continuity of the electric power production of units 5 and 6 of NPP “Kozloduy” PLC

  5. II. MAIN GOALS • Determination of the risks of the System critical functions for continued operation; • Determination of the impacts on the System in case of extended interruptions in those functions; • Identification of the strategiesthat can be used to reduce the risks and/or mitigate the impacts. • The specific objectives of the Business Impact Analysis are to: • Establish the maximum duration of time each function can be suspended in a crisis situation/terrorist attack; • Determine the minimum resources required to resume each critical function at the lowest acceptable level of operation; • Determine the priorities for systems recovery and operations resumption

  6. III. ASSUMPTIONS 3.1The analysis will cover predominantly the System for heat removal and its transformation into kinetic energy of the Steam Generatorforreactors of WWER (PWR) type. 3.2There will be examined only critical processes (and related equipment), supporting implementation of the technological process (primarily critical processes of the System) at maximum loading; 3.3On the basis of the above mentioned, there will be analyzed the critical for the System processes of units 5 and 6, in terms of providing conditions for their continued operation; 3.4 Leading analytical direction is the analysis and evaluation of the necessary conditions to ensure continuous operation of the plant, i.e. units 5 and 6, and safety is viewed as a minimum obligatory requirement for the continuity of the process. Nevertheless, the analysis will not go into assessment of potential financial and economic losses as a result of interruption of the plant operation but will focus on its continued operation from the viewpoint of safety..

  7. III. ASSUMPTIONS (cont.) • 3.5 The requirement to ensure the continuity of the process is based on the likelihood of a terrorist threat to the System. From this point of view, the analysis will focus on plant infrastructure objects in which the System subsystems operate (item 1.2): • The industrial water supply system which comprises Coastal pump station (incl. also the emergency pump station), Circulation pump station, cold and warm water channels. • The “circulating water” system in the turbine hall; • 3.6There are not considered scenarios in which аs a result of a terrorist act conditions are created for seismic deviations beyond design basis, threatening equipment and systems located at the site.These scenarios are properly described and response measures in these situations are clearly regulated in a set of documents on the activities of the plant

  8. IV. BUSINESS IMPACT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY • Business Impact Analysis (BIA) is a process for determining the critical functions of a system or organization and the related critical resources. For the purpose of the project HOME/2010/CIPS/AG/019 BIA of the System is conducted through the implementation of the following main stages: • Determination of the main functions; • Determination of all resources for the processes that contribute to the proper performance of functions; • Determination of the critical point in the business cycle of each process; • Determination of whether a process is critical for the normal performance of the functions; • Assessment of possible impact and time frame to restore the activities of functions; • Ranking of critical processes .

  9. The scenario, on the basis of which the analysis is carried out, is as follows: • As a result of terrorist attack against the plant cold channel, overcoming the security and protection system, terrorist group has penetrated the NPP “Kozloduy” PLC area attacking several targets: • Coastal pump station; • Key sites of warm and cold water channels; • Circulation pump stations 3 and 4; and • Turbine hall. • As a response to the attack, the teams for: • neutralization of the attack; and • recovery of the consequences, should adequately react, knowing the requirements and trained to apply a Business Continuity Plan. It is developed on the base of this analysis (i.e. the defined in the analysis time terms are the base for the training and activities of these teams). Carrying out the plan, the teams will guarantee not only the system continued operation and from there of the whole plant, but will also ensure its reliable safety. • The methodology considers the requirements of Regulation for securing nuclear plant safety, Government decree № 172/19 July 2004, State newspaper, No 66 .

  10. X. ASSESSMENT OF THE PROCESSES/EQUIPMENT IN THE SYSTEM • From the view point of direct terrorist threat probabilities and engagement in normal operation and therefore continuous plant function, the following items will be examined and assessed: • Circulating water system; • Industrial water supply for normal operation systems consumers

  11. There will not be examined and assessed: • System for removal to alternative final absorber, in particular its subsystem of industrial water supply for safety systems consumers. This system and its subsystems are designed to deliver water to the safety systems consumers and therefore they do not correspond to the basic limitation of the analysis – only the functioning of the plant/reactors in full power is analyzed. The basic characteristics of the spray cooling ponds, the basis of the industrial water supply system of the safety systems consumers, are presented in item 8.3.5; • System of heat removal from the spent fuel pond to the final consumer – the system is related to safety assurance and does not secure continuous operation of the reactors in full capacity ; • Systems of heat removal from the hermetical zone to final absorber – on the one hand, some of the systems (e.g. fan system) are not critical and particularly important for the continuous reactor operation and from the other, the degree of safety of the hermetical zone against terrorist threats is extremely high and in practice excludes the chance of external impact on the systems positioned in it

  12. There will not be examined and assessed (cont.): • Control equipment and automatics – this system is of extreme importance for the continuous operation of the plant/reactors. It is not analyzed and assessed because: • = The electric power supply is four times backed up – main, auxiliary, emergency and alternative sources (auxiliary diesel generators and mobile diesel generator). From this point of view it is practically uninterruptible in providing control equipment and automatics serviceability; • = The thickness of the ferroconcrete reactor vessel guarantees 100% protection against electromagnetic weapon attack; • = The level of reactors physical protection by means of consecutively embedded circuits-levels of physical access guarantees 100% protection against physical penetration in the restricted area with the purpose of virus infiltration; • The system has no access to external information systems, which guarantees impossibility to infiltrate computer virus in it from external source; • = The system is backed up, by «duplicate control hall », based on the principles of physical separation and independence. .

  13. The assessment of the processes/equipment of the System is done on the base of following criteria: • Critical / vitally important; • Important / very necessary; • Necessary / required.

  14. XI. PRIORITIZATION OF FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES/EQUIPMENT • The main functions that are critical and whose loss leads to undesired consequences for the functioning of the Plant are: • Power supply and its loss; • Final absorber and its loss.. • From the view point of power supply, in item 9 there are presented different variants in case of its loss which assess the possibilities of counteraction with the available means in the frames of the Plant. • From the view point of this part of the final absorber, considered in the frames of the system, the prioritization criteria of the processes/equipment of the respective subsystems are already given in item 10, and they are: • Critical / vitally important; • Important / very necessary; • Necessary / required . • On this basis it is proposed the following prioritization of the critical processes/equipment of the System for heat release and its transformation into kinetic energy of Steam GeneratorsofWWER- PWR reactor type, presented on the followed slides.

  15. 11.1 Critical/vitally important • Provision of vacuum for the turbine; • Collection of the discharged circulation water and its delivery to the warm channel; • Collapse of the Coastal pump station control room - panels Control equipment and automatics of main and back-up power supply inlets; • Mechanical damage of the operating bodies of two neighboring circulation pumps (supplying the same turbine condenser); • Mechanical damage of the electric engines or rotors of two neighboring circulation pumps (supplying the same turbine condenser); • Mechanical damage of minimum two neighboring filters in the filter room; • Disablement of the control room of Circulation pump station – with damage of sections Control equipment and automatics; • Break in the cooling water for the electric engines of the circulation pumps; • Decrease of cold channel level below altitude mark 31.50, connected with damage of its integrity; • Loss of the emergency volume as a result of degradation of overflow wall at curve 8; • Decrease of channel level below altitude mark 31.10 at Circulation pump stations 3 and 4 (antechambers) and below altitude mark 31.50 at Coastal pump station connected with embankment/wall damage.

  16. 11.2 Important/very necessary • Cooling the bearings of the turbine and Steam Generator; • Outage of the pumps in Coastal pump station; • Mechanical damage of pump in Coastal pump station (for more than 50 %, i.e. 17 pumps-coastal water); • Mechanical damage of electric engine in Coastal pump station (for more than 50 %, i.e. 17 pumps-coastal water); • Break in cooling water for pump electric engines of Coastal pump station; • Breakdown of electric power supply for the pumps in Circulation pump stations; • Decrease /increase of the channel level by more than 70 cm/hour with channel coating damage and gradual water infiltration/draining .

  17. 11.3 Necessary /required • Contamination/plugging of the pump grids in Coastal pump station; • Contamination/plugging of the rotating sieves of the circulation pumps; • Breakdown of power supply for the rotating sieves of the circulation pumps; • Breakdown of power supply for the level measuring devices or failure of the channel level gauges which requires their replacement; • Cold channel contamination by duckweeds; • Cold channel contamination by petroleum spots; • Filling up the antechambers of Circulation pump stations 3 and 4 with alluvium .

  18. XII. STRATEGY TO ENSURE SYSTEM CONTINUOUS OPERATION • The strategy of ensuringcontinuous operation of the system is a combination of the strategies of ensuring the activity of the main functions of the Plant related to the functioning of the System and those related to its processes and equipment. • For the purposes of improving the stability of Plant operation in case of loss of power it is necessary to: • Provide 2 pc. of new mobile diesel generators; • Provide power for charging one of the storage batteries of the emergency systems from mobile diesel generator. • In order to improve the stability of the Plant operation related to loss of final absorber it is necessary to make an assessment of the condition, efficiency and availability of the emergency system to supply water from reservoir “Shishmaov val” .

  19. To provide continuous operation of the circulating water system it should: • prepare a detailed recovery plan in case of damage of the system components; • enclose the distribution well 1 and make second level of physical protection; • provide permanent financial fund for the above described activities. • To provide continuous operation of the Coastal pump station it should: • prepare a detailed recovery plan in case of Coastal pump station damage/collapse; • train specialists for maintenance and repair and keep up their qualification; • provide the minimum required reserve of spare parts and facilities; • provide permanent financial fund for the above described activities. • To provide continuous operation of the Circulation pump station itshould: • prepare a detailed recovery plan in case of damage of the Circulation pump station; • build automatic checkpoint at the entrance of filter room for higher level of physical protection; • build automatic checkpoint at all entrances of the pump room at altitude mark 0 and altitude mark -9.60 of the Circulation pump station for higher level of physical protection; • provide permanent financial fund for the above described activities .

  20. To provide continuous operation of the warm channel it is necessary to: • prepare a detailed recovery plan in case of damage of the warm channel; • build enclosing fence for the auxiliary warm channel; • provide the necessary resource in the emergency reserve of building materials for critical drain of the warm channel; • provide permanent financial fund for the above described activities. • To provide continuous operation of the cold channel it is necessary to: • prepare a detailed recovery plan in case of damage of the cold channel; • provide the necessary resource in the emergency reserve of building materials for critical drain of the cold channel; • provide permanent emergency financial fund for the recovery of the cold channel in case of damage ;

  21. Ultimately, fundamental instrument for providing continuous Plant operation, directly connected with its safe exploitation, is the training of the personnel by qualification maintenance and development of key specialists. The actions of the staff for maintaining the Plant continuous operation, including the System, are defined in the instruction for staff actions in case of accident . The staff actions for diagnostics of the condition of units 5 and 6 for recovery or compensation of disturbed functions and prevention or limitation of the consequences of core damage are defined in the Symptom oriented emergency instructions, (SOEI).

  22. THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR ATTENTION! INSTITUTE OF METAL SCIENCE, EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGIES WITH HYDROAERODYNAMICS CENTRE BULGARIA, SOFIA, 1574, 67, SHIPCHENSKI PROHOD blvd., TEL.: + 359 2 46 26 200, FAX: + 359 2 46 26 300

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