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Key Establishment Protocols for Secure Mobile Communications

Key Establishment Protocols for Secure Mobile Communications. A. Aziz and W. Diffie, “Privacy and Authentication for Wireless Local Area Networks”, IEEE Personal Communications Presented by Yanxia Zhao. Content. Introduction Public-key cryptosystems Secret-key cryptosystems

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Key Establishment Protocols for Secure Mobile Communications

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  1. Key Establishment Protocols for Secure Mobile Communications A. Aziz and W. Diffie, “Privacy and Authentication for Wireless Local Area Networks”,IEEE Personal Communications Presented by Yanxia Zhao

  2. Content • Introduction • Public-key cryptosystems • Secret-key cryptosystems • Aziz-Diffie protocol • Conclusions

  3. Introduction • Mobile applications have special vulnerabilities. • the wireless medium introduces new opportunities for eavesdropping on wireless data communications. • Active intrusions through the wireless medium are made easier. • Security is a critical issue in mobile application, both for the users and providers of such system.

  4. Introduction (contd.) • Design goals of authentication and key management Protocols: • Prevent unauthorized access to mobile network. • Provide the mutual authentication between a base station and a mobile station.

  5. Introduction (contd.) • Types of Key Establishment Protocols for mobile communication • Secret-key cryptosystems: GSM(Global System for Mobile Communications) U.S. Digital Cellular System • Public-key cryptosystems: MSR+DH Protocol Beller and Yacobi’s Protocol Aziz-Diffie Protocol

  6. Secret Key Cryptography • Secret Key Cryptography involves the use of a single key. The same key is used for Encryption and Decryption. Encryption Cipher text Plain text Key Cipher text Plain text Decryption Figure 1 A secret key cryptographic system

  7. A B Challenge rA Response rA encrypted with KAB Challenge rB rB encrypted with KAB Response Secret Key Cryptography (Contd.) • Secret Key Systems provide Strong Authentication functionality. This implies that someone can prove knowledge of a secret without revealing it. Authentication is generally implemented using a Challenge-Response mechanism. Figure 2 Challenge –Response Mechanism A and B share a secret key KAB

  8. Advantage of Secret-key based protocol • The Secret-key based protocol supports inexpensive mobile stations of low power and light weight. So the Secret-key based protocol is suitable for high dynamic mobile system.

  9. Disadvantage of Secret-key based protocol • The key management of the secret-key based protocol is more complicated and more dangerous than that of public-key based one. • Each mobile station must keep its secret information, which of all should be stored in Authentication Center (AC). • AC becomes the critical component in the system because it should participate in all key establishment protocol executions. • The communication overhead of AC is increased and one must replicate the AC to reduce the overhead. However, the replication of AC increases the risk of the system.

  10. Encryption Plain text Cipher text Public Key Private Key Cipher text Plain text Decryption Public Key Cryptography • In Public Key Cryptography, each individual user has two keys: a Private Key (that is not revealed to anyone else) and a Public Key (that is open to the public). Encryption is done using the Public Key and Decryption is done using the Private Key. Figure 3. A Public Key Cryptographic System

  11. Public Key Cryptography (contd.) B A Encrypt mA using eB Decrypt to mA using dB Decrypt to mB using dA Encrypt mB using eA Figure 4. Information transfer in a Public Key Cryptographic System. A’s <Public Key, Private Key> pair is <eA,dA> and B’s pair is <eB,dB>

  12. Signing Signed Message Plain text Private Key Public Key Signed Message Plain text Public Key Cryptography (contd.) • Digital signatures : Public Key Cryptography also facilitates digital signatures, whereby a person can “sign” a plain-text using his Private Key and anyone can verify the person’s identity by using the Public Key of that person. Figure 5. Digital Signatures in Public Key System

  13. Advantage of Public-key based protocol • The public-key based protocols only need CA (Certificate Authority) which certifies the public-keys of mobile stations and base stations. • CA is less critical than AC (in secret-key based protocol) because CA only certifies public-keys, whereas AC should manage all secret information.

  14. Disadvantage of Public-key based protocol • Public-key based protocol is not fully utilized because of the poor computing power and the small battery capacity of a mobile station. Consequently, many researches for key establishment protocols focus on minimizing computational overhead of a mobile station without loss of security.

  15. Overview of Aziz-Diffie protocol • The protocol proposed by Aziz and Diffie uses public-key cryptographic techniques in order to secure the wireless link. Public-key cryptography is used to do session key setup and authentication. • Each participant in the protocol generates a public key/private key pair. The private key is kept securely by the owner of the key pair. The public key is submitted, over an authenticated channel, to a trusted certification authority (CA).

  16. Overview of Aziz-Diffie protocol (Contd.) • The participant submits the information. The CA will then issue a certificate to the participant. The certificate will contain a binding between the public key and a logical identifier of the participant , in the form of a document digitally signed using the CA’s private key. • Having obtained a certificate for each participant, as well as secure backup of the private keys, the mobile and base exchange certificates and engage in a mutual challenge-response protocol. The protocol allows negotiation of the shared-key algorithm.

  17. Notes on Nomenclature • Public key of certification authority: Pub_CA • Private key of certification authority: Priv_CA • Public key of mobile host: Pub_Mobile • Private key of mobile host: Priv_Mobile • Public key of base station: Pub_Base • Private key of base station: Priv_Base • Certificate of mobile host: Cert_Mobile • Certificate of base station: Cert_Base • E(X,Y): the encryption of Y under key X • MD(X): the message digest function value on contents X • Sig(X,Y)=E(X,MD(Y)): the signature of Y with key X

  18. Initial connection setup between mobile host and base station using Aziz-Diffie protocol • Message #1. MobileBase {Cert_Mobile, CH1, List of SKCSs} • Message #2. BaseMobile {Cert-Base, E(Pub_Mobile,RN1), Chosen SKCS, Sig(Priv_Base, {E(Pub_Mobile, RN1), Chosen SKCS, CH1, List of SKCSs}) } • Message #3. MobileBase {E(Pub_Base,RN2), Sig(Priv_Mobile, {E(Pub_Base, RN2), E(Pub_Mobile,RN1}) }

  19. Figure 6. Aziz-Diffie protocol for wireless networks CA-Certificate of A KA-Public key of A KA-1-Private key of A RA, NA-random # generated by A RB-random # generated by B

  20. Description of Initial connection setup process • At connection initiation time, a mobile requesting to connect to the wired network would send message #1 to the base. It includes mobile’s host certificate, a 128 –bit randomly chosen challenge value (CH1), and a list of supported shared-key cryptosystem (SKCS) to the base. • Certificate = Sig(Priv_CA, {Serial Number, Validity Period, Machine Name, Machine Public Key, CA name}) • The list of SKCSs is intended to allow for negotiation of SKCS with the base. The SKCS will be used to encrypt subsequent data packets.

  21. Description of Initial connection setup process(Contd.) • After receiving message #1, the base will attempt to verify the signature on Cert_Mobile. If the certificate is invalid, the base rejects the connection attempt. If the certificate is valid (the public key in the certificate belongs to a certified mobile host), the base will send Message #2 to the mobile: • Cert_Base • a random number RN1 encrypted under the pub_Mobile • the SKCS that the base chose out of the list of SKCSs • the signature on some message using Priv_Base.

  22. Description of Initial connection setup process (Contd.) Method of choosing shared-key cryptosystem (SKCS): The SKCS is chosen from the intersection of the set of SKCSs proposed in message #1 by the mobile and the set the base supports. The base will choose the one it deems the most secure from the intersection of the two sets. The selected algorithm is subsequently employed for encipherment of the call data once the initial connection is setup and a session key is established.

  23. Description of Initial connection setup process (Contd.) • After receiving message #2, the mobile validates the certificate of the base (Cert_Base). If the certificate is valid, then the mobile will verify the signature on the message. If the signature doesn’t match, the base is deemed an imposter and the mobile will abort the connection attempt. Otherwise, the base is deemed authentic and the mobile will send Message #3: • a random number RN2 encrypted under the pub_Base • the signature on the encrypted RN1 and RN2 using Priv_Base.

  24. Description of Initial connection setup process (Contd.) • After receiving message #3, the base will verify the signature in the message. If the signature verifies, the mobile is deemed an authentic host. Otherwise, the mobile is deemed an intruder and the base will reject the connection attempt. • If the connection attempt succeeds, then at this point mutual authentication has been setup. The mobile and base use (RN1 RN2) as the session key. Since both halves of the key are completely random, knowing either RN1 or RN2 tells an attacker nothing about the session key.

  25. Advantage of Aziz-Diffie Protocol • The protocol provides good forward secrecy. This approach requires the compromise of both the base’s and the mobile’s private keys in order for preceding traffic between that base and mobile to be compromised.

  26. Disadvantage of Aziz-Diffie Protocol • The protocol is computationally expensive. The expensive portions of public key cryptosystems are typically the private key operations. In this protocol, the mobile has to perform two operations using its private key. The base also performs two private key operations. • This protocol is also vulnerable to a man-in-the middle attack.

  27. Conclusions • Aziz-Diffie Protocol provides good forward secrecy, but it is computationally expensive and vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. • The problem of designing correct protocols for authentication and key management is difficult to solve in any environment. In the mobile system, the extra constraints and requirements make this problem all the harder. • More suitable key establishment protocol needs to be developed for mobile communication.

  28. Any Question?

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