PLANO DE CAPACITAÇÃO E FORMAÇÃO CONTINUADA PROGRAMA DE GESTÃO DO CONHECIMENTO

1. PLANO DE CAPACITAÇÃO E FORMAÇÃO CONTINUADA PROGRAMA DE GESTÃO DO CONHECIMENTO DIFUSÃO DE CAPACITAÇÃO REALIZADA Dados do Funcionário: Nome: Giuseppe Giulio Michelino Área de trabalho: EIPR (ano 2005) Ramal/ e-mail: 3584 -giuseppem@cetesb.sp.gov.br Período: 22 de setembro a 14 de outubro de 2005

2. Visita Técnica: Nome da instituição:ENVIRONMENT CANADA Endereço da Instituição: 351 St. Joseph Boulevard, Gatineau, Quebec - Canada Data: 22 e 23 de Setembro de 2005

3. ENVIRONMENT CANADA Foram organizadas várias apresentações técnicas, que contaram com a participação de técnicos da Environment Canada e da Health Canada. Foi apresentada a legislação canadense sobre o gerenciamento de riscos de substâncias tóxicas no Canadá, datada de 1999, e a forma como vem sendo implementada, cujo cronograma se estende até o ano de 2006.

4. ENVIRONMENT CANADA • Foi apresentado o ‘Programa de Notificação de Novas Substâncias’, a metodologia de classificação de substâncias tóxicas, que englobam substâncias produzidas por biotecnologia, e os Objetivos-Chave no gerenciamento dessas substâncias, que passam por sua eliminação virtual do meio ambiente, ou pelo gerenciamento ao longo de seu ciclo de vida, visando evitar ou minimizar sua liberação no meio ambiente. • Foi também realizada visita à área de atendimento a emergências químicas, onde foi apresentado o trabalho desenvolvido por essa área.

5. Simpósio: 50th Safety in Ammonia Plants & Related Facilities Symposium Nome da instituição:AIChE - American Institute of Chemical Engineers Local:Toronto, Ontário - Canadá Data: 26 a 29 de Setembro de 2005

6. 50th Safety in Ammonia Plants & Related Facilities Symposium • Session 1: Monday, September 268:00 – 11:30 AM • 50 Year History of the AIChE Ammonia Safety Symposium Gerald P. Williams • The AIChE Ammonia Safety Symposium 50 Years of Shared Experiences Venkat Pattabathula, Bhaskar Rani and D.H. Timbres • Session 2: Monday, September 261:30 – 4:30 PM • Commissioning of the First Ammonia-Urea Complex – A Challenging Venture for the Vietnamese Economy D. Cimarelli, S. Sridharan and Phung Anh Tuan • Waste Heat Boiler (101-C) Leakages & Possible Causes Ishfaq Ahmad Gondal • Revamping of the PCS Nitrogen 03 Plant in Trinidad Elizabeth West-Toolsee and Ermanno Filippi • Corrosion Damage in Waste Heat Boilers; Major Root Causes and Remediation • Harrie Duisters and Jo Savelkoul • Second Failure of Reformed Gas Waste Heat BoilerAgus Subekti, Azzam Ali Syamlam and Arief Budi Santoso • Failure of 110 Bar WHB’s Due to Poor Quality Boiler Feed Water Rudie Minnie

7. 50th Safety in Ammonia Plants & Related Facilities Symposium • Session 3: Tuesday, September 278:00 – 11:30 AM • Successful and Safe De- and Recommissioning of a Cold Ammonia Storage Tank L.A.J. Tol, G.J. Tol and A. Bourras • Catalyst Catastrophes II John Brightling and Mike Roberts • Innovative In–Situ Repair of a High Temperature Steam Super Heater CoilM.M. Raheja and S.N. Ambekar • Cracking and Repair of Closing Welds in 2.25 Cr1 Mo Steel Vessels Operating in High Temperature Synthesis Gas D.M. Firth, D. Keen, C. Jones and A. Karstensen • Damage of Central Pipe of I Ammonia Converter (S-200) and Consequent Blockage of Gas Distribution System in II Ammonia Converter (S-50) Ashok J. Gupta, Pranab Kr. Dey and Jørgen Juul Rasmussen • Thermal Fatigue Failure Phenomena in Steam Piping Systems at Ammonia Plant A. Hassan Faraji • Steam Reforming – 50 years of Development and the Challenges for the Next 50 years John Brightling, Peter Farnell Craig Foster and Falk Beyer

8. 50th Safety in Ammonia Plants & Related Facilities Symposium • Session 4: Wednesday, September 288:00 – 11:30 AM • High Temperature Shift Outlet Nozzle Failure, Inspection and Subsequent Repairs Michael Picou • F-901 Furnace Tubes and Headers Replacement Dean Garner • AmoMax-10 – A Novel Ammonia Synthesis CatalystNorbert Ringer, Marcus Michel and Rob Stockwell • New Reforming Concepts for Large Scale NH Plants Ib Dybkjær • Learnings from Completing Risk Based Assessments on 8 Ammonia Plants and Downstream Urea, Nitric Acid and Fertilizer Plants D.J. Keen, D.M. Firth and C.W. Thomas • Failure of Reformed Gas Boiler Tubes: A Learning in Harder WayC.K. Datta and Anand K. Gupta

9. 50th Safety in Ammonia Plants & Related Facilities Symposium • Session 5: Wednesday, September 281:30 – 4:30 PM • Replacement of a Secondary Reformer Guy Willemsen and Heinz Schuster • Ammonia Storage Tank in Kaltim 1: Operation Matters Hanggara Patrianta and Jaka Kirwanto • After Burning Phenomenon as the Cause of HP and MP Steam Superheater Tube Burst During Plant Start Up 2002 Setiyadi dan I Dewa Gede Bayu N. • 4000 mtpd Ammonia Plant Based on Proven Technology Joachim Rüther, John Larsen, Dennis Lippmann and Detlev Claes • Severe Surge Incidents at Process Air Compressor, Their After Effects and Problem Resolution Muhammad Majid Latif

11. Cursos: • 102: Conformidade com as Normas de PSM da OSHA e de RMP da EPA • 108: Auditoria de Conformidade com as Normas de PSM e de RMP • Nome da instituição:ABS Consulting, Risk Consulting Division • Local:Houston, Texas - USA • Data: 3 a 7 de Outubro de 2005

12. Conformidade com as Normas de PSM da OSHA e de RMP da EPA (3 dias) Programa de Gerenciamento de Segurança de Processos (PSM) da OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) Programas de Gerenciamento de Riscos (RMP) da USEPA (Environmental Protection Agency) Auditoria de Conformidade com as Normas de PSM e de RMP (2 dias) Técnicas de Auditoria em plantas industriais Metodologia elaboração Auditoria de Conformidade com os programas da OSHA e da USEPA

17. ABS Consulting, Risk Consulting Division ABS Consulting, Risk Consulting Division • O curso 102, ministrado em três dias, visou dar uma visão geral sobre o conteúdo do programa de Gerenciamento de Segurança de Processos (PSM) da OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration), e dos três programas de Gerenciamento de Riscos (RMP)da USEPA (Environmental Protection Agency), todos envolvendo a manipulação de substâncias químicas perigosas em processos industriais, além de discutir as diferenças e os pontos em comum entre os programas da OSHA e da USEPA. • Já o curso 108, ministrado em dois dias, abordou as principais técnicas de Auditoria em plantas industriais, além da metodologia específica para elaboração de Auditoria de Conformidade com os programas da OSHA e da USEPA acima citados.

18. ABS Consulting, Risk Consulting Division ABS Consulting, Risk Consulting Division Process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals (OSHA PSM) Purpose. This section contains requirements for preventing or minimizing the consequences of catastrophic releases of toxic, reactive, flammable, or explosive chemicals. These releases may result in toxic, fire or explosion hazards.

19. ABS Consulting, Risk Consulting Division ABS Consulting, Risk Consulting Division Process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals (OSHA PSM) (a) Application. (b) Definitions. (c) Employee participation. (d) Process safety information. (e) Process hazard analysis. (f) Operating procedures. (g) Training. (h) Contractors. (i) Pre-startup safety review. (j) Mechanical integrity. (k) Hot work permit. (l) Management of change. (m) Incident investigation. (n) Emergency planning and response. (o) Compliance Audits. (p) Trade secrets.

20. ABS Consulting, Risk Consulting Division ABS Consulting, Risk Consulting Division ABS Consulting, Risk Consulting Division • 4. Process Hazard Analysis. A process hazard analysis (PHA), sometimes called a process hazard evaluation, is one of the most important elements of the process safety management program. A PHA is an organized and systematic effort to identify and analyze the significance of potential hazards associated with the processing or handling of highly hazardous chemicals. A PHA provides information which will assist employers and employees in making decisions for improving safety and reducing the consequences of unwanted or unplanned releases of hazardous chemicals. A PHA is directed toward analyzing potential causes and consequences of fires, explosions, releases of toxic or flammable chemicals and major spills of hazardous chemicals. The PHA focuses on equipment, instrumentation, utilities, human actions (routine and nonroutine), and external factors that might impact the process. These considerations assist in determining the hazards and potential failure points or failure modes in a process. • The selection of a PHA methodology or technique will be influenced by many factors including the amount of existing knowledge about the process. Is it a process that has been operated for a long period of time with little or no innovation and extensive experience has been generated with its use? Or, is it a new process or one which has been changed frequently by the inclusion of innovative features? Also, the size and complexity of the process will influence the decision as to the appropriate PHA methodology to use. All PHA methodologies are subject to certain limitations. For example, the checklist methodology works well when the process is very stable and no changes are made, but it is not as effective when the process has undergone extensive change. The checklist may miss the most recent changes and consequently the changes would not be evaluated. Another limitation to be considered concerns the assumptions made by the team or analyst. The PHA is dependent on good judgement and the assumptions made during the study need to be documented and understood by the team and reviewer and kept for a future PHA.

21. ABS Consulting, Risk Consulting Division ABS Consulting, Risk Consulting Division ABS Consulting, Risk Consulting Division CHEMICAL ACCIDENT PREVENTION PROVISIONS EPA Risk Management Regulation 40 CFR 68

22. EPA Risk Management Regulation Subpart A—General 68.1 Scope. 68.2 Stayed Provisions. 68.3 Definitions. 68.10 Applicability. 68.12 General requirements. 68.15 Management. Subpart B—Hazard Assessment 68.20 Applicability. 68.22 Offsite consequence analysis parameters. 68.25 Worst-case release scenario analysis. 68.28 Alternative release scenario analysis. 68.30 Defining offsite impacts—population. 68.33 Defining offsite impacts—environment. 68.36 Review and update. 68.39 Documentation. 68.42 Five-year accident history.

23. Subpart C— Program 2 Prevention Program 68.48 Safety information. 68.50 Hazard review. 68.52 Operating procedures. 68.54 Training. 68.56 Maintenance. 68.58 Compliance audits. 68.60 Incident investigation. Subpart D— Program 3 Prevention Program 68.65 Process safety information. 68.67 Process hazard analysis. 68.69 Operating procedures. 68.71 Training. 68.73 Mechanical integrity. 68.75 Management of change. 68.77 Pre-startup review. 68.79 Compliance audits. 68.81 Incident investigation. 68.83 Employee participation. 68.85 Hot work permit. 68.87 Contractors.

24. Subpart E—Emergency Response 68.90 Applicability. 68.95 Emergency Response Program. Subpart F—Regulated Substances for Accidental Release Prevention 68.100 Purpose. 68.115 Threshold determination. 68.120 Petition process. 68.125 Exemptions. 68.126 Exclusion. 68.130 List of substances.

25. Subpart G—Risk Management Plan 68.150 Submission. 68.151 Assertion of claims of confidential business information. 68.152 Substantiating claims of confidential business information. 68.155 Executive summary. 68.160 Registration. 68.165 Offsite consequence analysis. 68.168 Five-year accident history. 68.170 Prevention program/Program 2. 68.175 Prevention program/Program 3. 68.180 Emergency response program. 68.185 Certification. 68.190 Updates. Subpart H—Other Requirements 68.200 Recordkeeping. 68.210 Availability of information to the public. 68.215 Permit content and air permitting authority or designated agency requirements. 68.220 Audits.

27. Visitas Técnicas: Nome da instituição:EPA - Environmental Protection Agency, Região 6 Endereços: 10625 Fallstone Road - Houston, TX - (Laboratórios); 1445 Ross Avenue - Dallas, TX - (Séde da Região 6). Datas: 11 de Outubro de 2005 (Laboratórios); 13,14 de Outubro de 2005 (Dallas).

34. EPA - Environmental Protection Agency, Região 6 • Foram organizadas várias apresentações técnicas sobre os seguintes tópicos: Preparação e Prevenção de Emergências Químicas; Plano de Gerenciamento de Riscos da EPA; Questões Ambientais na Fronteira com o México; Riscos Ecológicos e Toxicológicos, e também foram apresentados alguns casos práticos de gerenciamento e remediação de áreas contaminadas em Dallas, Texas City, e El Paso, no Texas. Foi também apresentado o software CAMEO - Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations, e além disso foram visitadas as instalações do Centro de Atendimento a Emergências em Dallas, e os laboratórios da Região 6 em Houston.

35. EPA - Environmental Protection Agency, Região 6 • EPA staff were aware even before 9/11 of our potential role in responding to terrorist incidents. Presidential Decision Directives 39, 62 and 63 redefined our role and relationships with other Federal agencies in dealing with terrorist/deliberate attacks. We've been responding to hazardous materials incidents for over 35 years; as a result of 9/11, we are applying what we have learned over the years to deal with terrorist acts. • However, EPA’s activities responding to the incidents of 9/11 and thereafter did present a new range and magnitude of efforts, including: • Providing data and health information to the public following 9/11 - a large-scale non-”hazardous materials” incident that still presented potential threats to human health; • Recovering and assessing evidence following 9/11 in support of FBI on a scale not previously expected; • Designing and implementing Decontamination Plans for new kinds of wastes and materials, in the anthrax, 9/11, and ricin incidents; • Developing Health and Safety measures and clean-up levels in real-time as the science evolved during the anthrax attacks; • Sampling and analyzing over 30 facilities potentially contaminated during the anthrax incidents; and • Facilitating disposal of anthrax-contaminated waste.