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Softwalls: Preventing Aircraft from Entering Unauthorized Airspace. Adam Cataldo Prof. Edward Lee Prof. Ian Mitchell, UBC Prof. Shankar Sastry. NASA JUP Sep 26, 2003 Los Angeles, CA. Outline. Introduction to Softwalls Objections Control system progress Future challenges Conclusions.

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Softwalls preventing aircraft from entering unauthorized airspace

Softwalls: Preventing Aircraft from Entering Unauthorized Airspace

Adam Cataldo

Prof. Edward Lee

Prof. Ian Mitchell, UBC

Prof. Shankar Sastry

NASA JUP

Sep 26, 2003

Los Angeles, CA


Outline
Outline Airspace

  • Introduction to Softwalls

  • Objections

  • Control system progress

  • Future challenges

  • Conclusions


Introduction
Introduction Airspace

  • On-board database with “no-fly-zones”

  • Enforce no-fly zones using on-board avionics

  • Non-networked, non-hackable


Autonomous control
Autonomous control Airspace

Pilot

Aircraft

Autonomous

controller


Softwalls is not autonomous control
Softwalls is not autonomous control Airspace

Pilot

Aircraft

+

bias pilot

control

Softwalls


Relation to unmanned aircraft
Relation to Unmanned Aircraft Airspace

  • Not an unmanned strategy

    • pilot authority

  • Collision avoidance


A deadly weapon
A deadly weapon? Airspace

  • Project started September 11, 2001


Design objectives
Design Objectives Airspace

Maximize Pilot Authority!


Unsaturated control
Unsaturated Control Airspace

Pilot lets off controls

Pilot tries to fly into no-fly zone

Pilot turns away from no-fly zone

No-fly

zone

Control applied


Objections
Objections Airspace

  • Reducing pilot control is dangerous

    • reduces ability to respond to emergencies



Objections1
Objections Airspace

  • Reducing pilot control is dangerous

    • reduces ability to respond to emergencies

  • There is no override

    • switch in the cockpit


Hardwall
Hardwall Airspace


Objections2
Objections Airspace

  • Reducing pilot control is dangerous

    • reduces ability to respond to emergencies

  • There is no override

    • switch in the cockpit

  • Localization technology could fail

    • GPS can be jammed


Localization backup
Localization Backup Airspace

  • Inertial navigation

  • Integrator drift limits accuracy range


Objections3
Objections Airspace

  • Reducing pilot control is dangerous

    • reduces ability to respond to emergencies

  • There is no override

    • switch in the cockpit

  • Localization technology could fail

    • GPS can be jammed

  • Deployment could be costly

    • Software certification? Retrofit older aircraft?


Deployment
Deployment Airspace

  • Fly-by-wire aircraft

    • a software change

  • Older aircraft

    • autopilot level

  • Phase in

    • prioritize airports


Objections4
Objections Airspace

  • Reducing pilot control is dangerous

    • reduces ability to respond to emergencies

  • There is no override

    • switch in the cockpit

  • Localization technology could fail

    • GPS can be jammed

  • Deployment could be costly

    • how to retrofit older aircraft?

  • Complexity

    • software certification


Not like air traffic control
Not Like Air Traffic Control Airspace

  • Much Simpler

  • No need for air traffic controller certification


Objections5
Objections Airspace

  • Reducing pilot control is dangerous

    • reduces ability to respond to emergencies

  • There is no override

    • switch in the cockpit

  • Localization technology could fail

    • GPS can be jammed

  • Deployment could be costly

    • how to retrofit older aircraft?

  • Deployment could take too long

    • software certification

  • Fully automatic flight control is possible

    • throw a switch on the ground, take over plane


Potential problems with ground control
Potential Problems with Ground Control Airspace

  • Human-in-the-loop delay on the ground

    • authorization for takeover

    • delay recognizing the threat

  • Security problem on the ground

    • hijacking from the ground?

    • takeover of entire fleet at once?

    • coup d’etat?

  • Requires radio communication

    • hackable

    • jammable



Reachable set
Reachable Set Airspace

set of all points reachable with

some control input

reachable set

starting at a point

in the state space


Backwards reachable set
Backwards Reachable Set Airspace

set of all states that can reach the final

point for some control input

backwards

reachable set

given a final point

in the state space


Backwards reachable set1
Backwards Reachable Set Airspace

Backwards reachable set

No-fly zone

States that can

reach the no-fly

zone when control is applied

Can prevent aircraft from entering no-fly zone

Safe States


Implicit surface functions
Implicit Surface Functions Airspace

implicit surface function

for no-fly zone

implicit surface function

for backwards reachable set

No-fly zone

Backwards Reachable Set


Analytic solution
Analytic Solution Airspace

  • Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs PDE

backwards reachable set implicit surface function

no-fly zone implicit surface function

  • Tomlin, Lygeros, Sastry

    v

dynamics


Control from implicit surface function
Control from Implicit Surface Function Airspace

Control decreases to zero

Safe States

Safe States

Control at

boundary

Backwards

Reachable

Set


Numerical solution
Numerical Solution Airspace

  • Mitchell

computations

&

storage

1

2

3

4

states


Assumptions for verification
Assumptions for Verification Airspace

  • The pilot and control inputs could be any bounded, measurable functions


In fly by wire aircraft
In Fly-By-Wire Aircraft Airspace

  • The pilot and control inputs will be piecewise constant, bounded functions which can change only every T milliseconds

T


Fly by wire aircraft
Fly-By-Wire Aircraft Airspace

  • How do we verify this?


In the news
In the News Airspace

  • ABC News

  • NPR Market Place

  • CBC As It Happens

  • Slashdot

  • Reuters…


Conclusions
Conclusions Airspace

  • Embedded control system challenge

  • Control theory identified

  • Future challenges identified


Acknowledgements
Acknowledgements Airspace

  • Xiaojun Liu

  • Steve Neuendorffer

  • Claire Tomlin


Backup
Backup Airspace

  • Discrete-Time Modified HJI PDE


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