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The State Evaluation Process. Therese Renis Section Head Division of Operations B Department of Safeguards 08 February 2007. Outline. IAEA Safeguards – past and present Strengthening the Safeguards System The Model Additional Protocol. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime.

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The state evaluation process

The State Evaluation Process

Therese Renis

Section Head

Division of Operations B

Department of Safeguards

08 February 2007


Outline

  • IAEA Safeguards – past and present

  • Strengthening the Safeguards System

  • The Model Additional Protocol


The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

Global, Regional

and Bilateral

Agreements

Export Guidelines

Physical Protection

Protection from seizure, theft and criminal activities

International

Safeguards

Control of the supply of nuclear and non-nuclear material, technology and equipment

International Safeguards


IAEA safeguards inspectors verify States’ compliance with their Safeguards Agreements

  • Safeguards implemented in 153 States with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (based on INFCIRC/153 Corr.) in force

  • Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreements (nuclear weapon States)

  • Item-specific Safeguards Agreements (based on INFCIRC/66)


Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements (INFCIRC/540)

  • New legal instrument approved by Board of Governors in May 1997.

  • Provides Agency with more rights of access to information and to locations in a State.

  • Concluded by States on a voluntary basis; becomes part of a State’s safeguards agreement.

  • As of 1 February 2007, additional protocols (AP) have been approved by the Board for 118 States and 78 States have APs in force.


Safeguards conclusions are reported in the safeguards implementation report sir
Safeguards conclusions are reported in the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR)

For States with safeguards agreements:

  • … the declared nuclear material and other items remained in peaceful nuclear activities …

For States with comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols:

  • … all nuclear material remained

  • in peaceful nuclear activities …


States with comprehensive safeguards agreements
States with comprehensive safeguards agreements Implementation Report (SIR)

The State evaluation process seeks to answer several questions:

  • Is all relevant information on the State’s nuclear programme consistent?

  • Is the “picture” of the State’s present and planned nuclear programme complete?

  • Is there sufficient information availableon which to draw a conclusion?


Results Implementation Report (SIR)

of verification activities

Otherinformation

State-suppliedinformation

Nuclear material accountancy; facility design information

Open andother sources

Inspection

Voluntaryreporting

Design information verification (DIV)

Complementaryaccess

Additional protocoldeclarations

Evaluation of “State as a whole”to draw Safeguards Conclusions


Evaluation of “State as a whole” Implementation Report (SIR)to draw Safeguards Conclusions

Results

of verification activities

Otherinformation

State-suppliedinformation

Nuclear material accountancy; facility design information

Open andother sources

Inspection

Voluntaryreporting

Design information verification (DIV)

Complementaryaccess

Additional protocoldeclarations

CSAs focus on verification of declared nuclear material and facilities


IAEA Board of Governors March 1995 Implementation Report (SIR)

“...the safeguards system for implementing comprehensive safeguards agreements should be designed to provide for verification by the Agency of the correctness and completeness of States’ declarations, so that there is credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities.”

Safeguards strengthening measures were needed.


Evaluation of “State as a whole” Implementation Report (SIR)to draw Safeguards Conclusions

Results

of verification activities

Otherinformation

State-suppliedinformation

Nuclear material accountancy; facility design information

Open andother sources

Inspection

Voluntaryreporting

Design information verification (DIV)

Complementaryaccess

Additional protocoldeclarations


Evaluation of “State as a whole” Implementation Report (SIR)to draw Safeguards Conclusions

Results

of verification activities

Otherinformation

State-suppliedinformation

Nuclear material accountancy; facility design information

Open andother sources

Inspection

Voluntaryreporting

Design information verification (DIV)

Complementaryaccess

Additional protocoldeclarations

Some strengthening measures could be introduced under existing safeguards agreements


Strengthened measures under inspections
Strengthened Measures under Inspections Implementation Report (SIR)

  • Unannounced/short-notice inspections

  • Remote monitoring

  • Environmental sampling

  • Enhanced cooperation with SSACs or regional systems

  • Early provision of facility design information


Additional information requested from states
Additional Information Requested from States Implementation Report (SIR)

Under INFCIRC/153

  • Information on closed-down and decommissionedfacilities

  • Information on past activities

    Voluntarily-Offered

  • Responses to State System of Accountancy and Control (SSAC) questionnaires

  • Periodic reporting on exports and imports of sensitive equipment and non-nuclear material

  • Holdings and exports of separated americiumand neptunium

  • Response to Agency requests for further information


State evaluation includes the use of open and other sources of information
State evaluation includes the use of open and other sources of information

  • IAEA information

  • Scientific and technical literature

  • Academic and research institutions

  • Trade publications

  • Newspapers/radio/television/magazine reports

  • Satellite imagery

  • Third party sources


States with comprehensive safeguards agreements1
States with comprehensive safeguards agreements of information

The State evaluation process seeks to answer several questions:

  • Is all relevant information on the State’s nuclear programme consistent?

  • Is the “picture” of the State’s present and planned nuclear programme complete?

  • Is there sufficient information availableon which to draw a conclusion?

Under comprehensive safeguards agreements alone, there is insufficient information and access to answer these questions.


Evaluation of “State as a whole” of informationto draw Safeguards Conclusions

Results

of verification activities

Otherinformation

State-suppliedinformation

Nuclear material accountancy; facility design information

Open andother sources

Inspection

Voluntaryreporting

Design information verification (DIV)

Complementaryaccess

Additional protocoldeclarations


Evaluation of “State as a whole” of informationto draw Safeguards Conclusions

Results

of verification activities

Otherinformation

State-suppliedinformation

Nuclear material accountancy; facility design information

Open andother sources

Inspection

Voluntaryreporting

Design information verification (DIV)

Complementaryaccess

Additional protocoldeclarations

Under an additional protocol the Agency has more extensive information and access.


Measures Contained in the of informationAdditional Protocol

  • Information about, and inspector access to, all aspects of a State’s nuclear fuel cycle

    - From mines to nuclear waste -

  • Information on, and short-notice inspector access to, all buildings on a nuclear site

  • Information about, and inspector access to, other locations where nuclear material is present

  • Information about, and mechanisms for inspector access to, fuel cycle-related R & D


Measures Contained in the of informationAdditional Protocol

  • Information on the manufacture and export of specified equipment and non-nuclear materials

  • Collection of environmental samples beyond declared locations

  • Information on future plans to develop the nuclear fuel cycle

  • Administrative arrangements

    • Visas

    • Inspector designation

    • Access to communication means


In addition the agency can request
In addition, the Agency can request: of information

  • Amplification and clarification of declared information

  • Information to clarify and facilitate the resolution of questions and inconsistencies

  • Operational activities of safeguards relevance


Complementary access under an additional protocol
Complementary Access under an Additional Protocol of information

  • On a selective basis to assure the absence of nuclear material and activities

  • To resolve a question or inconsistency related to the declaration

  • To confirm the decommissioned status of a facility


State evaluation has become the basis for safeguards implementation

State of informationDeclarations

Plan safeguards

activities

Conduct

safeguards

activities

Results of

activities

Other information

State evaluation has become the basis for safeguards implementation

Analyze

all information


Safeguards activities are implemented in a flexible manner based on evaluation
Safeguards activities are implemented in a of informationflexible manner, based on evaluation

  • Verification of declared nuclear material and activities - according to Safeguards’ criteria

  • Conduct complementary access

  • Find and evaluate more information to complete

  • the picture of the States nuclear programme

    • open source

    • request from State

    • conduct further activities

  • Resolve questions or inconsistencies with regard to State’s declarations

  • Follow-up on issues of safeguards significance


Strengthened safeguards measures
Strengthened Safeguards Measures of information

Additional Protocol Measures

Expanded declaration

Complementary Access

Broader Environmental Sampling

Strengthening Measures under CSAs

Environmental Sampling

Remote Monitoring

SSAC Cooperation

Traditional Measures under CSAs

Nuclear Material Accountancy

Containment and Surveillance

Design Information Verification


Integrated safeguards
Integrated Safeguards of information

  • Optimum combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency under CSAs and additional protocols.

  • Broader safeguards conclusion allows for reductions in verification effort for some categories of declared nuclear material.

  • Involves a redistribution of resources from nuclear material verification activities to the implementation of additional protocol measures.


Despite strengthening measures limitations remain
Despite strengthening measures, limitations remain of information

  • There are limits on information and access that States must provide

  • The Board recommended modification of small quantities protocol (SQP)

  • An Advisory Committee of the Board (Committee 25) is considering further improvement in the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards

    • Within existing legal framework

    • Voluntary

    • Expanding technical capabilities

      Cooperation and transparency of States facilitates safeguards implementation


Conclusion
Conclusion of information

  • Drawing the broader conclusion that all nuclear material has been placed under safeguards requires the additional information and access under the additional protocol.

  • Ensuring that this conclusion is credible requires a rigorous State evaluation process.

  • Implementation of integrated safeguards will result in savings in inspection effort.


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