Presentation Transcript

1. Developing Engineering Leadership at NASA Dr. Ed Hoffman NASA Chief Knowledge Officer
2. I. Cassini: Creative Solutions in a Complex Project Environment
3. Cassini-Huygens U.S. - European mission to explore Saturn NASA and Italian Space Agency: Cassini spacecraft European Space Agency: Huygens probe Launched October 1997 6.7 year voyage to Saturn Total cost to date: $3B+
4. Cassini Delivered Huygens probe to Titan Remained in orbit around Saturn Huygens Released by Cassini to land on surface of Saturn’s moon Titan Cassini Huygens Saturn Titan
5. The Complex Project Environment
6. Complexity
7. Technical Complexity: Zero Room for Error Journey to Saturn included “gravity assists” (slingshot acceleration effects) from Venus, Earth and Jupiter - incredibly precise timing Cassini orbiter would “insert” Huygens probe in orbit of Titan (one of Saturn’s moons) Complex communications among Cassini, Huygens, Deep Space Network, and ground system Cassini trajectory to Saturn Huygens descent to surface of Titan
8. Organizational +Strategic Complexity Italian Space Agency NASA ESA Cassini orbiter; launch vehicle and associated integration & test Huygens probe and associated communications equipment on Cassini orbiter Cassini high-gain antenna; radio subsystem equipment International partnerships affect organizational and strategic complexity
9. Organizational Complexity 260 scientists 17 countries 10 time zones 18 scientific instruments (payloads) with Principal Investigators
10. Project Management Challenge All 18 payloads had reserves: Cost ($ per fiscal year) Mass (kg) Power (watts) Data rate to the spacecraft bus (kilobytes/second) Overruns would lead to de-scoping (i.e., instruments cut) Problem: How would you manage the reserves to increase the likelihood that all instruments would fly on the spacecraft?
11. Challenge Solved Solution: Electronic trading exchange for Principal Investigators to trade reserves in cost, mass, power, and data rate. Governed by project management team (incl. veto power) Created win-win incentive for all Gave PIs ownership / assured buy-in

12. II. Learning from Failure

13. Learning from Failure pt. 1 Columbia accident 2003 Mars failures 1999 “NASA's current organization… has not demonstrated the characteristics of a learning organization.” Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report Challenger accident 1986
14. Why Projects Fail Factors that Drive Program Costs and Technical Risks (1992 Jack Lee Study) Inadequate Phase B definition (i.e., before Preliminary Design Review) Unrealistic dependence on unproven technology Annual funding instability Complex organizational structure, including multiple unclear interfaces Cost estimates that are often misused Scope additions due to “requirements creep” Schedule slips Acquisition strategy that does not promote cost containment
15. “7 Deadly Sins” Vague roles, accountability, and delegated authority. Team leaders in over their heads / ineffective. Poor acquisition planning with poorly incentivized / structured contracts. (Or contractors doing the wrong work.) The defined scope is not doable within available resources. Structures don’t support efficient systems engineering. Ineffective risk management process. Broken project team context.
16. Review Boards and Experts Challenger“… signals of potential danger … were repeatedly normalized … at the intersection of the social and technical …. “Normalization of Deviance.” (Diane Vaughn) Hubble“A leadership failure was the root cause.” (Lew Allen) MarsClimateOrbiter“Communications failure was the root cause.” (Noel Hinners) Columbia“In our view, the NASA organizational culture had as much to do with this accident as the foam. Organizational culture refers to the basic values, norms, beliefs, and practices that characterize the functioning of an institution.” (Doug Osheroff) PMI“… ultimately projects fail or succeed on the basis of the individuals assigned to the project team, the culture and the leadership.” (Eleanor Haupt) Technical expertise and process excellence are necessary but not sufficient for success.
17. A New Way of Thinking and Learning To cope with a challenging world, any entity must develop the capacity of shifting and changing— of developing new skills and attitudes; in short the capacity of learning. Arie De Geus, The Living Company
18. Qualities of an Adaptive Organization Elephants in the room are named. Responsibility for the future is shared. Independent judgment is expected. Leadership capacity is developed. Reflection and continuous learning are institutionalized. Source: Grashow, Heifetz, & Linsky, The Practice of Adaptive Leadership
19. Learning from Failure pt. 2 Columbia accident Mars failures Challenger accident Individual PM Competence Team Performance Knowledge / Communication
20. IntegratedCompetency Model
21. Role of theOffice of the Chief Engineer Governance Policy Checks + balances among projects, engineering, and safety communities Alignment with organizational strategy; codified knowledge of best practices Learning Capability-building at individual, team and organizational levels
22. IV. Knowledge at NASA
23. NASA requires many different kinds of knowledge, including: Codified knowledge - Scientific knowledge - Engineering and technical knowledge - Business processes Know-how - Techniques and craftsmanship - Social knowledge (e.g., political savvy) All are critical to mission success.
24. Managing knowledge is critical for: Sustaining and expanding the use of the Agency’s intellectual capital across NASA’s enterprises and generations Increasing collaboration across barriers Supporting our people in executing NASA's missions efficiently and effectively.
25. Knowledge Effectiveness = People + Systems Accessible information, user-friendly services Networks, alliances, and communities of practice PEOPLE SYSTEMS EFFECTIVENESS Infusion of lessons learned, mishaps, and best practices Culture of openness and sharing
26. What Does the CKO Do? CKOs outside NASA have tried to “manage” all the knowledge in their organizations…and failed. Given the complex nature of knowledge at NASA, the agency has adopted a federated model for coordination and collaboration of knowledge activities. The NASA CKO functions as a facilitatorand champion for knowledge. Each NASA center and mission directorate has a CKO to address knowledge needs at the local level.

27. Tools for Managing Knowledge

    Network Map Policy
28. Knowledge Categories
29. Knowledge Networks NASA Agency CKO Local CKOs/POCs Communities of practice Government Industry/ NGO APQC IPMC World Bank Federal KM Working Group CIA FBI
30. Knowledge Policy Governance model: federated approach to knowledge Roles and responsibilities Common vocabulary and definitions – six categories of knowledge services
31. V. Closing Thoughts – The practitioner knows best – Reflection is a critical part of learning – Sharing is learned through culture – Learning happens through motivation