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Defense Techniques

Defense Techniques. Sepehr Sadra Tehran Co. Ltd. Ali Shayan November 2008. Overview. Firewalls General Overview Packet Filter, Circuit-Level Gateway, Application Gateway Stateful-Inspection Firewalking. Firewall. Local network is trusted „Outside“ is potentially malicious

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Defense Techniques

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  1. Defense Techniques Sepehr Sadra Tehran Co. Ltd. Ali Shayan November 2008

  2. Overview • Firewalls • General Overview • Packet Filter, • Circuit-Level Gateway, Application Gateway • Stateful-Inspection • Firewalking

  3. Firewall • Local network is trusted • „Outside“ is potentially malicious • Unprotected network • security is implemented on each host • single vulnerable host would violate whole network security • administrative nightmare • Protected network • place barrier at the borders of trusted, inside network • barrier provides access control • helps with system monitoring and simplifies management  such a barrier is called firewall

  4. Firewall • Not the ultimate solution • cannot deal satisfatorily with content • vulnerable to inside attacks and covert channels • potential performance bottlenecks • when compromised, network is unprotected • Security Strategies • least privilege • only permissions that are necessary should be granted • defense in depth • additional security installations should be present • fail-safe • a failing firewall may not reduce security

  5. Packet Filter • Packet filters route packets between internal andexternal hosts • Do it selectively – perform filtering • allow or block certain types of packets • Screening procedure is based on • Protocol (whether the packet is a TCP, UDP, or ICMP packet) • IP source/destination address • TCP or UDP source/destination port • TCP flags • ICMP message type • Inbound and outbound interfaces may be used to specify rules

  6. Packet Filter • Filtering Rules - filtering is specified using a set of rules • Each rules specifies • action (allow, deny) • source address/port pattern • destination address/port pattern • presence or absence of flags • When a packet is received the rules are applied in anordered sequence • if a rule matches the corresponding action is taken • if no rule matches, a default action is taken

  7. Packet Filter • Might be vulnerable to spoofing • only filter packets coming from outside • Fragmented Datagrams • discarded when not enough information to apply filter • when first fragment contains enough information, remaining one are passed unchecked • potential vulnerability • first fragment with innocent values • other fragments with non-zero offset rewrite these values with malicious ones • reassembled fragment is delivered to protected service

  8. Packet Filter • Advantages • easy to implement (relies onexisting hardware) • good performance Limits • limited auditing • difficult to configure • not very flexible, extensible • can be bypassed by “tunnelinginformation” • FreeBSD - ipfw, ipf • Linux • iptables, ipchains

  9. Gateway • A gateway is a host with two (or more) networkinterfaces • (usually) operating system is configured so that IP forwarding isdisabled • Traffic can pass across the gateway only if there is anapplication that explicitly operates the transfer (proxy) • Proxy Service • application that acts as anintermediary between client within the protected networkand server in the outside world and vice versa • when a client requests a connection to the outside, itactually connects to the proxy • proxy examines the connection request with respect to security policy • and possibly opens the actual connection to the server on behalfof the client

  10. Circuit-Level Gateway • Not only checks packets, but sessions / connections - TCP handshaking • Transparently exchange data • Do not need to be aware of the protocol • Can not perform application-level filtering

  11. Application Gateway • Application-level gateways interpret the particular applicationprotocol being “proxied” • e.g. HTTP / FTP • need to know the application protocol details • need a different proxy for each protocol • can perform advanced filtering (e.g. on particularcommands) • Advantages • cheap • extensive logging possible • very secure – internal network invisible • Limits • scalability, performance bottleneck

  12. Stateful Inspection • acts as a packet filter, circuite-level and application-level gateway • but accesses higher-level protocol information • allows to track sessions (e.g. ftp) • virtual sessions for connection-less protocols (e.g. UDP) • firewallstores ports used in a particular UDPtransaction • temporarily creates an exception to let theanswer pass through • Cisco PIX, Check Poin Firewall 1 , Sepehr 4100,3400

  13. De-Militarized Zone • DMZ – de-militarized zone • network area between two packet filters • external filter only allows traffic from outside • internal filter only allows traffic from inside • separates external and internal network • contains hosts that provide • external services (e.g. webserver, DNS) and • application gateways for internal clients • when hosts are compromised • internal traffic cannot be sniffed • protection from internal packet filter

  14. Firewalking • Technique used to test the rules of a firewall withouttriggering inside IDS • Tools available athttp://www.packetfactory.net/Projects/Firewalk/ • Based on similar mechanism as used by traceroute • firewall at hop n • host at hop n+m • TTL set to n+1 • If a TTL expired message is received the firewall didn’t filterthe packet • Scan of firewall ACLs performed without triggering inside logging mechanisms

  15. References • [1]National Institute of Sdandards and Technology, Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy , NIST SP 800-42, 2002. • [2] Sepehr S. T. Co. LTD, Sepehr Firewalls, October 2008. • [3] D. Brent Chapman & Elizabeth D. Zwicky,Building Internet Firewalls, O.Reilly, 2nd Edition, 2000.

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