The Case of Phlogiston and the Dephlogisticated Air. James Ladyman University of Bristol. Outline. A brief introduction to phlogiston Phlogiston in philosophy of science: 2.1 Classic views of phlogiston
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University of Bristol
2.1 Classic views of phlogiston
2.2. Phlogiston and the contemporary scientific realism debate and the arguments from theory change
2.3 The flight to reference and recent accounts of the phlogiston case
(Gale calls this the basic form of Democritean explanation)
Noretta Koertege (1968):
phlogiston theory as an example supporting Post’s ‘general correspondence principle’ according to which the well-confirmed empirical generalizations of old theories are retained by their successors: there are no ‘Kuhn losses’.
The Pessimistic Meta-Induction:
So, by induction we have positive reason to expect that our best current theories will be replaced by new theories according to which some of the central theoretical terms of our best current theories do not refer, and hence, we should not believe in the approximate truth or the successful reference of the theoretical terms of our best current theories.
Novel predictive success
It is quite plausible to claim this:
(have to count Newtonian gravitation - accurate to one part in 107 although based on data accurate to one part in 103)
So, the no-miracles argument is undermined since, if approximate truth and successful reference are not available to be part of the explanation of some theories’ novel predictive success, there is no reason to think that the novel predictive success of other theories has to be explained by realism. (Ladyman and Ross 2007, p.84-85)
Truth explains empirical success and successful reference is a necessary condition for approximate truth.
Laudan (1981) on the first abductive argument for scientific realism:
However, both these claims are contestable.
1 is likely only true modulo the assumption of accurate background theories and auxiliary hypotheses.
2 is only plausible assuming some form of descriptivism about reference.
Phlogiston theory is pre-paradigmatic science
Approximate truth does not require successful reference
“a phlogiston-based taxonomy is wrong because no natural kind has the kind-constitutive properties attributed to phlogiston” (288)
“phlogiston refers to nothing” (291)
‘Phlogiston’ is a counterexample to the simple causal theory since then it would refer to oxygen (whatever is involved in combustion).
We could go further and allow that ‘phlogiston rich’ and ‘phlogiston deficient’ refer too
Both were supposed to be a material substance, both were involved in explanations in terms of their movement in space, both were ideas from earlier science that were eliminated.
Psillos says ‘caloric’ was not really central to the empirical success of the caloric theory of heat. Similarly, one could argue that ‘phlogiston’ was not central to the empirical success of phlogiston theory.
Compare with ‘mass’ and ‘atom’
The Democritean style of explanation is not preserved by fundamental physics.
Combustion, calcification and respiration are all the same kind of reaction.
The reaction has an inverse reaction and there is a cycle between plants and animals such that animals change the properties of the air in one way and plants in the opposite way.
Inflammable air (Hydrogen) really is metallic.
Solutions to the phlogiston problem based on defending the reference of the theoretical term phlogiston and dephlogisticated air are not plausible. Schurz view is better since reference of the names of the processes of ‘phlogistication’ and ‘dephlogistication’ is more plausible.
The phlogiston case further supports the induction that science will replace material explanations with structural ones.