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Softwalls: Preventing Aircraft from Entering Unauthorized Airspace. Adam Cataldo Prof. Edward Lee Prof. Ian Mitchell, UBC Prof. Shankar Sastry. NASA JUP Sep 26, 2003 Los Angeles, CA. Outline. Introduction to Softwalls Objections Control system progress Future challenges Conclusions.

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softwalls preventing aircraft from entering unauthorized airspace

Softwalls: Preventing Aircraft from Entering Unauthorized Airspace

Adam Cataldo

Prof. Edward Lee

Prof. Ian Mitchell, UBC

Prof. Shankar Sastry

NASA JUP

Sep 26, 2003

Los Angeles, CA

outline
Outline
  • Introduction to Softwalls
  • Objections
  • Control system progress
  • Future challenges
  • Conclusions
introduction
Introduction
  • On-board database with “no-fly-zones”
  • Enforce no-fly zones using on-board avionics
  • Non-networked, non-hackable
autonomous control
Autonomous control

Pilot

Aircraft

Autonomous

controller

softwalls is not autonomous control
Softwalls is not autonomous control

Pilot

Aircraft

+

bias pilot

control

Softwalls

relation to unmanned aircraft
Relation to Unmanned Aircraft
  • Not an unmanned strategy
    • pilot authority
  • Collision avoidance
a deadly weapon
A deadly weapon?
  • Project started September 11, 2001
design objectives
Design Objectives

Maximize Pilot Authority!

unsaturated control
Unsaturated Control

Pilot lets off controls

Pilot tries to fly into no-fly zone

Pilot turns away from no-fly zone

No-fly

zone

Control applied

objections
Objections
  • Reducing pilot control is dangerous
    • reduces ability to respond to emergencies
objections1
Objections
  • Reducing pilot control is dangerous
    • reduces ability to respond to emergencies
  • There is no override
    • switch in the cockpit
objections2
Objections
  • Reducing pilot control is dangerous
    • reduces ability to respond to emergencies
  • There is no override
    • switch in the cockpit
  • Localization technology could fail
    • GPS can be jammed
localization backup
Localization Backup
  • Inertial navigation
  • Integrator drift limits accuracy range
objections3
Objections
  • Reducing pilot control is dangerous
    • reduces ability to respond to emergencies
  • There is no override
    • switch in the cockpit
  • Localization technology could fail
    • GPS can be jammed
  • Deployment could be costly
    • Software certification? Retrofit older aircraft?
deployment
Deployment
  • Fly-by-wire aircraft
    • a software change
  • Older aircraft
    • autopilot level
  • Phase in
    • prioritize airports
objections4
Objections
  • Reducing pilot control is dangerous
    • reduces ability to respond to emergencies
  • There is no override
    • switch in the cockpit
  • Localization technology could fail
    • GPS can be jammed
  • Deployment could be costly
    • how to retrofit older aircraft?
  • Complexity
    • software certification
not like air traffic control
Not Like Air Traffic Control
  • Much Simpler
  • No need for air traffic controller certification
objections5
Objections
  • Reducing pilot control is dangerous
    • reduces ability to respond to emergencies
  • There is no override
    • switch in the cockpit
  • Localization technology could fail
    • GPS can be jammed
  • Deployment could be costly
    • how to retrofit older aircraft?
  • Deployment could take too long
    • software certification
  • Fully automatic flight control is possible
    • throw a switch on the ground, take over plane
potential problems with ground control
Potential Problems with Ground Control
  • Human-in-the-loop delay on the ground
    • authorization for takeover
    • delay recognizing the threat
  • Security problem on the ground
    • hijacking from the ground?
    • takeover of entire fleet at once?
    • coup d’etat?
  • Requires radio communication
    • hackable
    • jammable
reachable set
Reachable Set

set of all points reachable with

some control input

reachable set

starting at a point

in the state space

backwards reachable set
Backwards Reachable Set

set of all states that can reach the final

point for some control input

backwards

reachable set

given a final point

in the state space

backwards reachable set1
Backwards Reachable Set

Backwards reachable set

No-fly zone

States that can

reach the no-fly

zone when control is applied

Can prevent aircraft from entering no-fly zone

Safe States

implicit surface functions
Implicit Surface Functions

implicit surface function

for no-fly zone

implicit surface function

for backwards reachable set

No-fly zone

Backwards Reachable Set

analytic solution
Analytic Solution
  • Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs PDE

backwards reachable set implicit surface function

no-fly zone implicit surface function

  • Tomlin, Lygeros, Sastry

v

dynamics

control from implicit surface function
Control from Implicit Surface Function

Control decreases to zero

Safe States

Safe States

Control at

boundary

Backwards

Reachable

Set

numerical solution
Numerical Solution
  • Mitchell

computations

&

storage

1

2

3

4

states

assumptions for verification
Assumptions for Verification
  • The pilot and control inputs could be any bounded, measurable functions
in fly by wire aircraft
In Fly-By-Wire Aircraft
  • The pilot and control inputs will be piecewise constant, bounded functions which can change only every T milliseconds

T

fly by wire aircraft
Fly-By-Wire Aircraft
  • How do we verify this?
in the news
In the News
  • ABC News
  • NPR Market Place
  • CBC As It Happens
  • Slashdot
  • Reuters…
conclusions
Conclusions
  • Embedded control system challenge
  • Control theory identified
  • Future challenges identified
acknowledgements
Acknowledgements
  • Xiaojun Liu
  • Steve Neuendorffer
  • Claire Tomlin
backup
Backup
  • Discrete-Time Modified HJI PDE
ad